

THE DIVERGENT RHETORICAL CRISIS RESPONSES OF NOAM CHOMSKY
AND WILLIAM BENNETT: BURKEAN ANALYSES OF THEIR MORAL
ARGUMENTS COINED IN THE DRAMA OF SEPTEMBER 11TH

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By

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This thesis is dedicated in loving memory of and with gratitude to my parents, Larry and Esther Lewis, and also to my two truly delightful and supportive children, Erickson and Dannielle.

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CHAPTER 1

SEPTEMBER 11TH, PUBLIC ARGUMENTS, AND CRISIS RESPONSE

Introduction

Symbols of America's financial and military might, the 110-story World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, succumbed to acts of terror on September 11, 2001. Almost immediately evidence pointed toward Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as the masterminds behind the attacks. American aircraft were turned into weapons, killing thousands of innocent men, women and children in New York, Washington D. C., and Pennsylvania. The nation came to a standstill as ramifications of the worst air attack since Pearl Harbor sank into our national, collective psyche. The Federal Aviation Administration boosted airport security, survivors provided narratives of horror and chaos in the streets, capitol leaders were whisked to safety, and nations around the world offered their sympathy.

Authoritative rhetorical response was swift and decisive. The events and initial responses converged on a clear day in September 2001. Hay (2001) recounted that President George W. Bush, visiting an elementary school in Sarasota, Florida, that very morning, immediately posited, "terrorism against our nation will not stand" (p. 5). Hay (2001) adds that later that day as he addressed the nation, the president proclaimed,

“Today, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. These acts shattered steel but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve” (p. 6).

Clash of Ideologies: Chomsky and Bennett

For a few weeks in September a sacramental, reverentially patriotic mood prevailed. The airwaves and print media were filled with news and information about the attacks and public dialogues commenced to determine how best to respond. This thesis analyzes the primary dominant and oppositional political rhetorics that undergird the public conversation. Two post September 11th books serve as rhetorical documents for investigation and interpretation. The books, Noam Chomsky’s (2001) *9-11* and William Bennett’s (2002) *Why We Fight*, illustrate and illuminate oppositional polemics occupying the national conversation. Scott (1967) argues that “rhetoric may be viewed not as a matter of giving effectiveness to truth but of creating truth” (p. 10). Chomsky (2001) and Bennett (2002) recreate and magnify longstanding, defined ideological polarities within this crisis response context.

Noam Chomsky’s (2001) *9-11* rhetorical strategies represent a politically marginalized perspective. Chomsky inveighs against what he perceives as the United States’ imperialistic designs on the world at large and the country’s penchant for cloaking interventions in shallow promotions of democracy. He insists that the United States should reconsider its foreign policies and examine its own instigation of and culpability for the atrocities of September 11th. Chomsky argues that unaccountable power such as the United States wields requires scrutiny and should not be accepted without question.

According to Chomsky, a democratic society requires its citizenry to challenge and inquire especially in times of crisis.

Bennett's (2002) opus is in direct response to what he characterizes as meretricious leftist rhetoric seeking to place blame for September 11th at America's doorstep. Bennett's *Why We Fight* exemplifies rhetorical strategies that produce the current administration's ideologically preferred reality. Bennett's conservative polemics delineate administration responses to September 11th as representative of clear good v. evil moral imperatives. Bennett excoriates dissident voices that question the administration's "search and destroy" policy in response to the attacks. He concedes that the United States has made some foreign policy blunders. However, Bennett prophesizes America's standing as an exemplar and the last, best hope on earth as a beacon of democratic principles.

Significance

The importance of and basis for such a study are inextricably linked. The United States faces a significant paradigmatic shift in policy in light of the September 11th attacks and subsequent responses. The ideological arguments expressed publicly underscore contrary perspectives couched in Bennett and Chomsky's texts. These polemics question how the nation defines its democratic values and justifies responses to crisis situations. Our public dialogue asked if these acts were crimes punishable by trial or if they constituted justification for all out war. Conservative columnist Krauthammer (2001) argued that the perpetrators were deadly warriors who espoused a fanatical ideology rooted in radical Islam and should be treated with military might. Liberal leaning commentator Hoagland (2001) likened a war on terrorism to a war on cancer that should

systematically target specific persons rather than buildings and structures. Other arguments cautioned against suspending civil liberties. *Washington Post* editorial contributor Dionne (2001) contended that this was not a typical war and as a nation we could not allow the terrorists to alter our basic freedoms or question our values. What became clear was that the nation was no longer invincible. The attacks had exposed an underbelly of insecurity as the nation struggled to find its place in a different world order where enemies live in our midst. The ensuing debates focused on “why us” and how we should respond. These issues took center stage in our public dialogue.

This study applies rhetorical methodology and criticism in its analysis of Chomsky’s and Bennett’s ideological arguments. Rhetorical criticism offers analytical tools that cull out persuasive strategies and motivations that historical or political readings would miss. Rhetorical criticism allows us to evaluate the arguments presented and differentiate legitimate strategies of persuasion from illegitimate and questionable ones. Chomsky and Bennett typify antithetical ends of the ideological spectrum in their crisis response arguments. These authors represent salient factions in the national dialogue as the nation attempts to find appropriate and justifiable responses to the tragedy of September 11th. The public discourse surrounding September 11th is ongoing, evolving, and evidence of one of the basic assumptions of a democratic society, participatory opportunities for debate. Such crises raise substantive moral issues that require careful deliberation in a public forum.

The Roots of the Public Moral Argument Debate

This section brackets the rhetorical contributions of Chomsky and Bennett within a broader, ecumenical rubric of moral debate. Post September 11th discourse coalesces with other public arguments, past and present, that lends vital and salubrious contributions to a democratic society. Several rhetorical scholars have contributed theory to the arena of public moral arguments and added to our general understanding of the discourse. This review focuses on three prominent theorists and their contributions to the conversation. Fisher (1984) proposes an alternative to the conventional rational world paradigm that promotes logical approaches to public debates as well as underscores how the experts who utilize technical jargon dominate such debates. Fisher (1984) argues that this reliance on rationality excludes ordinary citizens from the conversation. Dependence on specialists, Fisher (1984) contends, restricts the participation of the rank and file in controversial and meaningful issues. Rather, the goal should to be a reconstitution of the public argument, allowing increased participation and consensus building (Fisher, 1984). He advocates an alternative that embraces narratives or storytelling components that embody universally recognized elements. The narrative paradigm would allow the hierarchy of experts and the citizenry at large to share commonality in language couched in and tested by probability and truthfulness (Fisher, 1984).

Controversies embedded in considerable public discourse (such as September 11th) are value laden and steeped in moral complexities. Fisher's (1984) and Frentz's (1985) narrative based theories embrace a value orientation of human nature. Frentz (1985) concurs with Fisher's narrative argument and reinforces the claim that technological

jargon congests the public sphere and disallows moral traditions and values. However, rhetoric couched in narrative symbols can disguise potentially nefarious motives or agendas (Frentz, 1985). Rather, Frentz (1985) argues that a “rhetorical conversation” (p. 1) would encourage a convergence of diverse individuals with their own histories and traditions in cooperative conversation aimed at resolving opposing moral perspectives in final discovery of an underlying, universal truth that is wrapped in moral absolutes.

A third scholar takes exception to an approach to public argument steeped in individualistic morality. Condit (1987) enters the conversation and voices objection to what she calls Frentz’s “privatization of morality” (p. 79). Condit (1987) transcends the realm of the morality-steeped conversational model, shifts the focus to the public arena, and converts the narrative conversation to public morality. Public morality is morally based because the good of the collective is considered and public rhetoric is “a process in which human desires are transferred into moral codes” (Condit, 1987, p. 84).

Furthermore, Condit reclaims the concept of rationality when she states that societies craft morality through a gradual collective rationale and that morality is derived from humans rather than from God as Frentz (1985) professes. Argumentation fosters greater understanding of truth and the participatory component is especially salient when nations confront crises of magnitude (Condit, 1987). This thesis will demonstrate how Condit’s (1987) rationality framework illuminates Chomsky’s argument rationality framework whereas Frentz’s (1985) emphasis on search for overarching truth illustrates Bennett’s polemics.

This thesis project examines the moral arguments couched in Bennett’s (2002) and Chomsky’s (2001) post-September 11th rhetoric, adds to the body of knowledge of

rhetorical strategies, and analyzes the merits and demerits of their rhetorical choices that potentially impact the nation's well-being. Understanding the wisdom and/or folly of the authors' choices requires a review of relevant crisis response literature. While most war/crisis rhetorical literature attends to presidential responses, the rhetoric of Chomsky (2001) and Bennett (2002) can be illuminated by this literature. The rhetorical offerings of Chomsky (2001) and Bennett (2002) represent significantly diverse ideological paradigmatic responses to the crisis situation and are imbued in unique moralistic tones. Their arguments embody the dialectic nature of post September 11th national conversations. These polemics debate the correlation between the nature of the crisis response and core values of a democratic society.

The Traditions of Crisis Response Literature

Effective and appropriate rejoinders to crises such as September 11th interrelate with societal values, standards, and moral concepts. The dialectic assessment of opposing propositions in an open-ended discussion becomes paramount in the search for a crisis response's moral justification. Lee (1988) argues that issues of ultimate value incorporate moral arguments and that moral judgment is the equivalent of critical application of "established norms to individual actions" (p. 297). An analytical review of the relevant rhetorically-based crisis response literature serves to situate September 11th polemics into this response schema as America grappled with suitable and practical rhetorical replies. Moral argument literature speaks to the need for communal judgment in decisions of national significance. A survey of rhetorical literature about crisis responses will unearth commonalities, provide an historical foundation on which to construct additional rhetorical

insights, determine how crisis rhetoric effects on national values, and ascertain how the current crisis rhetoric aligns with and differs from previous rhetorical responses.

One such perspective purports that images rather than facts garner positive responses in crisis situations that demand public support. Boulding (1959) suggests, “it is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior” (p. 120). Ivie (1974) agrees that national images define a nation’s war strategy and response and argues that particular vocabularies legitimize subsequent actions in the minds of the public. Ideographs such as freedom, sovereign rights, and democracies add to the lexicon of persuasive language choices. Language framing helped Reagan and Bush during Grenada and the Gulf War respectively (Olson, 1991). According to Olson (1991), Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, capitalizing on national guilt over Vietnam veterans, utilized “pro-troop” rhetoric to manipulate a sense of national duty in order to protect the troops in Grenada and the Gulf War rather than the connotatively loaded “pro-war” referent.

Justification theory contributes to the realm of rhetorical responses during wartime. According to Cherwitz and Zagachi (1970), justificatory rhetoric promotes explanation and rationalization of military action. President Bush situated his Gulf War rhetoric within a “just war” framework. Regarding Bush’s address to the New Christian Right organization, Pearce and Fadely (1992) explicate how he tapped into that conservative audience’s values to provide strength for his justification argument.

Different circumstances require variances in crisis response. For example, according to Windt (1973), reactions to international crises offer unique challenges and warrant a separate genre. The primary features of international crisis include (a) factual

information that defines the situation as critical, (b) emotional appeals that characterize the United States' stellar motivation and the denigration of the enemy, and (c) a contextual transcendence from political, pragmatic concerns to a moral high ground (Windt, 1973). Concurring with the premise of circumstantial requirements, Dow (1989) concludes that crisis rhetoric should not be packaged and marketed as homogenous types but should be viewed according to its function and the particulars of the situation. Supporting Windt's claims about international crises, Stuckey (1992) purports that myriad rhetorical and strategic difficulties inherently exist in (a) maintaining coalitions internationally, (b) establishing clear visions or purposes, (c) overcoming cultural impediments, and (d) negotiating ambiguous links between the conflict and national security.

The constraints of past military involvement pose rhetorical obstacles as well. Recounting President George Bush's Gulf War rhetoric, German (1991) traces how Bush overcame negative Vietnam-era war perceptions by employing directive language techniques. Directive language, characterized by emotional and abstract word usage, is intended to provide inspiration to the audience (German, 1991). According to Stuckey (1992), another strategy designed to deflect attention from perceived military failures is to align one's rhetoric with successful campaigns. In the same Gulf War rhetoric, George Bush aligned his arguments with righteous metaphors associated with World War II victories while dismissing comparisons with Vietnam (Stuckey, 1992).

Ideological divides and moral overtones thread through crisis rhetoric. Hayakawa (1964) asserts that directive language containing highly emotive words reinforces the established order through societal demands for sacrifice for the common good. Furthermore, Windt (1973) contends that crisis rhetoric demands decisive action by

leaders in the perpetual struggle of incompatible ideologies. This battle of good over evil suggests a sense of morality that contributes significantly to response choices. Goodnight (1986) contends that Reagan's rhetoric in his "Star Wars" address explicated the need to "play out an eternal drama where implacable evil always demands heroic sacrifice" (p. 408). Metaphors contribute significantly to the issue of rhetorical morality; for example, cloaking the young American republic in heroic imagery during the War of 1812 gave it the moral high ground against Great Britain (Ivie, 1982).

Closely aligned with the injection of morality as a prerequisite of war rhetoric is portraying the enemy as villain. Ivie (1982) claims that pro-war rhetors "perform the ritual of victimage as they cultivate images of a savage enemy" (p. 241) and analyzes metaphors that give credence to threatening wartime expectations regarding the enemy. The Republicans who favored war with Britain in 1812 favored the language of power and the degradation of the enemy; the utility of such language is to create a believable image of the enemy's savagery so as to exclude peace as a viable rhetorical or practical choice (Ivie, 1982).

Audience consideration figures prominently in crisis rhetoric. Different rhetorical choices are made contingent upon the interests and requirements of the audience. For example, Pratt (1970) differentiates crisis rhetoric that addresses domestic audiences and the international community. German (1985) emphasizes and identifies symbolic appeals most frequently employed in crisis rhetoric and traces the mobilization of verbal messages that create emotions in the public psyche in preparation for some sort of violent retaliation. Language symbols that evoke fundamental values based on shared myths are politically advantageous in soliciting individual participation in the drama of war

preparation and action (German, 1985). Carpenter (1986) contends that arguments couched in storytelling modalities influence audiences during times of war and that convincing stories that have resonance and refrain from negating people's self conceptions have powerful persuasive powers.

Comparisons of Cold War and post-Cold War rhetoric yield considerable insight into audience adaptation as well. In analyzing presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton's post Cold War polemics, Cole (1999) asserts that even though the two ex-presidents employed "civilized/savage" and "friend/foe" Cold War metaphors, the overarching rhetorical themes embraced containment theories and problem-solving formulas that enhanced U.S. interests. Cole (1999) maintains that reframing alternatives to longstanding policy comes with political risks as well as tests the limits of public tolerance. Benjamin (1987) and Cole (1999) emphasize the public opinion implications of presidential war rhetoric and the need to analyze public opinion before transforming rhetoric into action.

From this review it is evident that the persuasive elements of crisis response strategies include the relevance of ideological imagery, circumstantial considerations, the use of emotional language, and audience requirements and adaptations. Research on crisis rhetoric traditionally has been directed toward presidential rhetorical strategies. Crisis response strategies can also be applied to other forms of rhetoric, such as the books by Chomsky and Bennett. A broadened public sphere lends depth as well as divergence to the public moral argument. This proposal does not downplay nor negate the significant import of presidential crisis responses. The intention is to widen the public forum to include dialogical approaches that supplement existing literature rather than challenge it. The

selection of Chomsky's and Bennett's post September 11th rhetorical responses provides a legitimate trajectory and gateway for future considerations.

The Rhetorical Situation

The aforementioned framework of crisis rhetoric needs contextual illumination, including a description of the aftermath of September 11th, to unearth the thematic narratives that occupied the public sphere. *The New York Times* reported that Bush vowed in his first address to the nation on the evening of September 11th that he would “make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them” (Bumiller and Sanger, 2001, A1). The first signs of divisiveness regarding how to respond occurred when Hiatt (2001), the *Washington Post's* editor in chief, opined on September 12th that the country's current readiness fell short in light of past knowledge of previous terrorist attacks at home and abroad. He argued that response to the horrendous attacks must coincide with American values and that the country could not allow the situation to modify the fundamental openness of American democracy or trample unnecessarily on civil liberties (Hiatt, 2001).

