

ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR:
EXAMINING THE APPARENT ELECTORAL DOMINANCE
OF THE POLITICAL RIGHT FOLLOWING THE CIVIL WAR

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of
Texas State University-San Marcos
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements

for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

by

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San Marcos, Texas
December 2007

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his thanks to the many people who have contributed to this project. Of course, the members of his graduate committee were helpful throughout the process and instrumental in making the experience a meaningful one for the author. Their timely and insightful comments have contributed to making this a project that may enhance understanding of political maturation in previously conflicted countries. The author also wishes to thank his wife, Cynthia Contreras de Robles, for her contributions of advice and tolerance of the many late nights that went into the entire academic program. Finally, the author thanks Dan Smith for his editorial and typing assistance in creating the finished product.

This manuscript was submitted on November 29, 2007.

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of a bloody civil war and the advent of truly free elections in the early 1990s, El Salvador has experienced several rounds of presidential, legislative, and municipal elections. These have been peaceful and competitive. In general, the country has tended to favor the more conservative ARENA party over its primary competitors. The present research attempts to describe this trend and its antecedents in greater detail than has been previously attempted. A survey was administered to 60 Salvadorans in their native country and in the United States in an attempt to determine voter perceptions of the strategies and events that have led to the generally conservative trend. The attitudes expressed in this survey are consistent with the electoral outcomes and indicate a general

favoring of a market economy as opposed to the socialist offering of the primary competition. At the same time, concerns remain regarding a variety of social issues such as education, poverty, and crime. Based on these surveys, it seems likely that approaches to these and other issues important to Salvadoran voters will be decided on a political middle ground in which compromise and pragmatism are valued more than ideological purity. Elections will remain competitive, and the country's commitment to democracy seems likely to flourish.

I: POLITICAL EL SALVADOR TODAY

The path to a civil society is often arduous, and it can be argued that El Salvador's path in that direction has been more arduous than many in the western hemisphere. As Michael W. Foley argues, the run-up to the twelve-year civil war that racked the country until the signing of the peace accord in 1992, the war itself, and tactics of waging peace itself are fought on the ground of civil society and over the forms such a society will take. In his words, "...the struggle...is essentially a struggle over the character and direction of the new civil society that has arisen in the wake of the war and the Peace Accord" (Foley, 1996: 67). That struggle certainly continues today, though it has become progressively more peaceful, and its near-term direction seems clearer than it did at the time Foley wrote. The present work seeks to analyze from the perspective of some of those who have lived through this period just how and why that direction has developed over the short term.

The historical development of El Salvador, the most recent civil war, and the circumstances leading up to the Peace Accord, along with the social and economic divisions that still affect the country, have been so widely documented that an exhaustive review of their existence would serve little purpose or add little in the way of insight to the present analysis. Nevertheless, some review of the recent past and a general description of the present state of affairs are in order for the sake of clarity.

In 1992, the government of El Salvador and leftist guerillas signed an agreement that called for political and military reforms and ended a twelve-year civil war that had caused the deaths of more than 75,000 Salvadorans and the migration from the country of many thousands more. The war also brought significant economic costs, and the country is still recovering from the aftereffects of the war. Although the country is the smallest in terms of territory in Central America, its economy is the third largest in the region. Still, economic growth has been relatively slow over the recent past, and El Salvador is attempting to remedy that by expanding investment opportunities, linking its economy to that of the United States by adopting the dollar as its official currency, modernizing its taxation and healthcare systems, and building on an already favorable export trade (CIA World Factbook, 2007: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/es.html>).

