

**THE 1990 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF
ANN RICHARDS**

BY

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TO ANNIE AND DIANE.

*Power does not corrupt men;
fools, however,
if they get into a position of power,
corrupt power.*

George Bernard Shaw

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The author wishes to thank the members of the faculty committee for their assistance, encouragement, and effort in this endeavor. Their support for the approach and scope of this project is greatly appreciated.

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PREFACE

In November of 1990, Ann Richards became the first woman to be elected, in her own right, governor of Texas. She was also only one of three women, nationwide, elected to serve at that level, despite early predictions that 1990 was to be the “year for women” at the polls. Following her election, political pundits attributed her win, variously, to single-causes.

It is the contention of this thesis that Richards’ election was both the result, and representative, of trends in Texas and national politics which worked in combination with a variety of elements in the campaign to produce her victory. The approach of this paper is on that macro-level.

There is no published work analyzing this election on this level. My literature review will include materials pertinent to her election, specifically, and the larger issues related to it. These materials include various media releases, journal articles, histories, almanacs, and polling information. Additionally, structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with more than two dozen political observers, participants, scholars, and reporters to gain insights and information not otherwise available.

The chapters of the thesis are organized, not chronologically, but around the various issues which are components to the election’s outcome.

Macro-trends include: 1) the increasing participation of women at increasingly higher levels of the political process; 2) the diminishment of the conservative wing of the Texas Democratic party in controlling elections, including the resulting political state of flux; and, 3) the strains of conservative and progressive tendencies existing in the Texas political culture which can be tapped by people seeking political office. It is within this setting that the actual election took place and will be examined.

At the micro-level, analysis of Richards' election success will be made in the context of others, like her, who were essentially "outsiders", in the sense that they possessed a characteristic which would have previously ruled them out of consideration for the office they sought. Common threads which were factors in their elections will be established, and will become the basis for examining her election success.

Finally, alternative explanations for Richards' election will be presented and examined, and conclusions drawn.

A common statement made regarding masters' theses is that no one reads them. Along with presenting a sound scholarly study, it has been my goal to do so in a manner which is readable.

Chapter One reviews the early expectations of gender advantage for Richards' election and introduces the conflicting force of Republican ascendancy to that office.

Chapter Two examines gender issues in political elections in general, and in the Texas context specifically.

Chapter Three analyzes the historic trends in Texas partisan politics and establishes the state of flux which made it possible for “outsiders” to achieve office.

Chapter Four presents the historic control of the Texas governor’s office, identifying dormant and active (but generally suppressed) liberal challenges to that office, which have become increasingly powerful in recent years.

Chapter Five studies the successful election of historic “outsiders”: Andrew Jackson, first Western president; John F. Kennedy, first Catholic president; Jimmy Carter, first post-Reconstruction Southern president; and Bill Clements, first post-Reconstruction Republican governor of Texas. Each election is summarized, and common threads of success identified. They include: issues, political party climate, the “outsiders” themselves, campaign expenditures, campaign organization, general election opponents, and timing.

Chapter Six reviews and analyzes the 1990 Texas gubernatorial race based on the elements established in the previous chapter.

Chapter Seven presents and analyzes various explanations of Richards’ victory, including my own which is based on information previously examined in this paper.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Long the outsiders in politics, women now find themselves running on the inside track. . . . After the Texas economy went bust in the '80s, an unprecedented number of women were elected to straighten things out, including the mayors of Dallas, San Antonio and Corpus Christi. This year Ann Richards, who became the first woman to hold statewide office in Texas in a half-century when she was elected state treasurer in 1982, hoped for the same voter response in her knock-down, drag-out battle for the governorship.

(Carlson Fall 1990, 16)

IT'S GOV. RICHARDS

(Headline Austin American Statesman, 7 Nov. 1990)

The 1990 elections were heralded as the lead-in to a decade “. . . when women candidates would pour into (political) office in record numbers.” (Gibbs 1990, 41) The gender gap was considered to have reached fruition, the issues were presumed to be on their side, and the image of men as the mess-makers to be in their favor. This was to be their year at the polls. Depending on who was counting, there were 8 to 13 women running for governorships, 7 to 9 for the U.S. Senate, and 54 to 67 for the House of Representatives. “With few exceptions those candidates were experienced politicians who had worked their way up through the system .

. ..” (Gibbs 1990, 41) The potential existed for these women to more than quadruple their gender-representation in the nation’s statehouses and the U.S. Senate, and more than double it in the U.S. House of Representatives. The June 10, 1990 ABC news program, “This Week with David Brinkley,” was devoted to the issue. Entitled “Women in Politics”, the program featured interviews with a number of leading female candidates, and explanations for their potential success from a variety of political consultants and writers. The pre-election consensus was that women held a clear advantage over their male opponents in the fall elections. (Journal Graphics 1990) The post-election reality did not reflect that view: after the tallies were in, women still held only 3 governorships (all new to their offices, the one incumbent female governor who was running having been unseated by her male opponent), 2 U.S. Senate seats (representing no change in numbers), and 29 chairs in the House of Representatives, for a total gain of only 1 congressional office, and a mere three-tenths of a percent total increase in their representation at these higher levels. (Safire 1990, A11)

Table 1.1 WOMEN HOLDING HIGH POLITICAL OFFICE IN THE U.S. IN 1990

	Before Elections		Potential Elections		After Elections		Gains	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Governors (50 total)	3	6%	13	26%	3	6%	0	0%
U.S. Senators (100 total)	2	2%	9	9%	2	2%	0	0%
U.S. House (435 total)	28	6.4%	67	15.4%	29	6.7%	1	0.3%

Source: Chart compiled from figures in Journal Graphics' "This Week with David Brinkley" transcript, Gibbs and Safire articles, and the U.S. Congressional Research Services.

The gender-gap of the 1980's had not catapulted female candidates into political power in the 1990 elections. Despite years of service and training at lower-level offices, regardless of the increased participation of women at the polls, ignoring the theories that the election issues and the electorate's temperament would favor female candidates, the glass-ceiling remained intact. What happened to the gender gap promise? It was based on a false premise.

THE GENDER GAP MYTH

"In the presidential election of 1980, women gave significantly more of their vote to Democratic incumbent, Jimmy Carter than did men." (Wirls 1986, 316) That much-touted, anti-Reagan gender gap, born of that election, promised a bloc-vote which would open the doors to liberal/Democratic female candidates in profuse numbers. It turned out to be a false interpretation of the actual shifting of views, and votes, away

from liberal, “feminine” ideals, to more conservative ones. A look at this phenomenon in retrospective shows that, while women are participating in elections at a higher rate than previously, and now cast more ballots than their male counterparts, they were not, in fact, moving away from “. . . conservative (nor) to liberal values and the Democratic party.” (Wirls 1986, 318) While women formed a greater percentage of the total vote (and of the liberal/Democratic support) in the 1980 election, they were not increasing their share of the total (nor were they giving their liberal/Democratic support), in sufficient numbers to prevent its being a losing effort. “The Democrats (were) not gaining women as much as they (were) losing men.” (Wirls 1986, 328) Men led the movement to greater political conservatism, and women followed that trend in subsequent elections, and in sufficient numbers, to result in the actual deterioration of liberal/Democratic women’s chances of election victory. The gender gap did not benefit women’s issues; rather, it merely represented a lag in their switch to the traditional, conservative male ideal and image. (See Table 1.2)

Table 1.2 THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: 1976, 1980 AND 1984

	1976		1980		1984	
	D	R	D	R	D	R
Total	51%	49%	44%	56%	42%	58%
Women	51%	49%	47%	53%	45%	55%
Men	51%	49%	39%	61%	37%	63%

Source: Table from Wirls, 1986, page 322.

While the misinterpreted gender gap did not produce the certainty of election for female candidates, it did have the effect of increasing women's potential for candidacy. Wirls explains that the reaction to early warnings of a female gender gap mobilized political forces to respond by: 1) exploiting the assumed advantage, as in the case of the Democrats; and, 2) attempting to overcome the disadvantage, as in the case of the Republicans, by promoting a more compassionate image with female candidates. As a result, more women were groomed and elected at lower levels of political power in the 1980's, and they are the ones who are now, in the 1990's, challenging for higher office.

ANN RICHARDS' TEXAS SUCCESS

As has been noted earlier, few women succeeded in their 1990 attempts at election to higher office; only three of the thirteen women challenging for their governorships were elected. Democrat Joan Finney beat incumbent Kansas Governor Mike Hayden, and Oregon's Barbara Roberts bested her Republican male opponent in her state's open race for the governor's chair. In Texas:

ANN RICHARDS: The lady has a lot of spunk. How else could she have survived one of the nastiest gubernatorial races Texas has ever seen? When her opponents brought up her past alcohol problems, she fired right back with charges of her own. And she maintained enough class to convince even the staunchest good ole boys of east Texas that she, and not Republican Clayton Williams, belonged in the Governor's office.

(TIME 1990, 61)

Some of the “good ole boys of east Texas”, and others as well, would certainly look askance at this statement, but Richards did manage to eke out a 2.55 percent victory over her conservative Republican male opponent. Hers was the second closest gubernatorial election in Texas history, the distinction of closest gubernatorial victory being claimed by the vacating (and first post Reconstruction Republican) Texas governor, William Clements, in his 1978 win over Democrat John Hill, with a .75 percent margin. (Texas Secretary of State 1991)

THE 1990 TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION: A CHOICE BETWEEN TWO “SECONDS”

The typical (Texas) Governor will be white,
Anglo-Saxon, protestant, male, middle-aged, a
family man, a lawyer, and a conservative
Democrat.

(Kraemer, Crain, and Maxwell 1975, 276)

When Texas voters went to the polls to select their governor for the sixty-seventh term, they would choose between two “seconds”: the election of Democrat Ann Richards would mark the second woman in Texas history to fill that office. The choice of Clayton Williams would record the second Republican to win the chair since Reconstruction. (Both “firsts” held the position for two non-consecutive terms.) The Libertarian Party candidate was given no chance of winning.

Richards held four “negative” characteristics of a traditional Texas gubernatorial candidate: she was female, divorced, not a lawyer, and a

liberal. Williams carried only two “negatives”, in that he was neither a lawyer nor a Democrat. The fact that these two candidates, representing groups which had previously been considered outside the mainstream of potential for election success, were now the leading contenders for the governorship of Texas bears some examination.

CHAPTER 2

WOMEN AND THE TEXAS GOVERNOR'S CHAIR

MIRIAM AMANDA "MA" FERGUSON, FIRST WOMAN GOVERNOR OF TEXAS

Miriam Ferguson became the first woman governor of Texas in 1925, joining Nellie Taylor Ross of Wyoming in achieving historical note for ". . . the first time, ever, (being) women (who) won governor's races . . ." (Chronicle of America 1989, 1924)

Ferguson was proposed for election as a stand-in for her husband, a former progressive Texas governor, James "Pa" Ferguson, after he was indicted, found guilty, impeached and removed from his office in 1917. The whole fracas followed a battle with University of Texas supporters, some of whom were serving in the Texas legislature, over appropriations to that institution. (Kraemer, Crain, and Maxwell 1975, 21-22) In 1924, Miriam Ferguson won the governor's chair on a promise of "Two governors for the price of one," and her election was viewed ". . . as a repudiation of (Pa's) conviction by the voters of Texas." (Kraemer, Crain, and Maxwell 1975, 276-77) "Miriam" became "Ma" when the Houston Press could not fit her name in its headline, and used her initials, "M.A."; ". . . The image proved a helpful one politically." (Neal and Wilmans 1977, 4)

Ma continued her husband's progressive (and anti-Klan) policies, but lost her party's primary runoff in 1926 (the first Democratic governor to do so), and lost another primary runoff bid in 1930. In 1932, she turned the tables on the sitting Democratic governor, Ross Sterling, and beat him in the party's primary runoff, going on to win the election. During her second administration, she "... made sure that she took advantage of ..." President Roosevelt's New Deal social welfare programs "... for her own state." (Neal and Wilmans 1977, 5) This second successful campaign also included Pa's promise of involvement in government decisions, with his statement that "... he would 'be on hand picking up chips and bringing in water for mama.'" (Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 399.) Following that term, Ma remained out of the gubernatorial picture until 1940, when she failed to win the Democratic party primary. (See Table 2.1) Originally opposed to women's suffrage, Ma Ferguson "... grew politically during her career, and though her husband was extremely influential she was in the end a governor in her own right." (Neal and Wilmans 1977, 5)

FRANCES "SISSY" FARENTHOLD, A STRONG SHOWING

It was not until 1972 that another woman seriously challenged for the Texas gubernatorial election. Frances "Sissy" Farenthold, a liberal state representative, had been among a small minority in the state legislature pushing for ethics reform during the time of the Sharpstown scandal, which had implicated several Democratic leaders. She "... campaigned

heavily on . . . the issues of environmental and consumer protection and structural reform of government.” (Pettus, Bland, and Sullivan 1986, 141)

. . . Farenthold made a surprisingly strong bid . . . in the 1972 second (runoff) Democratic primary, garnering 44.7 percent of the votes cast. Her showing was remarkable in that she has three of the negative characteristics of a Texas gubernatorial candidate: she is liberal, a Roman Catholic, and a woman.

(Kraemer, Crain, and Maxwell 1975, 276n)

Farenthold ran again, in 1974, but did not garner a sufficient number of votes to qualify for a runoff primary against incumbent Democratic governor, Dolph Briscoe. In her announcement for election that year, she stated: “I guess my views make me a walking sociological textbook case, a woman, a Texan against racism and sexism, and a Roman Catholic from the Bible Belt.” (Farenthold 1977, 67) While Farenthold did not identify with the feminist movement, it is generally conceded that her loss in the 1972 Democratic runoff was “. . . because of her gender.” (Pettus, Bland and Sullivan 1986, 225)

Table 2.1 HISTORICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES BY WOMEN IN TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS PRIOR TO 1990

Year:	Candidate:	Election:	Vote %	Results:
1924	M.Ferguson	D. Primary	21. %	Made Runoff
1924	M.Ferguson	D. Runoff	57. %	Won D. nomination
1924	M.Ferguson	General	59. %	Became Governor
1926	M.Ferguson	D. Primary	34.5%	Made Runoff
1926	M.Ferguson	D. Runoff	35. %	Unseated by Moody
1930	M.Ferguson	D. Primary	29. %	Made Runoff
1930	M.Ferguson	D. Runoff	45. %	Lost to Sterling
1932	M.Ferguson	D. Primary	42. %	Made Runoff
1932	M.Ferguson	D. Runoff	50.2%	Unseated Sterling
1932	M.Ferguson	General	62. %	Won second term
1940	M.Ferguson	D. Primary	8. %	Placed fourth
1972	F.Farenthold	D. Primary	28. %	Made Runoff
1972	F.Farenthold	D. Runoff	44.7%	Lost to Briscoe
1974	F.Farenthold	D. Primary	28.7%	Lost to Briscoe

Source: Compiled from figures in the 1990-91 Texas Almanac, pp. 361-62.

WOMEN IN TEXAS POLITICAL POWER IN 1990

... No one has ever accused Texas of being in the vanguard of social progress. This is the most macho state in the U. S. of A. By lore, legend, and fact, Texas is 'hell on women and horses.' Until 1918, the state maintained a legal class consisting of 'idiots, aliens, the insane and women,' and its been slowgoing ever since.
(Ivins 1990, 100)

Of the ten largest cities in Texas, five have female mayors. On the surface, it might seem that the prejudice against Texas women in politics is evaporating, making gender a non-issue in political races. But most of those mayoral positions pay very little (with the exception of Houston, which has no city manager and where Mayor Kathy Whitmire, a CPA, had previously served as city comptroller), and each mayor operates in a

manner and projects an image tailored to her peculiar locale. “. . . One is tempted to conclude that not one of them could have been elected in another’s city.” (Ivins 1990, 100)

As early as 1935, Margaret Mead destroyed the myth that biology is destiny by noting that gender concepts “. . . are principally cultural, not biological . . .” (Conway, Bourque, and Scott 1987, XXII) Yet there remains in Texas, as in most of American (and Western) society, “. . . a certain conflict between what is seen by people as the image of a politician and what is seen to be the image of a woman.” (Williams 1987, 26)

Indeed, mayoral positions in Texas may have presented the “glass ceiling” for women, much as they have for other minority candidates in other locales. Political scientist Raphael J. Sonenshein has analyzed the structural differences between those local races and statewide contests which make minority (and women’s) victories less likely in the broader, statewide, races. Sonenshein confirms Ivin’s appraisal of the parochial nature of mayoral elections, and points out that “. . . city politics often centers on the intraparty conflict between party regulars and party reformers, (while) state politics more often involves interparty competition.” (Raphael J. Sonenshein 1990, 222) This “ownership” of city mayoral races by a single-party makes it easier for minorities (and women) to marshall their supporters to win these local races, where they often wield very real power within the party structure.

To win at the state level, Sonenshein also finds that Blacks cannot afford to challenge the majority stereotype of them; they must present “. . .

the image of the non-threatening moderate middle-class politician . . . (and must) avoid direct attacks on . . . (their) white opponent, cautiously following the southern norms of racial behavior.” (Sonenshein 1990, 236)

Texas women are socialized to want to be cheerleaders and then beauty queens. . . Football is Texas’s (sic) state religion and women’s traditional role . . . has been to cheer for the guys. Texas women were never allowed to play.
(Ivins 1990, 100)

Extending Sonenshein’s formula to a woman running for governor in Texas, one can see the almost impossible task of “following the norms of (Texas gender) behavior.” It’s a Catch-22 proposition; to become governor of Texas, you have to be able to “play”, and if you’re a woman, you’re expected instead to cheer from the sidelines and support the “guys”.

Yet a Texas woman did break through the “glass ceiling” and win statewide office, for first time since Ma Ferguson was elected governor in 1932. Half-a-century after that historic event, the Democratic incumbent state treasurer, Warren G. Harding, was up for re-election when, just two days before the filing deadline for the primary elections, Ann Richards, then a Travis County commissioner, was persuaded to challenge for his office. Harding was under grand jury investigation, and the news had just been made public; the Democratic party needed a candidate to prevent loss of the position to the Republicans, in the event that Harding was damaged by his legal problems. Richards made it through the primary, in which her recent alcoholism recovery was made an issue, and into a runoff with

Harding. The incumbent withdrew a few days after the first primary, already having been indicted. Richards went on to win the election over her Republican opponent, a Viet Nam War veteran who campaigned largely on his war experience, which had cost him both legs. She took 61.4 percent of the vote. (Richards 1989, 213-25). In 1990, when Ann Richards ran for Texas governor, she was a seasoned player.

CHAPTER 3

REPUBLICANS AND THE TEXAS GOVERNOR'S CHAIR

Until recently, state office holders were 'de facto' chosen in the (Democratic) primary--held in July until 1960 and in April or May thereafter. The November (general) election was little more than a coronation.

(Tedin 1987, 233)

↑

When Republican William "Bill" Clements eked out his .75 percent victory over his Democratic opponent, state Attorney General John Hill, to become the first Republican governor of Texas since Reconstruction, Clements ". . . did not mention his party affiliation during his campaign. (Kraemer and Newell 1980, 22) In Clements' first election bid, he faced an electorate only recently becoming comfortable with voting Republican at the state level. In that year, Texas was still ". . . a modified one-party state." (McCleskey and others 1982, 84)

DEMOCRATIC DOMINANCE AND DECLINE

The tradition of Democratic party dominance began early on in Texas, and it remained and grew throughout the nineteenth century, with a brief interruption during Republican Reconstruction. The 1990-91 Texas Almanac (360-63), credits Clements as the first Republican to ever attain the Texas governor's office, assigning party labels to neither Elisha Pease

nor Edmund J. Davis, both of whom are generally identified as Republicans by other sources. Pease, who had previously sat as governor from 1853 to 1857, had opposed the Texas secession and was appointed governor under federal military rule in 1866, immediately following the Civil War. Davis, who had served as a brigadier-general in the Union Army, succeeded Pease and was elected under Reconstruction rules in 1869 in an election which “. . . recorded little violence, but many irregularities. (The returns were) never made public--and they have never been found--but the vote (was) certified. . .” (Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 257)

Bitter over Republican treatment during Reconstruction, Texans gave the party little support once fully free to rid themselves of it. Beginning with the 1873 elections, the Texas Almanac consistently records the party identification of gubernatorial candidates. The Republican candidate for governor received only 33 percent of the vote in the 1873 election, and Republican support declined in succeeding elections, with the party replaced as the Democratic party's major competition by other parties in a majority of gubernatorial elections until the election of 1914. (1990-91 Texas Almanac 1989, 360-61) During the period from 1873 until 1916, the Republican gubernatorial candidate finished second to the Democratic victor in only about half the elections held, with their bleakest period falling between 1882 through the 1890's, when they failed to run a candidate in five of the ten gubernatorial elections held. “. . . By the 1880's, (Republicans) could compete with the Democratic party in only a

handful of districts.” (McCleskey and others 1982, 79) In only eleven of the twenty-one gubernatorial elections between 1873 through 1914, a Republican challenger provided the major competition to the Democratic victor.