This section will include three essential arguments generated from media news sources that occupied national attention to the crisis situation during the first month after September 11th: (a) the constitutive properties of “war”, (b) international implications and response, and (c) the restriction of civil liberties. *The Washington Post* recounted how the Bush administration revised the terminology for dealing with the terrorists as it turned away from treating terrorism in a criminal manner to seeing it as an act of war (Lancaster and Schmidt, 2001). Commentary soon shifted to the term “war” and its attendant

meanings. The war metaphor has been used in other contexts like poverty and drugs and connoted impossible standards as well as unrealistic expectations (Levinger, 2001; Mallaby, 2001; Shribman, 2001). Levinger (2001), writing for the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, reflected that instead of a “war” on terrorism, the situation should be called a “crime” or “contagion.” On the other hand, conservative reporters Kristol (2001) of the *National Review* and the *Washington Times*’ Feulner (2001) supported President’s Bush’s war rhetoric and argued that retaliation should extend to any nation states that sponsored or concealed terrorists.

The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan was met with mostly favorable reactions. A liberal leaning editorial writer for the *Washington Post* praised Bush’s rhetorical clarity and concurred that Bush’s argument to expand the search for terrorists was a sound one (Cohen, 2001). Conservative columnist Kristol (2001) supported retaliation on Palestine as well, a perceived hotbed of terrorist activity, and encouraged support for Israel. Demands surfaced for Congress to approve “every dime of [Bush’s] requested \$18 billion in additional military support” (Feulner, 2001, *p. A19*). More conservative contributor to the *Washington Post* Krauthamer (2001) dispelled the idea that the attackers were criminals and that justice should be sought in the courts. Moreover, Krauthamer (2001) declared war on radical Islam and pronounced that if bin Laden were residing in Afghanistan then Afghanistan is our enemy. Zacharia (2001), reporting for the *Jerusalem Post*, speculated that even as the missiles bombarded Afghanistan, the United States’ main objective was Iraq, a state sponsor of terrorism and biological warfare.

The national dialogue included the rest of the world’s role in this elusive fight and accompanying constraints. A writer for the *Washington Post* cautioned against fueling

anti-American sentiment that would only aid the terrorists' cause and argued that the administration should modify its Middle East policy and assist with more economic development in that region (Mallaby, 2001). Cohen (2001), another *Washington Post* contributor, took issue with Bush's contention that the United States was attacked because "we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world" (p. A27). Cohen also opined that the attack was predicated on the country's resented presence in that region, especially in its unilateral support of Israel.

There were calls for more involvement of the international community. As early as September 16th, *Newsday* reporter Cromwell (2001) encouraged Bush to immediately appeal to the United Nations for a global alliance and advocated an invitation to world leaders to witness the destruction at Ground Zero. de Wijk (2002) contended that the September 11th attacks demonstrated that terrorism should not be thought of as a local challenge; rather, it is an international challenge that necessitates global cooperation. The *New York Times* urged all countries to deny entry to terrorists in a cooperative international effort to eradicate the menace (Lewis, 2001). Reports surfaced in the press as early as September 18, 2001, from world leaders recommending that President Bush seek multilateral cooperation and consultation (Tyler & Perlez, 2001).

The Justice Department received extended powers to detain suspected immigrants. The administration's expanded powers drew criticism from civil liberties advocates and immigration lawyers who cautioned officials to consider long range implications. *Washington Post* editorial writer Boyd (2001) cautioned the nation to be diligent in the war on terrorists but also to be vigilant in defending the freedoms that make the nation strong. Dionne (2001), another editorial contributor for the *Washington Post*, argued that

the nation's primary resolve should be to retain civil liberties, otherwise the terrorists would win. The *Washington Post's* editor in chief Hiatt (2001) objected to some aspects of the administration's "hastily drafted" (p. A34) anti-terrorist legislation, arguing against indefinite detentions, and urged vigorous congressional debate and critique rather than blind allegiance.

Circumstances inherent in this rhetorical situation call up reference to a broader, earlier context of Cold War versus post-Cold War rhetoric. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 became the symbolic end of the Cold War against communism and heralded a coterie of lawful nations in a New World Order. This post-Cold war vision of global peace and prosperity dissolved into ethnic conflicts and religious strife in Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda among other places. Hill (2002), a more liberal editorialist writing for the *Baltimore Sun*, warned that international terrorism, the latest sign of post-Cold War disintegration, had the proclivity to divide the world into two groups, a throwback to Cold War-style thinking. There remained a sense of false security in applying the same predictable standards to a geographically known enemy (e.g. the Soviet Union) during the Cold War to enemies with unknown addresses (Hill, 2002).

More conservative publications disagreed with this assessment. For example, *The Weekly Standard* opined that America's 1990s utopian foreign policy, based on a coalition of treaty signing equal partnerships in a new world order proved unrealistic as well as dangerous (Krauthammer, 2001). In his analysis, Krauthammer made clear that "history abhors hegemony" (p. 25) and the post-Cold War folly of promotion of a "foreign policy of norms rather than of national interest" (p. 27) had set up the natural order of good

versus evil. The war against terrorism and radical Islam replaced Soviet communism as the next well-defined enemy in need of conquering (Krauthammer, 2001).

Many audiences were positioned to filter, absorb, and evaluate the relevance and logic of these post September 11th public arguments including those of Chomsky and Bennett. Perelman's (1969) definition of rhetorical audiences comprises two components, the universal and the particular. According to Perelman's (1969) theory, universal audiences ideally contain all rational beings that respond to facts and truths whereas particular audiences contain specific segments of the population (i.e., Republican, Democratic, liberal, or conservative) that adhere to values. This thesis concurs with Gross's (1999) assessment that most audiences combine both the universal and particular. Both Chomsky's (2001) and Bennett's (2002) audiences adhere to each author's explicit rendition of facts, truths and values.

Chomsky's *9-11*, published in October 2001, represented the first counter-narrative to the groundswell of patriotic fervor after September 11th. Chomsky's pamphlet-like collection of interviews sold 160,000 copies nationwide, ranking ninth on the *Washington Post* bestseller list. Published worldwide in 22 countries, *9-11* attracted a greater international following than it did national one (Powell, 2002). *Boston Globe* columnist Flint (1995) observed that Chomsky, treated like European royalty abroad, routinely finds himself marginalized in his own country. Chomsky's national audience consists mainly of liberal university academicians and political leftists. Chomsky appears to represent a rite of passage for many students on college campuses. As journalist Powell (2002) opined, Chomsky has "become a phase that people on the left should go through when they are young" (p. F1).

Bennett's *Why We Fight* appears to be modeled after Frank Capra's 1941 World War II propaganda film of the same name. Although no statistics were found on book sales, *Why We Fight*, published in April 2002 in direct response to leftist thinkers such as Chomsky, ranked 507 on Amazon.com's May 2002 best seller list. *Weekly Standard* columnist Armitage (2002) claims that Bennett's more parochial audience, consisting of political conservatives and traditional Christians, fears a correlation between declining morality, disrespect for traditional values and deterioration of America's power and greatness. Both authors' rhetoric reverberates with differing versions of the facts surrounding September 11th and their own moral clarity as to the proper and justified response. This summary of the rhetorical situation and audiences leads to choosing the most effective rhetorical method to analyze Chomsky's *9-11* and Bennett's *Why We Fight*.

Critical Methodology

Kenneth Burke's philosophical theories of dramatism constitute ideal methodological tools by which to analyze the subtexts of Bennett's and Chomsky's arguments within the rhetorical situation of September 11th. Every day the world dawns distinctly, unique from the preceding one as each day ushers in human dramas in varied guises. Bennett and Chomsky represent longstanding disparate political ideologies cloaked in post September 11th crisis drama as they each attempt to influence and lay claims of having influenced the course of progress. Kenneth Burke, philosopher, linguist, and invaluable contributor to rhetorical criticism, argues that all discourse captures the essence of the dramatic and that the metaphoric underpinnings of dramatism reflect human activity and motivation. Rueckert (1963) contends, "dramatism becomes Burke's final and coherent way of viewing man and the universe" (p. ix). Few human endeavors possess

more theatrical qualities than those steeped in war crises, retribution, and the ensuing rhetorical strategies.

This thesis employs Burke's most prominent themes, the dramatistic cycle and the pentad, as well as some Burkean philosophical terminology in its analysis of Chomsky's and Bennett's rhetorical responses. Burke (1950) contends that humans require order and hierarchy and the dramatistic cycle (pollution-purification-redemption) explicates how hierarchies adhere, disintegrate, and re-establish. When someone questions the hierarchy or status quo, the act of defiance causes pollution in the system in need of purging. This purging or purification process is accomplished either by scapegoating someone or someone stepping forward to take responsibility, thereby redeeming the system and restoring an orderly state of affairs. Human nature strives for perfection; thus there is the need to purify, redeem, and alleviate the system from guilt (Burke, 1950). This macro view of society, laden with religious underpinnings, is used as an analytical tool to explain human motivation within broader, more universal context. Using the dramatistic cycle as a template illuminates Chomsky's and Bennett's cyclic themes and underlying motivations as well as helps to explicate their ideologically based moral arguments surrounding the September 11th crisis.

In a microscopic description of motivation, Burke devises five key dramatistic terms to explain discourse. In one of his seminal works, *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke (1950) develops this pentad and defines the five terms as: "what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how she or he did it (agency), and why (purpose)" (p. 992). This language of the theatrical stage denotes the five main ingredients that explicate human strategic choices and expose how a rhetor views the world. A

second, more philosophical, layer contains terminology that exposes and explains not only a rhetor's motives and worldview but appropriate responses as well. Different philosophic schools (realism, materialism, idealism, pragmatism, and mysticism) "feature a different one of the five terms" (Burke, 1950, p.1016) while the other terms are "comparatively slighted or being placed in the perspective of the featured term" (Burke, 1950, p.1016). This pentadic apparatus will tease out how Chomsky and Bennett situate their crisis drama narratives within the format of the five terms and reveal their argumentative motivation as well as divergent ideological perspectives. A Burkean application allows scholars, rhetors, and audiences to unveil important dimensions of the persuasive properties and effectiveness of rhetorical discourse.

Although Burke's dramatistic theories originated over a half a century ago, the methods have timeless societal applications and utility. Solomon (1985) applies certain elements of the pentad in concluding that patients in the Tuskegee syphilis project served as scene and agency in the dehumanizing experiments. Furthermore, scientific terminology creates divisions amongst people and in the scientific community the end result may be more important than the means through which the end was obtained (Solomon, 1985). Burke's dramatistic cycle aids Williamson (2002) in his conclusion that assigning guilt and obtaining redemption through scapegoating and victimage often reduces the complexities of race hatred to a metonymy, which leaves the larger issue unresolved. Chomsky's and Bennett's September 11th crisis response polemics would fit comfortably within this rhetorical theory, building upon a rich and productive heritage of critical analyses.

Summary and Preview of Chapters

This chapter introduced the contextual backdrop that called up the divergent polemics under examination, previewed the artifacts, and positioned them within the rhetorical situation and national conversation. A review of pertinent literature followed, explicating the relevance of public argumentation as well as surveying communication crisis response literature. Myriad persuasive standpoints were then explored that occupied national airwaves, editorials, and public forums. Finally, components of Burke's rhetorical methodology were proffered as fitting analytic tools for treatment of Chomsky's and Bennett's texts.

Chapter two includes an in depth discussion of Burkean methodology, applications, and utility that will guide the analyses of Chomsky's and Bennett's texts. Chapter three focuses on ideological origins that underscore Chomsky's philosophical perspective and provides a Burkean treatment of the analytical underpinnings in 9-11. Chapter four provides the same treatment for Bennett's *Why We Fight*. Chapter five presents conclusions and a thorough discussion of the theoretic and practical implications of the analytical findings and their impact on rhetorical criticism in general and crisis rhetoric and public moral discourse in particular.

CHAPTER 2

BURKEAN PHILOSOPHY, THEORETICAL CONCEPTS, AND APPLICATIONS

Human action is based on the ability to manipulate symbols within an arena of dramatic performances. Kenneth Burke devises a philosophy, method, attendant grammar, and applications to explicate motivations for human action that inextricably link the human capacity for symbol use or language to the dramatic. As Burke explains in a letter to his friend and confidante Malcolm Cowley in 1928, he is “tremendously interested in trying to locate exactly what goes on in the word-slinging racket” (Jay, 1988, p. 280). Burke’s contributions inform not only the “word-slinging racket” but myriad academic fields including philosophy, sociology, theology, literature and criticism. As Knox (1957) observes, “Burke is a builder of mosaics, piecing together the ingredients of tragedy, comedy, satire, and lyrics in order to formulate a ‘strategy of strategies; or an overall strategy’” (p. 105). Ruekert (1982) captures Burke’s legendary ambition, contributions, and significance when he states “[Burke as a critic] enters history and plans to make his mark and become a significant permanent part of history by making an original contribution to our knowledge and understanding of ourselves and the drama of human relations” (p. 19). First, this chapter details the evolutionary process of Burke’s writings

and philosophical perspectives and how his methodologies developed.

The progression of Burke's contributions is chronicled, including significant biographical information and brief synopses of his noteworthy texts that supply definitions and explanations of his perspectives as they relate to rhetorical study. Next, the chapter explicates germane Burkean methodological tenets and attendant terminology that detail his dramatistic standpoint as well as noteworthy scholarly interpretations of his concepts. Finally, examples of other scholars' versatile applications of Burke's methodological tools are offered to support the claim that a Burkean analysis can effectively illuminate within Chomsky's and Bennett's rhetoric.

The Evolution of "Burkology"

Pinpointing Burke's exact field of study is a difficult task. Hyman (1955), one of Burke's interpreters, notes that, "[Burke] has no field unless it be Burkology" (p. 359), while Rueckert (1989) suggests that Burke is one of the great rhetoricians and that the quest for knowledge is his religious calling. Burke began his life-long sojourn as a "linguistic student of human affairs" (Knox, 1957, p. xvii) at the age of six when his mother presented him with a dictionary as a childhood gift. Burke clung to the book of words just as other small children would cling to a teddy bear (Knox, 1957). Burke's love affair with the wonders of language would last a lifetime as indicated by his self-description, "[w]hat am I but a word man?" (Josephson, 1962, p. 35). Burke lacked a formal academic foundation. Having quit college after his first year, he proclaimed that academia favored teaching and not his passion, writing. Burke's ensuing authorship would cross and influence such diverse academic fields as sociology, anthropology, theology,

history, literature, and philosophy. Burke's eclecticism eschewed a credentialed education in favor of an unencumbered trajectory more suited to his freelance nature (Chesebro, 1993).

Burke's penchant for poetry and literature informs much of his subsequent philosophical renderings and pursuits. His works reflect a personal growth affected by societal changes and upheavals. Burke's perspective includes elements of Marxism and Freud's psychoanalytical thought and captures repercussions and consequences of the Depression era, increased technology, World War II, and the effects of a changing post-War landscape. After forsaking college, in 1921 he began working as assistant editor at the *Dial*, a literary magazine. During the 1920s Burke published myriad essays and poems as well as a collection of short fictional essays titled, *The White Oxen and Other Stories*. Burke's 1931 book *Counter-Statement* explains one of his life-long passions, the poetic process. Here, his readers glean Burke's interdisciplinary nature when he declares that poetry and its forms constitute effectual rhetoric that can change audience attitudes. Burke authority Rueckert (1963) explains that poetry reveals the "poet's nature as well as poetry's symbolic form and structure revealing emotional 'exaltation' or 'catharsis'" (p. 33). In *Counter-Statement* Burke rejects the ironclad, restrictive philosophy of "either/or" terminology and adopts a more fluid, inclusive interpretation of "both/and".