Despite the relatively minimal economic growth of recent years, the picture of El Salvador that emerges is that of a relatively stable country that is committed to a course of continued democratization through free elections and with the prospect of increasingly enhancing the prospects of its citizens. What also emerges from the elections held since the peace was concluded is a picture of a country that has trended conservative politically. Edwin Corr, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from 1985 to 1988, observed as much in a recent interview with this writer, citing the deeply conservative nature of most rural Salvadorans, a conservatism that has tended to favor the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista party (ARENA) over the revolutionary party Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). Indeed, Ambassador Corr pointed out that the election of Napoleón Duarte in the 1980s, despite the nonparticipation in those elections by the

FMLN, indicated even earlier this trend toward conservatism. According to Ambassador Corr, even though Duarte was not in the strictest sense a conservative, his Catholic upbringing and centrist political tendencies would have been attractive to those of a more moderate conservative political view (Corr, 2007).

Whereas there are several other political parties, ARENA and the FMLN are by far the leaders in terms of their ability to garner the votes of the citizens. Other parties, however, may at times find themselves in position to extract concessions from the two major parties that need their support to control the legislature.

The most important feature of the political landscape in El Salvador, however, is the commitment of the country to a democratic process of selecting its leadership at all levels. O'Shaughnessy and Dodson noted this commitment in their 1999 study of the political bargaining that had come to characterize El Salvador and Nicaragua, both countries attempting recoveries from bitter and destructive civil wars. By the late 1990s, all the meaningful actors on the political scene had "accepted the legitimacy of the elections and the constitutionality of the governing regime. Parties across the political spectrum participated (in elections), and there was extensive international support for the process" (O'Shaughnessy and Dodson, 1999: 99).

Elections since the conclusion of the peace demonstrate the general dominance of the conservative ARENA party. Even the election in 1991, before the treaty was signed, yielded a substantial plurality of deputies in the Chamber of Deputies for ARENA. Of 84 Deputies, 39 were ARENA victors. In this election, the FMLN was not active, and only a bit more than one million votes were cast (Political Database, 1991: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/dip91.htm>). But even after the FMLN became

fully engaged in the electoral process and fielded viable candidates for both president and seats in the national assembly the trend has been relatively stable in favor of ARENA at the national level. This is not to say, however, that the political environment in El Salvador is not competitive. Quite the contrary, as we will see later on. But the general trend at the national level has been a favor of the more conservative political contestants with ARENA picking up presidential wins and majorities or large pluralities in the national assembly.

How the parties themselves view the reasons for their success may be important, and attempts were made to contact leaders of the major parties on the national scene. No representative of FMLN responded to repeated telephone inquiries, but Maricio Suvillegas, Information Director of ARENA, responded with an interview on October 29, 2007. In that interview, Mr. Suvillegas was asked to account for the general success of ARENA in elections at all levels. He indicated that the major reason was that ARENA “offers better options for the country to move forward.” In elaborating on this general theme, he described ARENA candidates and elected officials as more willing to listen to the citizens, less ideologically driven, and more willing to compromise to reach realistic solutions to the needs of the people.

As an example of the ARENA commitment to listening and compromise, Mr. Suvillegas noted that ARENA leaders are in constant conversation with members of the electorate through such instruments as public meetings and surveys at which ideas from the people are actively solicited. Data gathered from such sources are analyzed by economists and sociologists, among others, and the analyses are forwarded to the highest levels of government without censorship and for the purpose of informed policymaking.

Mr. Suvillegas' assessment of the primary opposition to ARENA is also important. He described the FMLN as still wedded to the socialist ideology that it had taken into the civil war. In his view, this ideology simply cannot compete with the growing prosperity and peace being experienced by all Salvadorans since the Peace Accord.

II: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1994

Although the ARENA candidate has won in each presidential election since the peace was concluded, the elections have sometimes been close enough to require a runoff or to enable other parties to compete effectively in legislative or local elections, which in any event are not held on the same schedule as the presidential elections. The present chapter reviews the results of these elections.

1994

In the presidential election of 1994, Armando Calderon, the ARENA candidate garnered 49.3% of the vote in the first round of voting. El Salvador's election rules require that a majority be achieved in order for the leading candidate to avoid a runoff with the candidate drawing the next highest vote total, so a runoff was required. The leading opposition candidate was Ruben Zamora of a coalition formed between the FMLN and Christian Democratic (CD) parties, who in the first round had garnered 25.6% of the vote. In the second round, however, Calderon and ARENA garnered 68.3% of the vote. This was a resounding victory and proved a predictor of later political trends as well. The results are shown in Table 1, below.