Table 3.1 PARTISAN TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1873:
MAJOR OPPOSITION TO DEMOCRATIC VICTOR

Year:	Opposition Party:	Opposition Vote Share:
1873	Republican	33%
1876	Republican	24%
1878	Greenback	23%
1880	Republican	24%
1882*	Greenback	40%
1884	Greenback	27%
1886	Republican	21%
1888*	Ind. Fus.	28%
1890	Republican	23%
1892#	Democratic	31%
1894	Peoples	36%
1896*	Peoples	44%
1898*	Peoples	28%
1900	Republican	25%
1902	Republican	21%
1904	Republican	20%
1906(a)	Republican	13%
1908	Republican	24%
1910	Republican	12%
1912	Socialist	8 %
1914	Socialist	12%
1916(b)	Republican	14%

Source: Prepared from information and figures in 1990-91 Texas Almanac, pp 360-61.

*No Republican running. #Reformed Republican candidate running. (a)First year of legislatively prescribed Democratic Primary. (b)Since 1916, Republican Party has consistently been Democrat's major opposition.

Ignoring the 1952 election, in which the Republican party cross-filed to list Democratic gubernatorial candidate Allan Shivers on its ballot, the Republican party has presented the major challenge to the Democratic

party's domination of the Texas governor's office since 1916. The Republican share of the vote increased dramatically with Ma Ferguson's candidacy in 1924, but returned to its normal, weak position for that era immediately following that experience. Indeed, from 1916 through 1934, Republican gubernatorial candidates never recorded more than 20 percent of the vote, except in the two elections won by Ms. Ferguson, tallying 41 percent in 1924 and 37 percent in 1932 against her. (See Table 3.2)

Table 3.2 REPUBLICAN PARTY CANDIDATES' SHARE OF THE TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL VOTE FROM 1916 THROUGH 1986

Progressive Era		Depression/War		FDR Factionalism		Modern Era	
Year	%	Year	%	Year	%	Year	%
1916	14%	'34	3%	'46	9%	1960	27%
'18	16%	1936	7%	1948	15%	'62	46%
1920	19%	'38	2%	'50	5%	1964	26%
'22	18%	1940	6%	1952	(a)	'66	26%
1924*	41%	'42	3%	'54	10%	1968	43%
'26	12%	1944	9%	1956	15%	'70	47%
1928	17%			'58	12%	1972	45%
'30	20%					'74#	31%
1932*	37%					'78!	49%
						'82	46%
						'86!	53%

Source: Compiled from figures in 1990-91 Texas Almanac, pp. 361-63.

* Ms. Ferguson elected. (a) Democrat Allan Shivers listed by Republicans on their ballot.

First year of four-year gubernatorial term, with elections held in off-presidential election years. !Republican Bill Clements elected with 49.99% of the total vote in 1978 and 52.7% in 1986. Presidential election years are written full (i.e., 1952); off-election years are abbreviated (i.e., '54). Note the Republican vote in off-election years compared to elections when voters were selecting a president.

Following the rally against Ferguson in 1932, Republican fortunes declined for another decade. From 1934 through the 1946 election, no Republican gubernatorial candidate received more than 9 percent of the vote in the general election. As the Democratic party encompassed a

broader constituency, however, friction developed. The intraparty, liberal-conservative factionalism resulting from Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal exhibits itself clearly by the end of the forties. Beginning in 1948, Republican gubernatorial candidates took an increasingly larger share of the total votes. Starting with the 1960 election, they consistently tallied over 25 percent, and in seven of the eleven elections between 1960 and 1986 inclusive, Republican gubernatorial candidates won over 40 percent of the total general election vote.

Until 1974, the Texas gubernatorial term ran for two years, with most governors serving for two consecutive terms. In 1972, the Democratic state legislature lengthened the term to four years (requiring a constitutional amendment), with the election scheduled for the off-year, when the Republican vote had historically been lower.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

The near monopoly of the Democratic Party in Texas was promoted and perpetuated by the introduction in 1906 of the direct primary to nominate candidates for public office. For the next several decades, political conflict in Texas was confined almost entirely to the Democratic primaries; the general election was usually a mere formality, offering little interest and even less significance. Erstwhile Republicans, Populists, Socialists, and the like found it necessary to participate in the Democratic primaries if they wanted to have any real voice in the real election.

(McCleskey and others 1982, 80)

In 1905 the Terrell Election Law mandated that any political party receiving more than 100,000 votes in a gubernatorial election select its candidate for the following election through a statewide primary. (The requirement was amended in 1945 to 200,000 votes cast for the party's nominee in the previous gubernatorial election.) In 1918, the primary election code was modified, creating the potential for a two-tier primary system, with the requirement that a candidate receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary to achieve party nomination to office. Thus, since 1918, the primary runoff, and its possibility, have very much figured in Democratic nominations for the governor's office.

Prior to 1962, the Republican party vote had been too low to require the primary process, except in three instances: in the 1924, 1928, and 1932 elections, over 100,000 Republican votes were cast, requiring Republican primaries for the next gubernatorial elections. Interestingly, the 1924 and 1932 elections involved Ms. Ferguson; and all three were presidential election years, with 1928 marking the first time a Republican presidential candidate won the Texas vote, a feat which was not repeated until the 1952 election of General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The importance of the Democratic primary, and inevitability of its victor becoming governor, can be seen in the participation in that election compared to voter turn-out for the general election. (See Table 3.3) From 1906, the first year of the Democratic primary, until 1944, only twice did the general election record a higher vote total than that recorded for the Democratic primary leading up to it. In 1920, the first time a Democratic

runoff was necessary, the general election vote in November exceeded both primary votes by less than ten percent. The 1924 general election, Ms. Ferguson's first success, posted a higher total vote than her runoff victory, but fell short of total ballots cast in the first primary.

Participation in the Democratic primary election continued to overshadow the general election until 1944, a presidential election year. Factionalism within the Democratic party in Texas was stirred by F.D.R.'s New Deal and

. . . sharpened division along liberal-conservative lines. . . These alignments turned in part on conflict between business and organized labor, between the better off and the worse off, between those who wanted less government regulation of the private sector and those who wanted more.

(McCleskey and others 1982, 80)

Beginning in 1944, the Democratic gubernatorial primary vote has consistently registered a smaller amount than the general election tally in presidential election years. Until 1962, however, the Democratic gubernatorial primary vote in off-election years continued to exceed the general election total. "In 1950 (an off-election year), almost three times as many people voted in the Democratic primary as voted in the November (general) election." (Tedin 1987, 234)

Since 1960, the Democratic primary vote has fallen short of the general election vote for governor in every election, regardless of whether or not it was held concurrently with a presidential election.

**Table 3.3 HIGHER VOTE TOTAL IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1906-86:
DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY (DP) AND GENERAL ELECTION (GE)**

Progressive Era		Depression/War		FDR Factionalism		Modern Era	
Year:	Higher Total:	Year:	Higher Total:	Year:	Higher Total:	Year:	Higher Total:
'06	DP	'34	DP	'46	DP	1960	GE
1908	DP	1936	DP	1948	GE	'62	GE
'10	DP	'38	DP	'50	DP	1964	GE
1912	DP	1940	DP	1952	GE	'66	GE
'14	DP	'42	DP	'54	DP	1968	GE
1916	DP	1944	GE	1956	GE	'70	GE
'18	DP			'58	DP	1972	GE
1920	GE					'74#	GE
'22	DP					'78	GE
1924*	(a)					'82	GE
'26	DP					'86	GE
1928	DP						
'30	DP						
1932*	DP						

Source: Prepared from information and figures in 1990-91 Texas Almanac, pgs. 361-63.

*Years when Ms. Ferguson was the victorious candidate. (a)General election figures exceeded the runoff, but not the first primary vote. #First year of the extended, four-year gubernatorial term, held in off-election years. Presidential election years are written full (i.e., 1952); off-election years are abbreviated (i.e., '54).

REPUBLICAN INROADS INTO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

In time, factional feeling became stronger than partisan attachment for some persons, and the losing faction in the Democratic primary began trying to carry the battle into the general election by withholding support from the Democratic candidate or by openly supporting their Republican opponents...

(McCleskey and others 1982, 81)

While the Democratic party within Texas was periodically embroiled in factional disputes, the national Republican party was making inroads at attracting traditional Democrats away from their party's presidential candidates. Because Democratic party identification was essentially

pragmatic (the only way to participate in state races was within the Democratic party) rather than philosophical, it was not difficult for conservative Republican presidential contenders to draw votes in Texas. Republican Herbert Hoover won the Texas presidential vote in 1928, when "... the three P's of Protestantism, prohibition, and prosperity . . ." gave him a state plurality of 26,000 votes over his anti-prohibition, Catholic, Democratic opponent, Alfred E. Smith. (Fehrenbach 1980, 649-50) Following that flight from Democratic dominance of presidential elections, the Republicans faced a dry spell which lasted over twenty years.

The New Deal launched by President Roosevelt in 1933 eventually stirred considerable political conflict in Texas, but it took the form of factionalism in the Democratic party rather than competition in the general election between Republicans and Democrats.

(McCleskey and others 1982, 80)

Defections among conservative Democrats, simmering over during the 1940's, came to a rolling boil in the 1952 presidential election when General Dwight D. Eisenhower took the Texas tally away from liberal Democrat, Adlai Stevenson.

So intense was the anti-Stevenson feeling that the Democratic governor (Allan Shivers), the candidate for U.S. Senator (Price Daniel), and even the party's state convention itself actually endorsed and worked for Republican Dwight Eisenhower.

(Pettus, Bland, and Sullivan 1986, 134)

The 1952 presidential election is credited with tearing permanently the delicate fabric binding the Texas Democrats, resulting in an intensified power-play between the conservative Democrats who had supported Eisenhower, and the liberal/loyalists who were outraged at what they viewed as philosophical and political heresy. The active support given a Republican presidential candidate, and his ultimate victory, also lent respectability to the acts of supporting and voting for Republican candidates in general. Republican success in presidential elections in Texas grew steadily; a Republican won again in 1956, 1972, 1980, and 1984; “. . . they scored near misses in 1960, 1968, and 1976, and they were solidly defeated only in 1964, when Texan Lyndon B. Johnson was the Democratic nominee.” (McCleskey and others 1982, 96) So routine is the victory of the Republican presidential candidate in Texas that “. . . it has become customary for most machine Democrats to support the Republican presidential nominee.” (Pettus, Bland, and Sullivan 1986, 128-29)

Table 3.4 RATIO OF PARTISAN POPULAR VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: 1940-'88: DEMOCRATIC TO REPUBLICAN (1)

Year:	Ratio:	Year:	Ratio:	Year:	Ratio:
1940	4.22	1960 (a)	1.04	1972	.96
1944	4.30	1964 (b)	1.73	1976 (c)	1.07
1948	2.66	1968	1.03	1980	.75
1952	.88			1984	.56
1956	.79			1988	.77

Source: Compiled from figures in The 1991 World Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 420. (a)Texan Lyndon B. Johnson was the Democratic vice-presidential candidate. (b)LBJ was the Democratic presidential candidate. (c)Southerner Jimmy Carter was the Democratic presidential candidate.

THE REPUBLICAN RISE AT THE STATE LEVEL

Republican success at the state level began with a 1961 special election to fill the Senate seat won by incumbent Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson the previous year. Johnson had entered both the race for Senate re-election and the race for the Democratic presidential nomination. Upon his election to the vice-presidency, his Senate seat became vacant and a special election was called to fill it. John Tower, who had been Johnson's Republican opponent in the previous regular Senate race, capitalized on his recently acquired name identification and the growing liberal/conservative rift within Democratic ranks, to win over his conservative Democratic opponent.

The victory was evidence of the growth of the Republican party, though the liberal Democrats refusal to support their conservative candidate contributed to the Republican cause.

(Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 437)

Spurred by Tower's statewide success, a record number of Republicans ran for office the following year. They increased their representation in the state legislature, won over twenty county offices, and garnered their second seat in the U.S. Congress.

As Texas became more industrialized, in-migration included,

A realitively high proportion of people . . . from states where Republicans are strong or who are inclined toward the Republican party by their socioeconomic status.

(McClesky and others 1982, 102)

At this same time the Democratic party experienced less capacity to deal with the factionalism which naturally results from growth and lack of discipline. Additionally, the change in the minimum voting age from twenty-one to eighteen produced a new group of voters less tied to tradition and more innately independent. Evidence of the increased Republican vote can be seen in the fact that the Republican primary has consistently been a part of Texas elections since 1962, with that increased interest reflecting a loss for the Democrats. Between 1955 and 1986, the Democratic party identification in Texas was cut in half, dropping from 66 percent to 33 percent, with Republican identification jumping from 6 percent in 1955 to 27 percent in 1986. Independents grew from 28 percent in 1955 to 40 percent in 1986. (See Table 3.5) Tedin postulates that this growth in the independent category represents a way-station for Democrats-turning-Republican. (Tedin 1987, 236-37)

Table 3.5 PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN TEXAS BETWEEN 1955 AND 1986

	1955	1968	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986
Democratic	66%	59%	48%	43%	42%	33%	33%
Independent	28%	31%	37%	39%	49%	43%	40%
Republican	6 %	10%	14%	18%	17%	24%	27%

Source: Tedin 1987, page 236. (Note: Figures do not always total 100%, but are given as they appear in Tedin's table.)

If voters were switching parties during this period, so were their elected officials: "No other state in the Union has witnessed as many partisan switches among leading politicians as has Texas!" (Pettus, Bland, and Sullivan 1986, 112) Democratic Governor John Connally became a

Republican in 1973, and later ran (unsuccessfully) for the presidential nomination of his adopted party. In 1978, renegade Democratic Congressman Phil Gramm quit his office, after having been ousted from the Democratic Caucus in the House for sharing that body's strategy with the Republican administration, and won the special election to fill his vacant seat--as a Republican. He later, as a Republican, won the Senate seat vacated by former Republican Texas Senator, John Tower. In 1985, Democratic Congressman Kent Hance became a born-again Republican, in what many felt was a move to position himself to run for the governorship in 1990. Clearly, Republican party identification was no longer a condition for which people in Texas apologized, or necessarily suffered.

THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF WILLIAM CLEMENTS, REPUBLICAN

In 1978, Republican party identification was only 14 percent compared to a Democratic identification of 48 percent, with independents at 37 percent. Clements was able to win with that split, using his personal wealth to finance his own campaign and taking him from obscurity to statewide recognition in his party primary, when he scored a three-to-one upset over Republican party chairman, Ray Hutchison. His victory in the general election of 1978 resulted from over-confidence on the part of party Democrats who considered his election a fantasy, a bitter rift within the Democratic party over a hotly contested primary battle in which incumbent (and conservative) Democratic Governor Dólphe Briscoe was

denied the nomination, and Clements' own adroitness at painting his opponent as "... a liberal/politician/lawyer." (Tedin 1987, 239)

Clements outspent his Democratic opponent, state Attorney General John Hill by two-to-one, and succeeded in garnering enough independent and disgruntled (Briscoe) Democratic votes to combine with Republicans, winning the closest Texas gubernatorial election in history. "Of those who voted for Briscoe in the primary, 47 percent voted for Clements in the fall." (Tedin 1987, 239) There is consensus that the strong Republican vote in that off-election year, with unpopular Democratic President Jimmy Carter in the White House, showed the increasing impact of national politics on Texas elections. "Clements, to his credit, was prepared to take advantage." (Tedin 1987, 239)

Clements lost his re-election bid in 1982, to conservative Democratic Attorney General Mark White. A faltering state economy was a major factor, and Clements' "... image as a bad tempered curmudgeon ..." helped restore Democratic solidarity. (Tedin 1987, 240) In the re-match of 1986, the state economy was still in a downward spiral; White had lost support over his education reforms, especially the no-pass/no-play rule which incited rural Texans; and White was perceived to be better at looking good than getting things done, with the state facing a huge deficit. Clements was able to increase his previous share of the vote among Hispanics, rural whites, and lower-income groups, while losing support among the wealthier voters. His 1986 victory showed a reverse of his 1982

defeat; he won by the same margin White had enjoyed in 1986: 53 percent to 46 percent.

The Republican party in Texas has established itself as a very viable opponent to the Democratic dominance of the past century: “When Clements was first elected Democrats had a 130-20 edge in the House; for the 1987 session it was 94-56.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1987, 1131) Clements’ second election proved that a Republican victory in Texas gubernatorial elections is not necessarily a fluke. “In future years the party should be able to recruit increasingly better candidates.” (Tedin 1987, 249) The issue facing the voters in 1990 was how soon that would happen.

CHAPTER 4

WHAT DO TEXANS WANT IN A GOVERNOR?

“Texans do not want a ‘do-good’ governor. Caring is a personal, individual matter. Texans don’t believe that it is the role of government to help the needy.”

“Somebody they see as an outsider, who will fight against taxes and bureaucracy, but caring enough to stress education and economic development. Not much more.”

“Someone who is honest and decisive, with real ideas of what should be done and how to do them.”

“Someone like John Connally who can wear a cowboy hat and look good.”

“Somebody like them.”

(Representative responses to the author’s question: “What do Texans want in the person they elect governor?” Confidential interviews with political observers, participants, scholars, and reporters who were actively involved in the 1990 gubernatorial election. Fall, 1990.)

THE TEXAS GOVERNOR: CONSTITUTIONALLY AND HISTORICALLY

The governor has quite limited constitutional and statutory powers. . . It is the informal factors such as leadership, bargaining skill, and persuasive ability rather than the formal powers of office that make a Texas governor appear to be powerful.

(Kraemer and Newell 1980, 97)

More than most state constitutions, the Texas constitution adopted in 1876 established a very fragmented delegation of powers. It is under this constitution that Texas still operates. The fact that Texans have not required a new document, one that would provide their governor with formal powers not reliant upon “leadership, bargaining skill, and persuasive ability,” illustrates the traditional Texas attitude about the appropriate relationship between government and the governed. To understand what Texans want in their governor, it is necessary to examine this attitude and its development.

Texans are conservative in the sense that there is a strong, general belief that “. . . ‘the less government the better.’” (Kraemer and Newell 1980, 2) Texans view government with suspicion, for it has the power to intrude on natural forces which are deemed better able to solve, and avoid, problems. Free enterprise is one such superior force. Natural selection is another. In the traditional, conservative Texas view, people succeed or fail strictly as a result of their own efforts, and not because of any outside forces over which they exercise no control. The traditional Texas belief is

that government has no place tinkering in this almost-holy system. The development and perpetuation of this attitude has singularly historic roots.

Texas emerged from Mexican rule after a relatively short experience with government domination, to spend a brief time as an independent and unfettered republic. It then joined the Union as a southern slave state, and was soon embroiled in a Civil War fought over the right to hold slaves, a relatively unimportant aspect of the livelihood of the vast majority of Texans, but the basis of lifestyle--and power--of the planters who controlled state politics. Following the Civil War, a period of humiliation fell in the form of Republican Reconstruction. When Texans forged their 1876 constitution, they determined to be governed as loosely as possible.

The vacuum of power created under the 1876 constitution led to power aggrandizement by the emergent financial interests, first in the form of livestock empires, then railroad entrepreneurs, then petroleum development. Most recently, land and financial interests have been powerful factors in state policy, perpetuating the heritage that government is the enemy and free market the savior. Texas has a national reputation for this attitude, and it is part of the Texas-brag to be big on the business climate. Among factors considered as positive are the following:

. . . weak labor unions and extremely poor government performance in worker-related programs, namely, the lowest unemployment compensation benefits in the nation, the fifth lowest state and welfare expenditures, and the fifth lowest maximum disability benefit under workers' compensation. . . total state and local spending for all public programs in Texas stand at only 83.8 percent of the average (for) the U.S. . . In one measure

of wealth, Texas ranks 23d among the states. In services, it ranks 43d.

(Pettus, Bland, and Sullivan 1986, 20)

Historian (and native Texan) T.R. Fehrenbach maintains that "Texas entered the 20th century with its basic society a full two generations, or about sixty years, behind the development of the American mainstream." (Fehrenbach 1980, 279) "The attitudes and institutions of Texas civilization were firmly established in the years between 1835 and 1861," essentially the time of the republic and early statehood. (Fehrenbach 1980, 279) It was during this time that Texas was a cotton producer, with heaviest settlement on its eastern border and the remainder of the state a vast frontier. This Texas parochialism, rather than diminishing after the Civil War and turn of the century, actually increased for

. . . two primary reasons. Texas was a vast province. . . remote from the rest of the United States. . . and thus not in continuous contact with other states. Second, after the final quarter of the 19th century, there was no significant outside immigration into the Texas heartland. (Fehrenbach 1980, 633-34)

Thus, while the rest of the nation was evolving a social response to the impacts of industrialization, and developing governmental programs to deal with them, Texas was still in its agrarian social mode, with the result that it was to be overwhelmed by industrialization when it did occur. And its occurrence, again, was not typical of the rest of the country.