Burke's philosophical evolution mirrored societal changes in the 1930s era of national and international foreboding. *Permanence and Change*, penned in 1935, reflects Burke's growing interest in Marxism and Communism as feasible vehicles to achieve a more cooperative society. He believed that artists, through critical analysis, could offer insights into and solutions for societal problems. Burke, as well as many other social

commentators, believed that the Great Depression signaled drastic and sinister changes that could eventually portend structural collapse. Burke (1935/1984) describes the growth of technological capitalism or “technological psychosis” (p. xiii) as another problem that featured negative outcomes such as combative, destructive, and unethical behaviors that required counterbalance. His evolution from a literary critic to a diagnostician of societal ills manifests in his 1937 publication of *Attitudes Toward History*, when he argues that history is a series of competing claims and counter claims within five major dramas. Burke divides these dramas into: (a) Christian evangelism, (b) medieval synthesis, (c) protestant transition, (d) naïve capitalism, and (e) emergent collectivism. In *Attitudes Toward History*, Burke formulates a theory of ironic attitudes that focuses on the dialectics of historical acceptance and rejection (Foss, Foss & Trapp, 2002). Chesebro (1993) observes that Burke’s affinity for Communism waned in the wake of the Stalinist purges, the Moscow trials of 1936-1938, Soviet participation in Poland, and Finland’s invasion.

From the 1940s through the mid-1960s, Burke established his reputation as a critical scholar and professor. He taught and wrote at various universities such as Bennington in Vermont, the University of Chicago, Harvard, and Princeton. Burke wrote *The Philosophy of Literary Form* in 1941 where the concept of “dramatism” and his philosophy of symbolic action first appear. At this time in history Burke’s philosophical thought mirrored his concerns surrounding impending war. Burke began his ascent as a translator of human symbolic action and its motives. Rueckert (1963) contends that Burke’s call for the eradication of war informs his entire dramatistic philosophy as he advocates humans to “redirect [their] inexhaustible energies toward the pursuit of peace” (p. 162). As war loomed abroad, he developed and defended a theologically based

philosophy that explains the crises of humankind through processes of purification and redemption. These two concepts figure prominently in his methodology as he carves out various linguistic terminologies that promote and motivate social unity.

Burke's dramatistic theme continued to evolve in his 1945 book *A Grammar of Motives* where he charts the precise nature of both the human condition and human motivation. Using the elements of the pentad and ratios, Burke formulates an array of analytical tools to discover rhetors' motivations in using words to "form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents" (Burke, 1945, p. 41). In *A Grammar of Motives* Burke perceives that human substance equates to verbal action and can be accounted for by a pentadic terminology and clustered logic or logology. Rueckert (1989) argues that within the confines of the *Grammar* Burke exhibits his ability as a grammarian as well as captures "human energy, adventuresomeness, ingenuity and intelligence" (p. 247). In his 1950 text, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke advocates social and ethical commentary on societal woes as the cold war superpowers begin confronting one another. As Rueckert (1989) poignantly argues, *Motives* emphasizes how social hierarchy can be manipulated for destructive motives through rhetorical means. In *Motives*, Burke also develops the concept of identification that figures prominently as a persuasive device and explains the human need for social identity and a sense of order.

Burke refines his theories of the dramatic system during the 1960s and 1970s with *The Rhetoric of Religion* (1961) and changes his language metaphor from one of poetics to religion. Rueckert (1963) explains that *The Rhetoric of Religion* reflects Burke's contention that the religious drama of the order, covenant, and fall congregate under the rubric of rhetoric when viewed as social identification and therefore "theology can be

replaced by logology” (p. 156). During this period, Burke refines two essential philosophic concepts that inform his methodology, dramatism and logology. Dramatism represents Burke’s ontological system, explicating the way things are, whereas logology reflects how humans understand and know existence. Burke uses dramatism to discover human motivation that resides on the metaphorical stage of life and encompasses symbol use through a series of conflicts and divisions that threaten a natural existing order.

Burke applies theological vocabulary to explain the philological or linguistic lexicon of logology. In order to fashion a grand explanation for human motivation, Burke chooses religious terminology and analogies that he argues render the “widest and deepest possible scope, concerning the authorship of men’s motives” (Burke, 1961, p. v). The relationship between dramatism and logology can be viewed as complementary. As Rueckert (1982) elucidates, Burke translates human nature (or sense of being) within an analytical technique of dramatistic lexicon while framing the human capacity for knowing and the realization therein within a logological framework. Logology, as Rueckert (1963) puts it, is “a methodology for the study of symbol systems which uses a kind of neutralized Christian theology as its paradigm” (p. 264). Dramatism features a microscopic perspective and logology is a macroscopic view of human symbolic activity.

In 1966 Burke’s lifelong pursuit to discover and impart his renditions of knowledge and critique culminates in one of his last original publications, *Language as Symbolic Action*. Burke explicates major distinctions between mere motion of the physical world and the neurological characteristics of human activity defined by action. According to Burke, the distinction between the world of spontaneous animal instinct and that of human intentions is represented in the human capacity to use and interpret symbols. This

work also refines his dramatistic theories as well as includes an eclectic mix of self-reflective musings, essays, poems, dream analyses, and commentary on a burgeoning fast-paced, complex society. As Rueckert (1989) astutely notes, *Language as Symbolic Action* embodies and epitomizes Burke's love of words, his appreciation of their dialectic power, and his unique, pun-loving relationship with them that often verges on the comic and absurd. Burke continued to lecture, critique and correspond as well as enjoy his family and entertain guests at his rustic and technologically-limited farm in Andover, Massachusetts, until his death in 1993.

This section has mapped out the evolution of Burke's philosophy and theories as they relate to rhetorical criticism. Burke began his career as a commentator on and critic of literature and the state of affairs. Brock (1993) proffers that philosophically Burke, during his early writings, emphasizes the distinctions between human symbol use and the objective physical world. Furthermore, Burke establishes a penchant for "paired opposites, such as 'mind' and 'body' and especially 'motion' and 'action'" (Brock, 1993, p. 311). In Burke's next period, his most prolific and well known, he establishes his critical methods of the pentad and identification and pens *A Grammar of Motives*, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, and *A Rhetoric of Religion*. As Brock (1993) concludes, by 1968 Burke's philosophical conceptualism transcends his original notions of dualism into a coherent system that reflects his view of "symbol use as central not only to being human but to all experience as well, unifying nonsymbolic motion and symbolic action" (p. 327). Burke attempts to explicate both the motives of human symbol use and the universal dimensions of reality through his concepts of dramatism and logology respectively.

The Theoretical Underpinnings of “Burkology”

Two overarching theorems, dialectics and identification, inform Burke’s philosophical attitudes and relate to this thesis. Dialectical, oppositional relationships govern Burke’s theory of language and explain the inherent tensions that exist between humans as well as their language usage. Burke (1937/1984) dissects grammatical patterns of association/disassociation, negativity (the morality-based shalls and shall nots of life), and transcendence that exemplify the upward and downward features of human activity in pursuit of perfection. The concepts of merger and division that constitute human relationships can amalgamate people into one group and thereby separate and distinguish them from some other group. Through symbol usage humans continually attempt to bridge these natural divides and enhance consubstantiality or their sense of identification (Burke, 1950).

Rhetors use arguments and appeals in order to persuade their audiences through the establishment of commonality and identity. According to Burke (1950), the dialectic-identification perspective suggests, “if men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man’s very essence” (p. 22). Humans’ biological, and also, symbolic differences and divisions keep individuals from complete consubstantiality; communication is the primary method to abate divisions and increase identification. This dialectic phenomenon provides the basic motivation for persuasive strategies. Burke (1968) contends that “drama is employed, not as a metaphor, but as a fixed form” (p. 24) that links rhetorical effects to an audience. For Burke, life is not like a drama, life is drama. Burke’s dramatistic perspective provides critical analytic tools that

direct attention to five crucial elements of human drama and reveal a rhetor's motivation and persuasive effectiveness within the context of public discourse and rhetorical situations.

In a microscopic treatment of human symbolic activity and nature within a social framework, Burke (1950) develops the dramatistic pentad and reduces rhetorical statements to five terms: act (what is done), agent (who did it), agency (how the act was done), scene (where it was done), and purpose (the reasoning for the act). Years after Burke proposed this pentad he added a sixth element, attitude, to his model of human action, constructing a hexad. Attitude, reflected in such examples as equality, impartiality, respectfulness, sympathy, or arrogance, shapes the rhetor's disposition so that simply expressing the correct attitude might be enough to serve as sufficient substitute for the act (Burke, 1968). Attitude, according to Signorile (1989), exemplifies the style or manner that is attached to human activity. A thorough examination of these six elements reveals the rhetor's motivation. Extending pentadic analysis, Burke (1950) introduces proportional relationship, or ratio, among the elements that: (a) describes the connection between the elements, (b) spotlights dramatic emphasis, (c) reinforces motivation, and (d) uncovers conflicts, ambiguities and/or perspectives.

A corresponding philosophic terminology exposes and further explicates rhetorical motivation as well as the rhetor's worldview. The intention is to describe how different philosophic schools (realism, materialism, idealism, pragmatism, and mysticism) "feature a different one of the five terms" (Burke, 1950, p.1016) and to demonstrate that the other terms are "comparatively slighted or being placed in the perspective of the featured term" (Burke, 1950, p. 1016). The "act" denotes a commitment to realism, "agent" suggests

idealism, individual responsibility and agent as instigator, “agency” confers pragmatism or a means to an end, “scene” represents materialism or circumstances outside of human choice, and “purpose” signifies mysticism or higher principles. The alignment of pentadic terms and philosophy exposes rhetorical motivation and unveils promotional worldviews that the rhetor wants the audience to reinforce, consider, and/or incorporate into their own belief system.

Burke’s logologic macroscopic treatment of how reality is revealed stems from the human proclivity for symbolic action. This penchant for abstract, active symbol usage separates humans further away from the physiological, natural, and motion-oriented freedoms of the purely physical realm. A wellspring of concepts originates from Burke’s logological perspective including guilt, hierarchy, mystery, perfection, the negative, and the cycle of pollution, purification, and redemption. Guilt, unique to symbol-using humans, is an ever-present human condition. The concept of guilt weaves a religious connotation of original sin with more pedestrian translations of “anxiety, social tension, unresolved tension, or embarrassment” (Burke, 1961, p. 5). Conceptual products of guilt include hierarchy, perfection, the negative, and the purification cycle (Burke, 1966). These manifestations undergird motivation and serve as impetus for all human action.

Burke’s treatment of the concept of mystery or the unknown secret is submerged in theories of social order and dialectic considerations. Blankenship (1989) offers that mystery is inherent in human biological differences and in the very nature of language’s discriminating ability to direct attention to and deflect attention away from situations. Burke’s social mystery (bureaucracy, hierarchy, and authority) suggests dialectic tension and competition exists between those who know and those who want to know.

Blankenship (1989) purports that mystery also functions to reveal (when we are part of communal secrets) and conceal (when we are left in the dark) as we attempt to reconcile the dialectical relationship between the known and the unknown. These frictions conflict with the human quest for consubstantiation or identification. When a believer is “brought to accept mysteries, he will be better minded to take orders without question from those persons whom he considers authoritative” (Burke, 1961, p. 307).

Hierarchies continually are redefined as mysteries and are exposed and dealt with, as humans position themselves in the “upward and downward movement that they hold on the hierarchy” (Foss, Foss & Trapp, 2002, p. 207). According to Burke (1950), hierarchical structuring invites divisions because humans view the world and use language reflective of their own experiences and ideological frame. Hierarchy can take the form of stages of learning, skills, and state-sponsored bureaucracy and has an overarching concern for the “arrangement whereby each rank is overlord to its underlings and underling to its overlords” (Burke, 1950, p. 138). Hierarchies are fluid social entities established by symbol-using humans to accommodate different perspectives.

No matter where humans are positioned on the social order or hierarchical ladder, they continually strive for the idealized transcendent pinnacle. Burke (1966) contends that humans possess perfectionist tendencies and strive for some ordered conclusion. Although humans attempt to identify perfection through language, the ideal remains unachievable. If humans could not conceive of the perfected state, they would not feel guilty about its untenability. As humans strive for perfection, Heath (1986) concludes that there exists a vast dimension of motivations and possibilities, such as becoming perfect parents, children, teachers and the like. The third way in which symbolic ability translates to human guilt

involves language's abstractive nature and the human ability to label that leads to the invention of the negative. Burke contends that there is no negative in the natural, non-symbolic world of sheer motion. According to Burke (1966), "the essential distinction between the verbal and the nonverbal is in the fact that language adds the peculiar possibility of the negative" (p. 420) and thereby enhances humans' capacity to make associations and dissociations. The most salient consequence of the negative is the addition of moral derivatives culminating in hortatory "thou-shalt-nots's" or "don't's" (Burke, 1966, p. 13). Since humans invented many negatives, resulting in law and social rules by which we judge and are judged, it is difficult to avoid guilt from disobeying the very laws and rules humans make. Burke would say that this conundrum produces dialectic tension in myriad applications that speak to personal and societal codes of morality.

The contention that guilt represents motivation for human relations leads to the displacement of socially-contrived senses of guilt onto some other group, composing a dramatisic cycle (Burke, 1950). The first stage of the cycle, pollution, denotes "an unclean condition of sins and burdens" (Foss, Foss & Trapp, 2002, p. 209) that needs purification. For example, if someone questions the hierarchy or status quo, that act of defiance causes pollution in a system. The next stage, the guilt purification process, is accomplished either by mortification, victimage, or scapegoating. Mortification reflects self-blame and resembles the Catholic ritual of confession. Mortification can range from the steady stream of socially derived "I'm sorrys" to various forms of politically-motivated apologia. Burke's concept of victimage symbolizes the process of identifying and blaming something or someone external (other than the rhetor) as the polluting

source. Finally as a derivative of victimage, scapegoating “combines in one figure contrary principles of identification and alienation” (Burke, 1950, p. 140). The scapegoat originates from the ranks of the group, assumes the group’s sins, and is then sacrificed in order to purify the whole. For example, Hitler’s killing of the Jews as scapegoats for the ills of the German population illustrates the concept of victimage. The final cycle, redemption, returns the situation to a natural state of order and compliance until the next rupture occurs. This cycle reflects Burke’s contention that humans’ continual quest for identification and inherent divisions perpetually hampers perfection.

Perspectives as manifested through language act as filters that let through some awareness while blocking others. Burke (1935) purports that humans acquire language that reflects their environmental reality and this selectivity is known as terministic screening. The rhetor’s ultimate goal is to “awaken an attitude of collaborative expectancy” (Burke, 1964, p. 58) that triggers self-persuasion and compliance in the audience. Rhetors encourage some interpretations while discouraging others through their terminology. Burke (1964) argues that selective terminology functions “as a kind of photographic ‘screen’, which will ‘let through’ some perceptions and ‘filter out’ others” (p. 105). For example, Heath (1986) suggests that a clash of perspectives can assign different names for the same trait, such as the different filters used to perceive an adult female. Because of the ambiguous nature of symbolic language, human attempts to reflect the reality of “adult female” filter through such perceptive screens as “girl”, “lady”, or “woman” as a vocabulary is selected and other choices are deflected (Heath, 1986).

Burke’s concept of perspective by incongruity delineates a form of linguistic impiety. Burke (1935/1984) defines piety as being truthful to one’s identity. Whedbee

(2001) extrapolates that piety reflects the human desire to fit our vocabularies with our experiences in order to establish order and stability in life. Alternatively, Whedbee suggests that impiety represents a disloyalty and challenge to human identity, one that rearranges and alters orientations and thought patterns. Burke (1937/1984) argues that this impiety or perspective by incongruity violates basic human interpretations and assumptions, causing cognitive dissonance. Accordingly, Burke (1937/1984) contends that perspective by incongruity “[puts] things together that were in different classes and [divides] things that had been together” (p. 106), all in keeping with Burke’s dialectic philosophy. Perspective by incongruity shifts not only how we view the world but how we perceive ourselves as well.