Table 1. Results of the Presidential Election in 1994

Candidate / Party	Primary	Runoff
Armando Calderon Sol / ARENA	49.3%	68.3%
Ruben Zamora / FMLN	25.6%	31.6%
Fidel Chavez Mena / PDC	16.0%	—

Political Database, 1994: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/pres94.htm>

1999

The presidential election of 1999 did not yield quite such a resounding majority. The ARENA candidate, Francisco Flores, received only 51.96% of the vote. But it should be noted that no runoff was required in this election. Flores achieved a clear majority in the first round. Again, the FMLN candidate, Facundo Guardado, was the runner up, but he harvested a vote total of only 28.88%, making him a distant trailer in the presidential election. Still, the vote was nearly equally divided between the more conservative ARENA and parties that are less conservatively inclined. That ARENA achieved only a bare majority in this presidential election may have been a harbinger of things to come in legislative elections the next year, when the FMLN attained more seats in the Assembly than did ARENA. The full results are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Results of the Presidential Election in 1999

Candidate	Party	Percentage of Vote
Francisco Flores	ARENA	51.9%
Facundo Guardado	FMLN	28.9%
Rubén Zamora Rivas	CDU	7.6%
Rudolfo Parker	PDC	5.8%
Salvador Nelson García	LIDER	3.7%
Hernán Contreras	PCN	1.7%
Francisco Ayala de Paz	PUNTO	0.5%

*Rounding error may yield slightly more than 100%

Political Database, 1999: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/pre99.htm>

2004

The presidential election of 2004 saw a return to substantial ARENA dominance of the political landscape. Fielding a new and more popular candidate, Antonio Saca, ARENA received 57.71% of the vote in 2004, a clear majority in the first round. The election also saw a consolidation of the number of political parties fielding candidates at the national level. The FMLN came in second at 35.68% of the vote as usual, but a union of the PDC the Coalición Democrática Unida (CDU/PDC) and the Partido Conciliación Nacional (PCN) were the only other viable candidates.

Table 3. Results of the Presidential Election in 2004

Candidate	Party	Percentage of Vote
Antonio Saca	ARENA	57.7%
Schafik Handal	FMLN	35.7%
Hector Silva	CDU	3.9%
Rafael Machuca	PCN	2.7%

Political Database, 2004. <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/pre04.htm>

Even together, though, the two minor candidates received only a bit more than 6% of the vote. It may be that such a result will turn out to be the impetus for even more consolidation of the political parties in the future as parties other than ARENA attempt to improve their chances in the presidential elections.

III: LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

The legislative elections since the Peace Accord have demonstrated a bit more open competitiveness than has been shown at the presidential elections. The El Salvador Asamblea Legislativa (Legislative Assembly) is composed of 84 total seats whose members are elected every three years by popular vote. Twenty of those members are elected by nationwide popular vote, while the remaining 64 are elected in 14 districts that are allowed from 3 to 16 seats each depending on their population. It can be seen that such an arrangement would allow for minority parties to achieve significant representative in the Assembly, and that is exactly what has happened. This is not a trivial consideration (Travel Document, 2007: <http://www.traveldocs.com/sv/govern.htm>). In El Salvador's government, representation in the Assembly brings with it the opportunity to bargain for positions held by minority parties as their support is sought by the dominant, but not always majority, party on a variety of issues. Such representation, as is demonstrable in all representative democracies, also brings the opportunity to secure financial support for future elections.

The staggered schedules of elections for the presidency, representation in the Legislative Assembly, and various municipal governments also reduce the likelihood that dominance in elections at one level will translate automatically into dominance at other levels. And, indeed, the competitiveness of the various parties has been quite different in the legislative elections, as is shown by the results over the elections since the Peace

Accord. It should be noted, however, that presidential, legislative, and municipal elections will coincide in 2009 (Travel Document, 2007: <http://www.traveldocs.com/sv/govern.htm>). This increases the likelihood of a coattail effect at lower levels, especially if one party or coalition of parties achieves substantial dominance at the presidential level.