The major differences between Texas and the majority of other states were that, in Texas, the

development seemed more explosive because it started late and such industrialization as occurred took peculiarly regional forms.
(Fehrenbach 1980, 664)

The initial industrial growth in Texas, unlike most of the nation, was agri-based. With “. . . the economy (being) 90 percent agricultural, there were few means of escape from the dominant social pattern. This remained stable until the 1950's” and produced very conservative politics. (Fehrenbach 1980, 665-66) Texas in the 20th century remained close to the land, economically and in terms of social attitudes; when the land produces wealth, and it is theoretically available to all, there is no excuse for poverty.

Oil was to become the basis for economic growth after the discovery of East Texas reserves in the 1920's, but “. . . oil only reinforced old trends. . . Further, the great refining and petrochemical industries were not labor-intensive.” (Fehrenbach 1980, 667-68) Thus the land-based industrialization which came late, imperfectly, and rapidly, to Texas, did not result in a change of 19th century social order or attitudes.

Later industrialization “. . . with the exception of the aero-space complex around Dallas and a few other scattered enterprises,” continued this same pattern, being “based on the processing of agricultural products and the extraction and processing of raw materials.” This agricultural-mining complex resulted in an economy quite different from a true industrial state. “The society of Texas was still based on private property, not skills.” (Fehrenbach 1980, 672)

The evolutionary shift from a property-based social order to one which is labor/skill-based is identified as the key factor which prompted other states to develop social-government programs addressing the problems brought on by industrialization. Texas missed this evolutionary step. And the late 20th century economic “boom” in Texas (still quite land- and property-based) could not affect a change in the already entrenched social attitudes of Texas. The industrialization that came to Texas was so rapid and overwhelming that it produced, not evolution, but stress. “Under stress, everywhere, human beings react according to their basic value systems, never according to acquired education.” (Fehrenbach 1980, 675)

Thus, Fehrenbach contends that early Texas attitudes about government and the state’s subsequent economic development combined to produce a self-perpetuating “small-government/big business” attitude. This is not to say that there have been no challenges to the traditional conservatism of Texas government. Texas native (and political scientist) V.O. Key contends that the basic conflicts in Texas politics arise out of economic considerations:

A modified class politics seems to be evolving, not primarily because of an upthrust of masses that compels men of substance to unite in self-defense, but because of the personal insecurity of men suddenly made rich who are fearful lest they lose their wealth. . . a new class has arisen from the exploitation of natural resources in a gold rush atmosphere.

(Key 1949, 255)

Both Fehrenbach and Key attribute Texas' earlier economic development to land and mineral bases; while Fehrenbach would emphasize the cultural and sociological aspects of this development more strongly than does Key, their analyses are not necessarily incompatible. Certainly, political events which have followed the rapid population and economic growth Texas experienced since Key wrote his analysis supports his vision of class conflict and the ". . . portent of the rise of a bipartisan system." (Key 1949, 255)

TEXAS GOVERNORS AND CHALLENGES TO THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION

By now it is abundantly clear that conservatism has been a dominant theme in the history of Texas politics. . . . From the earliest days of statehood, the Democratic party has been the political vehicle for the implementation of this conservatism.

(McCleskey and others 1982, 115)

Perennial rebels nationally against the liberal wing of the Democratic party, the machine Democrats . . . have concentrated their efforts on holding the governorship, because although the office itself has little power, a liberal governor could use the prestige and moral leadership of his or her position to espouse policies that might be damaging to conservative interests.

(Pettus, Bland, and Sullivan 1986, 134)

For the Democratic party to become, and remain, the "political vehicle for the implementation of . . . conservatism" in Texas, it had to encompass a broad spectrum of interests. Because, as we have seen, Texas culture has

an inherent conservative bent, this has not generally been a particularly difficult task. However, there have been periods in the development of the Texas economy and society when a strain of discontent emerged, and became sufficiently widespread and activist that it required a response by the powerful party. Such challenges to the party's traditional conservatism, and the party's response, are especially important to the study of the 1990 gubernatorial election in that there are historical trends and important parallels which may well have affected that most recent election.

THE POPULIST CHALLENGE

'When men suffer, they become politically radical; when they cease to suffer, they favor the existing order.'

WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, Plains Historian.
(Fehrenbach 1980, 613)

Following the Civil War, the American economy was overwhelmingly agrarian, and Texas was almost exclusively so. At the same time that agriculture was becoming more mechanized, farm prices were falling (especially cotton, Texas' one crop), and transportation costs and interest rates rose. The squeeze on the Texas small farmer was intense; unlike other regions of the country, Texas was not developing industrially so the farmer hadn't the choice of leaving the farm to support his family. As agricultural anguish grew, the sufferers sought government assistance to relieve the symptoms of their problems.

The Greenback party, promoting an increase in the supply of paper money as an answer to the farmers' cash shortage, was established in Indiana and transported effectively to Texas. Garnering 23 percent of the vote in the first gubernatorial election the party contested, the Greenbacks established themselves as a threat to dominant Democratic party control in 1878. In the subsequent election, the Greenback gubernatorial candidate placed third, receiving only 13 percent of the vote. The Greenback party ran candidates in the next two elections, joining with the Republicans in 1882 to back a candidate who polled 40 percent of the vote. (See Table 4.1) As it grew, the Greenback party expanded its platform, calling for, among other things, ". . . the income tax, . . . an improved school system for rural areas, . . . and strict regulation of railroads." (Fehrenbach 1980, 617) Despite the widespread appeal of the Greenback agenda, the conservative Democratic party, not uninfluenced by the smaller segment of Texas society known today as "the interests," resisted adopting the relief measures sought by the farmers until there was no other option. "This, and . . . temporary prosperity . . . caused the protest party to wither away and disappear." (Fehrenbach 1980, 618)

Another populist revolt, a bit later in the same era, took the form of the People's party, also challenging the conservative Democratic party. Born of the Farmers' Alliance, an 1875 Lampasas, Texas, product, the People's party was the national response to a national problem experienced in, and outside of, Texas. Prior to its organization into a political party, the Alliance called for state regulation of railroad rates and equitable

taxing of railroad property. It gradually added additional appeals, including anti-trust legislation. The People's party stood for a wide range of social reform, including an increase in the money supply, ". . . the 8 hour workday, (and) free compulsory education through high school." (McCleskey and others 1982, 77) The Populists ran a candidate in every gubernatorial election from 1892 until the establishment of the Democratic primary in 1906. (See Table 4.1.)

The Democratic gubernatorial candidate in 1890 was state Attorney General Jim Hogg, who, as the people's attorney, had ". . . declared war on big business, wherever it might be found. He became the center of attention and won a million farmers' hearts." (Fehrenbach 1980, 620) As Governor Hogg, he took on the railroads, one of the villains specifically identified by the Populists as responsible for their desperate situation. Ultimately, the Texas Railroad Commission was created, the fulfillment of a campaign pledge credited with his victory. While it got him the love of the farmers, it wrought the wrath of "the interests" and conservatives accustomed to controlling the party and the governor's chair promoted a "machine" candidate against Hogg in the 1892 election. Hogg won the five-candidate race with 44 percent of the vote.

In Hogg's second term, he ". . . secured the United States' second antitrust law, following the state of Kansas by about one month." (Fehrenbach 1980, 621) Ultimately, the maverick Hogg was unable to retain the support of the Alliance's membership; to do so would have required him to directly attack too many of "the interests" within Texas,

those who held power in the Democratic party. His attacks on the railroads and trusts had largely affected non-Texas entities. At that point, the Alliance joined the People's (Populist) party and expanded their attack on "the system." The Democratic party in Texas was unable to accommodate to all of the Alliance's issues, however; ". . . almost all (their) demands were eventually to be worked into U.S. law." (Fehrenbach 1980, 623)

Hogg was succeeded by C.A. Culberson in 1895. Culberson perpetuated the reform programs begun by his predecessor, but initiated none of his own. The next two governors, Sayers and Lanham, adopted some reforms, but favored a business climate, leading Richardson to credit them with being ". . . responsible for the resurgence of conservatism." (Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 346) Yet the dominant conservative Democratic party had sufficiently responded to the problems which had ignited the Populist movement to avoid being destroyed by it. The threats of the Greenback and People's parties to Democratic dominance was thus defused through a measured approach which incorporated within the party program that which was not anathema to it, then cautiously ignored that which would have destroyed its conservative essence.

Table 4.1 POPULIST CHALLENGES TO CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

Year	Party	Vote %	Place	# Candidates	Dem. %
'78	Greenback	23%	2	3	67%
1880	Greenback	13%	3	3	63%
'82	Greenback	40%	2	3	60%
1884	Greenback	27%	2	3	65%
1892	People's	25%	3	5	44%
'94	People's	36%	2	5	49%
1896	People's	44%	2	3	56%
'98	People's	28%	2	4	71%
1900	People's	6%	3	4	68%
'02	People's	4%	3	4	71%
1904	People's	3%	3	6	74%

Source: Prepared from information and figures in 1990-91 Texas Almanac, p. 360. Presidential election years are written full (i.e., 1952); off-election years are abbreviated (i.e., '54).

By the beginning of the twentieth century, populism was a spent force, the victim of its own mistakes, of better economic conditions, and of masterful politicking by its opponents.

(McCleskey and others 1982, 77)

THE PROGRESSIVE THREAT

With the decline of agrarian protest, sentiment for reform subsided temporarily, only to be revived after 1900 with the spirit of the progressive movement.

(Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 336)

With the thunder of the People's party spent, and the introduction of the Democratic primary in 1906, political contests were fought within the Democratic party. The winner of that first primary was Thomas M.

Campbell, endorsed by former Governor Hogg and an activist reformer who (unsuccessfully) proposed a state income tax. Other progressive changes were instituted under his leadership, but did not continue beyond his tenure. He was followed by O.B. Colquitt, a conservative under whom, nonetheless, progressive measures such as child labor laws and workmen's compensation were passed by the legislature.

In 1912 and 1914, candidates for governor ran in the general election under the label of the Progressive party; in the first such election, the Progressive candidate received 5 percent of the vote. In the second, he received only .8 of one percent. Again, the dominant, conservative Democratic party had responded to a strong liberalizing social force by incorporating into its candidates and policies a sufficient response to deflect the challenge.

Progressive programs and resultant action by the legislature continued to identify Texas as one of the most progressive states in the nation throughout the early 1900's.

(Kraemer, Crain, and Maxwell 1975, 20)

Governor James Ferguson began an era which came to be named after him, because of his presence (sometimes in the person of his wife, Miriam), influence, and style. Some historians characterize his policies as being in the finest of the progressive traditions; others view his emphasis on personality as bordering on demagoguery. "Farmer" Jim campaigned on a platform calling for farm rent controls, and was liberal in his pardoning policies. His battle with the University of Texas, earlier

mentioned, is said to have led to his impeachment and removal from office. The cluster of governors who succeeded him and served under “Fergusonism”, including his wife, successfully fought off the onus of the Ku Klux Klan and identified with the common man. This era survived “Farmer” Jim’s impeachment, bitter in-party fighting over the election of his wife to serve as first woman governor of Texas, state-wide division over prohibition, and a world war, and spilled over into the economic depression of the 1930’s. Besides the two Fergusons, the era produced other political stand-outs, such as the state’s youngest governor, reformer Dan Moody (a conservative in his older years), and James V. Allred, at once Texas’ last, and most, liberal governor (although he was the most conservative of all the candidates in his first election).

The Fergusonian period of Texas political history is generally identified not with conservative or liberal forces so much as personalities. It is noteworthy, however, that most of these personalities identified not with “the interests,” but with the people, retaining a touch of the populist tinge from the past.

Following the liberal tenure of James V. Allred, Texas-in-transition was governed by “Pappy” O’Daniel, a flour milling company executive and salesman who had gained a large following with his down-home radio program featuring a hillbilly band and homilies, many of them religious. His political program was strong on promises for old-age pensions, but short on delivery. His candidacy may well be viewed as a transition to

what was certainly among the most conservative spells of conservative Democratic dominance of the Texas governor's office.

THE MODERN CHALLENGE

. . . Texas, a nation-state that was only recently a kind of underdeveloped country is now one of the high tech centers of the world . . . (There is) a certain unevenness to Texans' perceptions of where their state (stands) and ideas about where it should go. . . Its politics, like its economy, has had its roller-coaster ride ups and downs over the last decade.

(Barone and Ujifusa 1987, 1126-27)

During the period from 1936, when James Allred was re-elected governor, through 1952, the Democratic party was forced to hold a primary runoff on only two occasions, in the Allred election which began that period and again in 1946 when conservative Beauford Jester won an easy victory over liberal Homer P. Rainey. This means that only 22 percent of the Democratic primaries during that period required runoff elections.

In sharp contrast is the modern period which followed; between the 1954, and through the 1990 Texas gubernatorial elections, the Democratic party was forced into runoffs on six occasions, or 40 percent of the time, to select their candidate for the governor's office. In all but one of those contests, a liberal closely contested a (victorious) conservative for the party's nomination. That one exception was in 1990, when two liberals vied for the party's endorsement.

Table 4.2 MODERN CHALLENGES TO CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS; DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY (DP), DEMOCRATIC RUNOFF (RO), AND GENERAL ELECTION (GE) THREATS BETWEEN 1952 AND 1978:

Year	Election	Liberal Challenger	% Vote	Place	Number Running	Gub. Victor	% Vote
1952	DP	R.Yarborough	34.7	2	3	Shivers	62.8
'54	DP	R.Yarborough	47.8	2	4	Shivers	49.5
'54	RO	R.Yarborough	46.8	2	2	Shivers	53.2
1956	DP	R.Yarborough	29.4	2	6	Daniel	39.9
1956	RO	R.Yarborough	49.9	2	2	Daniel	50.1
'58	DP	H.Gonzalez	18.7	2	4	Daniel	60.6
'62	DP#	D.Yarborough*	22.	2	6	Connally	29.8
'62	RO	D.Yarborough*	48.8	2	2	Connally	51.2
1964	DP	D.Yarborough*	28.9	2	4	Connally	69.1
1968	DP	D.Yarborough*	24.1	1	10	Smith	22.1
1968	RO	D.Yarborough*	44.7	2	2	Smith	55.3
1972	DP	F.Farenthold	27.9	2	7	Briscoe	43.9
1972	RO	F.Farenthold	44.7	2	2	Briscoe	55.3
1972	GE	R.Muniz @	6.2	3	4	Briscoe	47.9
'74	DP	F.Farenthold	28.7	2	4	Briscoe	67.4
'74	GE	R.Muniz @	5.6	3	5	Briscoe	61.4
'78	GE	M.Compean @	.6	3	4	Clements	50.

Source: Prepared from information and figures in 1990-91 Texas Almanac, pp. 362-63. Presidential election years are written in full (i.e., 1952), off-election years are abbreviated (i.e., '54). #In the 1962 Democratic primary election, incumbent governor Price Daniel placed third with 17% of the vote, thus failing to qualify for the runoff. *Don Yarborough was thought by many political analysts to have been confused with Ralph Yarborough by a large segment of voters. @La Raza Unida candidate.

As was noted in Chapter Three, the FDR New Deal period evoked a bitter party rift between liberal and conservative factions within the Democratic party, with conservatives always seeming to come out on top. Liberals were consistently unable to mobilize voters in sufficient numbers to elect their candidates. Governor Shivers' (and the entire Democratic machine's) 1952 support of Republican presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower resulted in a coalescence of liberal/loyalist rebellion of the left-wing of the party. When Price Daniel vacated his U.S. Senate seat in 1956

to become governor, liberal Ralph Yarborough, whom Shivers, then Daniel, had beaten in bitter primary runoff battles for that office in 1954 and 1956, respectively, was able to win the special election (in which 23 candidates competed) to fill the Senate vacancy in 1957. With the help of the newly formed liberal organization, "Democrats of Texas," Yarborough won ". . . a decisive victory over his conservative (primary) opponent to retain the Senate seat. . ." the following year. (Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 432)

The liberal challenge to conservative control of the Democratic party continued, with great persistence, albeit varying degrees of failure. (See Table 4.2) During this modern time period, third-party La Raza Unida established a challenge to the conservative Democratic control, running a candidate in the 1972, 1974, and 1978 gubernatorial elections. Thus, from the 1950's on, the Democratic party, which had for nearly a century reigned supreme over the Texas governor's chair, was being threatened from within and/or without by a liberal challenge. As we saw in Chapter Three (Tables 3.2 and 3.5), it was also losing strength to its conservative competition, the Republican party, creating a de-alignment in that party.

Many conservative Democrats were joining the (Republican) party, which may help to explain a noticeable tendency (of the party) toward the extreme right.

(Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 438)

As this collision course was developing, the Democrats who filled the governor's chair were caught in a Catch 22 situation: which dissatisfied segment of the party should be appeased? Early on, in the fifties, the liberals were largely ignored by Governors Jester and Shivers. Price Daniel was more moderate, followed by John Connally who, although a conservative, courted Blacks before the poll tax was ruled unconstitutional by the federal courts in 1966. Following the Supreme Court's Baker v. Carr decision in 1962, a federal court order required Texas to redistrict: the result may have exacerbated the Democratic party's liberal/conservative split on a philosophical basis, but the contention that the redistricting would "... diminish the influence of rural areas . . . (and provide) liberal politicians . . . an advantage" (Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 440) proved to be exaggerated.

Connally's lieutenant governor and successor, Preston Smith, was conservative, but endorsed a state minimum wage law in his first term, nonetheless. Wealthy South Texas landowner Dolph Briscoe (who may well have coined the now-famous "no new taxes" phrase), beat off the liberal challenge of "Sissy" Farenthold in the 1972 Democratic runoff after they had eliminated the Sharpstown scandal-scarred Governor Smith and Lieutenant Governor Ben Barnes in the primary. The conservative Briscoe wooed organized labor and the Mexican-American vote, perhaps in recognition of the threat from La Raza Unida in the general elections during the 1970's. (Richardson, Wallace, and Anderson 1981, 447) In his 1974 bid to retain his office, Governor Briscoe avoided a runoff, taking

67.4 percent of the primary vote, and won the general election with a 61.4 percent, an increase of 13.5 percent over his 1972 victory. The La Raza Unida candidate received .6 of one percent less in the 1974 election than he garnered in 1972. The Governor's position was tenuous, nonetheless.

With Briscoe's bitter primary runoff loss to moderate John Hill in 1978, the Democratic party split was large enough for conservatives, now united behind the Republican party, to squeeze through another victory.

Moderate-conservative Democrat Mark White retook the governor's mansion from Republican Bill Clements in 1982, only to lose it back to Clements in 1986. That exchange has been analyzed in some detail earlier, but its reality is important to acknowledge here. The conservative Democratic party in the 1980's was caught between the rising tide of conservative Republicanism (and the desertion of its own conservatives to that ideologically united party), and the dissatisfaction of its liberal constituency, who were becoming an increasingly larger faction of the party as the conservatives moved over to the Republican party.

In former days, when elections were won in the Democratic primary and simply confirmed by the general election, the conservative Democrats could, perhaps had to, be lax on party discipline and dim on philosophy. With the advent of a well-defined outside challenge, in the form of the Republican party, the conservative elements controlling the Democratic party continued that earlier pattern, and, in 1978 and 1986, lost their precious governorship as a result. As the Democratic party struggled to be all things to all people, it ran the risk of being nothing to anyone.

Having lost the governorship to Republican Bill Clements in 1978, the conservative Democrats in the 1980's were losing state-wide races to the liberals within their own party. Ann Richards became treasurer; Jim Mattox took the attorney general's office; former Ralph Yarborough aide, Jim Hightower, headed the agriculture department; environmentalist Gary Mauro became land commissioner; and LLoyd Doggett, the epitome of liberalism abhorred by the conservative Democrats, was elected to the Texas Supreme Court. These liberal gains capped an era in which

. . . Republican gains in the Texas legislature, in various judicial offices, in county government, and in a mix of other offices (came) more often at the expense of conservative Democrats than of liberal Democrats.

(McCleskey and others 1982, 116)

In the 1990 Democratic primary, the conservative Democrats were to experience yet another blow to their control: the two candidates who went into the Democratic runoff were both liberals. In 1990, the Democratic party was to be led into the general election not by the most conservative candidate in the primary, or a moderate, but by the candidate whom Republicans could realistically assail with the dreaded "L" word: Ann Richards was a liberal. And the person she had beaten in the Democratic primary runoff, Jim Mattox, was a liberal as well! The conservative Democrats had lost control of the governor's chair, first to a conservative Republican in 1978, then again in 1986, when their conservative candidate lost. Now they would not even be in the running. The conservatives had

not only lost the governor's chair; if Ann Richards won the election, they might well have lost their party.

CHAPTER 5

“WHAT WILL IT TAKE FOR ANN RICHARDS TO WIN THIS ELECTION?”

“She has to get Mattox out of her head, and get back to being the Ann Richards she was before the primary.”

“Something has to happen that mobilizes an unexpectedly large turnout of minorities and women, for her. She needs a golden issue, and Clayton Williams must make a big mistake.”

“She needs to define herself as a professional who can get things done and stop being so defensive.”

“The recent (Texas Abortion Rights Action League) poll shows she can win, but she has to take eight out of nine ‘undecideds’. However, the polls don’t factor in momentum.”