Burke’s style of puns and irony and search for opposites inform this perspective. This often-used rhetorical tool allows the critic to reveal the limited nature of any speaker’s terministic screen. As Gusfield (1989) suggests, the comedic speaks to Burke’s contention about the limits of human intelligence and knowledge that “people are not vicious but they are often mistaken and necessarily mistaken” (p. 44). In pointing out the paradoxes and ambiguities in human language and action, Burke (1937/1884) argues that “every insight contains its own special kind of blindness” (p. 41). Finally, for Burke, form, or the presentation of the rhetoric, is a dimension central to the nature of language that frames the text. Weier (1993) contends that form enables the audience to experience selective terminology in certain ways and within specific frameworks. According to Burke (1966), form proceeds in three ways: (a) progressive, linear and methodically constructed arguments or stories that lead “the audience to anticipate or desire certain developments” (p.54), (b) conventional forms divided into expected categories that manifest internal

consistency through repetition, and (c) the minor form of metaphors and tropes. Heath (1979) defines Burke's concept of form as a "dynamic progression" (p. 392), consisting of various stages and rhetorical devices that mesh with audience expectations. Effective rhetors must present arguments that satisfy the audience's perspective on the subject.

The aforementioned Burkean concepts will be applied to Chomsky's and Bennett's morally based arguments in response to the crisis of September 11th. A close analysis will determine the authors' individual terministic screens, including which premises they accentuate, and which ones they avert. An examination of their motivations through pentadic interpretation and the dramatistic cycle of pollution-purification-redemption will also be provided. Analyses of Chomsky's and Bennett's perspectives on order, hierarchy, and the significance of mystery will reveal their rhetorical motivation, ideological worldviews and illustrate their dialectical divergence in the public debate about how to respond to September 11th.

The Praxis of "Burkology"

To generate a sense of how Burke's precepts illuminate Chomsky's and Bennett's texts, a review of other applications is instructive. First, this section offers samples of scholarly applications of the pentad, Burke's most versatile and frequently used rhetorical tool. The pentad reveals the rhetor's worldview and serves as a template for the analysis of scapegoating/mortification. Next, applicable examples of the purification cycle and perspective by incongruity round out the chapter. Methodological applications of Burke's concepts populate contemporary rhetorical scholarship. As Hawhee (1999) argues, Burke is considered the father of contemporary rhetoric. Burke's analytical instruments pervade

rhetorical criticism and are grounded in his expansive and complex philosophical precepts. In explaining the dominance of the Burkean perspective in the field of rhetoric, Klumpp (1995) writes that in the 1950s and 1960s many Burkean assumptions and procedures had to be justified whereas today they are “the air that our scholarship breathes” (p. 2). Many elements of Burke’s dramatistic perspective such as the pentad terms (act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose), as well as scapegoating, identification, and hierarchical mystery, inform rhetoric’s lexicon without prerequisite citing.

Applications of Burke’s pentad illuminate rhetorical arguments, emphasis, and motivations that will prove useful to the analyses in this thesis. Pentadic insights garner and reflect discursive effectiveness and persuasiveness and allow the critic to delineate rhetorical motivation by revealing what information is spotlighted and/or deflected. The critic initially identifies and labels all the terms (act, agent, agency, scene, purpose and often attitude), then uncovers the term or ratio of terms that dominates the discourse and leads to causality and rhetoric motivation. Identifying connections and relationships between terms exposes: (a) the central thesis of the rhetorical message, (b) any purposeful deflection of audience attention, and (c) the rhetorical attempts to alter the audience’s perspectives. In Ling’s (1970) analysis of Senator Edward Kennedy’s rhetoric in response to events surrounding the 1969 death of Mary Jo Kopechne, the “scene/agent” ratio and terministic relationships figured prominently in the analysis. Having to explain why he left the scene of the accident, Kennedy directed attention to the scene, a narrow, poorly lighted bridge over turbulent water that left him incoherent and nearly caused him to drown. In this instance, Kennedy, the agent cast as victim, deflected other interpretations such as Kennedy as irresponsible agent driving under the influence (agency) with a cavalier

attitude about Kopechne's fate. In Ling's prophetic analysis, he argues that Kennedy's choice to emphasize "scene" as the controlling factor rather than accepting responsibility worked for him in retaining his senate seat. However, Ling contends that Kennedy's lack of good decision-making skills and his choice to emphasize scene portrayed him as a weak and ineffectual agent and cost him legitimacy or consideration in seeking the higher office of the presidency.

Other salient Burkean pentadic applications include analyses of Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign, Reagan's Lebanon crisis rhetoric, a U.S. Congressperson's re-election rhetoric, wider implications of one small town's hunting tragedy, and implications of judicial profiling. During the 1980 presidential debate season, Blankenship, Fine, and Davis (1983) contend that Reagan's powerful presence transformed him from "agent" status to a more expansive, influential "scenic" status that placed other candidates in the background. Birdsell's (1987) analysis of Reagan's crisis rhetoric involving the truck bombers in Lebanon defines the bombers as objectifying, dehumanizing scenes of terrorism rather than agents. In Kelley's (1987) examination of Idaho congressperson George Hanson's felony conviction and subsequent re-election bid, an agent/act ratio reinforces Hanson's terministic screen. Kelley posits that Hanson deflected attention from his misdeeds as agent by emphasizing the abusive acts of the government. Even though Hanson was defeated in his re-election bid, Kelley postulates that his establishment of a clear identification with Idahoans thwarted attempts at government retribution. In their seminal examination of a hunting trial in Maine in 1988, Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (1993) employ a complex analysis of the pentad to explicate three scenic levels of a crime involving a newcomer/interloper to the community and a native resident. The levels

include: (a) the physical scene that exonerated the native shooter, (b) the metaphysical symbolic community that shielded the shooter as victim, and (c) the universal perspective that situated the shooting victim/newcomer as scapegoat. Rountree (2001), in his dramatistic analysis of judicial discourse, claims that government portrayals of Japanese Americans as dangerous sites/scenes after the bombing of Pearl Harbor influenced the Supreme Court's decision that prohibitions against their traveling to the East Coast were not unconstitutional.

Other Burkean concepts serve as useful analytical tools to decipher Chomsky's and Bennett's polemics. Applications of identification/alienation and the logology-derived hierarchical mystery, as well as terministic screens, the scapegoating/victimage/redemptive cycle, and perspective by incongruity will illustrate their analytic utility. For example, Peterson (1986) examines the rhetoric of agricultural conservationists vis-a-vis the land use practices of farmers during America's dust bowl era through an identification/alienation lens that captures the ambiguous and conditional nature of reconciliation between the two groups. In Peterson's (1988) inquiry into the workings of Senate subcommittee hearings, she discovers that the maintenance and reinforcement of hierarchic mystery is grounded in the nature of special terministic vocabularies and hierarchical divisions. According to Peterson (1988), the majority members portrayed those who opposed legislation as encouraging "a disarray of hierarchical relationships" (p. 262) necessary to maintain order and identify with the establishment. Compliance enhances governmental hierarchy as people acquiesce to "strategies of unobtrusive control" (Peterson, 1988, p. 274). In his 1999 article, Lindsey argues that David Koresh's skewed terministic screen and deranged concept of perfection abetted the tragedy at

Waco. As Lindsey contends, Koresh and the Davidians were so “desirous of fulfilling or bringing to perfection the implications of their terminologies that they engage in very hazardous or damaging actions” (1999, p. 282). In their content analysis of suicide notes, Messner and Buckrop (2000) conclude that motivation for suicidal attempts include mortification that stems from a need to redeem perceived shameful guilt for transgressions against some form of established order/hierarchy.

Williamson’s (2002) employment of the purification cycle serves as a template for the analysis in this thesis of Chomsky’s and Bennett’s discourse. In his interpretation of James Byrd’s dragging death in Jasper, Texas, Williamson describes the black man’s death as the pollution that exposes the mystery of racial intolerance; the townspeople exhibit mortification through their acts of prayer with the black community and tearing down the town’s segregating cemetery fence. Williamson recounts how defendant John William King, a white supremacist, proves to be the perfect scapegoat, while the media glosses over the victim’s imperfect image. According to Williamson’s conclusion, although the trials and convictions complete the purification cycle, the complexities and ramifications of everyday intolerance remain unaddressed and obscured.

Whedbee’s (2001) and Selby’s (2002) scholarly applications of Burke’s concept of perspective by incongruity serve as models for an analysis of Chomsky’s and Bennett’s respective strategies and motivations for audience identification. In his analysis of Norman Thomas, the leader of the Socialist party in the United States during the second quarter of the twentieth century, Whedbee (2001) argues that Thomas’s use of irony and incongruent word choices “encourages his audience to reconsider how their interpretation of war implicates them as moral agents” (p. 45). Thomas’ impiety juxtaposes conflicting

perspectives of war as he presents his audience with images of both the victories and the untold anguish of war (Whedbee, 2001). Selby (2002) supports his claim that Frederick Douglass, the black anti-slavery orator, overcame a major argument that the Bible condoned slavery by using irony, parody, and satire. Douglass' strategy illustrates Burke's perspective by incongruity. Selby argues that Douglass brilliantly established identification with his audiences as he mocked the slave/Bible association, reconstructing that relationship in more amenable, anti-slavery terms.

This chapter has detailed the evolution of Burke's philosophical perspective as it relates to rhetorical criticism and to his views about social construction. Burke's perspicacious theory of human interaction as rhetorical informs how "public acts and artifacts serve to persuade audiences" (Gusfield, 1989, p. 40). For Burke, a dramatic perspective does not represent life; rather, it is life. Burke's essential message is that if there is hierarchy and social order, there is the dialectical repulsion of said order and the accompanying guilt. Gusfield (1989) surmises that the cycle of purification assuages the guilt and humans' dramatic enactments provide "visible symbols in which hierarchy is built up and in which rejection is atoned for...the scapegoat...[and] [t]he sacrificial principle is essential" (p.47). The next two chapters analyze Chomsky's and Bennett's rhetoric respectively, using Burke's concepts and perspectives. In employing the myriad, versatile tools Burke has bequeathed, the following analyses intend to unmask the authors' motivations, expose their worldviews, and decipher their strategic choices and objectives.

CHAPTER 3

CHOMSKY'S CRISIS RESPONSE, 9-11: VIEWED THROUGH A BURKEAN LENS

Burke's theory of dialectics illustrates the diametric polemics of Chomsky and Bennett. Their attitudes about the appropriate response to the attacks on September 11th exemplify the bifurcated nature of public discourse about the crisis and reflect the complexity of moral imperatives. When Chomsky and Bennett endeavor to "name something by its proper name" (Burke, 1966, p. 16), their symbol-making capabilities encourage ideological outlooks that are expansive, all encompassing, and preponderant. Language acquisition reflects one's perceptions of reality, names this reality and shapes and refines our ideological focus (Burke, 1964). According to Wilson (1992), ideology is a type of political thinking that influences political behavior as well as dominates and supports a particular hierarchical system in order to bolster a specific pattern of control. Conversely, ideological thinking that manifests itself in our linguistic signs, meanings, and symbolic representations can also "entail an aggressive alienation from the existing society" (Skils, 1967, p. 66). Burke's concept of duality illuminates the ideological divide between Chomsky's and Bennett's moral arguments. Gerring (1997) posits the dual nature of ideology, arguing that it is "a structure of domination and an ideational form structuring opposition to the status quo" (p. 968). Bennett's polemics support the

dominant status quo whereas Chomsky's rhetoric opposes the present establishment.

Chomsky's and Bennett's dialectical debate exemplifies unswerving adherence to their respective standpoints as well as alienation from and adherence to the status quo. As Hassett (1995) observes, the human drive for the ideal leads us to seek the perfect solution and have the final say. This analysis of the Chomsky and Bennett crisis responses wherein each asserts his standpoint illustrates Burke's (1950) contention that when rhetoricians "act upon one another you get a dialectic that, properly developed, can lead to the views transcending the limitations of each" (p. 292). Burke's dialectic approach, as Heath (1979) purports, explains social knowledge as resulting from the "wrangle of voices competing to develop some overarching idea, a god term, and its accompanying perspectives" (p. 162).

This chapter describes how Chomsky presents his "perfect solution" and "wrangling for god terms", including biographic and ideological data that inform his terministic screen and subsequent standpoint. Next, a thematic summary of 9-11's principal arguments is illustrated through Burke's concept of representative anecdote and then analyzed through Burke's dramatistic pentad. Chomsky's prevailing ratio of terms will be determined and his terministic strategies of selection and deflection revealed. Chomsky's application of the dialectical tensions of alienation and identification as well as his use of the hortatory negative will be explored. Chomsky's rhetoric will illustrate Burke's ethically and morally derived pollution-purification-redemption cycle within a framework of hierarchical mystery. Finally, this section demonstrates how Burke's theories help illuminate Chomsky's thinking.

The Origins of Chomsky's Terministic Screen

Chomsky's environment influenced his perspective more so than his genealogical inheritance. A product of the Great Depression and the progeny of working-class Jewish immigrants, Chomsky arrived early and intensely to political consciousness. His terministic screen was nurtured and encouraged in the cities of Philadelphia and New York during the 1930s and 1940s when revolutionary discourse filled the air. Chomsky grew up amongst socialist sympathizers and fears of Europe's surrender to fascism influenced his life-long stance of unswerving dedication to the underdog. The publication of Chomsky's *Syntactic Structures* in 1957 revolutionized the study of language, turned linguistics into a major social science, and transformed him into the "founding father of linguistic philosophy" (Jaggi, 2001, p. 1). In *Syntactic Structures* Chomsky argues that humans are born with an innate, universal capacity for language, which refuted the widely held behaviorist tenet that humans have to be trained for linguistic development.

Chomsky's revolutionary perspectives continue to refute, condemn, and agitate the political and economic status quo. Jaggi (2001), a reporter for the British news journal, *Guardian*, elucidates that Chomsky "has spent much of his life stripping away America's most cherished illusions" (p. 1). Chomsky has secured a place in the margins of mainstream America as he rallies against his perception of corporate-dominated media, their political influence and concomitant propaganda, and academic intellectuals while advocating a bi-nationalist outcome in Palestine based on Arab-Jewish cooperation. His modified anarchist stance reflects no political party affiliation and he supports systems of authority (government institutions) as long as the authority can justify itself. Chomsky

recommends undermining any system that cannot establish or prove its legitimacy.

Chomsky saves his harshest critique for what he considers America's illegal, corrupt, and imperialistic designs on the Third World.

From his anti-Vietnam protestations in the 1960s to his overriding mission of shunning carefully designated parameters of acceptable debate, Chomsky, the whistle blower, "doesn't just tack into the prevailing wind. He sails into category '5' hurricanes" (Powell, *The Washington Post*, p. F1) as his rhetoric mirrors his leftist ideology. Chomsky fits well into Newfield's (1966) description of the new left's philosophy, one composed of revolts against racism, poverty, and war and interdiction of the hypocrisy that "divides America's ideals from its actions" (p. 22). Chomsky's tome *9-11* exemplifies his perennial indictment of the United States' actions as they relate to the world community and allows him to reiterate his arguments through the context of a post September 11th war in Afghanistan.