“She has to successfully mobilize her grassroots women’s networks; have a brilliant, closing, negative media blast that is well-defined; and Clayton Williams has to collapse in a major gaffe.”

(Representative responses to the author’s question: “Ultimately, what will it take to win this election for Ann Richards?” Confidential interviews with political observers, participants, scholars, and reporters who were actively involved in the 1990 gubernatorial election. Fall, 1990.)

These days, many folks here--including women--are saying they would vote for a yellow dog before voting for a woman for governor. . . A lot of folks here just have something against women.
(Copelin 17 Sept. 1990, A4)

Less than two months before the 1990 general election to select the governor of Texas, Ann Richards was running ". . . 10 to 15 percentage points behind (Clayton) Williams in the polls," but the fact that he had not surpassed the majority mark indicated that she still had a chance, albeit a slim one, of winning the election. (McNeely 18 Sept. 1990, A13) While her opponent's negative ratings were moving upward, hers were not, causing her campaign workers to believe that the momentum of the race was beginning to shift in their favor. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) Richards had not led in any of the polls taken since her primary runoff victory had cast her as the Democratic opponent to Republican Clayton Williams in the November general election. She was not unaccustomed to that under-dog position; her own campaign polls just weeks before the three-way March primary had warned her that, absent a major shift, she was in danger of a last-place finish in that race, leaving her out of the Democratic runoff a month later. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Ann Richards ultimately survived a brutal Democratic primary against Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox and former Governor Mark White, then a runoff against Mattox, by playing by the "boys'" rules. Hammered repeatedly as a result of Mattox's charges of previous drug abuse, Richards had refused to directly answer her opponent's (and the presses') questions as to whether she had ever used illegal drugs. (Many political writers

credit the drug issue with her pre-primary position in third place.) Richards attributed her refusal to respond directly to concern for recovering addicts--she is an acknowledged recovering alcoholic--and not wanting them to feel that it was impossible to move forward without being blemished by the past.

Richards' turn-around first finish in the primary, and 57 percent victory in the runoff, have been credited to three factors: 1) She acceded to her campaign's recommendation that she accuse former Governor Mark White ". . . of 'lining his pockets' when he was governor by enriching his old law firm." (Swartz 1990, 164); 2) Mattox's incessant pecking at her over the drug issue--and other things--caused a backlash among Texas Democrats who perceived him as the ". . . meanest mother of Texas politics" (Swartz 1990, 120); and, 3) She had an untraditional, loosely-organized network of women across the state that got her voters to the polls for both the primary and runoff elections. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

While she won the Democratic primary, she emerged badly damaged: "the 'negatives'--the damage done by Mattox . . . fixed Richards in the minds of many voters as a divorced, dope-smoking liberal with a rabid lesbian following." (Swartz 1990, 120) Her post-primary image in tremendous conflict with the traditional Texas female stereotype, Richards had also broken with the common wisdom expressed by Sonenshein's earlier appraisal of effective minority candidates by directly attacking a white male opponent. Additionally, she faced a general election opponent

who had already defined the campaign issues to his own image, and had staked out the right-most positions on issues which all political experts contended that she, as a woman and reputed liberal, needed to establish as her own: crime and the death penalty. "It just sounded like 'me, too' whenever she talked to these issues. She couldn't possibly overcome his media-molded control of those issues." (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) Professionally damaged and personally ravaged, her campaign organization was in disorder as well when she focused on the campaign against Clayton Williams in the Spring of 1990.

Williams had been the first Republican to announce for the gubernatorial race, and early pre-primary news stories had hardly showed him consideration. He had no background in government, and was, in fact, a Democrat until just a few years before he decided to try to succeed Republican Governor Bill Clements, in whose image many say Williams was partially cast:

He's Bill Clements on a cow-pony. And just like Bill, Claytie promises us he's going to launch a billion-dollar drug war, to cut the state budget, and to run government more efficiently on less money.

(Hightower 1990, 7)

The little statewide recognition Williams enjoyed before his announcement for the race had come from previous television advertisements for his long-distance telephone service, in which he appeared in cowboy garb astride a horse. Breaking with the Texas

convention that postponed TV ads until the August prior to the general elections--and well after the primaries--Williams put up over \$6,000,000 of his own money and, fourteen months before the general election, blanketed the state with what has been called the best, most effective political advertising campaign ever. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) It “. . . touched on many symbols of (the Texas) past, including a campfire, a horse, family photographs, and . . . the romance of Old-West justice.” (Jarboe 1990, 148) His theme was simple: “Let’s Make Texas Great Again.” It was also effective; he rode through the Republican primary with 61 percent of the votes, leaving his opponents, all of whom had extensive experience in government and politics (and more duration as Republicans), scratching their heads in disbelief. He emerged unscathed, with his party united behind him, and his image the personification of the Texas mythical cowboy hero. Williams had a month to rest and polish his image, facing no primary runoff. Following the Democratic runoff one month later, he faced his opponent, Ann Richards, who was so badly bruised that, in the words of one pundit, “she should have checked into a battered women’s shelter instead of entering a grueling general election campaign.” (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

In April of 1990, Ann Richards was clearly the under-dog in the Texas gubernatorial race. The fact that she was a woman was not a small part of that reality, but was inter-woven into all aspects of her status. As a woman, she was held to a different standard of behavior, had less automatic access to the traditional sources of campaign support money, and

had to overcome basic prejudices regarding the appropriateness of her election--as well as her ability to govern. Miriam Ferguson had been elected Texas' first woman governor without those burdens; after all, it was understood that "Pa" would be toting water and "chips" for her. Ann Richards would be running as a true "outsider" in the sense that, as a woman running not as her husband's surrogate, her election would mark the first time a woman had ever gained election to the Texas governor's chair.

"OUTSIDERS" WHO GOT "IN"

Following the 1990 Texas gubernatorial election, there were a variety of explanations of what, precisely, caused the outcome; they are analyzed in a later chapter. It is the thesis of this paper that no single factor was paramount in Ann Richard's election, and that the phenomenon it represents has certain common characteristics. To analyze Richards' victory, we will first examine victories by outsiders in other historically important elections: Andrew Jackson, first Western president; John F. Kennedy, first Catholic president; Jimmy Carter, first post-Reconstruction president from the Deep-South; and Bill Clements, first post-Reconstruction Republican governor of Texas.

ANDREW JACKSON, FIRST WESTERN PRESIDENT

Andrew Jackson's 1828 election to the U.S. presidency broke the tradition established by his six predecessors[↑] that the office be held by East Coast gentry. The campaign for his ultimate election began immediately

following the “corrupt bargain” of 1824, in which he lost the House of Representatives’ vote to select the president that year. Jackson, a Senator from Tennessee, had led the electoral college vote with 99 ballots, followed by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who had 84 votes, and Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford with 41 votes. Speaker of the House Henry Clay had finished fourth, with 37 electoral votes, and was not considered in the House of Representatives votes, under the provisions of the Twelfth Amendment which governed the outcome.

When the House voted to elect Adams, and Adams subsequently named Clay his secretary of state, a public frenzy over the “corrupt bargain” followed, becoming the basis for a rally behind Jackson’s candidacy for the 1828 election. Jackson, at first, accepted his defeat with equanimity, but soon resigned the Senate and returned to Tennessee in disgust. He actually did little campaigning, leaving the mechanics of electioneering to his supporters. His attraction to voters came from four sources: 1) his national status as the hero of the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812; 2) the masterful political organizing by Martin Van Buren, on his behalf; 3) the demise of political parties existent at the time; and, 4) public disfavor for his opponent-to-be, incumbent President John Quincy Adams, who was unable to govern the nation effectively during his term.

The election of 1828 was held with a tremendously increased participation by the “common man” in selecting electors to the electoral college. This was a result of reduction of property and religious qualifications for voting in most states, and the westward expansion of the

nation following the opening of territory (and addition of states) after the Revolutionary War. In 1821, the United States' land area was two-and-one-half the size of the original thirteen colonies. (Connor and others 1977, 508)

New Yorker Van Buren and his Albany Regency utilized very polished techniques to promote Jackson's candidacy throughout the nation, rebuilding the New York-Virginia connection and bringing the middle-Atlantic and western states into the fold. A past-master of coalition-building in East Coast politics, Van Buren expanded those skills to promote Jackson as the best alternative to Adams. From capital presses to country journals, from statehouses to townships, Van Buren enlisted grassroots support, as well as political machines. Even trade unions were put to work for the cause. (Chambers 1961, 92)

In the U.S. Senate, Adams' own vice-president, John Calhoun, worked on behalf of Jackson's eventual victory. Calhoun's election to the vice-presidency had not been tied to Adams' selection, there being no rules binding the two offices by party at the time. The vice-president led the Senate opposition to Adams' policies at the national level, a feat that was not too difficult, given the political fragmentation of that era. The country was sectionally divided over Clay's "American system" to improve transportation systems for the developing states, and a protective tariff to promote national markets for western-produced goods. Additionally, the Panic of 1819 had created the nation's first soup lines, and caused farm mortgage foreclosures; the resulting discontent was fully exploited by

Jacksonian forces. The candidate took no stands on the issues, effectively allowing the electorates' distaste of Adams' policies to unite his own supporters, stating ". . . My real friends . . . want no (such) information . . . and I never gratify my enemies." (Boller 1984, 42)

The campaign, perhaps because of the lack of issues to bind, became incredibly dirty, with Jackson maligned as an adulterer, his mother designated a whore, and the hero portrayed as a blood-thirsty killer. Adams was characterized as a whore-monger, as well as a monarchist.

Jackson won the election with 56 percent of the popular vote, and 178 electors; Adams received only 83 electoral votes. ". . . Mr. Justice Story (sniffed): 'The reign of King Mob seemed triumphant.'" (Chambers, 1961, 94) Ultimately, however, the election had been a choice between property and proletariat, ". . . the old order fought not for John Quincy Adams, whom they could not love, but against . . . the common man, whom they feared." (Roseboom and Eckes 1979, 43)

JOHN F. KENNEDY, FIRST CATHOLIC PRESIDENT

Massachusetts Senator John Kennedy was denied the vice-presidential nomination at the 1956 Democratic national convention when convention chair Sam Rayburn broke a close vote between Estes Kefauver and Kennedy by selecting the pro-Kefauver Missouri delegation first when vote-switching time came. Kennedy believed the move to have been calculated, and set about to assure he would not be out-manuevered again in his quest for national office. Upon reflection, he decided to run for the top spot on the ticket in the next, 1960, election. He began immediately to pave

the way for his success. His first public act, immediately following Kefauver's selection, was to move for the unanimous nomination by acclamation of the convention; the speech was carried on national television, and Kennedy became a popular figure as a result of his wit, charm, and grace.

Kennedy decided that, to get the 1960 nomination, he would have to win big in various state primaries, proving his Catholicism was not a barrier, and he would have to gain support of the party leaders to assure acceptance at the convention in 1960.

His first phase included winning re-election to the Senate seat he had earlier taken from Henry Cabot Lodge, by the biggest margin of any Senate race that year. This was accomplished with incredible scheduling, superb campaign organization and grassroots effort, and the free expenditure of money. At the same time, Kennedy campaigned all over the nation on behalf of other Democrats, gaining exposure to voters in various regions and the acceptability (and indebtedness) of Democratic party leaders.

Kennedy's best-seller, Profiles in Courage, provided a focus for national press exposure, as did his speeches in the Senate. He also travelled the nation, speaking out on behalf of civil rights, and calming people's concerns about his religion, frequently calling for an end to federal subsidies for parochial schools on the ground that they were unconstitutional. His wit was often used to defuse the religion issue; in responding to the question regarding the Pope's infallibility, he was likely

to say that he had posed that same question to Cardinal Spellman, who told him, “. . . ‘I don’t know, but he keeps calling me Spillman.’” (Boller 1984, 304) In the beginning of the election year, the January Gallup poll showed him the leading Democratic candidate, and incumbent Vice-President Richard Nixon his leading opponent.

Kennedy entered seven of the sixteen state primaries being held that year, and he did so selectively. He took a big (and uncontested) vote in his first primary, in his neighboring state of New Hampshire, which was heavily Catholic. “Inconclusive,” said the pundits.

In his next contest, Wisconsin, he would be in the neighboring state of his top Democratic rival, Minnesotan Hubert Humphrey. Headed by his brother Bobby, Kennedy’s grassroots, door-to-door organizing there (the first used for a national election) was to become the model for future campaigns. (Wayne 1984, 190) He also had his entire family, except for his father (who frequently proved an embarrassment) campaign across the entire state, holding teas and appearing on talk-shows. He took the election with a record vote for that state’s primaries, but he lost all four Protestant congressional districts.

In West Virginia, Kennedy held a 70 percent lead over Humphrey before campaigning began, and before the populace learned of his Catholicism. At that point, Humphrey took a 60 to 40 percent margin: Humphrey’s campaign tune was “Amazing Grace.” After trying every subtle measure to assuage Protestant fears, Kennedy directly addressed the religion issue by stating that the presidential oath of office requires a

president to swear on a Bible to support separation of church and state, and he would so do, because to do otherwise would be ". . . a sin against God, for he had sworn on the Bible." (Manchester 1983, 103-104) Kennedy won West Virginia by a 60 to 40 percent vote, and Humphrey retired in debt and humiliation. The remaining primaries were uncontested, but continued his winner image, enabling him to build his local organizations, national recognition, and party acceptance.

Kennedy's primary strategy and execution were matched by his convention success. Although factions of the convention, including Texas Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, were assaulting Kennedy with questions (and rumors) about his health, youth, and religion, Kennedy's organization (again, headed by brother Bobby) was prepared for all possibilities, and stopped Johnson's strong-man tactics before they could do any damage. Kennedy won the Democratic nomination on the first ballot. In his televised acceptance speech he captivated his audience with idealism; in his selection of a running-mate, the pragmatism of politics led him to select Johnson, whose Southern connections would be key to victory in November.

Kennedy's competition, as predicted by Gallup, was incumbent Vice-President Richard Nixon. While the Eisenhower-Nixon administration had been popular in its earlier years, there were growing tensions which it had failed to resolve: civil rights unrest was fomenting; there was labor unrest, with states enacting right-to-work laws; a recession had upset the economy in 1958; and the U2 incident, in which an American spy plane was shot

down in Soviet airspace, had occurred early in the election year. The Republican party had lost seats in the House, the Senate, and the governors' mansions during the administration. Additionally, Eisenhower's efforts on Nixon's behalf came late in the campaign. "It was a good year to be united against a Republican nominee." (Manchester 1983, 111)

The general election was conducted in much the manner of the Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries, with Kennedy's campaign (with Bobby at the helm) enlisting every possible support organization and individual, going door-to-door, undertaking massive voter-registration drives, conducting media interviews and events, and the candidate's family seemingly everywhere. Johnson's "LBJ Special" (reminiscent of FDR's) whistle-stopped the Old Confederacy, and the Kennedy crowd concentrated on the rest of the nation. Religion became an issue, again, with a group of Protestant leaders, headed by Rev. Norman Vincent Peale, eventually being satisfied with Kennedy's response to their concerns at an address in Houston. Kennedy's effectiveness in his address was so solid that his campaign made recordings of it and sent them out nation-wide.

Kennedy capitalized on civil rights concerns, enlisting the support of the father of Martin Luther King, Jr. (who was originally concerned about Kennedy's Catholicism) when he intervened on behalf of the jailed younger King, and arranged bail following the civil rights leader's arrest for participation in a sit-in demonstration in Atlanta. Throughout it all, Kennedy remained witty and charming, often joking about himself: in one speech, referring to a previous pledge not to make diplomatic appointments

on the basis of contributions, Kennedy quipped: "Ever since I made that statement I have not received a single cent from my father." (Boller 1984, 301)

Kennedy's campaign poise is probably best remembered from his demeanor during his televised debates with Nixon. The first such debate occurred shortly after Nixon recovered from an illness which had evidently left him tired and looking haggard. Kennedy, in contrast, appeared bright, comfortable, and in command. People who heard the debate on radio rated it a draw; those who saw it on TV declared Kennedy the clear winner. (Watson 1984, 69-70)

Nixon out-spent Kennedy, both totally and on media advertisements, to lose an election which Kennedy called ". . . a race between the comfortable and the concerned." (Boller 1984, 298) It was the largest vote in history, and the closest popular election since 1888. Kennedy took the East and lower South, divided the Midwest, lost the upper South, and lost most of the West. Outside the South, he won urban America and lost the small towns and rural areas. He brought the waning Catholic vote back into the Democratic fold, winning a record 78 percent of that bloc. He was the youngest man to be elected President of the United States, as well as the first Catholic.

JIMMY CARTER, FIRST POST-RECONSTRUCTION DEEP-SOUTH PRESIDENT

The United States in its bicentennial year was suffering the after-effects of its first perceived military defeat with Viet Nam; the resignation

of a vice-president under a cloud of criminal charges; the resignation, under the threat of criminal charges and impeachment, of a second-term president; and the immediate and full pardon of that ex-president by the vice-president who had replaced him as president, and who had been selected for vice-president as a replacement for the previous one who had resigned in disgrace.

Gerald Ford, formerly House minority leader and a Republican representative from Michigan, had told the congressional committee approving his selection to the vice-presidency “. . . that he would not seek election in 1976 in the event he became president.” (Roseboom and Eckes 1979, 326) He changed his mind. In 1976, with unemployment at a 30 year high, inflation the highest since the Korean War, the national deficit and petroleum prices up, the stock market down, and economic growth at a negative two percent, Republican Gerald Ford faced former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter in the presidential election.

No Southerner had been elected to the White House since Reconstruction, Lyndon Johnson not qualifying as such because, as a Texan, he was perceived, nationally, to be a Westerner. (This perception was a post World War II phenomenon. [Caro 1982, 535]) Carter meant to change the course of history. As governor of Georgia, he had presided over a highly successful reform administration which reorganized state government and stressed anti-segregation stands. Before he left the office in 1974, after serving the state-mandated single term, he began to prepare for his 1976 presidential attempt.

Carter gained party recognition and national exposure by first heading the 1972 Democratic Governor's Campaign Committee, and expanded his party contacts and public exposure in 1974 by chairing the National Democratic Party Campaign Committee, assisting in sixty key elections in thirty states. His chief campaign advisor, Hamilton Jordan, devised a strategy for Carter to gain additional exposure, despite his lack of national stature: he cultivated the interest of important political columnists by commenting favorably on their columns whenever he could, and scheduled personal visits with them. His book, Why Not the Best?, was used as a topic for media discussion, and to establish him as a thinking politician. By the time Carter became the first Democrat to announce his candidacy for the presidency, just prior to vacating the Georgia governorship, he had achieved some level of recognition, although not enough to prevent most Americans from asking, "Jimmy Who?" (Whitney 1978, 402)

Carter benefitted greatly from reforms in federal and Democratic party election rules which provided easier funding for potential candidates, in the case of the former, and easier access in the latter. As a result, he was able to count on the eventual assistance in matching funds for his campaign, and the inclusion of groups and individuals previously precluded from the convention-selection process. Both openings were important to his chances for success, and both were fully exploited.

In early 1975, Carter's campaign began preparations for the public national answer to "Jimmy Who?" by beginning his Iowa campaign. In October, his "peanut brigade" supporters packed a Democratic fund-raising

event there and he won the straw poll taken in preparation for the caucuses the following January. Winning those caucuses with only 28 percent of the 50,000 votes, CBS correspondent Roger Mudd declared him the “. . . ‘clear winner.’” (Watson 1984, 37) Jordan employed similarly clever strategies, utilizing the “peanut brigade” and his genius for putting the best light on events (what has come to be known as “spin control”), to establish a string of primary victories on Carter’s behalf.

Carter showcased his outsider status by taking “. . . advantage of the nation’s distrust of public officials. . .” and expressing disgust for the imperial presidency and governmental abuses and failures. (Watson 1984, 37) To differentiate himself from the rest of the Democratic pack, Carter took a middle-of-the-road position, leaving the liberals to scrap among themselves. At the end of the primaries, although he had lost 10 of the final 17 due to over-exposure, he was considered to be unstoppable. Wins in Florida (over conservative Wallace), Wisconsin (over the liberals), and Pennsylvania (over the “machine”) proved that he was regionally, racially, and in terms of economic divergence, a candidate of national acceptance. The summer polls showed him to be the favorite: despite some unfortunate gaffes, Carter had more than twice as many delegates as his closest opponent, and his nomination was secure.

In a convention that looked like a love-fest, Black Congresswoman Barbara Jordan was keynote speaker, Italian Catholic Peter Rodino nominated Carter, Black Congressman Andrew Young seconded the nomination, and Hubert Humphrey nominated his ex-aide Walter Mondale

as Carter's running mate. The Democrats were united for the campaign. The Republicans were not.

Ford faced a serious primary challenge in the person of former California Governor Ronald Reagan, who successfully assailed the president for foreign policy decisions under Henry Kissinger. The Republican primaries were inconclusive: the undecideds at the convention would decide. Ultimately, the veteran politician Ford outmaneuvered the outsider Reagan, and took the convention vote, but not without damage to the party unity. Carter led the polls with a 33 percent advantage over the incumbent Ford.