Chomsky's thin text, a compilation of chiefly e-mail interviews given within a month of the crisis, reflects his popularity abroad and marginality at home. In an interview with *Boston Globe* staff reporter Flint (1995) Chomsky states "established powers [in the United States] have never been able to handle [my] brand of dissent" (p. 1). Chomsky's purpose is to bring to light myriad historical antecedents that illustrate how United States' actions gave cause for the current exigency. Chomsky's thematic emphasis is reflected in his statement: "These facts have been completely removed from history. One has to practically scream them from the rooftops" (p. 9). In *9-11* like-minded, primarily European interviewers offer a series of facile questions that set September 11th within an international framework. Topics addressed include the essence of geopolitics, unsavory

ramifications of a war, and the liability of the United States and its allies for producing the scenic backdrop for September 11th. As Chomsky's crisis response, *9-11* provides another forum for his continual outcry against what he perceives as U.S. misdeeds.

An analysis of Chomsky's *9-11* arguments illuminates his unique moral argument and rejoinder to the crisis of September 11th. As crisis literature indicates, responses to aggression normally incorporate clarion calls for action in the form of retaliation. Crisis rhetoric emanating from sources of power typically solicits public compliance, support, and approbation. Chomsky's rhetoric actuates national self-reflection rather than reprisal, giving rise to voices from societal margins. The following pentadic application underscores components of dramatic action and highlights the dominant terms, and distinguishes those preeminent perspectives that Chomsky beseeches his audience to incorporate within their own value systems while minimizing and averting other perspectives.

Chomsky's Perspective: Pentadic and Incongruity

An essential characteristic of Burke's pentadic methodology is the evaluation of the social consequences of rhetorical acts. In Burke's seminal work on dramatism, *A Grammar of Motives*, he begins with an overarching question, "[w]hat is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?" (p. xv). This implication of human action, rather than mere motion, requires a philosophical analysis of Burke's concept of pentadic action. According to Burke (1945/1969), there must exist an act undertaken by an agent within some contextual scene through some means or agency for some purpose and acted out in some manner or attitude. Identifying *9-11*'s basic themes

reflects Burke's (1950) concept of representative anecdote through which a critic sums up the essence of a text, provides textual grounding, places the action within a specified context, and judges motivation. Burke suggests that the identification of an anecdote is an essential element of dramatic, pentadic analysis. Madsen (1993) examines three criterion for the representative anecdote: (a) the reflection of human action, (b) possession of sufficient evidence that the anecdote mirrors the subject matter, and (c) the requirement that the anecdote be a synecdoche, which "represents the text in its entirety" (p. 213). In *9-11* the representative anecdote that informs the pentadic analysis is Chomsky's contention that the United States must be held accountable for its long history of imperialistic designs on other nations and understand the consequences for past and present pernicious behavior. Every contention in *9-11* represents a variation of this premise and gravitates back to this primary thesis.

This two-part representative anecdote embodies both the pentadic and dramatistic/logologic analysis of Chomsky's response to the September 11th crisis. Each term of the pentad will be identified along with the dominant ratio of terms to determine how Chomsky wants the audience to interpret his rendition of factual data as well as through which terministic screen they should focus, filter, and process. Next, the implications of the silence, the unspoken, and the diverted are examined as well as the location of Chomsky's worldview within a philosophical school. Although Chomsky (2001) acknowledges "[t]he horrifying atrocities of September 11th" (p.11), his overarching premise, manifested within a cause-and-effect framework, magnifies the United States' acts of intentional and continual promotion of terrorist crimes against humanity.

Chomsky places the blame for these crimes with the agent, an imperialistic United States of America that has a recalcitrant, established history as “perpetrators of the crime of international terrorism” (p. 15) that has been condemned by the World Court 15 years ago during the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. According to Chomsky (2001), the means or agency of such crimes is recurrent world-wide military intervention and the “propping up of oppressive regimes” (p. 13). The pentadic scene or location of the action is the international community for the purpose of “see[ing] the wealth of the [Middle East] region flow to the West and to small Western-oriented elites and corrupt and brutal rulers backed by Western powers” (Chomsky, 2001, p. 13). Another purposive consideration is “undermining social democratic programs and concerns over corporate globalization” (p. 13). Chomsky (2001) contends that the U.S. policy of “low intensity warfare” (p. 57) is almost identical to the official definitions of “terrorism” in the U.S. code that defines it as “the use of coercive means aimed at civilian populations in an effort to achieve political, religious or other aims” (p. 57). Therefore, Chomsky would argue that the manner or attitude that accompanies the dramatic action is one of arrogance, authoritative entitlement, and hypocrisy. Chomsky contends that the United States operates within a double standard system that allows it to ignore compliance with mandates imposed on others from its position of power.

The primary function of this pentadic analysis is to distinguish and critique the text’s dominant terms. Birdsell (1987) suggests that identifying the controlling terms provides a more thorough analysis of the text’s implications and offers “a schema for directing the critic’s attention” (p. 277). The ambiguous nature of the interrelationship of terms cannot be minimized; the controlling terms or dominant ratio in Chomsky’s *9-11* are

the act and the agency. Burke (1945/1969) emphasizes that the terms are “like the five fingers. Each is distinct yet all merge in the hand” (p. 13). Of the three forms that Burke argues frame a text, Chomsky employs the repetitive form of argument presentation. He emphatically focuses on and reiterates numerous historical antecedents that restate egregious interlocking acts and their agency. For example, Chomsky’s supporting evidence includes United States interference in such scenes as Bosnia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Lebanon, and South Vietnam.

Chomsky’s frequent choice of action-oriented and aggressive vocabulary reflects his intrinsic perspective on life or terministic screen. These choices indicate the predominance of the act/agency ratio throughout the text. In describing what he perceives as the United States’ promotion of crimes against humanity (the act), Chomsky employs incisive verbs such as “incite”, “retaliate”, “exploit”, “invade”, “attack”, and “destroy” and associates the United States synonymously with such descriptive devil terms as “perpetrator”, “international terrorist”, and “extreme religious fundamentalist culture”. Rueckert (1963) argues that language connotes action, especially in terms of the pentad and its ratios and reveals “motivational ground of any human act” (p. 134) as well as connects all pentadic terms. Chomsky’s ideological predilections are expressed through his symbolic choices.

Examples of Chomsky’s perspective about the United States’ imperialistic military interventions (agency) in various scenes are evident throughout the text. Although the United States represents the “agent” term, any aggressing country or entity could substitute. Chomsky’s motivation underscores the agency of any given aggressor. Chomsky (2001) denounces “the profound impact of several hundred years of imperial

violence on the intellectual and moral culture of the West” (p. 37) as he illustrates the “devasta[tion] of much of Indochina” (p.37) as a by-product of the U.S. attack on South Vietnam in the 1960s. Chomsky (2001) inveighs against the “violent assault by the U.S.” (p. 24) of Nicaragua in the 1980s, the terrorist bombings in Beirut during the Reagan administration, and U.S. support for “Turkey’s crushing its own Kurdish population” (p. 44) during the Clinton administration that Chomsky excoriates as “the worst campaign of ethnic cleansing and destruction in the 1990s” (p. 45). Chomsky (2001) also cites the “destruction of the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan” (p. 45), the ubiquitous U.S. “support for atrocities against Palestinians” (p.59), the “U.S.-led devastation of Iraqi civilian society” (p.59), and support of sanctions that weaken the national population “while strengthening Saddam Hussein” (p. 72). These historical illustrations support the contention that agency or means dominates Chomsky’s discourse.

Chomsky’s emphasis on the United States’ actions and agency as the dominant ratio deflects from other interpretations of the crisis. Burke (1961) indicates that conversion occurs when the audience accepts the symbolic terms the rhetor uses as a true representation of reality and discards other “screens”. As Chomsky encourages certain interpretations of events and slights others, limitations are placed on alternative perspectives. Using the pentadic frame that emphasizes the United States’ culpability, Chomsky strategically diverts attention away from the dramatic interpretation that terrorist agents perpetuated the acts of terror on September 11th by means of the murderous use of airplanes. He downplays the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as the scenes or locations of the action. Chomsky also minimizes the government and media’s prevailing logic that the purpose of the attacks was to destroy a widely accepted sanction of the

democratic hegemony that the United States fosters. Chomsky's occupational perspective as a harsh critic of American foreign policy and his focus on act/agent places him in the Burkean philosophical schools of realism and pragmatism.

Chomsky conforms to this philosophy when he evokes historical illustrations of U.S. transgressions within their contexts and stresses the revelations of truth through what he perceives as the practical consequences (September 11th) of the United States' act/agency determinants. Chomsky's perspective reflects a realistic portrayal of the United States' aggressive and imperialistic designs or acts on less powerful countries and highlights how the realism philosophy portends to face facts and present a situation exactly as it is viewed. Agency, the other term in the ratio, denotes a pragmatic worldview that conjoins well with Chomsky's realistic approach. Chomsky's motivation is to proclaim and expose the practical consequences of the means that the United States employs to carry out its acts. Pragmatic thinking situates meanings within applicable contexts and deals with historical facts in causal relationships.

Chomsky's dedicated and perpetual campaign to expose the United States' unjust policies informs his terminology as demonstrated by his use of the Burkean concept of perspective by incongruity. When rhetors examine issues from certain perspectives, Burke (1966) argues, they limit consideration of the problem to "that special angle of approach" (p. 415) thereby achieving "trained capacity...that state of affairs whereby one's very abilities can function as blindness" (Burke, 1935/1984, p. 7). Chomsky's particular ideological "blindness" manifests itself as a challenge to the audience's sense of cognitive consonance as he prods them to alter customary associations.

Chomsky persuades readers to look beneath the surface image of the United States

as an innocent victim of September 11th, shift their perspective to one that labels the United States as “a leading terrorist state” (p. 16), and reconfigure the terrorist atrocities from a framework of motives for war to a diametric one of crimes in need of punishment. Chomsky points to the hypocritical and ironic symbol usage of the world powers during the NATO bombings of Serbia. Chomsky argues “the very same people and actions can quickly shift from ‘terrorists’ to ‘freedom fighters’ and back again” (pp. 90-91) depending on the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s decisions to launch attacks. Chomsky notes that the incongruence of the Serbians’ transformation from “terrorists” to “freedom fighters” then back to “terrorists, thugs, and murderers as [terrorists/freedom fighters] carried out what from their point of view” (p. 52) consisted of a similar struggle (as in Serbia) in Macedonia, a western ally.

Chomsky cites another example that fits within the paradoxical and restrictive nature of terministic frames. When the Bush administration and mainstream media seek perfect terminology, Chomsky opines that they place a pejorative meaning on the term “fundamentalist” in association with the Arab population and its terrorist element, while the United States “is one of the most extreme fundamentalist cultures in the world, not the state, but the popular culture” (p. 21). He also contends that Saudi Arabia, a favored client of the U.S. government, provides the fundamentalist inspiration for worldwide terrorism through its theocratic stranglehold on its citizenry.

As Chomsky finds the “perfect” terminology that defines and delineates the nature of the September 11th crisis, he encourages the audience to regard the United States and its allies as the “international community”, one that defines terrorism as acts “directed against [the United States] and [its] friends” (p. 75). Conversely, Chomsky’s impiety

directs the audience to view the “global community” as the overwhelming majority “who do not support the actions of wealth and power” (p. 75) as he exposes the dialectical tensions within the world community. He entreats the readers to recognize that the “[w]anton killing of innocent civilians [in Afghanistan] is terrorism, not a war against terrorism” (p. 76) and blame the “deep-seated ‘culture of terrorism’ that prevails in Western civilization” (p. 85).

This section constructed an argument that Burke’s pentadic methodology adeptly illuminates Chomsky’s rhetoric. Each element of the pentad, located and described, delineates Chomsky’s ideological perspective, demonstrates how rhetors select, deflect and reject varying standpoints, and use perspective by incongruity to affect public perceptions. Chomsky’s pentadic choices reflect his life-long excoriation of the United States’ imperialistic acts worldwide and its methods. In the next section, an analysis of the Burkean concepts of identification and the negative as they apply to Chomsky’s text is provided.

Chomsky’s “Identification with the Negative”

When Chomsky identifies the United States as “a leading terrorist state” (p. 23) and aligns the country with international terrorism, he creates a dialectic tension between alienation and identification. He espouses a division that promotes alienation against the United States’ policies and identification and rapport with an internationalist perspective that seeks to reduce the threat of similar attacks by finding remedies that “require an effort to understand and to address the causes” (p. 36). He endorses alienation by stating that the United States can be considered “an ‘innocent victim’ only if we adopt the convenient

path of ignoring the record of its actions and those of its allies” (p. 35). As Chomsky seeks to bridge cultural divisions by promoting shared values that lead to cooperative action, he argues that “[a]n aroused public within the more free and democratic societies can direct policies towards a much more humane and honorable course” (p. 36). Chomsky encourages identification among the citizens of the world community to use their influence to redirect the great powers from a course of war.

Chomsky’s campaign to align the audience with his perspective and increase division and estrangement includes his contention that a cause/effect corollary exists between the United States and the September 11th attacks. He purports that the CIA had a substantial role in the 1980s in “recruiting, training and arming the most extreme fundamentalists...to fight a ‘Holy War’ against the Russian invaders of Afghanistan” (p.18). In other words, the United States government created the Taliban’s presence and influence in Afghanistan at a time when it served its interests. Chomsky clarifies that the attacks “are not ‘consequences’ of U.S. policies in any direct way” (p. 82) yet reiterates that “the terrorist network...has its roots in the mercenary armies that were organized, trained and armed by the CIA, Egypt, Pakistan, French intelligence, Saudi Arabia funding, and others” (p. 82).

Chomsky’s simultaneous and dialectic strategy of identification and alienation underscores his use of the Burkean precept of the hortatory negative. Burke (1966) argues that the abstract nature of the hortatory, “thou shall not” negative is the source of human morality. The underlying axiom of the national moral argument on appropriate response to the September 11th crisis is the diametric dimensions of good versus bad and right versus wrong. Chomsky’s moralistic screen directs the “thou shall nots” towards the United

that were extraordinary in scale and destruction” (p. 68). He condemns the hypocrisy of the U.S. and its allies that “lead in spreading the cancer [of international terrorism] they were demanding must be extirpated” (p. 68). Chomsky exposes U.S. hypocrisy by using the hortatory negative and invites his readers to identify with his moralistic perspective.

Revelation and Purification

Elements of Burke’s purification cycle weave through Chomsky’s *9-11*, support his major thesis, and inform his leftist ideology. The axis of Chomsky’s righteous indignation lies in his assertion that the hierarchical, imperialistic powers of the United States demand a disrupting disorder in efforts to restore a more equitable world order. The fundamental utility of hierarchical mystery is to maintain and preserve established order in attempts to foster compliance. Chomsky submits that “members of [President Bush’s] coalition are expected to be silent and obedient supporters, not participants” (p. 111) and that they will defer to U.S. hegemony. Furthermore, Chomsky maintains that the U.S. “explicitly reserves itself the right to act as it chooses...avoiding any meaningful recourse to international institutions, as required by law” (p. 112). The U.S. government’s contention that Muslims “hate us because we champion a ‘new world order’ of capitalism, individualism, secularism and democracy...” (p. 117) is an effort to keep the mystery sealed and protect U.S. economic interests.

Chomsky encourages noncompliance and persuades citizens not to “stride resolutely towards catastrophe, because those are the marching orders” (p.70) of the governing power structure. Self-interests and considerations inform hierarchical decisions

Chomsky encourages noncompliance and persuades citizens not to “stride resolutely towards catastrophe, because those are the marching orders” (p.70) of the governing power structure. Self-interests and considerations inform hierarchical decisions reflected through the polluted agency of “militarization, regimentation, reversal of social democratic programs, transfer of wealth to narrow sectors, and undermining democracy in any meaningful form” (Chomsky, 2001, p. 19). Reflecting Burke’s concept that everything and everybody strives for perfection, Chomsky encourages an ideal of universal compliance to international order rather than unilateral proclivities of the United States.

Illustrations of the United States’ imperialistic designs signify the corruption within the country’s foreign policy edicts. The country’s support of brutal regimes in the Middle East is the cause for bin Laden’s rhetoric to resonate throughout that region. Chomsky argues that “bin Laden draws support from a reservoir of bitterness and anger over the U.S. policies in the region” (p. 17) and that the immorality needs unmasking. When Burke (1961) defines pollution, he submits that it is the first stage of guilt, symbolized by impurities. Chomsky adjures the United States to exculpate itself thereby ridding the country’s democratic process of the prevailing pollution.

This necessary process of purification requires the perpetrators to atone for their sins or mortify themselves. Chomsky purports that the only way for the cycle of violence to abate is for the United States to acknowledge its culpability in creating the climate that could produce the atrocities on September 11th and acquiesce to the international court of law. To make his case, Chomsky directs attention to an analogous situation involving the Oklahoma City bombing. He argues that the U.S. government did not obliterate Montana and Idaho in search of the links to ultra-right militias. Rather, Chomsky contends, “there

was a search for the perpetrator, who was found, brought to court, and sentenced, and there were efforts to understand the grievances that lie behind such crimes and to address the problems” (p. 24). In another effort to evince the certitude of his argument, Chomsky points to the decentralized hierarchical structure of the terrorist network that would make penetration unrealistic if not impossible. However, he concludes with surety, “a serious effort to reduce the threat of this kind of terrorism, as in innumerable other cases, requires an effort to understand and try to address the causes” (p. 36). Chomsky’s moral argument suggests, “it is easier to personalize the enemy [bin Laden], identified as the symbol of ultimate evil... [and] ignore one’s own role” (p. 37).

Chomsky personifies Burke’s concept of dialectical tension when he at once admonishes and identifies with U.S. citizenry for allowing years of criminal activity, advocates “countercurrents”, and invites them to actively participate in the promulgation of the appropriate crisis response. Specifically, he highlights, “our crimes [in the Sudan], for which we are responsible: as taxpayers, for failing to provide massive reparations, for granting refuge and immunity to the perpetrators, and for allowing the terrible facts to be sunk deep in the memory hole” (p. 46). Chomsky exudes confidence that a counter-movement is growing in the United States that has always found a home in Europe. He reports that he has gained “considerably more access even to mainstream media in the U.S. than ever before” (p. 118). Although Chomsky recognizes those from the ultra-right and even some leftist intellectuals “who demand silent obedience” (p. 118), he exhorts his audience, “not to be intimidated by hysterical ranting and lies and to keep as closely as one can to the course of truth and honesty and concern for the human consequences of what one does, or fails to do” (p. 118). Chomsky’s moral argument and truth is embedded in

resisting blind allegiance to power sources, holding the hierarchy accountable, and exposing systemic disconnects.

Once the pollution has been exposed and the system is purified through attrition, redemption is possible. Burke (1941) defines redemption as the revelation of a new perspective, outlook, or the feeling “of moving forward, toward a goal” (p. 203) and as Rueckert (1963) describes it, it is the state, “whereby every [person] can move toward a better life” (p. 129). Chomsky’s vision of a “better life” would include the United States as a beneficiary of respect for and adherence to codified international law and sovereignty as well as a contributing member to that code. Burke’s “secularized, dramatistic version of the Genesis ‘myth’” (Rueckert, 1963, p. 132) explains Chomsky’s search for humans’ ideal behavior through his linguistic attempts to reach his terministic perfection. This section has demonstrated the interrelationship of the elements of Burke’s logologic screen of human symbol usage and how the elements explicate Chomsky’s worldview from the marginal spaces of the ruled. The purification cycle illustrates Chomsky’s contention that the United States’ pollutive acts and agency require exposure, cleansing and replacement with a more equitable hierarchy of judgment.

Summary of “Burkology’s” Significance to Chomsky’s *9-11*

This chapter delineated how several methodological tools that Burke bequeathed to rhetorical criticism provide cogent insights into Chomsky’s motivations in his response to the September 11th crisis within a framework of his representative anecdote of the United States accountability for its imperialistic designs. A description of Chomsky’s background, philosophic origins and career path were provided. A pentadic analysis

unearthed the hexad terms, the predominance of “act” and “agency” as the motivational ratio, and signified his realistic and pragmatic perspective on the repercussions of the United States’ longstanding foreign policy. Next, illustrations of Chomsky’s application of Burke’s perspective by incongruity were followed by examples of Burke’s dialectic concepts of identification and alienation as well as Chomsky’s espousal of the hortatory negative. An analysis of how Chomsky’s polemics reflect and enact the purification cycle and his tension with the status quo followed. Finally, similarities between Chomsky’s theories and impact and those of Burke conclude the chapter. Burke’s theory will further illustrate the dialectic tension in chapter four that includes a close reading of Bennett’s *Why We Fight* and the analysis of its strategies via the framework of Burkology.

CHAPTER 4

A BURKEAN ANALYSIS OF BENNETT'S RESPONSE: *WHY WE FIGHT*

This chapter analyzes how Burke's philosophy of social hierarchies and maintenance of order illuminate Bennett's ideological arguments. Bennett would agree with Burke (1961) that order dissuades anarchy and chaos, and that hierarchical relationships are necessary to maintain the status quo. The existence of perpetual struggle exists to repress diametric contentions as humans continually strive towards the perfected ideal. Additionally, Bennett's moral arguments in defense of the rhetoric and decision-making since September 11th mirror more traditional crisis response rhetoric. An analysis of *Why We Fight* demonstrates how Bennett's use of ideographs, just war polemics, and denigration of the enemy support this claim. This chapter commences with pertinent biographical data that traces the origins, development, and application of Bennett's moral terministic screen. A summary of Bennett's reasons for a response and a structural outline of *Why We Fight* will be followed by two separate pentadic analyses that reveal Bennett's attention to the context of crisis response rhetoric and a broader, more inclusive subtext and underlying motivation. Bennett's polemic selections and deflections will be defined within a dialectical framework that focuses on what he wants his audience to identify with and be alienated from. Finally, an interpretation of how his arguments can be understood through Burke's purification cycle is presented

Biographic and Ideological Factors

William J. Bennett's trajectory from Brooklyn's middle class to national recognition and influence began with a Roman Catholic upbringing both in Brooklyn, the city of his birth, and in Washington, D. C. A self-proclaimed street-wise youth with a penchant for doo-wop music, Bennett received a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Texas, spent time as a college professor, and obtained a law degree from Harvard in 1971. Bennett, a registered Democrat, became disillusioned with liberal politics in the early 1980s and henceforth allied himself with Republicans and served the Reagan administration in three separate capacities. He served as director of the National Endowment for the Humanities from 1981-1985, secretary of education from 1985-1988, and director of national drug policy from 1989-1990.

During Bennett's tenures he was described as controversial, polarizing, blunt, and opinionated as he wove a constant moral theme throughout his career. As chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, Bennett cut the budget and promulgated strict definitions of the humanities that incorporated traditional values. During his tenure as cabinet secretary of the Department of Education, he advocated the teaching of values and moral absolutes, promoted a rigorous core curriculum based on classic works in Western thought, implemented strict standards of accountability for teachers, and spoke against affirmative action. During his tenure as Secretary of Education he alienated many school administrators and college campuses. According to Wilson (1988), a commentator for *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, educators, used to confronting others on their shortcomings rather than being confronted directly about theirs, bristled as Bennett spotlighted

educational deficits such as defaults on student loans and lack of accountability for teachers.

While director of drug policy Bennett pushed for severe penalties for drug dealers and coined the “war on drugs” metaphor to encourage military action in Columbia and Peru in order to destroy drug supplies. Bennett currently serves as co-founder of Empower America as well as a distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, both conservative non-profit organizations. Bennett uses his office as a public pulpit for controversial causes, yet as *Washington Post Book World* columnist Yardley (1992) argues, although he was not always polite or judicious, Bennett “displayed a pugnacious eagerness to take on difficult issues of the sort ordinarily skirted...and browbeat his constituency into thinking about important issues” (p. 3). Bennett remains a self-appointed spokesperson for conservative causes and values.

Bennett’s moralistic grounding originates in the socially conservative New Right ideological mantra against unbridled permissiveness. Bennett’s social conservatism resulting from his Roman Catholic vocabulary aligns well with conservative Protestant groups who advocate exacting moral standards. As Hopson and Smith (1999) explicate, the New Right’s answer to societal anomie was to “restore the Christian character of American culture and to promote a Christian solution for the social problems of modern society” (p. 56). Johnson and Tamney (2001) concur that the goal of social conservatives is to bring back moral religious authority and discipline into people’s lives. Political activism assures that changes affect the public policy domain and as Medhurst (1985) argues, conservatives believe that “religion should never be separated from the act of governing” (p. 105) because of humans’ innate religious nature. Medhurst contends that

conservative justification for political activism and involvement centers around the need for personal salvation and larger societal protection against liberal pluralism.

Some New Right predilections include resentment of the Eastern, leftist establishment, nationalistic sentiment that translates into advocacy for the military and economic preeminence of the United States, as well as strong patriarchal family values based on venerated traditions and a clarifying moralistic world view (Blum, 1974; Gottfried & Fleming, 1988; Hixon, 1992; Medcalf, 1985; Medcalf & Dolbeare, 1985). Bennett embraces these tenets that have their origins in basic conservative beliefs about the inherent nature of human beings. Burke's logologic precepts can effectively illuminate these ideas that include maintenance of hierarchical order and the drive to achieve perfection within the order.

Conservatives espouse a belief in the maintenance of the status quo and only embrace change that reduces incoherence. Russell Kirk (1953), an expert on modern conservatism, describes conservatives as "a loose league of people who prefer the devil they know to the devil they don't" (p. 152). Oakeshote (1948) agrees with Kirk's assessment and adds that change should only bring "one aspect of life into fuller harmony with the rest and that responds to an already existing sympathy" (p. 45). Conservative adherence to a transcendent enduring moral order coincides with Burke's theory that man continually strives for the perfected end. As Kirk (1953) contends, conservatives realize the imperfect nature of humans who always fall short of the ideal. This conservative mainstay corresponds to Burke's definition of humans as "rotten with perfection" as language becomes a motivation to achieve perfectly the state of affairs they symbolize.

Due to human imperfections, conservatives believe that life should be ordered

according to unchanging precepts. In defense of order, Blum (1974) purports that conservatism's essence is "to affirm existing institutions whatever they are" (p. 135) because human nature is inherently evil and the "inequality of humans necessitates complex hierarchical organizations and leaderships" (p. 135). These beliefs concur with Burke's theory of order and maintenance. Bennett's ideological trajectory reveals a penchant for moral causes steeped in conservative values and beliefs that form the foundation for his writing of *Why We Fight*.

Bennett's Moral Mission

Bennett has penned many books that underscore his moralistic messages and philosophy. Specifically, *Why We Fight* offers justification for the Bush administration's militaristic answer to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Bennett addresses what he perceives as the radical political left's vituperative rhetoric that questions the morality of the established order. Bennett (2002) argues that if criticisms such as the ones that Chomsky hurls at the administration are not answered, "we [as a nation] would be undone" (p. 12). Bennett laments the dissipation of the swell of "patriotic ardor that burned bright" (p. 2) after September 11th with the patriotic display of flags, volunteerism, and the "righteous anger and resolve" (p. 2) that displayed "support for our leader, our armed forces, our country" (p. 2). His goal is to answer questions such as: (a) is force necessary, (b) why do the Muslims hate America, (c) is old-fashioned patriotism somehow jingoistic, and (d) what is the rationale behind U.S. support of Israel? Bennett concedes that these inquiries are framed in moral terms, that "their connection with policy is implicit, not explicit" (p. 13), and that he refrains from making policy decisions. Bennett's

intentions are to differentiate and widen the divide between genuine concerns of the well meaning and the arguments of America haters who would stoke the fires of doubt, suspicion, and vitriolic anti-Americanism.

The entirety of Bennett's September 11th crisis argument coalesces under the rubric of correcting the misguided and setting the record straight that America has "a moral right and a grave obligation to defend the common good against such terrorist attacks" (p. 24). His five-chapter tome is divided into such headings as the proper uses of righteous anger, just war advocacy, distinctions between good and evil, the weaknesses of Islamic tenets, defense of Israel, and the erosion of moral clarity and its effects on the nation. In *Why We Fight* Bennett concedes that America has made mistakes yet he carefully deconstructs arguments against the administrative hierarchy and reconstructs them in a light more in line with his terministic screen. Two separate pentadic analyses will reveal Bennett's duality of purpose within a problem-solution and cause-and-effect framework respectively.

Pentadic Analyses of Bennett's Dual Purpose

Pentadic action in Bennett's *Why We Fight* reflects a two-fold purpose. A surface analysis finds Bennett situating a cadre of illustrious participants as agents in the action. Bennett incorporates the President, Secretary of Defense, Congress and the many "firemen, police officers, and volunteers from around the country" (p. 1) who by their "stoic courage, the fierce bonds of brotherhood among them, the sense of duty so ingrained in their character" (p. 6) rose to the occasion. Bennett's list of valiant agents in the drama encompasses a diverse array including the heroic yet ordinary passengers on

board the hijacked United Airlines flight who “sprang to action to do something about [the hijacking over Pennsylvania]” (p. 163).

The act in Bennett’s immediate drama is justifiable retaliation against the September attacks that “incinerated to death thousands of fellow Americans” (p. 3). Bennett’s pentadic scene is the pervasive untenable threat of terrorism, bred in Islam. He warns, “looming hugely over the landscape of contemporary Islam for at least the past three decades has been a militant, jihad-based ideology, profoundly hostile to religious tolerance or pluralism of any kind” (p. 76). Bennett claims “[w]hat is heartbreaking is how few countervoices exist with the Muslim community itself” (p. 95). The agency or means employed is that of the justified “morality of means” (p. 46), military action. The fifth pentadic term of ultimate purpose is to preserve the American way of life, support “the march of Western ideas of freedom and prosperity in the modern world” (p. 63), and “liberate people from the yoke of state power and economic stagnation” (p. 63) in the Islamic world. Bennett recounts the “unmixed joy among the Afghan people” (p. 19) after the liberation of Kabul for the purpose of “humanitarian relief for the suffering people of Afghanistan” (p. 30). Bennett is expansive as well as inclusive about the purpose as he incorporates national and international benefits of intervention.

Bennett’s high-minded emphasis on inclusive agents and moral purposes is explained through the application of Burke’s pentadic ratio of prominent terms. Bennett wraps the agents in a cloak of patriotic fervor and represents Americans as “a peaceful people, averse to conflict” (p. 39) whose natures and habits are those of a “commercial society, resting on rich deposits of social trust and on laws that regulate and protect transactions of every kind” (p. 39). Bennett’s descriptive language choices, influenced by

his conservative terministic screen, denote Americans as innocent victims of a vicious and unprovoked attack. As Burke (1950) indicates, an emphasis on agent or actor reveals an idealistic perspective and a call for the agent to act responsibly and take command. The second term of the dyadic equation, purpose, represents a highly principled perspective that coincides with Bennett's morally-based conservative ideology. Bennett couches the purpose of the acts against terrorism in transcendental god terms, stating that "this is a war about good and evil" (p. 45) and that the U.S. has a moral obligation to "avoid future evil" (p. 28). This interpretation of Burke's pentadic ratios reveals Bennett's exaltation of an America whose quest should be the triumph of good over evil. Bennett's avocation as a didactic moralist informs his occupation and preoccupation. Burke (1935/1984) argues that one's way of thinking pervades their outlooks, attitudes, and discriminations as well as brings "special preferences, dislikes, fears, hopes, apprehensions, idealizations" (p. 40) into focus. Bennett's motivation reflects his cultural orientation or as Burke (1935/1984) would argue, "[o]ne is simply interpreting with the only vocabulary he knows" (p. 33) and that we mirror the "particular vocabulary of the cultural group into which we are born" (p. 52). An alternate pentadic reading of *Why We Fight* undergirds Bennett's central, underlying motivation, a call for moral clarity wherein the events of September 11th serve as another context to underscore his broader perspective about what ails America. In this analysis, the common thread woven through the fabric of Bennett's argument is the erosion of core values. The agents of this decay are the intellectual elite, academicians, relativists, the "peace party", anti-Americans, and "guardians of political correctness" (p. 56). Bennett identifies the peace party's goal as "weakening [a] consensus, sowing and reinforcing doubt of our purposes and our methods" (p. 19) as well as "casting a shadow

of moral doubt over our righteous and justified anger [about the attacks]" (p. 20). The pentadic agents are also "American professors, intellectuals, and journalists" (p. 96), anti-traditionalists, misguided pacifists, and Israel haters. Bennett professes that the agents act to undermine a sense of national unity, patriotism, and "righteous anger and resolve" (p. 2). They promulgate a philosophy that promotes a "deep mistrust of the good faith of the American government" (p. 18) "the erosion of moral clarity and the spread of indifference and confusion" (p. 169) as well as the erosion of "cultural confidence and love of country" (p. 20). Bennett's terministic screen or point of view colors the world in moral hues and directs attention to a pervasive moral narrative.