The campaign seemed to drag during the summer, with Carter's interview in Playboy revealing he had lusted in his heart, and bumperstickers proclaimed, "In his heart he knows your wife." Carter incurred the wrath of some southerners by including Lyndon Johnson among a list of politicians he didn't respect, but won others by urging people in the South to support his candidacy so that ". . . the rest of the nation (would) stop treating the South as a whipping boy." (Roseboom and Eckes 1979, 335) His campaign emphasized his sincerity, his versatility, and continued to make extensive use of his "peanut-brigade" and Jordan's masterful allocation of campaign assets.

Ford stumbled and fell, physically and verbally, a number of times. His campaign became so concerned over his image that they released his college and law school grades to prove his intellect. (Wayne 1984, 213) Ford's "Rose Garden" strategy wasn't working well, so he began to spend

fast and heavy on more media, trying to replicate Carter's action-oriented image. The polls showed Carter losing momentum, but still ahead. Then the candidates met for the debates to which Ford had challenged Carter in his convention acceptance speech.

Ford's campaign had heavily promoted his knowledge in foreign affairs, pointing out Carter's lack of national experience. In the second debate, the viewers had cause to question that advantage: Ford blundered badly, maintaining that ". . . there was 'no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.'" (Roseboom and Eckes 1979, 334) Despite being given a chance to correct himself, Ford restated his first position. The momentum of the polls slowed, preserving Carter's lead.

As the season wore on, the economy continued its plodding decline, with unemployment reaching 7.8 percent. The campaigns plodded along as well, moving Eric Sevareid to note: "Election day is not far off. . . , It just seems that way.'" (Boller 1984, 353)

In 1976, Gerald Ford became the first incumbent since Herbert Hoover to lose re-election to the presidency. Because both candidates had accepted federal funding, their campaign budgets were limited to the \$21.8 million public grant money, plus the allowed \$3.2 million from their national parties. Carter had gained from the assistance of organized labor in massive vote-registration drives undertaken on his behalf; Ford had the advantage of being a sitting president and free media associated with that status.

Carter won 23 states and the District of Columbia, taking the South decisively, primarily due to his strong showing among Black voters. He achieved his objective of getting sufficient votes in the large industrial states to assure his victory, reviving the FDR coalition of industrial North and Dixie. He became the thirty-ninth President of the United States, and first Southerner elected to that office since Reconstruction. Following his inauguration Carter refused the traditional limousine ride and, instead, walked up Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House.

BILL CLEMENTS, FIRST POST-RECONSTRUCTION TEXAS GOVERNOR

Oilman Bill Clements was relatively unknown when he announced for the Republican gubernatorial primary in 1978. Clements' previous experience in Texas politics was as a fundraiser. He had contributed 100,000 to George Bush, and headed the Bush fund-raising effort in Bush's losing bid for the U.S. Senate in 1964, and was Richard Nixon's Texas fund-raiser in 1972. (McNeely 1981, 80-82) Named deputy secretary of Defense by President Nixon in 1972, Clements served four years under the Nixon-Ford administration, vacating that office upon Ford's loss to Carter in the 1976 election.

Clements' victory over Republican party chair, Ray Hutchison, was credited largely to his personal wealth which allowed him to roll over his opponent by a three-to-one margin. The use of professional campaign organizers and media specialists greatly assisted in that effort. Capitalizing on the previously discussed rift in the Democratic party as a result of

Democratic Attorney General John Hill's bitter primary victory over incumbent (conservative) Governor Dolph Briscoe, Clements financed a highly polished media campaign portraying Hill as a dangerous liberal, enlisting the support of defected conservative Democrats, including members of Briscoe's own family and other high-ranking Democratic officials who openly endorsed Clements. Clements, a determined, goal-oriented individual, who has been described as ". . . maybe the toughest dumbitch you know," (McNeely 1981, 80) waged what political observers say was a "dirty" race, with Clements casting himself as the outsider who could save the voters from the evils of professional politicians.

Indeed, Clements' lack of Texas political experience was not a drawback, while his national experience proved an asset. National issues very much dominated the minds of Texas voters in that election year: inflation was high, taxes were an issue, and there was an aggravating energy shortage with no federal policy proving effective in dealing with these concerns. Still, few experts--or novices--gave Clements much chance of winning the general election, perhaps adding to Hill's complacency, which some say became arrogance: Hill was so sure of victory that he made pre-election announcements of his intended appointments. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

As was stated earlier, Clements' \$7 million campaign budget outspent Hill by a two-to-one margin, contributing more ". . . out of his pocketbook than Hill was able to raise from all sources." (Tedin 1987, 238-39) Clements used part of his huge budget to finance an out-of-state firm's

professional telephone-bank operation, identifying his conservative supporters, and coordinating a get-out-the-vote effort which took his voters to the polls, while many Democrats sat out the election, either out of a misplaced sense of security or smoldering resentment over Hill's primary win.

Clements' campaign, which did not highlight his Republican connections but show-cased his conservative identification, took advantage of the Texas disaffection with the Carter administration in Washington. As he would later phrase it before a group of newspaper editors, (he was) "Carter (Carter's) ass.'" (McNeely 1981, 79) Carter was persona non grata in Texas in that off-election year, and the combination of a liberal Democrat in the White House being replicated by another in the statehouse struck a magic chord with conservative Texas voters. In the low turnout election of 1978, Clements tough-talked his way into the Texas governor's office by being against government and the politicians with which he refused to identify.

COMMON THREADS OF VICTORY

ISSUES:

Concerns over foreign affairs normally favor incumbent presidents. In all three presidential elections discussed, our outsiders ran against incumbency (two presidents, one vice-president), and were aided by having domestic issues at the fore-front. In all three instances, the sitting administrations had been unable to deal effectively with the public's discontent arising out of those unresolved issues. In some instances, the

challenging candidates blatantly exploited those discontents. In no instances were specific solutions offered.

In Texas, state issues favor Democrats, while national issues tend to be advantageous for Republicans. In 1978, Clements successfully tapped into Texans' loathing for Democratic President Jimmy Carter, and the national issues which caused that discontent, to assist in his election bid. Like the presidential outsiders, Clements' proffered solutions were also simplistic and non-specific.

POLITICAL PARTY CLIMATE:

In all the instances examined, there existed a state of flux in political alignments, presenting the possibility for creating coalitions favorable to the outsider. All the outsiders took advantage of the weakening of established political party control to promote their candidacies, bringing in new factions to expand their campaigns. Once established as viable, they recalled traditional party coalitions to win their elections.

THE OUTSIDERS:

All the victorious outsiders had previous experience, at some significant level, in public office and had experience in the political process. All were aligned with the political party not occupying the office sought.

At the presidential level, the winning outsiders were Democrats who espoused Populist idealism and traditional American values. Clements' Texas appeal, although Republican, had a similar tinge. (All four outsiders

represented their campaigns as crusades by the powerless against the powerful.) At least two, Jackson and Kennedy, were decidedly charismatic, and Carter had a certain amount of that appeal. Clements wrapped himself in the Texas-tough, "bidness" cloak, which has an almost-charismatic draw in the Texas culture. Also, all four show-cased the element that identified them as outsiders, and did so in a manner which was either re-assuring to the general public rather than threatening or bitter (Kennedy and Carter), or successfully aligned themselves with public bitterness and exploited it (Jackson and Clements).

CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATIONS:

The winning presidential outsiders all began their campaigns at least four years in advance of the elections they won. Clements also entered early, relative to Texas tradition. All four started out strong, with a solid game-plan and highly skilled organization: two presidential outsiders (Kennedy and Carter) relied on organizations headed by workers of long-standing, who were personally devoted to the campaign. Jackson's campaign was headed by a professional who had well-established contacts and an in-place organization. Clements relied primarily on hired professionals who, like Jackson's Martin Van Buren, knew how the system worked. All the campaigns were savvy and innovative and dedicated to victory.

GENERAL ELECTION OPPONENTS:

All our outsiders' opponents were members of the party in office; all suffered from the disaffection of their party leadership and constituency. None of the opponents were able to excite the electorate and re-build their natural coalitions. Three were members of the minority (Republican) party; John Hill, Clements' opponent, was effectively designated as a member of minority (liberal) status in Texas. The three presidential opponents were perceived by the electorate, ultimately, as being inadequate for the office they contested. Hill's arrogance, along with his unforgiven victory over Democratic incumbent Governor Briscoe, raised similar doubts.

USE OF THE MEDIA:

All four candidates made extensive use of the media; Clements probably relied somewhat more heavily on paid-ads than the others. All, with the exception of Jackson whose campaign occurred before the advent of broadcast-media, spent hefty portions of their campaign budgets for radio and television advertising. The presidential outsiders, especially, developed clever techniques to elicit extensive free coverage, including the discussion of books they had written, cultivation of columnists, and staged events.

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES:

Sufficient funds at key points were available to the winning outsiders. Superior total expenditures, relative to the resources of opponents, were

not consistently a factor, but sufficient early money was evident in all cases. Tedin holds that “. . . political office cannot be bought by money alone,” and “after a point, (it) has a sharply declining value.” (240) Early money is necessary to secure the party nomination, however, because campaigns must quickly “. . . gain visibility, mobilize support, and develop an effective organization” to establish credibility with the electorate, and discourage competition. (Wayne 1984, 33)

TIMING:

It is difficult to assess the role of the times in assessing reasons for success. In all four cases, it would seem reasonable that the social and political climate had developed to a stage where the outsiders' candidacies were appropriate. Yet the role of the candidate in creating that perception of appropriateness is elusive. It seems possible that the success of the outsiders was a matter of the right person, in the right place, at the right time--and with the right organization and opponent.

CHAPTER 6

KEY FACTORS IN THE 1990 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF ANN RICHARDS

Ann Richards, like her Texas counterpart-outsider, Bill Clements in 1978, was given little chance of winning the Texas governor's chair following her primary selection. Behind in the polls, far short of Williams' financial capacities, bloodied from her primary and runoff battles, and with her campaign organization plagued with in-fighting, Richards was considered to have only a long-shot for victory in November.

Political analysts focusing on her turn-around victory following the election searched for a factor which occurred between the primary runoff and the general election to explain it. Based on the previous examination of other outsiders who were victorious, there is little support for such a narrow explanation. This chapter will look at the common threads from which those outsiders wove their cloaks of victory to analyze Richards' success.

ISSUES

Underlying the race was the issue of gender. . . Billed as Claytie and the Lady, the Texas governor's race matched opposites: the legendary cowboy-oilman who talked of making Texas great again versus a divorced feminist trying to be the first woman governor in Texas since Miriam


“Ma” Ferguson served as a stand-in for her husband in the 1930’s.

(Copelin 7 Nov. 1990, A1)

The general election campaign began with drugs as the public focus for both candidates: Richards had been politically and emotionally drubbed in her primary contests by Mattox’s charge of past use of illegal substances, and Williams was riding the crest of his primary victory astride his newly established image of drug buster. Gradually, however, Richards’ drug issue went away, perhaps partly in sympathy for the way Mattox had pounded her, partly because she refused to let it dominate her, and partly because Williams began to shift focus on himself with some of his statements. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) When there were attempts to revive the drug charges later in the campaign, public opinion turned against the individuals making the accusations (they were connected to the Republican effort) and the issue was dropped.

According to the experts, this election was no more, or less, focused on political issues than Texas gubernatorial elections in the recent past. There was consensus that Richards had generally well-developed stands and program proposals for major state issues, that they were well covered by the print media (but that they were not amenable to twenty-second sound-bites), and that details which could hurt her (i.e. tax and revenue matters) had been astutely avoided. There was also consensus that Williams’ proposals were incomplete and exhibited a profound lack of understanding. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) Yet, until the closing days of the campaign, Williams had managed to define the issues, as a result of his

incredible media campaign ads depicting him as the cowboy-hero who could save the populace from the evils of government and society.

 While many newspaper editorials called for more talk on the issues, the journalists who wrote them privately described issues as relatively unimportant, in and of themselves. The contention was that issues matter insofar as they shape the image of the candidate: no one takes them seriously, unless they provoke a negative reaction, as evidence Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale's fate following his campaign statement regarding the need to raise taxes. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) Throughout the general election campaign, Richards avoided that pitfall, and others, but that avoidance was blamed midway in the campaign for her failure to ignite support which could be reflected in the polls.

Richards did not exploit her natural issues, such as abortion or racial and gender inequities, which might have been perceived as pandering to her feminist and minority constituency. While Williams tied her to loser Michael Dukakis, liberal Jane Fonda, and lesbians in general, she quietly and persistently defended herself, following the strategy gleaned from the Dukakis failure to do so in the 1988 presidential election. Nor did she vilify her opponent with her well-known irreverent and caustic wit, much to the chagrin of many of her supporters. Out in the public and among her supporters, she was blamed for being defensive and failing to define herself, causing the complaint: "People who ought to be for her don't know why she's in the race." (Swartz 1990, 166)

Meanwhile, an early-August Texas Poll revealed that the state economy was the top concern of Texas voters, but that the level of that concern was down significantly from previous polls. "Twenty-five percent of those surveyed said the economy is the No. 1 problem facing Texas, about half as many as cited the economy as their top concern 18 months earlier." (Austin American Statesman 11 Sept. 1990, B2) Drug and alcohol abuse were designated as the second greatest concern with 11 percent, and education was third with 10 percent. (See Table 6.1)

Richards had well-developed policy papers on all issues mentioned by that Texas Poll, but lack of funding to create mass-media advertisement of them was a problem for her campaign. Interestingly, however, the 1990 ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1) on election night showed a different priority of voter concerns following the election: Education was top on the list, followed by crime, ethics in government, and the state economy. (This change could reflect the re-shaping of concerns as the campaign evolved, or could give evidence to the experts' contentions that polls are not reflective of voters' true motivations, or might suggest that polls are simply poor measures of issue concerns.) The election-night polls showed little agreement between Republican and Democratic voters.

Table 6.1 1990 TEXAS VOTER PRIORITIES: THE ISSUES

Priority	August Texas Poll:	1990 ABC Exit Poll:		
	All Voters	All	Dem.	Rep.
#1	State Economy	Education	Educ.	Crime
#2	Drug/Alc. Abuse	Crime	Ethics	Educ.
#3	Education	Ethics	Crime	St. Taxes
#4	Oil/Gas Crisis	St. Econ.	St.Econ.	St. Econ.
#5	Environment	Abortion	Abortion	Abortion
#6	Governor's Race	State Tax	St.Tax/	Ethics
#7	Taxes	Insurance	/Ins.	Gun Contr.
#8	Crime	Gun Contr.	Gun. C/	Insurance
#9	(not given)	S&L's	/S&L's	S&L's

Source: Compiled from information provided by ABC Voter Research and Surveys (see Appendix 1) and the Austin American Statesman, Sept. 11, 1990, B2. In the ABC Exit Poll, Democratic voters showed ties for priorities 6 and 7, and again for 8 and 9.

Political experts during the campaign were also unable to agree on the priority of important issues facing voters. All believed, however, that economics (including state deficit problems and unemployment) were not the key issue; they contended that the public perception was that the Texas economy had survived the worst and was on the mend, and they agreed that this perception was more important than the reality. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) The 18-month decline in importance expressed in the Texas Poll, and its low priority in the ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1), tend to support that vision.

Education, and the Texas Supreme Court's order that the state system be made more equitable, was receiving a great deal of attention, with Richards supporting the court order and Williams' determination that it could be overturned or supplanted with a voucher system--which was questioned at length by the media and education specialists. Both

candidates were non-specific on the details of financing their proposed solutions.

As the campaign wore on, gender issues came more and more to the forefront. The experts agreed that gender became an issue because of Williams' insensitive statements on the subject.

Clayton Williams . . . seems to be less worried about being too insensitive than about being insensitive enough. . . Despite, or because of, his so-called gaffes, Williams remains well ahead in the polls. Richard Shingles, a scholar at Virginia Polytechnic Institute who is doing a study on gender and race in politics, explains that in Texas, "it takes more for a man to be perceived as a bully than it takes for a woman to be perceived as a bitch."

(Carlson Sept. 1990, 41)

Williams had earlier echoed a concern among many male politicians when he stated: "I'd be less comfortable, I think, campaigning against a woman than a man." (Journal Graphics 1990, 4) The theory that a man couldn't run as mean and tough against a woman, without fatal backlash, had been theorized but remained untested. The implication is that there is a gender advantage which accrues to a woman as a result of this theoretical factor. In Texas, that theory didn't seem to hold up; Williams' sexist remarks in general, and his attacks on Richards in particular (sometimes made through female surrogates in his campaign) hadn't damaged him to any noticeable degree. Some say, to the contrary, they had helped.

In the waning weeks of the campaign, however, a backlash began. The polls, which had Williams ahead by eight points at the start of the campaign in late April, then with a ten to fifteen percent lead in September, began to slide. He had easily survived his early campaign gaffes--making a joke about enjoying rape if it was inevitable and admissions of having been "serviced by prostitutes" in his youth. In the Fall, after Richards found in statewide insurance abuse the populist issue which traditionally galvanizes Texas support for Democratic candidates, and managed to link Williams to it directly, his macho-cowboy remarks began to draw fewer chuckles and more criticism. Late in September he stated his intention to ". . . rope her 'and drag her through the dirt.'" (Austin American Statesman 23 Sept. 1990, B6) Less than a week later, when Richards announced her polls showed her closing the gap between them, and he retorted that he ". . . hoped his opponent, a recovering alcoholic, 'didn't go back to drinking again.'" (Copelin 29 Sept. 1990, B1) While Williams was making his insensitive statements, Richards refused to drub him on those gaffes, perhaps remembering the reaction to her primary assault on Mark White.


As the campaign came to a close, insurance abuses increasingly took the public limelight, igniting positive attention for Richards and bringing visits to Texas from national consumer advocate Ralph Nader, and the announcement of investigations for fraud in the insurance and banking industry. Following more news stories linking Williams' business firms to the insurance-abuse issue, and Richards' questioning of his bank's involvement with drug-money laundering activities under federal


investigation, Williams sought out a public opportunity to approach her, castigated her as a liar, and refused to shake the hand she smilingly extended. Television cameras captured the entire scenario, including Williams' prior exchange with an associate stating his intention to have a confrontation with his opponent. The Gallup poll taken the following week-end showed the ten percent lead Williams had enjoyed one month earlier pared down by half. (Table 6.2: Gallup Polls, early Sept. and Oct.)

Table 6.2 POLLS OF VOTER 1990 TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

Poll Source (Time)	Voter Preference:		
	Williams	Richards	Undecided
Texas Poll (Late April)	46%	38%	17%
Texas Poll (Early Aug.)	47%	37%	16%
Houston Chronicle (Early Sept.)	48%	33%	19%
Gallup Poll (Early Sept.)	50%	40%	10%
Gallup Poll (Early Oct.)	45%	40%	15%
Eppstein Group (Late Oct.)	38%	38%	24%
Texas Poll (Late Oct.)	42%	35%	23%
Mason Dixon Poll (Late Oct)	45%	43%	12%
Gallup Poll (Late Oct.)	44%	44%	12%

Sources: Elliot 25 May 1990, A1; Copelin and Elliot 26 Aug. 1990, A1; Austin American Statesman 16 Sept. 1990, B3; Copelin 17 Oct. 1990, A1; Elliot, 25 Oct. 1990, A1; Copelin and Elliot, 31 Oct. 1990, A1; Graves 2 Nov. 1990, A1. Figures are given exactly as reported, and may add up to more than 100 percent due to rounding-up by the polling organizations.

 In the final week of the campaign, Williams made two more gaffes which became issues. First, he noted that he couldn't remember how he had voted on the 1990 ballot proposal for a constitutional amendment relating to the power of the governor. He also admitted that he wasn't exactly sure what the measure was, offering the excuse that he was not, after all, a politician. Secondly, on the Friday preceding the election, he volunteered the information that he had paid no federal income tax in 1986, (although he is worth over \$100 million). Many political writers (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) credit these two errors with swinging the election to Richards, yet the cumulative effect of his gaffes--the bulk of which were sexist in nature--cannot be discounted. "Gaffes can either have a shock effect and disappear,' said Jim Riddlesperger, a Democrat and political science professor at Texas Christian University, 'or they can have a spiraling effect'. . ." (Copelin 17 Oct. 1990, A1)

 Gender, an issue which seemed early on to be working for Williams, backfired on him. It would seem that the mythical Texas cowboy persona of Clayton Williams failed to live up to the legend. In Texas, it's okay for the cowboy-hero to kiss his horse and be clumsy with the womenfolk, but the cowpoke whose honor is sullied cannot bully the ladies without turning in his white hat. His appeal to the "Bubba" vote wore out for him and, ultimately, worked to Richards' advantage, not as a pure issue, but in that it allowed her to differentiate herself as the more appropriate contender for the office of governor. As the experts had said, issues are not important

in-and-of-themselves, but only as they are used to define the images of the candidates.