Bennett's occupational passions include the United States' educational system and its apparent moral erosion as well as the moral decline of the culture at large. Many of the instruments or agencies in this dramatic despoliation are institutional and serve as pentadic scenes as well. Bennett inveighs against "the power of the religion of nonjudgmentalism that has permeated our culture, encouraging a paralysis of the moral faculty and leading, in the case of school boards, to a new tyranny of the minority" (p. 53). Bennett directs his outrage and blame for the dissipation of patriotism after September 11th toward the leftist institutional liberalism. He offers anecdotal evidence such as student proclamations against United States' foreign policy and protestations from leftist-leaning activists against the American war machine that were "treated with exceptional seriousness by the media, and [were] amplified accordingly" (p. 17). Bennett claims that such examples demonstrate not only a lack of clarity but "well developed, well entrenched judgment about our country, and about the democratic West in general, that had come to dominate virtually every one of our major cultural and educational institutions" (p. 8). Bennett differs from these

immoral agents and encourages reader alienation when he proclaims that “leading educators and intellectuals [have] been saying that the United States was no better and might even be worse than its enemies” (p. 8). The acts of spreading mistrust in the government as well as disintegrating the nation’s moral fiber and sense of justifiable superiority find fertile ground in public institutions and the cultural landscape.

Bennett would argue that the purpose of these leftist-instigated acts is to spread postmodernist relativism, demoralize the government, and destroy the nation’s moral center. He declares a preoccupation with creating a multicultural society which “overlays [students’] abysmal ignorance of its history with a ‘sophisticated’ understanding of America as but one cultural option among many of equal worth” (p. 146). *Why We Fight*’s central thesis identifies this purpose, attempts to alienate the readers against this campaign, and focuses attention on ennobling Western values. Bennett argues that unpatriotic, leftist-leaning agents seek “to deliver a preemptive judgment against the president, prevent another generation of young people from learning the proper uses of righteous anger, and to throw dust in the eyes of the American people” (p. 22). Burke (1945/1969) notes that pentadic terms overlap and likens the terms to fingers, suggesting that one needs to “trace the tendon down into the palm” (p. 996) where margins of overlap exist. This section has demonstrated a pentadic interconnectivity and focus of Bennett’s conservative moralistic screen that rails against unpatriotic agents who elect to undermine national strength, pride and cultural virtues. Bennett also enacts Burke’s dialectic description of discourse as he methodically concedes, deflects, and selects arguments for audience consideration.

Bennett's practice of *sic et non*

Bennett employs an interesting dialogic method that aligns in principle with Burke's precept of dialectical positives/negatives, association/disassociation, and identification/alienation. Bennett exalts dialectical reasoning as "the weighing of opposite propositions in an open-ended search for the truth" (p. 165) and the theology of *sic et non* (yes and no) "might be thought of, indeed, as a watchword of our Western civilization, of our very outlook on the world" (p. 165). He employs a "yes but" style as he occasionally concedes segments of diametrical points of view, then deflects attention and reconstructs arguments and vocabularies for which he seeks audience identification.

Bennett employs this concession/deflection style throughout *Why We Fight*. For example, Bennett carefully acknowledges pacifism as "a genuine predisposition against violence" (p. 20). He cites myriad church doctrines and countless examples of Biblical teachings that support a perspective of living peacefully and grants the texts' "equivocal aversion to the use of force they have resonated down the centuries with a clarion purity" (p. 25). However, he deflects attention from this philosophy and purports that the Gospel writers were worldly enough to understand that not every "answer to every human conflict is to turn the other cheek" (p. 27). On the subject of relativism Bennett posits that the premise that all ideas and opinions are as good as every other has the guise of democratic thought and open-mindedness, which are virtuous considerations. However, he heralds the superiority of Western culture and its values, and wants his readers to understand and identify that "wherever [these values] have taken root, they have brought economic well-being and civil felicity in measure undreamed of" (p. 65).

In another case Bennett presents (not concedes) the argument about the one-sided, unflagging support of the United States for an Israeli government that participates in “unconscionable treatment of the Palestinians” (p. 118). He changes course and recounts the many instances of anti-Semitism among international leftists in the Arab and Western worlds. Finally, his conservative perspective and concordant vocabulary identify a kinship between Israel and “tens of millions of Americans who have seen in the founding and flourishing of the Jewish state the hand of the same beneficent God who attended our own founding and has guided our fortunes until now” (p. 130).

One final illustration of this modified dialectic technique includes the topic of the Muslim American community. Bennett acknowledges that their community in America is an unqualified success story and that “both socially and politically it has developed a significant presence on the American scene” (p. 97). He proceeds to recount the numerous concessions that American officialdom has afforded the Muslim community such as allowing beards, head coverings and locations for prayers in the workplace, the inclusion of Islamic symbols in public rituals, and increased invitations of Muslims to churches and synagogues. Bennett then directs attention to Muslim Americans who have all too well “adapted to our general ethos of entitlement that they and their representatives should so uninhibitedly denounce even the most timid expression of concern for the Islamist danger...as an infringement on their rights” (p. 98). In the preceding illustration Bennett wants the readers to identify with the freedoms that are afforded to foreigners and to disagree with Muslims’ unwarranted sense of entitlement. These examples represent Bennett’s method of directing reader attention to and fostering identification with stances that support his philosophical, political, and religious tenets. The next section

demonstrates how Burke's purification cycle edifies Bennett's his conservative religious beliefs.

The Redemption of the Hierarchy

Bennett's theocentric conservative philosophy that civilized societies need order and class distinctions corresponds well with Burke's model of neutralized Christian theology. Foss, Foss and Trapp (2001) contend that faith, doctrine, and the notion of a higher presence exist through language and that Burke (1961) uses a theological perspective to reflect the creation of reality through symbol use. Conservative doctrine protects the status quo and an essential hierarchical structure. *Why We Fight* represents a testament to the recapture and preservation of a hierarchy of traditional values embedded within the context of post September 11th crisis rhetoric. For Bennett, there is a rupture or pollution that has seeped into the body politic and disrupted a sense of national unity and clarity of purpose. Bennett's motivational purpose is to dissipate the damage and from this pollution restore equilibrium and a sense of direction to the national psyche.

Bennett cites the turmoil in the 1960s as the harbinger of leftist, postmodernist, and relativist pollution to the system that has been woven into the cultural fabric. He contends that "the peace party that cloaks their arguments in moral objections to the war" (p. 40) is in actuality revealing hostilities to America that have a long history. Bennett argues that during the period of the Vietnam War and its aftermath, there existed "critique of the United States as an imperialist or colonialist power, wreaking its evil will on the hapless people of the third world" (p. 40). This pervasive mentality has "informed the policy preferences of the [Democratic] Carter and Clinton administrations, and is with us

still” (p. 40) in the form of relativist teachings in schools and other institutions. Bennett contends that the Boy Scouts of America, an “irreplaceable institution” (p. 42) that has continually inspired “male idealism, is derided as irrelevant, ‘patriarchal’, and bigoted” (p. 42). According to Bennett, Columbia University students ostensibly purporting pacifist principles held signs spelling “Amerika”, a clear comparison between the United States and Nazi Germany and a clear indication of anti-Americanism. Bennett couches this pollution in terms of “a truly widespread and debilitating confusion as to our basic national purposes” (p. 9) and suggests a “larger political and ideological agenda” (p. 35). Bennett contends that attacks from the left result not only in alienation against the military but promulgate divisions among social segments in the country. These divisions “prevent the forging of a single people [and] they also prevent the building of a true and thoughtful patriotism” (p. 154). The ruptures are ubiquitous and call for purification by resisting the negative and embracing a common moral code that celebrates standards of behavior and moral absolutes.

Bennett employs strong action verbs and ideographic images in response to the omnipresent anti-Americanism as he answers the pollutive elements with demands for purification. He beseeches readers to implant in America’s youth the belief that their country is a model of democratic principles for the world to emulate and to instill in them a sense of duty to preserve and protect the nation’s government. Good citizens should also imbue themselves with pride and confidence in “our own culture and civilization [and] its universal values” (p. 65), and reclaim and “grasp the value of our political traditions and what distinguishes it from others” (p. 150). Bennett encourages the resistance of nefarious by-products of contemporary relativism such as self-doubt and lack of clear objectives.

Furthermore, Bennett encourages the American people to persevere during the aftermath of September 11th and embrace the moral clarity of a just answer to the attacks.

Conservative ideology reflects a comfort with the known, resists hurried change, and, according to Kirk (1953) also resists hasty innovation that “may be a devouring conflagration, rather than a torch of progress” (p. 152). Politics should be a process of *attending* (emphasis added) to the arrangements of a population rather than *making* (emphasis added) arrangements (Oakeshott, 1962). Bennett’s terministic screen and vocabulary reflect this philosophy as he proposes a closure to the purification cycle through resistance to the changing demographics of cultural diversity and a reclamation of conservative values and a sense of civic pride and devotion. Restored order would reposition the United States as a “beacon of freedom and opportunity to people throughout the world since the day of our creation” (p. 151). Although Bennett concedes that the world views America as the “place people run to when, in hope or hopelessness, they are running from somewhere else” (p. 151), he envisions restoration of America as a unified front working toward the common good that includes “defend[ing] our country when defense is needed” (p. 154). The guilt caused by relativistic thinking will be expunged and a new state of spiritual unity will be achieved. For a brief moment in time shortly after September 11th, redemption reigned.

Bennett’s lifelong quest for moral clarity and redemption reflects a determination to continually expose societal disruptions whether they take form as educational institutions, alternative lifestyles, untraditional marriages, morally bankrupted presidencies, or unsustained periods of national unity. He argues that these aversions have been felt “in the opinions expressed in our leading newspapers, in the sermons preached in our

churches and synagogues, in the causes supported by our major philanthropic institutions, [and] in the positions on public issues” (p.8). Rueckert (1963) argues that Burke’s emphasis on the pollution-purification-redemption cycle “indicate[s] more clearly than anything else the fundamentally moral and ethical center of Burke” (p. 133). The same argument can be made for Bennett. This chapter demonstrated Bennett’s moral themes as viewed from his particular terministic vocabulary. The pentadic analyses illustrated Bennett’s fervent patriotic proclivities and how the events of September 11th served as another conduit to underscore his broader perspective on what ails America. Interpretative analyses illustrated how Bennett’s rhetoric fits within descriptions of mainstream crisis rhetoric’s arguments for justified retaliation. The analyses also underscored Bennett’s lifelong concern about what he perceives as the nation’s declining morality.

Bennett enacts Burkean principles of identification/alienation and attention/deflection as persuasive tools to direct attention to some arguments and minimize others. Bennett concentrates on America’s strengths rather than its weaknesses and champions unity and certainty over diversity and variability. The purification cycle explains Bennett’s quest for that perfect period of stasis that Rueckert (1963) describes as redemption or “the still moment following the fusion” (p. 137) or rupture. A short-lived period of equilibrium culminated in a unifying spirit after September 11th before the Burkean cycle of purification invariably began again.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND IMPLICATIONS

The September 11th attacks resulted in a crisis of archetypal proportions and the ensuing moral arguments regarding how best to respond still consume the nation's public discourse. This thesis analyzed the polemics of Noam Chomsky's and William Bennett's particular arguments within the context of post September 11th crisis response. Their moral arguments joined countless others in print and visual media and reflect Frentz's (1985) search for universal truths and moral absolutes as the nation contemplated the best course of action in response to the crisis. Zarefsky (1998) argues that rhetoric can influence the course of ideological history by altering the ongoing conversation. This thesis argued that Burke's concept of dialectical tension illuminates the diametric ideologies of Chomsky's and Bennett's rhetoric that represent a microcosm of the ongoing and polarizing national debate.

The crisis gave rise to a clash of words as representatives from the ideological left and right offered rhetorical responses. As representatives of these diametrically opposed ideologies, Chomsky and Bennett view themselves, society, and others through their distinctive left and right prisms of reality. This thesis demonstrated how Burkean analysis of their discourses supports the contention that "people who belong to either side will tend to define their own side with words that are axiologically positive, and the other side

with words that are axiologically negative” (Bobbio, 1996. p. 37). Chomsky’s and Bennett’s rhetorical strategies illustrate Burke’s (1969) definition of rhetoric as the “use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents” (p. 41). Their polemics represent opposition to and support for the government’s actions and serve potentially to influence future public policy action.

The analysis of Chomsky’s text, *9-11*, illuminated Burke’s most prominent concepts, the pentad and the dramatistic or purification cycle. Additionally, Burke’s concepts of representative anecdote, the negative, and perspective by incongruity served as methodological tools. An extensive pentadic analysis exposed Chomsky’s worldview that featured the dominant terms of “act” and “agency”. According to Chomsky’s perspective, or terministic screen, the “acts” are terrorist crimes against Third World nations through the means or “agency” of recurrent military interventions and support of oppressive regimes. The other pentadic terms include the United States as agent, the international community as the scene, and the purpose as the stockpiling wealth for the Western world’s powerful regimes. As Chomsky centers attention on this particular dramatic scenario he strategically diverts attention from a drama that places the terrorists as nefarious “agents” that committed “acts” of terror through the “agency” of murderous use of planes. Furthermore, Chomsky downplays the “scenes” of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon as American icons of economic and military security. Chomsky’s emphasis on an “act” and “agency” ratio reflects Burke’s realistic and pragmatic philosophical schools of thought. Looking through a Burkean lens, Chomsky’s perspective on the world and international relations is one of realistic pragmatism.

An analysis of Chomsky’s rhetoric using Burke’s purification cycle examined the

United States as the hierarchy and its imperialistic designs as the corruption in need of exposure and redress so that the system can be restored or remade in accordance with international law. Burke's notion of representative anecdote revealed how Chomsky's contention that the United States must be held accountable for its imperialistic acts abroad is a central theme. Both accountability and a clear understanding of the consequences of adverse behavior reflect Chomsky's practical and realistic worldview of how to rectify tangible wrongs.

Chapter three's analysis utilized other Burkean terminology such as identification, the negative, and perspective by incongruity. Chomsky's motives include eliciting reader identification with an internationalist perspective and other world citizens in redirecting the course of war. Burke's concept of "the negative" illuminates Chomsky's rhetorical strategy of spotlighting the "thou shalt nots" of imperialism including the negative "don'ts" of immoral policies, international terrorism, and hypocritical policies of support and condemnation that shift and depend on imperialistic interests. Chomsky demonstrates the Burkean idea of perspective by incongruity through challenging the readers' sense of cognitive consonance. Chomsky attempted to limit their considerations of the problem to coincide with his specific worldview. He redirects their perspective of United States as victim to a perspective viewing the United States as part of the problem. Additionally, he reconfigures the terrorist attacks from a "motive for war" framework to one that positions the terrorists' actions as crimes in need of punishment in a court of law.