The 1990 gubernatorial race was publicly characterized as one of the dirtiest ever. Privately, however, consensus was that it was rather typical of Texas elections. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) What differentiated this campaign from others of the recent past was that it started sooner than most. Although there was speculation that the negative and lengthy campaign was turning voters off, the fifty percent turnout in Texas exceeded the forty percent turnout nationally, and represented a three percent increase in turnout for the 1986 Texas governor's race. In response to a question regarding the negativeness of the election, Richards responded: "If you're gonna be governor of Texas, you've got to be tough." (Copelin 7 Nov. 1990, A1)

POLITICAL PARTY CLIMATE

The Texas governor in the summer of 1990, Republican Bill Clements, was suffering from his lowest approval rating of his second (non-consecutive) term. Texans gave him a 34 percent approval in the August, 1990, Texas poll; his highest rating, a bare 36 percent, was achieved just after he retook the office from Democrat Mark White in 1987. In contrast, White's approval rating during his tenure ". . . varied from the mid-40 percent range to 35 percent during his term of office." (Graves 4 Sept. 1990, A11) This was considered to be an advantage for the Democrats, but not as helpful as it would have been had Clements been the Republican nominee.

Because all Texas gubernatorial elections are now held in the off-presidential year, presenting a theoretical advantage to the “out” party, and Republican George Bush was the sitting President, the conventional wisdom would have called for the Democrats to have an edge. Bush’s sending American troops to the Mideast in August, in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, may have offset that advantage slightly, as Americans--and Texans, especially--tend to rally behind a president in times of international crisis. Additionally, George Bush, an adopted Texas, was immensely popular in Texas, as he had been nationally before he broke his “no new taxes” pledge, vetoed a civil rights bill, and the word “recession” was whispered. His national approval rating dropped 25 to 30 percent, depending on the poll one reads, resulting in Republican candidates across the nation dropping plans to appear with him in their own re-election campaigns. Yet Bush retained sufficient popularity in Texas for Clayton Williams and other Republican candidates to welcome his assistance in their own races. While there was not a negative reaction resulting from Bush’s mid-October visit, as there had been in other states, there was deemed to be no positive effect on the Texas Republicans’ campaigns, either. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Texas Democrats, out of the governor’s office for four years, were able to avoid a replay of the bitter rift following the 1978 Hill-Briscoe primary, despite the bitterness of their 1990 primary campaign. Liberal Attorney General Jim Mattox, Richards’ runoff opponent, quickly moved to heal party wounds by supporting Richards’ candidacy. Former

Governor Mark White, who received only 19 percent of the primary vote, was less magnanimous; there were even rumors that he might come out in support of Republican Williams, but that never occurred. White continued to express his anger over Richards' primary charges, but got little press coverage; he was considered to be a bit of a crybaby by journalists. Dave McNeely, political editor for the Austin American Statesman wrote of White in 1982: "He will blame almost every problem that occurs on someone or something else . . ." (McNeely 1982, 87)

Party realignment probably was also a factor in the Democrat's ability to recover from the divisive primary battle. Both Democratic candidates in the runoff were liberals, and White was a moderate. As more conservatives left the Democratic party to participate in the Republican party and primary, the Democrats became more capable of joining together to beat-off the conservative, Republican force. In 1962, the first year of continuous Republican primaries in Texas, that party received only 7 percent of the total primary ballots cast. In 1990, they received 37 percent. (See Table 6.3) The 1990 ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1) showed voters in the 1990 election identified themselves as 39 percent Democrats, 35 percent Republicans, and 22 percent independent. Perhaps the reality that the Republican party was so strong served to unite the Democrats in a way one Democratic party leader described: "We were fighting for our lives." (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Table 6.3 POLITICAL PARTY SHARE OF TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY ELECTION VOTE: 1962-1990

Year:	Total Votes:	Democratic Share:	Republican Share:
'62	1,562,421	93%	7%
1964	1,758,443	93%	7%
'66	1,304,968	96%	4%
1968	1,855,417	94%	6%
'70	1,120,321	90%	10%
1972	2,306,910	95%	5%
'74	1,590,407	96%	4%
'78	1,971,299	92%	8%
'82	1,584,514	83%	17%
'86	1,642,297	67%	33%
'90	2,336,472	63%	37%

Source: Figures compiled from 1990-91 Texas Almanac, 362-63, and Texas Secretary of State.

Democratic, and general, division over a woman candidate was a continuing focus, but it did not serve to divide the Democratic party to any great extent. Early polls showed the gender gap to be a factor in both parties, but beneficial to Williams: the spring and summer Texas Polls showed men favoring Williams by a 44-32 margin, then a 57-28 split, respectively, with women's support for Richards' at 43-39, then 44-40, respectively. (Elliot 25 May 1990, A1, McNeely 6 Sept. 1990, A15) The summer poll, conducted in early August, showed Republican women favoring Williams by a 69-17 margin, and Democratic women supporting Richards with a 71-15 split. (McNeely 6 Sept. 1990, A15) Richards contended that early polls were not accurately reflecting her strength because: 1) telephone polls did not reach many of her supporters who had no telephones; 2) the registered voter lists used for the sample were outdated and did not include many of her newly-registered supporters; and,

3) many of those polled would not admit to a stranger that they intended to vote for a woman, especially if someone else were in the room. Many in this latter category were reasoned to be listed in the “undecided” category. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) As the campaign wore on and Clayton Williams’ gaffes grew, some polls reflected a decline in the size of undecided voters, and an increase in Richards’ share. This could support Richards’ argument, perhaps illustrating that it was becoming more acceptable for voters to support her openly. (See Table 6.2)

The ultimate poll, on election day, showed Richards getting only 44 percent of the male vote, but 59 percent of the women’s vote. Williams took 56 percent of the male vote and 41 percent of women’s ballots. (ABC Exit Poll 1990, Appendix 1) What is most interesting, however, is that women voted the same percentages on the other two top positions, for lieutenant governor and attorney general. Men, on the other hand, voted more heavily Democratic for those positions, giving Democrats Bullock 53 percent and Morales 51 percent, and their Republican opponents 47 and 49 percents, respectively. Richards’ share of the male vote equalled Mark White’s in his losing 1986 election; her share of the female vote was a nine percent increase in White’s ’86 female vote. (ABC Exit Poll 1990, Appendix 1)

From this, one could conclude that the gender gap worked for Richards, among women, and that her presence gained female support for men on the Democratic ballot--or that it worked against her chances among male voters. Tedin’s figures from the 1982 and ’86 races (based on

telephone polling following the elections) provide clarification. (See Table 6.4) He records that 1986 Republican victor Clements received 59 percent of the male vote (a 3 percent difference with the 1990 ABC Exit Poll calculation), and 49 percent of the women's vote (a one percent difference with ABC's number) This would indicate that, in terms of political party, the 1990 male vote was, perhaps, slightly more Democratic than it was in 1986. Considering both the 1990 ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1) and Tedin's 1986 figures, women voted quite differently in those two races. (Tedin 1987, 245-46) Of course, 1986 was an election in which the Republican won, and in this election the Republican lost. Looking at Democrat Mark White's 1982 victory, Tedin's figures reveal that men gave Republican Clements 51 percent of their vote, and women gave White 59 percent of theirs. Comparing that to the 1990 election, when another Democrat won, there is incredible similarity in the female vote, and a five percent difference in the male Republican vote, leaving us to conclude that Williams probably enjoyed a gender advantage among men in this election while women voted in this election essentially as they had in the previous gubernatorial election when a (male) Democrat won.

Table 6.4 MALE AND FEMALE VOTE PERCENTAGES IN THE 1982, 1986, 1990 TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

Year	Candidates	Party	Men's Votes		Women's Votes	
			Tedin	ABC	Tedin	ABC
1990	Richards	Dem	-	44%	-	59%
	Williams	Rep	-	56%	-	41%
1986	White	Dem	41%*	44%	51%	50%
	Clements	Rep	59%	56%	49%	50%
1982	White	Dem	49%*	-	59%#	-
	Clements	Rep	51%	-	40%#	-

Sources: Tedin 1987, 245-46, and the 1990 ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1) * extrapolated, based on 100 percent. # Tedin supplies these, which do not equal 100 percent.

While a gender division seems to have existed in the electorate, it could be explained either by sexism (men--and women--reluctant to vote for women), or ideology (Richards was the liberal and Williams, the conservative). Either case could be argued, considering Wirls' analysis of the gender gap presented earlier, and the previous examination of Texas conservatism and macho tradition. Still, according to George Christian, both a Texan and a political analyst: "It would be silly to say that there aren't a heck of a lot of chauvinistic voters in Texas." (Newsweek 29 October 1990, 35)

The ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1) shows that Richards captured the traditional Democratic winning partisan-vote split, taking 85 percent of the Democratic vote, an increase of 5 percent over White's 1986 share; 18 percent of the Republican vote, a six percent increase over the '86 share; and 48 percent of independent votes, 14 percent more than White took in 1986. (ABC Exit Poll 1990, Appendix 1) Richards' share of these votes

closely approximate White's share in his 1982 victory over Clements, with the exception that she received a greater share of independent votes than he did, according to Tedin's measurement. (See Table 6.5)

Table 6.5 TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE VOTE BY PARTY AFFILIATION: 1982, 1986, 1990

Year:	Candidate:	Self-Identified Party Affiliation			
		Source:	Democrat	Republican	Independent
1990	Richards (D)	ABC	85%	18%	48%
	Williams (R)	ABC	15%	82%	52%
1986	White (D)	ABC	80%	12%	34%
		Tedin	78%	18%	48%
	Clements (R)	ABC	20%	88%	66%
		Tedin	23%	82%	52%
1982	White (D)	Tedin	84%	17%	40%
	Clements (R)	Tedin	16%	83%	60%

Source: Figures compiled from Tedin 1987, 245, and ABC Exit Poll 1990, Appendix 1.

The ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1) showed Richards maintaining the traditional winning Democratic share of both the Black and growing Hispanic blocs at 90 and 71 percents, respectively. Richards' victory came from a strong showing in the urban areas of the state and enough support in the rural areas (unlike White's 1986 record) to carry the four traditionally Democratic regions (Central, North, East, and South), offsetting her losses in the traditional Republican strongholds of West Texas and the Panhandle. Richards' historic 1990 win was definitely a classic Democratic party victory.

ANN RICHARDS: THE OUTSIDER

The election of Ann Richards is a stunning turnabout, not only because she is a woman but because she represents the hopes and aspirations of citizens who have counted not a whit to the powers that have held sway for so long in Austin.

(Billy Porterfield 12 Nov. 1990, B1)

Although Richards had successfully served two terms as state treasurer and was well-established as a politician who knew how to get things done in Austin, she was still an outsider. Her gender was part of this classification, but so was her philosophy. The values she expressed in her keynote address to the Democratic National Convention reflected her belief that

. . . our strength lies in the men and women who go to work everyday, who struggle to balance their family and their jobs, and who should never, ever be forgotten."

(Richards 1988)

In her 1989 biography, Straight from the Heart, Richards provides insight into the source of those beliefs. Born Dorothy Ann Willis in Lakeview, Texas, Richards was the only child of Texas farm stock parents. Her mother was a housewife, whom Richards admired greatly for her strength, determination, and management ability. Her father, a pharmaceutical delivery-salesman, is credited by Richards with social ease and charm. Her parents moved her to Waco to begin high school in order to provide her with more opportunities and exposure; it was then that Dorothy Ann dropped the first half of her name as too countrified.

Richards recounts that her parents were ambitious for her, that she was encouraged to believe that she could do anything she wanted, although she wasn't too clear on exactly what that might be. Duty was stressed in her home, and Richards was not indulged in playtime as a child. The achievement-oriented environment was not scholarship-defined, but performance was highly prized. Richards was able to achieve her goal of being "somebody" in high school through her success in debate and speech competitions. ("I just knew my standards were way beyond me. . . It seems like I was scared all the time." [59]) In high school, she was selected to attend Girls State and Girls Nation, where she was filled with awe at the diverse people she met, and their abilities.

She met her future husband, Dave Richards, in high school and they married the year prior to her graduation from Baylor. Her husband finished law school in Austin while she taught school; then they lived for a time in Dallas, moving later to Austin where he became involved in liberal causes and she joined him in those activities. She credits her in-laws with having exposed her to intellectual interests, and her mother-in-law is said to have exposed her to concepts of feminism.

Richards became the "perfect" wife, mother, hostess, and liberal, and her parties and political skills became legendary. When her husband declined to run for Travis county commissioner, she was drafted and proved a successful choice. She expanded her feminist activities during that time, establishing many projects which highlighted women's achievements and expanding a growing network of women promoting

women's causes. She was later drafted to run for state treasurer and became the first woman elected to statewide office in Texas since Ma Ferguson's gubernatorial surrogacy on behalf of her impeached husband.

Richards was treated for epilepsy early in her marriage, and for alcohol addiction while serving as county commissioner. She and her husband divorced during that time, when her four children were in their late teens and early twenties. (Richards 1989)

Richards seems to have gotten from her parents those characteristics she most admires in them; people who know her marvel at her warmth, wit, organization, determination, and strength. Somewhat physically frail, she manages to pace herself to allow her to accomplish the things that are important to her.

Her sense of family is very strong, and was reflected in her references to family members and memories in the 1988 keynote address to the Democratic National Convention. She incorporated family members into her campaign for the governor's chair, with her son Dan serving as her treasurer and her other children working in important positions in her organization. One of her most successful campaign ads featured her father, with Richards expressing concern about him, and people like him, who relied on their insurance policies for their financial security.

Friends are also high on Richards' list of importance. Many of her closest friends have served with her since her first interest in politics was sparked upon moving to Austin. Most of them have since been involved in her campaigns and many have served in key spots in her administrations--

for which they were well-suited. Perhaps her value of friends explains her decision-making style, which is

. . . to gather a lot of information and work for consensus from everyone affected by a decision before making it. She likes to hammer things out on the front end, instead of simply handing down a decision and expecting everyone to live with it. . . Fortunately, that style is much better suited to being governor than running for the job.”

(McNeely 27 December 1990, A11)

McNeely may have missed the point a bit: Richards’ consensus-building approach, much criticized during her campaign as being indecisive, may well have been a factor in her election. Her capacity for bringing everyone into the fold, for not offending anyone, was in sharp contrast to Williams’ “us-against-them” approach. By the end of the campaign, she had offended very few people.

Her liberalism was expressed in populist terms, promising that her “. . . appointments will reflect the makeup of the Texas population.” (Copelin 19 Aug. 1990, A1) Her leadership at the treasury resulted in 43.9 percent of employees being minorities, the highest level of all state agencies. (See Appendix 2) She also called for government ethics reforms, and promised appointments and policies to make state boards more reflective of the concerns of the average person as opposed to the interests they were supposed to regulate. This was the essence of her “New Texas” theme, one that

held “. . . that Texas deserves better than what we’ve had . . .” (Elliot 11 Nov. 1990, A1)

All this was not playing well in Waco, McLennan county seat and her home town, just one month before the election, where “. . . being a progressive-minded female politician with a quick wit and sharp tongue is like being a canary at a cat show.” (Kelso 4 Oct. 1990, A1) Richards went on to win McLennan county, however, by a 55-45 percentage margin.

Richards’ inclusiveness seems to have worked both ways. She expressed her desire to bring a broader representation to government, and a broader base of people worked on her behalf. Part of this was due to the vast and numerous networks she had established statewide as a result of her various interests and concerns, ranging from her tenure as Travis county commissioner when she lobbied the state legislature on behalf of such issues as mental health and welfare; her activities and efforts on behalf of women’s interests and organizations; and her involvement in alcoholic recovery programs around the state. It was informal networks of people such as these who were personally devoted to her that many political observers credit with her primary and general election victories. What puzzled them most was the manner in which they were organized. “No one can figure out how to chart them, where they fit into the organization, or how many of them there are.”

(Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) Some of these were outsiders who had never worked in a campaign--or voted--before.

Richards was careful not to alienate the core of Democratic party support. She ducked a furor over Bush's red-herring proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution to protect the flag, by saying that she was ". . . for anything to 'prohibit flag desecration, and I want to include politicians who wrap themselves in the flag for political gain.'" (McNeely 19 June 1990, A9) While this proposed threat to first amendment protections upset some in her campaign, it was a practical necessity to assuage the discomfort of the "white, conservative, middle-class voter who is the greatest share of those voting." (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) Yet on issues that were substantive, Richards would not yield. Her support of abortion rights and rejection of parental consent remained unshakable. She wisely avoided the income (or any) tax trap, and kept her acerbic wit out of the public--or, at least--toned it down so as not to scare off the more somber. While she went after Williams hard on ethics and government issues, her humor toward him was soft and light. At the 1990 Democratic state convention, she said of her opponent: "We can't afford any slow-learning rich people in the governor's office anymore." (McNeely 10 June 1990, B5)

This was Richards' third statewide election race, and that experience was probably essential to her capacity to endure and triumph following the brutal primary race she experienced in 1990.

Immediately following the runoff, she was said to have lost direction for a time, but, by early August, she was running at full steam in search of the issue to consolidate her support. As she became focused on her goal, her self-possession returned, and the charisma that captivated television viewers during the 1988 Democratic National Convention emerged. After the election, Dave McNeely wrote:

She has the most charisma of any Texas chief executive since John Connally. She has a presence, star quality, that can really come through now that she will have relief from a constant barrage of negative ads from her opponents.
(McNeely 27 Dec. 1990, A11)

CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

Richards' consensus-building approach to decision making was reflected in her campaign organization, with the result that both the public and the pundits perceived the effort as lacking in direction and cohesion. Some of her top campaign workers from past elections, most of whom were women, were frequently at odds with the new "professionals", most of whom were men brought in for the gubernatorial race.

As the professionals gained more and more control, a schism formed between Richards' female loyalists and the male political consultants. . . To the boys, the girls were amateurs obsessed with flow charts and schedules. . . To the girls, the boys were overzealous guerilla fighters, dragging them into a needlessly dirty campaign.
(Swartz 1990, 162)

Richards became stalled by the dissention, and precious post-primary time was spent trying to re-order the organization for the November election. Those efforts seemed to some observers to be failing. Perhaps they did not understand that consensus-building is often noisy, generally inefficient, but usually rewarded with resolution and unity. The results of Richards' internal campaign struggles over divisive issues protected against hasty actions which might have divided the electorate.

A journalist closely covering the campaign offered the opinion that much of the criticism of Richards' organization was a reflection of frustration over Williams' superior media effort, which Richards' limited funding could not approach, let alone surpass. All who were interviewed credited Williams' campaign strength as money and media magic, but found it lacking in polish and ability beyond that level--a deficiency which resulted in two blatantly inaccurate television ads based on faulty research being produced and immediately removed from the market. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Richards had several advantages in her campaign. First, she had the assistance of political consultant Robert Squires, who had engineered her primary win in the Spring by convincing Richards that it was necessary to knock White out of the primary in order to assure a place in the runoff. His strategy of exposing Williams' weaknesses on populist issues in the final moments of the general election campaign was key to her victory. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Second, she had a cadre of loyal and experienced workers who were, following the primary races, led by long-time friend and associate Mary Beth Rogers. Dave McNeely describes Rogers' importance as "... the flour in the gravy necessary for Richards to beat Republican Clayton Williams." (26 Feb. 1991, A13)

Third, Dr. George Shipley headed her opponent research effort. It was he who had provided the well-documented information that resulted in White's primary election elimination, and he got the goods on Williams in the later stages of the campaign with, among other things, his insurance and banking irregularities. Asked about the insurance investigation and its timing coincident with the last weeks of the campaign, one observer stated: "There are no coincidences in politics." (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) So effective was Shipley, and so thorough was his gathering of evidence, that he was admirably referred to by insiders as "Dr. Dirt". (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Fourth, Richards had support from a number of interest groups and organizations that were either terrified at the prospect of Williams' election, and/or determined to see her policies prevail. Many of these were traditional Democratic coalition groups, including feminist, gay-lesbian, education, environmental, labor, trial lawyer, and minority groups. The Richards' campaign expanded both the types and levels of participation of such organizations through a policy of inclusion, actively (although not necessarily publicly) seeking the support and participation of all organizations which might have shared goals with her candidacy. Mailing

lists, donations, volunteers, and votes resulted from the active cultivation of all possible alliances with such groups. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Finally, and this was described as the trump card in the final outcome, Richards' statewide informal network of supporters provided a component which could not be duplicated by her opponents. These were loosely coordinated by the central organization, but typical of Richards' approach, they had great latitude in making her campaign amenable to the peculiarities of their own locales. As a result, they were very creative and hard-working, and they felt as valuable as they were, resulting in innovative and far-reaching activities. They designed and sold campaign buttons and tee-shirts, created local media spots--getting local heroes to speak in radio messages, organized telephone banks, carried on local fund-raisers, conducted voter registration drives, did direct mailings and newspaper ads on Richards' behalf, and got their friends involved. Ultimately, it was these groups that brought out the vote for Richards in both primaries and the general election. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Dave McNeely terms much of this effort the "termite" campaign, especially the direct mail and other essentially unseen activities. He explains that one can look at a structure being eaten away by termites and superficially observe that it is solid. However, when the termites have done their work, the building suddenly caves in. (McNeely interview, 4 December 1990) While most people saw Williams' campaign as holding

up--based on the visible media campaign activities, it was being imperceptibly eroded by Richards' coalition and grassroots efforts. Williams' gaffes helped in the collapse, but Richards' network efforts had weakened the structure sufficiently to maximize his self-inflicted damage. Evidence of the wisdom of McNeely's analysis can be seen by the results of a survey of eight political analysts from across Texas and Washington, D.C. Their observations of the campaign, from outside, caused them to rate the contenders as shown in Table 6.6:

Table 6.6 POLITICAL EXPERTS RATINGS OF RICHARDS AND WILLIAMS IN KEY AREAS OF THEIR CAMPAIGNS:

Candidate's ability to raise money:	Richards B	Williams A	..
Effectiveness and use of media:	Richards C	Williams B	
Image-projection of Texas leader:	Richards C	Williams B	
Solutions to Texas problems:	Richards C	Williams C-	
Appeal to independents and opposite party voters:	Richards C	Williams B	

Source: Copelin 2 Oct. 1990, A1.

While the grading may have been fair, clearly the categories were not complete. This is why Richards' "termite" campaign has been deemed so significant.

CLAYTON WILLIAMS, JR.

Self-described country-boy from Fort Stockton in West Texas, Clayton Williams, Jr. is the son of local, well-educated parents who were ". . . well-off, but not rich like 'Claytie' was to become," according to a newsperson with the Fort Stockton Pioneer. (Stephan interview 11 Feb.

1990) At age 23, Williams' mother was finishing her last year of college when she met his father, then 33 and her father's boss in the oil fields. They were married upon her graduation, and Clayton, Jr. was born three years later. He has one sibling, a sister who is three years younger than he.

Williams' father, a Texas A&M graduate in electrical engineering, was the son of a Harvard lawyer who had journeyed to Texas for his health. Grandfather Williams was to become a judge and Clayton, Sr. was active in local politics, serving as county commissioner but losing a bid for county judge when his victory in the Texas courts established his right to pump as much water from under his land for irrigation as he wanted. The resulting drying up of Comanche Springs, source of water for several of his neighbors, is still a sore spot with some folks in the area.

While Williams, Sr. drilled for oil and ranched, he spent most of his time in town, indulging himself in his love for writing local history. Both parents were described as intellectuals, by local standards. (Stephan interview 11 Feb. 1990)

"Claytie," as he is known by the folks around Ft. Stockton and close friends, was an average student in high school, played football despite his size (5'9"), and always showed an interest in making money. He graduated from Texas A&M with a degree in agriculture and began a career of making money in the areas of ranching, farming, oil-development, insurance, banking, and telecommunications. Although recent years have seen him troubled with business set-backs in various of these undertakings,

he is still a rich man, even by Texas standards, being universally described as worth “. . . more than \$100 million.” (Copelin 17 Sept. 1990, A1)

His exposure to politics began in 1987, when he successfully lobbied the legislature to influence a bill brought by AT&T affecting the telecommunications industry, a measure which would have adversely affected his own holding, ClayDesta.

Williams accomplished the task by directing his own team of lobbyists, making well-placed campaign contributions to key lawmakers and relying on his flair for getting publicity. . . Williams grabbed the public's attention--and sympathy--by leading a posse of horseback riders to the steps of the Capitol. As television cameras rolled he led his own insurrection against AT&T.
(Copelin 19 Aug. 1990, A1)

In 1989, more than a year before the 1990 Texas gubernatorial election, Williams became the first Republican to announce for the race. Initially discounted, he employed his millions of dollars to promote the same media image used during his legislative-lobbying, identifying himself as the Texas cowboy with the “right” stuff. “In his most memorable television commercials, . . . garbed in chaps, boots and cowboy hat, (he) is pictured on the Texas frontier, poised to take Austin.” (Copelin 19 Aug. 1990, A1) He took the Republican primary with a 60 percent share of the vote over far more seasoned politicians and went into the general election with the call to “make Texas great again.”

Williams' appeal was to Texas what Ronald Reagan was to the nation: ". . . a self-styled cowboy. . . In the words of [the late] GOP Chairman Lee Atwater, 'the political phenomenon of 1990.'" (Whitman 1990, 40) Like Reagan, Williams called forth the memories of past greatness, and his solutions to Texas' lapse from that greatness were strikingly Reaganesque: execute the criminals you can, lock up the rest for as long as you can, give business more freedom to grow without government intervention, let the citizens keep their guns to protect against government abuse, get rid of as much government as possible, and cure drug-users by exposing them to the "joys of busting rocks." (No one seriously questioned that last solution in light of his own son's drug treatment in an expensive Dallas program, sans rock pile.) His off-hand remarks, early on, angered some but seemed to endear him to many who viewed his individualism and candor as examples of what makes America and Texas great. ". . . When one campaign opponent accused him of pandering to the 'Bubba' vote, he proudly retorted: "I am Bubba.'" (Whitman 1990, 40)

However, Republican financial contributor H. Ross Perot was never amused by Williams' remarks. He was said to have been livid over Williams' rape remark, and proclaimed that he would give Williams neither money nor support for election. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) Others in the Republican party, especially women--most notably the ones in the Dallas area who are known to be strongly feminist--were embarrassed and angered by Williams' cavalier attitude. Republican businessmen were described as angry that Williams, whose behavior can be

Texas-showy in the extreme, was casting himself as the national model for Texas businessmen. In the words of one pundit: "If Williams had behaved like a Texas businessman, he might have won this election." (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

Additionally, Texans, while being proud of their heritage and uniqueness, are sensitive about the caricature of them on the national level. And Williams began to look more and more like the caricature. His swimming pool in the shape of an Aggie boot was one thing, but his flip remarks over serious matters began to cast him not so much as a rugged individualist as a loose cannon. His admission of patronizing prostitutes was carried in the May 7, 1990 issue of Newsweek, with Williams explaining: "It was what the boys did at A&M." (page 6) The Austin American-Statesman reported on the coverage of that gaffe in U.S. News & World Report in which Williams referred to ". . . prostitutes 'servicing' men," headlining the article, "Williams speaks and jaws drop." (Copelin 12 July 1990, B6) Nationally syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman awarded Williams her "Raging Hormone Imbalance Prize" and wished him ". . . a silver-plated gender gap and a spur to help gallop into the horizon." (Goodman 1990, A17)

Williams' own campaign despaired at his inability to be reverent and controlled. As his share in the polls went up, he seemed to believe that he could do no wrong--and proceeded to disprove it. Then, when he began to slip in the polls, he became even more uncontrolled and multiplied the damage. His "handlers" wrung their hands over his eleventh-hour

revelation that he had paid no income taxes in 1986. There was simply no reason for him to offer that information, but it is said that he had been drinking on the train that day and got carried away. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) His earlier staging (and bragging of his intentions) of an opportunity to refuse to shake his opponent's hand been beyond the behavior accepted of Texas gentlemen.

One important factor in Williams' unravelling, of course, is that he had absolutely no previous exposure to, or participation in, any significant partisan political election activity. He did not know the ropes, he could not pace himself, and he had no sense of what would fly outside of West Texas. He seemed to have mistaken his success with the legislature in 1987 as the key to election at the state level. Indeed, he had ". . . boasted to some of his opponents in the Republican gubernatorial primary that he planned to buy the governor's office." (McNeely 6 Sept. 1990, A15)

The growing uneasiness over Williams' capacity to behave flowed over into concerns for his capacity to govern, affecting his own party's enthusiasm. He was unable to retain the aura that he held in early Summer, and enthusiasm for him within the Republican fold waned. Many prospective Republican votes went to the Libertarian candidate, or just stayed home, on election day. (Confidential Interviews, Fall, 1990) A comparison of the decline in the recent increase in Republican votes, shown below in Table 6.7, supports this contention; even in the 1982 race, in which Democrat White defeated incumbent Republican Clements, there was a dramatic increase in Republican balloting over the previous election year,

when Clements won. In 1990, Williams garnered only one percent more Republican votes than Clements did in 1986.

Table 6.7 POLITICAL PARTY VOTE CHANGE IN TEXAS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS SINCE CONVERSION TO OFF-ELECTION YEAR BALLOTING: 1974-1990

Election Year	Winner	Democratic Cand. Vote	% vote/ Pre. El.	Republican Cand. Vote	% vote/ Pre. El.
1974	Briscoe	1,016,334	—	514,725	—
1978	Clements	1,166,919	115%	1,183,828	229%
1982	White	1,697,870	145%	1,465,937	124%
1986	Clements	1,584,515	93%	1,813,779	124%
1990	Richards	1,925,670	122%	1,826,431	101%

Sources: 1990-91 Texas Almanac and Texas Secretary of State.

The Texas cowboy hero, personifying the Texas macho image, is very well-defined and quite inflexible. There can be little room for bending that image. Williams was helped by playing to the stereotype, but was damaged by his failure to live up to it. He may have forgotten that cowboys aren't allowed to take an unprovoked slug at the womenfolk in saloon fights, no matter how just they believe their cause.

USE OF THE MEDIA

There can be no doubt that the media played a key role in this election. Texas, more than most states because of its size, is very dependent on media coverage for political campaign information. That makes it very susceptible to the sort of "big-bucks" campaign Clayton Williams waged to get his party's nomination. (It's the same formula that worked for Clements in 1978.) And it was the media which catapulted Ann Richards to

pre-eminence via her Democratic National Convention speech in 1988, considerably increasing her collateral with Texas Democrats--surely a factor in her own positioning for the 1990 Democratic primary. After these shared advantages, the playing field became a lot less even.

Until now, Richards has been in a debate with Williams in which she gets in about one word to his four. That's because his great personal wealth allows him to buy all the TV commercials he wants. The more modestly funded Richards, with no personal wealth, is at a definite disadvantage, and the sad thing is that her inability to compete financially with Williams makes her show up worse in the polls--which in turn makes it tougher for her to raise money.

(McNeely 18 Sept. 1990, A13)

Williams started his campaign with approximately \$6.5 million of his own money, assuring himself the best media-magic money could buy. He was able, through his own wealth and persona, to strike a mythical memory that caused his popularity with the voters to soar, making it possible for “. . . him to survive his series of gaffes. . . which would have destroyed any ordinary political figure.” (Copelin and Elliot 1 Nov. 1990, A1)

Richards' lack of money was matched by a poor attempt to define her in commercials in non-threatening, yet appealing roles, including that of grandmother. None of them inspired. Short of money, Richards found it necessary to save her media budget for a final-stage blitz, which left her sorely lacking in screening time in the early stages of the campaign while Williams was piling up points in the polls.

Richards was also plagued with an angry “free” press, following the primaries. Long the darling of liberal reporters, she had chafed at them for their insistence that she respond to the drug charges hurled at her by her Democratic opponents, especially Mattox. They continued to do what they saw as their jobs, and she, perhaps the wear-and-tear showing through, began to instruct them on their duties. The result was a lovers’ quarrel of sorts, leading to what one journalist termed a “feeding-frenzy.” During this time, Williams, who faced no runoff, had been courting reporters in a free-and-easy relationship, and they found his candor to be refreshing. Following a few of his gaffes, however, access to him was sharply curtailed and the romance-on-the-rebound died, resulting in an advantage for Richards who was, by then, re-gaining her previous ease, wit, and charm. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

The negative campaigning so loudly decried is, in fact, a traditional part of Texas politics. Political observers generally agree that Williams started it in this election, “. . . trying to paint his Democratic opponent as a liberal with symbolic images of flag-burning, Jane Fonda, sodomy and gun control.” (Copelin 29 July 1990, B4) The Williams’ campaign polling in September convinced them that they had raised Richards’ negative ratings as high as they could, and to continue the approach would backfire. For a time they went back to Williams’ positive ads, showing their candidate as the cowboy-hero which one reporter analyzed as actually being a strong father-figure, protecting his children from the natural consequences of their own inadequacies and weaknesses. However, when Richards began to

score with her attacks on Williams (and his gaffes started to grow), they decided to return to their negative advertising. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

All of this seemed to further tarnish Williams' image. Days before the election, the Williams' campaign was holding onto the hope that the early-months of positive imagery would contain the later-day damage. By the time it was over, the "best political commercial ever" was worn thin, having been replaced in the voters' minds with Williams' televised admission of not having paid income taxes in 1986, ignorance of the constitutional amendment on the ballot he had voted, and statement that he intended to provoke a confrontation with Richards and subsequent refusal to shake her hand.

Charles Elliott, a political science professor at East Texas State University, said Richards did a good job of capitalizing on Williams' mistakes. 'I think the people decided they didn't want an amateur in office,' Elliott said.

(Copelin 7 Nov. 1990, A1)

In the end, the media that was used to create the myth of Clayton Williams as the Texas cowboy hero served to destroy it.

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES

After a point, political money has a sharply declining value. The eight million dollars Mark White raised (in 1982) was enough to insure that he would not be denied the essentials that money can provide for campaigns. The large revenues

(\$14 million) that Clements raised (in 1982) could not all be effectively spent. One lesson of the 1982 election is that political office cannot be bought by money alone.
(Tedin 1987, 240)

When the figures were tallied, Clayton Williams had outspent Ann Richards by close to two-to-one in his attempt to become governor of Texas. Estimates are that he bank-rolled his campaign to the tune of over \$10 million, and attracted a similar amount from supporters. Richards' campaign gives her total expenditures at approximately \$12.5 million.
(Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

The key to election victory is not in the final figures, but access to money at critical stages. Williams had no difficulty, whatsoever, with this. By mid-July, he had already ". . . spent more than \$12 million on the race, establishing an all-time high for one individual candidate in Texas." (Copelin 29 July 1990, B4) This money appeared, at that point, to have been a good investment. In September he was riding the popularity that money had purchased through his media effort and his victory seemed so certain that the message went out from his campaign to the interest groups that "the train was leaving the station." This was the call for everyone who wanted to share his victory ride to purchase a ticket, and most of those contacted felt the necessity to do so. The result was that he further filled his coffers. (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990)

In the meantime, "Richards, who (was) being outspent by more than a 2-1 ratio, (was) not expected to have the money to take her message to television until the final weeks before the November showdown." (Copelin

29 July 1990, B4) Money is generally harder for female candidates to attract from traditional sources, and Richards, so badly bloodied from her primary and the resulting polls, could easily have folded at this point. However, she was saved by a number of factors.

First, many of her various interest groups remained loyal, despite the grim reality of the polls. Second, she was able to go to her grassroots supporters and network for small, but sufficient, funding to keep her alive during those hard times. Third, because she had already held state-wide office for two terms, she had established contacts and credibility, and her capacity to attract donations was not as badly diminished as it would have been had she been a neophyte. And lastly, one must factor in the amazing determination of the candidate herself. She simply would not give up.

Once Richards began to move in the polls, the traditional Democratic campaign funding began to flow. Those "interests" which had earlier given to Williams in an attempt to assure an ear in the governor's office then had to hedge their bets and her financial situation improved markedly. This desire to be among the counted can best be illustrated by the following:

The enhanced status Richards gained once she was elected was amply demonstrated when her \$450,000 campaign debt was paid off within a few weeks, and that much again added to her coffers for day-to-day political expenses in the future.

(McNeely 27 Dec. 1990, A11)

In 1982, Mark White retook the Texas governor's office for the Democrats by spending \$8 million to Clements' \$14 million, or 36 percent

of their total. In 1990, Ann Richards retook the Texas governor's office for the Democrats by spending \$12.5 million to Williams' \$21 million, or 37 percent of their total. Clayton Williams failed to achieve his stated goal of buying the governor's office.

TIMING

The political party state of flux which existed in Texas in 1990 was clearly critical to Ann Richards' election to the governor's office. It allowed a liberal to emerge from the Democratic primaries, and the reality of the powerful Republican force served to unite the Democratic party behind her, as did the fact that the Democrats were not the incumbent party in either that office or the presidency.

The state economy, which refused to heal under both a Democratic and then a Republican governor, probably worked to Richards' advantage: had there been improvement under Republican Clements, her progressive alternative may not have been so appealing to the voters.

Lastly, the potential for women to gain higher offices in the state of Texas was certainly established, partially by Richards herself with her successful tenure as treasurer for two terms. The unstable gender gap cut both ways for her. To her credit, she minimized its disadvantages and maximized its potential. As was earlier stated, it is difficult to assess the extent to which outsiders create the perception that their election is appropriate to the times.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Following Ann Richards' victory over Clayton Williams, the street-talk and the published analyses offered, essentially, two contentions: 1) "Votes of women, minorities made Richards' day." (McNeely 8 Nov. 1990, A20); and, 2) "After all, Ann Richards did not win the election; Williams lost it." (Trevino 9 Nov. 1990, A17) Both of these statements represent cursory solutions to the puzzle presented by Richards' come-from-behind triumph.

MINORITY AND WOMEN'S VOTE AS DETERMINANTS

Assigning the election's outcome to the voting behavior of any single group is impossible, as well as superficial. In the first place, no group, no matter how they were identified by the ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1), was large enough and voted in sufficient solidarity to decide the election. Women comprised 50 percent of the voters, according to ABC (Appendix 1), but split their vote, 59 percent to Richards and 41 percent to Williams. Minorities, with Blacks and Hispanics voting 90 and 71 percent respectively for Richards, comprised only 22 percent of the total vote. Indeed, the largest ethnic bloc, whites, split their 76 percent of the total vote 42-58 percents for Richards and Williams, respectively. Had men only voted, or

whites only (or Republicans or independents or those earning \$30,000 or more yearly), Richards would have lost. The fact that their opposites gave the majority of their votes to her cannot logically be said to have created her victory. (ABC Exit Poll 1990, Appendix 1)

As we saw in Table 6.4, Richards garnered approximately the same percentage of women's votes in her 1990 victory that Mark White took in his '82 win. Additionally, Richards' share of the minority vote is the traditional Democratic winner's share. Finally, the ABC Exit Poll (Appendix 1) records that Richards won 85 percent of the Democratic vote with Williams getting 15 percent of that bloc, and that Williams polled 82 percent of the Republican vote with Richards polling 18 percent of that category. It would seem that the partisan vote was approximately equitably divided along party lines. Richards won the election by garnering the votes a Democrat traditionally takes to win; for Williams to win, he would have had to cut more deeply into those traditional Democratic blocs. For Richards to win, she had to hold those blocs. The fact that she won a minority 44 percent of the male vote does not mean that she was elected by women; she had to win these male votes to achieve her victory over Williams, who needed a larger majority of men's votes (and a larger minority of the female vote) to create the traditional Republican formula for victory. (Conservative Republican Clements took a 59 percent majority of the male vote, and 49 percent of women's votes, to win in 1986.) Thus, it was not the female vote which gave Ann Richards her victory, but the successful capture of a sufficient percentage of male votes in combination

with the sizeable majority of female votes that won the election for the Democratic candidate.

The same analysis holds true for Richards' minority vote; Clements' win in 1986 records 39 percent of the Hispanic vote, a 14 percent gain over his 1982 share, no change among Blacks between the two elections, and a 13 percent increase in his support among the sizeable white majority, with 54 percent in '82 to 67 percent in '86. (Tedin 1987, 245) Williams' 1990 minority vote is more like that of Clements in his '82 loss than his '86 victory. However, because the minority vote is such a small portion of the total tally--only 22 percent in 1990--the bigger consideration is the vote of whites. According to ABC (Appendix 1), Williams was able to garner only 58 percent of the white vote in 1990; again, that share resembles Clements' 1982 losing share more closely than his 1986 winning margin. One could argue that Richards' ability to minimize the traditional conservative and Republican white majority vote was as key to her election success as was her sustaining the traditional majority vote of minorities for Democratic candidates.

THEORY THAT RICHARDS DIDN'T WIN, BUT WILLIAMS LOST

The assertion that Richards did not win the election, but Williams lost it is based on two presumptions: 1) the early polls showing Williams in the lead accurately reflected the way people would have voted if the election had been held at the moment of polling; and, 2) Richards was not an active participant in the campaign. The first postulation can neither be proved nor disproved. Even if it were true, the second assumption is

clearly erroneous. The earlier description of Richards' campaign, as well as the fact that her organization did manage to collect and spend over \$12,000,000.00, evidences the fallacy of that suggestion. Every contested political campaign has a winner and a loser; generally the bulk of analysis is directed toward how the election was lost, perhaps because missteps are easier to identify than the accumulation of appropriate actions (and avoidance of glaring errors) which consolidate a victory. Certainly this election exemplifies that approach.

Many experts assert that political choices are not so much a matter of responses to single or several acts, but the result of informed and rational decision-making. V.O. Key's The Responsible Electorate was dedicated to "the perverse and unorthodox argument . . . that voters are not fools." (Key 1966, 7) An Austin Ph.D. psychologist who specializes in the treatment of personality disorders resulting from the deprivation of childhood emotional development, and who is politically active and educated, has provided a support to Key's theory. He maintains that Williams' well-documented gaffes were not superficial causes of his undoing, but that they revealed the real person behind the cowboy mask--a person who was inadequate for the leadership responsibilities of the governorship--and that the electorate responded rationally, if subconsciously, to that information.