Chapter four's analysis of Bennett's *Why We Fight* revealed how his conservative terministic screen is more reflective of strategies described in conventional crisis response literature and with the administration's specific policy positions. Dual pentadic analyses

examined Bennett's loyal patronage to Bush's war rhetoric and revealed an overarching agenda that castigates liberalism for undermining the country's historic, moral, and patriotic heritage. In the first pentadic analysis Bennett conjures up a host of brave "agents" whose "acts" were justifiable retaliation against the "scene" or situation of the horrifying threat of Islamist terrorism. The "agency" or instrument is portrayed as powerful military might for the express "purposes" of preserving the American way of life and sharing American/Western ideals of freedoms and prosperity to the world community. Bennett's emphasis on America as "agent" mirrors a corresponding idealistic philosophical school and the accompanying ratio of "purpose" exemplifies a mystical orientation with transcendental overtones of America's quest for good over evil. Bennett's accentuation on "agent" and "purpose" reveal an idealist and religious perspective about America's place in the world that would appeal to conservative audiences.

The second pentadic analysis underscored loftier motivations. A related analysis of Bennett's rhetoric positions the relativistic liberal elite as mendacious evil doers or "agents" whose "act" is to undermine national unity, patriotism, morality, and a sense of righteous anger. Bennett argued that many of the country's institutions such as schools and media outlets serve as "agencies" and "scenes" for the purpose of spreading the secular religion of postmodernist relativism. Bennett's conservative perspective or "screen" focuses attention on and fosters reader identification with the contributions to Western thought and ideals, clear cut distinctions between right, wrong, good and evil, and America's positive influence on the world scene.

The analysis revealed one of Bennett's most prominent rhetorical strategies, a variation on Burke's theory of selection/deflection. A close reading of *Why We Fight*

revealed numerous examples of “yes but” arguments as Bennett concedes portions of opposing views or alternate interpretations only to divert the reader’s attention to other explanations more in keeping with his philosophy. A prime and effective illustration of this style involves Bennett’s concessions to Biblical pacifist teachings and subsequent use of “yes but” strategy that negates previous concessions in unusually relativistic fashion when he argues that not every conflict can be solved by turning the other cheek.

Bennett’s arguments regarding conservatism’s tragic view of the human proclivity for imperfection are explained by Burke’s logologic theory of hierarchy and order. Bennett’s preoccupation with leftist ruptures to the systemic status quo presents an alternative pentadic perspective that illustrates the dramatistic cycle interpretation. He chastises leftist thinkers who threatened post September 11th patriotic fervor and undermined not only a mystical national unity but also the basic education system by promoting a disruptive multicultural “no wrong answers” agenda. Bennett’s motives include reaching stasis by reinstating a “thorough and honest study of our history, undistorted by the lens of political correctness and pseudosophisticated relativism” (p. 55). Conceding that America’s growth and prosperity is based upon a diverse population, this analysis revealed that Bennett fears a dilution of such ideographs as “democracy”, “patriotism”, “honor”, and “freedom” if encumbered under the weighty mantle of a culturally disunified nation. A logologic reading teased out Bennett’s motivation to rid the system of the guilty relativism in an effort to restore mystery and order.

Chomsky and Bennett: Diametric Comparisons

Chomsky’s and Bennett’s ideologies, styles, and strategic techniques warrant comparison and evaluation as viewed from a Burkean perspective. Burke’s (1945/1969)

whimsical definition of ideology includes the observation that ideology is “like a spirit taking up its abode in a body: it makes that body hop around in certain ways; and that same body would have hopped around in different ways had a different ideology happened to inhabit it” (p. 6). The spirits that allow Chomsky’s and Bennett’s terministic screens to “hop around” originate in their divergent backgrounds. Immigrant roots and nurturing informed Chomsky’s penchant for dissidence and defending the voiceless along society’s margins. Although Bennett had an early flirtation with the Democratic party, his devotion to his religious beliefs provided powerful motivation for espousing conservative Protestant views. Chomsky embraces a leftist philosophy that naturally rebels against hierarchical oppression whereas Bennett’s respect for definitive order and certainty abides well within a philosophy that maintains and supports the status quo.

There are some indications that both authors attempt to broaden their audience base. Chomsky’s use of Burke’s perspective by incongruity illustrates a unique rhetorical strategy. Chomsky challenges skeptical readers to alter their customary ideology and shift their perspectives to include other possible explanations and scenarios for September 11th other than those that are cloaked in blind patriotism. He encourages cognitive dissonance amongst the readers when he presents alternative interpretations that include the United States as villain rather than victim. On the other hand, Bennett’s attempts to gather converts include his strategic style of *sic et non*. Bennett’s “yes but” approach contains concessions in hopes to persuade undecided readers and attempts to bridge ideological divides. He concedes some ground to virtuous non-violent biblical references, relativism, and Muslim American success stories in order to appear less dogmatic and before focusing attention on other elements of each subject that support his argument.

However, these attempts to broaden their audience base are offset by Chomsky's and Bennett's unswerving and inflexible moral certainties as they conduct their virtuous crusades in accordance with their terministic screens. Leftist rhetoric centers on "conspiratorially-devised injustices that reduce issues "to conflicts between 'them and us'" (Clark, 1979, p. 410) and reflects Chomsky's desire for others to completely reject the established governmental order. Chomsky's rhetoric is couched in secular rigidity as he vehemently objects to the evils committed by United States' imperialism. Chomsky worships the gods of "honesty", combats "hypocrisy", and, as staff writer for the *Washington Post* Powell (2002) observes, Chomsky's "hot contrarian nature is devoted to simple moral truisms" (p. F1). These truisms reflect his skepticism about governmental authority, his anarchist underpinnings, and an unswerving dedication for the underdog. As Chomsky encourages dissension regarding America's penchant for destroying and/or invading countries, he wants readers to identify with his affinity for Third World movements for the powerless against the powerful.

Burke's pentad and dramatistic cycle unearth Bennett's moral inflexibility. Even though Bennett's rhetorical style involves a modicum degree of concession, his lifelong pursuit for moral clarity is on display. Unlike Chomsky's secular morality, Bennett's fight against the "evils" of relativism is blanketed with religion, support of the power of authority, and an invitation to readers to accept the mystery. The analyses in this thesis reveal that both rhetors take moralistic, rigid stances that promote polarization as they preach their own ideology to the already converted. For Chomsky, the converted include a loyal European following and many American leftist-leaning constituents found among Democrats, university faculty, students, and grass roots organizations. Bennett's

converted audience consists of many social and religious conservatives primarily within the Republican party.

These bipolar attitudes prove Burke's admonitions about "trained incapacity" and the human penchant for making "themselves and the world over in their own distinctive trait, often with disastrous results" (Burke, 1961, p. 161). Chomsky's and Bennett's inability to persuade the unconverted middle of public opinion is in direct proportion to how they identify with their readers and the logic of their rhetoric. Chomsky's "incapacity" represents a dogmatic and detached logic from the margins of society and does not identify with the prevailing mood of the country. Walzer (2002), an editorial writer for *Dissent*, contends that many leftist intellectuals [like Chomsky] "live in America like internal aliens, refusing to identify with their fellow citizens, regarding any hint of patriotic feeling as a surrender to jingoism" (p. 21). Additionally, Shatz (2002), news analyst for the *Nation*, observes that Chomsky "couldn't quite connect to the emotional reality of American suffering" (p. 27) in interviews after September 11th as evidenced by the "dispassionate tone of his reaction to the carnage at Ground Zero" (p. 28) which only engaged his most loyal constituency. Chomsky's terministic screen of righteous indignation de-emphasizes the importance of the pentadic scene or the situation after the attacks and serves as a hindrance to persuading the undecided.

Chomsky's "incapacity" manifests in an inability to ponder the very relativism that Bennett rails against and "reveal[s] the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise" (Burke, 1945/1969, p. xvii). Chomsky's didactic invectives against the "evils" of imperialism fail to acknowledge that some US military interventions may have had beneficial outcomes. Burke (1935/1984) argues that "one's very own abilities can function

as blindnesses” (p. 7) and Chomsky’s ability to unmask abuses of power competes with a certain “blindness” or inability. His leftist position that the “root cause” of terror is global inequalities fails to acknowledge the power of religion. Walzer (2002) concurs that couching “root causes” in globalization deflects from the assertion that Islamic religious motives really count. Chomsky’s entrenched position of moral superiority and his determination to unmask sources of oppression deflect from a demand for accountability. Powell (2002) comments on Chomsky’s 9-11 fury against American invasive actions in Cambodia and notes that Chomsky is “incapable of seeing the Khmer Rouge for the malevolent force it was” (p. F1). A Burkean interpretation underscores Chomsky’s “blindness” and his failure to consider Third World and other regimes that are oppressive and not controlled by America.

Conversely, Bennett’s shortsighted “blindness” and fervor to remake the world in accordance with his own nationalistic worldview has its own set of ambiguities. Bennett’s rhetoric mirrors conservatism’s penchant for reclamation of past conditions that reinforce the known and the status quo. Clark (1979) determines that conservatives’ opposition to change may not translate into shared visions of the future and that their prudent rhetorical strategy is to “stick to analysis of the present and the past” (p. 419). Bennett employs Cold War crisis rhetoric from the past that frames the world in the clarity that Cole (1999) argues clearly defines friend and foe, assigns moral responsibility, and propagandizes those messages to the public. Bennett’s perspective fails to account for the growing complexities of a post Cold War world. Changing demographics and a more diverse citizenry challenge Bennett’s mythic vision of America and its inhabitants as God’s chosen country and people. Realistically, the future includes increased global interconnectivity and

interdependence that preclude as well as contradict Bennett's call for a well-defined moral clarity based on Christian precepts. Additionally, a Burkean analysis accentuates the ambiguity between Bennett's idealistic concepts of independence, nationalism, and clear choices when the world has become more interrelated with and affected by perverse non-state terrorist actors who exist in anonymous cells.

Another example of ambiguity lies in Bennett's definition of patriotism. Calls for unquestioned patriotism can redefine the "act", love of country, into identifying foreign others as the enemy. *Nation* news analyst Rankin (2002) concurs that "Americanism can serve as a code word for 'contempt for other peoples'" (p. 34). Bennett's advocacy of homogenous national unity could create cognitive dissonance among readers who are patriotic but also respect cultural differences. As attention remains fixed on patriotism and a call to arms, attention is deflected from motivations that would serve the corporate and military beneficiaries of war and military preparedness. Bennett's motivational choices could create cognitive dissonance for those in the public sphere who respect cultural differences if not diversity. Burkean analysis uncovers vagueness in Bennett's rhetoric of a clear and present enemy. His argument that "not resorting to force leads to evils far greater than the one we oppose" (p. 14) downplays the fact that the perpetrators of September 11th were from Saudi Arabia and not from Afghanistan and exposes a hypocritical foreign policy.

Fear of disrupting the status quo and confusion generated by global changes could persuade many conservatives and other citizens to embrace fierce nationalism within the rigid confines of good and evil. However, Bennett's didactic clarity fails to recognize that healthy skepticism is part of the democratic process and that relativism may serve a useful

purpose to the process by encouraging examination of facts from different vantage points. Burke (1945/1969) argues that “no one’s ‘personal equations’ are quite identical to another’s [and] in the unwritten cosmic constitution that lies behind all man-made Constitutions, it is decreed by the nature of things that each man is ‘necessarily free’ to be his own tyrant” (p. 53). Attempts to understand how and why the events of September 11th occurred do not excuse terrorist crimes as Bennett claims. Rather than accept Bennett’s conclusion that the motivations for the attacks were “envy and hate” of the American way of life, a re-examination of United States’ foreign policy could contribute a counter balance to Bennett’s strict moralistic dogma.

Bennett’s argument that the United States’ retaliation comes under the rubric of conventional “just war” crisis rhetoric warrants evaluation. Rankin (2002) describes a just war as being “predicated on struggles between nations [with] a beginning, middle and end and is not supposed to do more damage than the original harm” (p. 39). Bennett’s war rhetoric suits his predilection for coining war metaphors dating back to his drug czar days and reveals his motivation that the United States, representing status quo hierarchical power, should continue undeterred. This unilateralist philosophy contradicts growing global sentiment in favor of international cooperation in light of tendencies toward pluralistic cultures.

Chomsky’s and Bennett’s crisis rhetoric reflect their opposing perspectives on the United States’ role in the world. As Burke (1945/1969) argues, “there are two kinds of terms: terms that put things together, and terms that take things apart” (p. 49) or terms that continue or discontinue the status quo. Chomsky’s call for the cessation of American imperialism counters Bennett’s interpretation of an America as the world’s symbolic savior

that sets an example for other countries in their quest for perfected democratic governance. Bennett's pleas for national pride, patriotic unity, and acceptance of America's benign hegemony abroad offset Chomsky's vision of an America that becomes identified as a cooperative member of a court of international law rather than a country consumed by hubris and visions of world domination.

Pentadic analyses of Chomsky's and Bennett's moral arguments expose a significant philosophical shift. Historically, the liberal-minded have been labeled as idealistic romantics whereas conservatives recognize the realism of human imperfections and deal with the known rather than the ideal. Barber (2002), an editorial contributor to *Nation*, concurs that the world faces new tenants of an old paradigm, rather than a paradigm shift. Since September 11th, Barber argues "the blather of romantic left-wing idealists who preferred to see the world as they wished...rather than as it actually was" (p.11) invites a possible new realism. In a post September 11th world, the "realism" of Bennett's perspective of national sovereignty and security suggests a dying ideal, whereas Chomsky's heretofore "idealism" of global interconnectivity has become the new reality. Chomsky's pentadic emphasis on act/agency reflects a more realistic, pragmatic, and utilitarian view of world affairs. Conversely, Bennett's emphasis on agents/purpose represents an idealistic and transcendent purpose usually reserved for liberals who have utopian visions of equality and peace. These analyses reflect the potential of a different world order that supercedes the older no longer viable order.

Burke's dialectic methodology exposes far-reaching implications and motivations of the United States' hierarchical political system, one that encourages bipolar contention rather than seeking alternative, cooperative consensus. America's "either/or" two-party

system forces the voting populace to choose from within an already established binary system of ordered political possibilities that promotes maintenance of an established order while limiting options. The national two party system shifts attention away from any third party possibilities that would upset the balance of power by promoting Burke's "both/and" theory where possible cooperation dwells. Clear-cut oppositional rhetoric gives the appearance of division when, in actuality, Chomsky's and Bennett's diametric rhetoric helps to bind the public within a powerful two-party system of governance, each maintaining its hierarchical power.

An essential component of Burke's methodology is an assessment of the consequences of rhetorical acts for society. The choices proposed by Chomsky's *9-11* and Bennett's *Why We Fight* reinforce Burke's theory of dialectic rhetoric. Chomsky undermines the status quo as Bennett maintains it and they both preach to already converted readers. Burkean theory encompasses the notion that humans are endowed with inclinations to carry out the symbolic implications of their terminologies, that they continue the cycle of identification and division, create and reconcile ruptures, and rebel against and adhere to their particular hierarchical structures. What is silenced is any indication that an overarching sense of identification and cooperation can ever be sustained, at least for very long. This thesis has demonstrated how Chomsky's and Bennett's ideologies "represent the particular perspective of some or less limited group, to sanction special interests in terms of universal validity" (Burke, 1950, p. 203). In other words, their terministic screens give these rhetors no choice but to represent only one particular, narrow approach to "reality" and support the established hierarchy because of their blindness.

This study has reinforced the importance of the examination and scrutiny of rhetorical strategies in times of national ruptures or crises as well as stasis or relative stability. As the airwaves and print media swell with political discourse from presidents, presidential candidates, government officials, and representatives of varying ideologies such as Chomsky and Bennett, it becomes imperative that audiences develop a sophistication to determine rhetors' philosophies, motivations, and/or hidden agendas. Burke's pentad and dramatisitic cycle are tools that will help critics and audiences alike to continue to examine discourse in order to maintain an open and democratic public sphere.

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