The psychologist-cum-political analyst describes Williams' personality as "transparent", a clinical designation which identifies people who color what they do according to their unmet needs rather than functioning in a

manner which deals with reality. This behavior ultimately results in exposing the transparent personality as being intent on creating an image rather than actually possessing the characteristic being projected. The psychologist, who provided this analysis on condition that his identity be protected, sees Williams' inability to become politically astute or to act in a sound political manner as being based on his need to have outside validation that he was what he was trying to be; i.e., that Williams sought recognition that he was a cowboy-hero whose (projected and false) persona qualified him for the governorship. Williams' refusal to respond to political realities, resulting in his increasingly politically-suicidal behavior, is typical of the transparent personality, in the expert's opinion, and comes out of the need to control external factors while there is little internal control. Rather than responding internally to external realities, the transparent personality tries to re-define the external reality. (Protected-source psychologist 1991)

Support for this analysis, and the public's intelligent response to it, can be seen in the analysis of one pundit who earlier described Williams' projected image as that of a father-figure: Williams expounded on busting rocks as drug-treatment at the same time that he had a son with a drug problem, which Williams had dealt with by seeking conventional treatment methods. Clearly the reality was out of sync with the image.

The psychologist asserts that the use of false imagery can be effective on a poorly-informed and uneducated electorate; people with any level of political sophistication see through the mask and, unconsciously--but not

irrationally--withdraw their support for such candidates, an analysis which supports Key's belief that political voting in this country is not essentially irrational and uninformed. The psychologist postulates that campaign stress, which Richards kept heaping on Williams (and to which he added on his own), over-whelmed whatever inner-controls Williams may have had, thereby increasing the transparent behavior and resulting in the ultimate public exposure of his unpredictability, simplistic solutions, lack of direction, and denial of reality. Transparent personalities, he holds, ultimately lose the trust of those they try to lead in this manner. (Protected-source psychologist 1991)

Ann Richards' personality, that of a recovering alcoholic, is more amenable to political success, according to this expert. He contends that this type personality is well-defended, in the sense that there is a high capacity to focus on goals and achievement. The addictive personality, he maintains, will generally become more focused as pressure increases, with a strong capacity to suppress personal problems and needs. This intense focusing on externals at the expense of the inner-person, he asserts, is a characteristic of the addictive personality--one that assists in their external accomplishments but often results in the diminishment of capacity to attend to inner needs. A direct assault on the personality of such an individual will, however, shatter the defenses, in the opinion of this expert. This source attributes Richards' emotional state following the Democratic primaries to Mattox's personal attacks on her. He postulates that Williams did not succeed in shattering Richards' defenses in this manner, allowing

her strengths to control the exchange and giving her great power. It is his opinion that as Richards' power, and her exposure of Williams' transparency, grew, it fed Williams' weaknesses which, in turn, fed her strength. (Protected-source psychologist 1991) One of the journalists who covered the campaign stated: "During the primaries, Mattox got into Richards' head; in the general election, she got into Williams' head." (Confidential interviews, Fall, 1990) The candidates' personalities thus interacted to produce behavior on both parts which resulted in Richards winning and Williams losing. V.O. Key might analyze the public's response as support for his contention that "voters are not fools."

SUMMARY

The previous chapter analyzed Richards' victory in terms of common factors in the elections of other political outsiders. In all of these eight areas, Richards was able to gain a sufficient advantage, through her own efforts, a certain degree of luck, and some assistance from her opponent, to go on to win the election by a slim margin.

Richards avoided those issues which would have proved divisive and manipulated those which could expose Williams as inadequate for the leadership position, and successfully cast herself as a preferable alternative; long and hard-fought political campaigns rarely result in adulation of the winner so much as disgust for the loser. She made optimum use of the political party climate to solidify the emergent progressive power in her party and win its nomination, and, at the same time, retained the traditional Democratic base of support, and took advantage of the real threat of the

opposition Republican party to sustain the support of the less liberal factions of her own party. Her political experience and personality allowed her to focus on the goal of election and kept her from committing serious errors in the general election campaign. The campaign organization with which she surrounded herself was dedicated, savvy, and diverse, and her consensus-building approach to dealing with internal division resulted in a superior over-all campaign; her effective use of grassroots support was especially a result of this approach. While the visible, paid, media effort undertaken by the Richards' campaign was sorely lacking, she made exemplary use of free media exposure and the "termite" media effort, which resulted in an overall effort superior to that of her opponent. Money, usually a problem for female candidates, was a comparative problem early on for Richards, but she was able to sustain herself in the hard-times and go on to raise a sufficient amount to accomplish a well-financed effort. Richards also maximized any advantage of being a woman in this election year, without falling into the pitfalls of others of her sex who lost their election bids as a result of their gender disadvantages. And finally, in all of these aspects of the campaign, Clayton Williams' presence was a factor. His lack of experience, personal control, and adequacy for the governorship became obvious to the electorate and created advantages for Richards which she was able to exploit. Yet he had begun the race with an apparent advantage, and his unmasking and unravelling which occurred over the course of the campaign did not occur in a vacuum.

Like the previously analyzed campaigns of successful outsiders, Ann Richards' victory was the result of a convergence of possibilities of which she took advantage. Neither Williams' dance to defeat nor Richards' march to victory was a solo-effort.

APPENDIX 1
THE 1990 ABC EXIT POLL



VOTER RESEARCH & SURVEYS
533 West 57th Street New York, N.Y. 10019

Phone: (212) 975-5551
Fax: (212) 975-1794

INVOICE

TO: Ms Mary Ellen Keisch
SW Texas University

FROM: VOTER RESEARCH & SURVEYS
533 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10019

DATE: November 15, 1990

EXIT POLL TABLES FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
HANDLING CHARGES:

\$ 25.00

TOTAL: \$ 25.00

PAYMENT DUE IN FULL.

PLEASE DIRECT ANY INQUIRIES TO: LEE C. SHAPIRO
DIRECTOR, MEDIA SERVICES
(212) 975-2111

TO ACCESS THIS SCREEN, PRESS F1 (Demographics) AND THEN S (SENATOR).

VRS Exit Poll -- Idaho			Senate				N = 1188 As of 13:19 EST			
	MEN	WOMEN	18-29	30-44	45-60	OVER 60	WHITE	BLACK	HISP	
%TOTAL	47	53	20	34	23	21	83	12	3	
TWILEGAR	49	63	62	59	54	49	50	91	62	
CRAIG	51	37	38	41	46	51	50	9	38	
CHG DEM (84 SEN)	+ 7	+ 13	+ 14	+ 10	+ 9	+ 6	+ 10	+ 2	+ 4	
	UNDER 15K	15-30K	30-50K	50K+	DEM	REP	IND	PRO CHOIC	ABORT SOME	PRO LIFE
%TOTAL	13	24	24	34	41	30	26	40	43	17
TWILEGAR	69	54	51	48	85	18	55	80	48	21
CRAIG	31	46	49	52	15	82	45	20	52	79
CHG DEM					+ 9	+ 11	+ 6			
	BUSH APPR	BUSH DISAP	ECON ST +	ECON ST -	WHITE PROT	CATH	STATE SPEC1	STATE SPEC2	STATE SPEC3	STATE SPEC4
%TOTAL	60	27	38	60	34	39				
TWILEGAR	40	90	44	57	46	64				
CRAIG	60	10	56	43	54	36				
CHG DEM					+ 1	+ 16				
Demo- graph F1	Issue F2	Other Ques F3	NES Vote F4	Report: F1 - F4 Office: P,S,G or H						

This screen is a "Demographic" (F1) screen. It is an example of an exit poll in a state with only a limited number of questions. It shows the vote for six important demographic groups -- sex, age, race, income, voter's party identification and religion. It also shows candidate support by a voter's position on the abortion issue, the state's economic condition and the satisfaction with George Bush's performance as President. There may be other issues of interest in some states.

California, which follows, is an example of a state with a longer questionnaire. Its first demographic screen is very similar to Idaho's. However, there are additional displays that Idaho does not have.

This screen is self updating. It will change only about four times from mid afternoon until late at night. This happens when new information is received from the precincts.

In our example, on the %TOTAL line we see that Men are 47% of the voters in Idaho and women are 53%. Men voted 49% for Democrat, Ron Twilegar and 51% for

Republican, Larry Craig. On the CHG DEM line we see +7, which means Twiligar is running 7 points better than the Democratic candidate in the 1984 Idaho Senate race. The race used for measuring the change from the past on this screen is identified only once.

The data can be interpreted in several ways. If we look at the vote by age we can see that Twiliger's share of the vote gets smaller as we go from younger voters to older voters. It went down with each age group from 62% for 18 to 29 year olds to 49% for voters over age 60. Younger people are voting more Democratic, older people more Republican. If we look at the change from the last Senate race in Idaho for this seat we see that the greatest change is among the young. They are voting 14 percentage points more than the young did in 1984. Older people changed much less, only 6 percentage points more than the past. So, there is a trend that is stronger among the young that is a shift to the Democrat. This appears to be a reversal of the strong support the young gave Ronald Reagan and the Republicans in 1984.

GS71 TX G 1 <01> TEX GOVR AS OF 1:30 PM RSP: 2684 P1 NOW 5:26 PM

	MEN	WOMEN	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+	WHITE	BLACK	HISP	---
%TOTAL	49	50	17	40	25	17	76	13	9	
RICHARDS	44	59	46	52	53	54	42	90	71	
WILLIAMS	56	41	54	48	47	46	58	10	29	
CH DEM86	+ 0	+ 9	- 13	+ 10	+ 6	+ 11	+ 2	+ 12	- 12	
(86 GOV)										

	UNDER 15K	15- 30K	30- 50K	50K+	DEM	REP	IND	PRO CHOIC	ABORT SOME	PRO LIFE
%TOTAL	11	26	30	28	39	35	22	32	50	15
RICHARDS	70	57	48	45	85	18	48	66	47	35
WILLIAMS	30	43	52	55	15	82	52	34	53	65
CH DEM86					+ 5	+ 6	+ 14			

	BUSH APP	BUSH DISAP	ECON ST +	ECON ST -	WHITE PROT	CATH	JEW	LIB	MOD	CONS
%TOTAL	61	34	28	71	56	22		14	41	42
RICHARDS	33	84	46	57	40	59		78	65	29
WILLIAMS	67	16	54	43	60	41		22	35	71
CH DEM86					- 2	- 2		+ 4	+ 8	+ 2

GS71 TX G 2 <01> TEX GOVR AS OF 1:30 PM RSP: 2684 P2 NOW 5:26 PM

	HS OR	SOME	COLL	POST	F-FIN	F-FIN	F-FIN	ECON	ECON	
	LESS	COLL	GRAD	GRAD	BETER	WORSE	SAME	NAT +	NAT -	---
%TOTAL	26	30	24	17	33	26	39	22	75	
RICHARDS	55	50	49	55	42	62	54	41	55	
WILLIAMS	45	50	51	45	58	38	46	59	45	
CH DEM86	+ 1	+ 5	+ 15	+ 5						
(86 GOV)										

	NEW	RET-	MARR-	EMPL-	LABOR	ATEND	FEM-	ARMED	GAY	
	VOTER	IRE	IED	OYED	UNION	CHRRH	INIST	FORCE	LESB	----
%TOTAL	4	16	62	64	5	52	6	13		
RICHARDS	65	53	48	50	76	46	85	53		
WILLIAMS	35	47	52	50	24	54	15	47		
CH DEM86	+ 5	+ 9	+ 3	+ 6	+ 3					

	'88	'88	RIGHT	WRONG
	BUSH	DUKE	DIREC	DIREC
%TOTAL	59	31	44	52
RICHARDS	28	92	37	63
WILLIAMS	72	8	63	37
CH DEM86				

GS71 TX G 3
ISSUES

<01> TEX GOVR AS OF 1:30 PM RSP: 2684 P3 NOW 5:26 PM
FACTORS IMPORTANCE OF GENDER

	ALL	DEM	REP		ALL	DEM	REP		ALL	DEM	REP
EDUC	38	44	30	EXPERENC	34	51	15	#1 ISSUE	4	4	4
CRIME	27	17	38	MANAGER	28	25	32	1 OFMANY	15	16	14
ETHICS	18	24	12	OP 2NEG	20	17	24	NOT ISSU	79	78	80
ST ECON	18	16	21	TOUGHNES	16	6	27				
ABORTION	17	15	20	OP 2EXTR	15	12	17	S&L IMPORTANCE			
STATETAX	15	10	22	OUTTOUCH	14	20	8		ALL	DEM	REP
INSURANC	7	10	4	CANDPAST	8	6	10	#1 ISSUE	4	5	4
GUNCONTR	5	3	6	OUTSIDER	6	2	11	1 OFMANY	46	51	40
S&L'S	2	3	2	CANDSEX	3	2	3	NOT ISSU	46	41	53

CAMPAIGN MORE NEG?

	ALL	DEM	REP
RICHARDS	30	9	55
WILLIAMS	35	59	6
BOTH	32	28	36
NEITHER	1	2	1

WHEN DECIDE VOTE

	ALL	DEM	REP
LAST3DAY	16	16	16
LASTWEEK	11	11	10
LASMONTH	17	21	13
EARLIER	55	50	61

BENTSEN A GOOD PRES?

	ALL	DEM	REP
YES	41	55	24
NO	49	33	68

GS71 TX L 1 <01> TEX LTGV AS OF 1:30 PM RSP: 1980 P1 NOW 5:26 PM

	MEN	WOMEN	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+ OVER	WHITE	BLACK	HISP	---
%TOTAL	49	50	19	41	25	15	76	14	8	
BULLOCK	53	59	45	55	59	67	49	85	73	
MOSBACHE	47	41	55	45	41	33	51	15	27	

	UNDER 15K	15- 30K	30- 50K	50K+	DEM	REP	IND	PRO CHOIC	ABORT SOME	PRO LIFE
%TOTAL	11	28	31	25	40	36	20	32	49	15
BULLOCK	74	60	54	48	85	24	56	63	55	41
MOSBACHE	26	40	46	52	15	76	44	37	45	59

	BUSH APP	BUSH DISAP	ECON ST +	ECON ST -	WHITE PROT	CATH	JEW	LIB	MOD	CCMS
%TOTAL	61	35	28	72	57	20		14	42	42
BULLOCK	40	82	48	59	46	62		79	65	23
MOSBACHE	60	18	52	41	54	38		21	35	62

GS71 TX L 2 <01> TEX LTGV AS OF 1:30 PM RSP: 1980 P2 NOW 5:26 PM

	HS OR LESS	SOME COLL	COLL GRAD	POST GRAD	F-FIN BETER	F-FIN WORSE	F-FIN SAME	ECON NAT +	ECON NAT -	---
%TOTAL	25	31	24	17	33	26	39	21	77	
BULLOCK	68	53	49	53	46	68	56	46	59	
MOSBACHE	32	47	51	47	54	32	44	54	41	

	NEW VOTER	RET- IRED	MARR- IED	EMPL- OYED	LABOR UNION	ATEND CHRCH	FEM- INIST	ARMED FORCE	GAY LESB	---
%TOTAL		15	62	64	6	52	5	14		
BULLOCK		62	53	52	77	50	81	57		
MOSBACHE		38	47	48	23	50	19	43		

	'88 BUSH	'88 DUKE	RIGHT DIREC	WRONG DIREC
%TOTAL	57	32	43	54
BULLOCK	36	87	42	66
MOSBACHE	64	13	58	34

GS71 TX A 1 <01> TEX ATTG AS OF 1:30 PM RSP: 1964 P1 NOW 5:26 PM

	MEN	WOMEN	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+ OVER	WHITE	BLACK	HISP	---
%TOTAL	49	50	19	41	24	15	75	14	8	
MORALES	51	59	46	56	57	61	46	85	82	
BROWN	49	41	54	44	43	39	54	15	18	

	UNDER 15K	15- 30K	30- 50K	50K+	DEM	REP	IND	PRO CHOIC	ABORT SOME	PRO LIFE
%TOTAL	11	28	31	25	40	36	20	32	49	16
MORALES	71	62	51	45	88	22	52	65	53	40
BROWN	29	38	49	55	12	78	48	35	47	60

	BUSH APP	BUSH DISAP	ECON ST +	ECON ST -	WHITE PROT	CATH	JEW	LIB	MOD	CONS
%TOTAL	61	35	27	72	56	21		14	42	42
MORALES	38	83	46	59	43	65		78	67	34
BROWN	62	17	54	41	57	35		22	33	66

GS71 TX A 2 <01> TEX ATTG AS OF 1:30 PM RSP: 1964 P2 NOW 5:26 PM

	HS OR LESS	SOME COLL	COLL GRAD	POST GRAD	F-FIN BETER	F-FIN WORSE	F-FIN SAME	ECON NAT +	ECON NAT -	---
%TOTAL	25	31	24	17	33	26	39	22	77	
MORALES	62	57	47	52	44	67	57	46	58	
BROWN	38	43	53	48	56	33	43	54	42	

	NEW VOTER	RET- IRED	MARR- IED	EMPL- OYED	LABOR UNION	ATEND CHRRH	FEM- INIST	ARMED FORCE	GAY LESB	---
%TOTAL	4	15	62	64	6	52	6	15		
MORALES	62	58	53	53	73	49	83	54		
BROWN	38	42	47	47	27	51	17	46		

	'88 BUSH	'88 DUKE	RIGHT DIREC	WRONG DIREC
%TOTAL	57	31	44	53
MORALES	33	90	43	65
BROWN	67	10	57	35

APPENDIX 2
MINORITY EMPLOYMENT AT STATE AGENCIES

Ann Richards

G O V E R N O R

Minority Employment at State Agencies

State Agency	Number of Employees	Percent Minority
Treasury	214	43.9
Agriculture Department	570	39.3
Attorney General	1,522	37.8
General Land Office	550	35.0
All state agencies except universities	108,864	34.6
Comptroller of Public Accounts	2,716	31.3
State Bar of Texas	214	22.0
Parks & Wildlife	2,031	21.5
Texas Supreme Court	46	15.2
Court of Criminal Appeals	53	5.7

Administrative and Professional Positions

Category	State Bar (214 Employees)	Treasury (214 Employees)
Total administrative & professional positions	74	110
White male	38	42
White female	30	33
Hispanic male	2	9
Hispanic female	3	11
Black male	0	5
Black female	0	7
Other* male	1	1
Other* female	0	2
Administrative & professional positions held by minorities	6	35
Percentage of administrative & professional positions held by minorities	8.1	31.8

* American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, or Pacific Islander

SOURCE: Report by governor's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, based on data collected on Form EEO-4, filed May 1989.

APPENDIX 3
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW:

1. As you cover/follow the 1990 Texas Gubernatorial election, how does it compare to, and/or stand out from, others you have covered/followed?

2. A. How would you characterize the strengths of the Williams' campaign?

B. The Richards' campaign?

C. How would you characterize the weaknesses of the Williams' campaign?

D. The Richards' campaign?

3. A. Have you been surprised by the Williams' campaign? (How?)

B. Have you been surprised by the Richards' campaign? (How?)

4. A. In your assessment, did the primaries affect Richards' general election strategies or opportunities? (In what way?)

B. In your assessment, did the primaries affect Williams' general election strategies or opportunities? (In what way?)

5. Do you think either candidate came out of the primaries with the advantage for the general election? (Which one?) (Why?)

6. What do you think will be the effect of party unity on each candidate's success in the general election?

A. Republican (Dallas faction, Pro-choice faction)

B. Democratic (Conservative faction)

7. What do you see as the major issue or issues the candidates need to address to enhance their election opportunity?

A. Richards

B. Williams

C. Which candidate do you view as having the "edge" on the important issues? (Why?)

8. A. How important are issues in this race?

B. How does that compare to previous gubernatorial races you have covered/followed?

9. What is the importance of the following on voter attraction and election victory? (Explain importance)

A. Race

B. Gender

C. Abortion issue

D. Candidate experience

E. The Economy (national and/or state)

F. Cost of government

G. Mid-East situation

H. Environment

I. Crime

J. Education

K. Image (Candidates and Texas--the S&L "blame", traditional "macho", etc.)

L. Drugs

M. Prisons

N. Money (Is this going to be a "bought" election?)

O. Negative campaigning

P. Party loyalty (redistricting, other issues)

Q. Liberal/conservative identification

R. "Undecideds", who choose a candidate at the last minute and are said to be the least informed of all voters

S. Early voting

T. Insurance

U. Other issues

10. A. What do Texas voters want in the person they elect Governor?

B. What is the relative importance of issues to image in this election?

11. Ultimately, what will it take to win this election?
A. For Richards

B. For Williams

12. Considering the polls at the moment, what do you predict will be the movement between now and election day?

13. Who do you think will win what regions and blocs of voters?

A. North	B. East	C. West	D. South
E. Gulf Coast	F. Central	G. Urban	H. Rural
I. Suburbs	J. Women	K. Minorities	L. Labor
M. Business	N. Teachers	O. Other:	

14. A. Why will the loser lose and the winner win?

B. Given the current situation, who do you think will be the winner?

C. What could happen between now and the election to alter that?

15. Do you sense a gender "backlash" which is affecting either campaign? (Could you please analyze that?)

16. What have I missed?

17. Would you have anything to add?

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