In the meantime, however, the elections at the legislative and municipal levels have demonstrated both the commitment to peace and democratic governance of all the parties involved and the general competitiveness of the political landscape of El Salvador.

1991

Because of its importance to the conclusion of the Peace Accord in 1992, the legislative election in 1991 deserves mention here. The results are shown below in Table Four. Note that the legislature at that time was referred to as the Chamber of Deputies but that its composition was the same as is that of the Legislative Assembly today. In that election, the ARENA party, which represented most of the hard-line conservative elements that had fought so brutally in the civil war, achieved a dominant position in the legislature, demonstrating that despite its uncompromising reputation it was capable of achieving a substantial political position in elections. Its 44.23% of the vote, while not a majority and which did not give it a majority of the seats in the Chamber, did put it in a position to bargain effectively to retain the power of its constituents in the negotiations that led to the Peace Accord. Similarly, other parties perhaps also recognized they could make progress toward the political and economic objectives of their constituents through participation in a democratic process. An apparent exception to that pattern was the FMLN, which did not participate in this round of elections as a party. Still, the

groundwork was laid for the Accords and for the growing stability and generally peaceful political competition that has ensued (Travel Documents, 2007: <http://www.traveldocs.com/sv/govern.htm>).

Table 4. 1991 Chamber of Deputies Election Results

Parties	Percentage of Vote	Number of Deputies
ARENA	44.23	39
PDC	27.96	26
PCN	8.99	9
CD	12.16	8
MAC	3.23	1
UDN	2.68	1
AD	0.65	0

Note that the FMLN did not participate as a party in this election.
Political Database, 1991: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/dip91.htm>

1994

The first elections for the Legislative Assembly following the conclusion of the Peace Accord saw considerable consolidation of the political parties in El Salvador. Really, only three parties were fully competitive and received significant numbers of deputies in the Assembly. The results are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. 1994 Legislative Assembly Election Results

Parties	Percentage of Vote	Number of Deputies
ARENA	45	39
FMLN	24	21
PDC	14	18
PCN	—	4
CD	—	1
UD	—	1

Note that the smaller parties' percentage of the vote was negligible as a percentage of the national vote. That these parties still were represented is due to the division between "at large" and "local" representatives in the Assembly, making it possible for them to win the occasional local district without gaining a significant percentage of the national vote.
(Political Database, 1994: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/leg94.htm>)

Again, ARENA was the dominant party, but it did not achieve a majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. This made it necessary for the party to solicit the cooperation of competing parties in order to achieve its legislative goals. One of the characteristics of the legislative process in El Salvador is that some kinds of legislation require a supermajority of two-thirds of the votes in the Legislative Assembly for passage. Such a supermajority makes it necessary for both dominant and minority political organizations to approach each other in some spirit of compromise and cooperation. The alternative would be a return to the violence of previous years.

1997

The elections of 1997 produced results that were rather remarkable for the gains demonstrated by the FMLN. The generally leftist party achieved an outcome very nearly equal to that of the ARENA party and put itself in a position both to block many ARENA initiatives and to negotiate with other parties to achieve some of its legislative goals.

Table 6. 1997 Legislative Assembly Election Results

Parties	Percentage of Vote	Number of Deputies
ARENA	35.4	28
FMLN	34.3	27
PCN	8.1	9
PDC	7.9	8
PRSC	3.4	3
Others / Independent	8	9

(CIA World Factbook, 2000: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/es.html>)

Note: The reader will notice a different source for data for the 1997 legislative election. For some reason the OAS/Georgetown University Political Database used to provide all other election results reported here does not list an election in 1997 despite it clearly having occurred. Another source was used in this one instance.

In this election, the FMLN was able to draw on dissatisfaction with both the ARENA governance during the period and both increase its own representation and reduce that of ARENA in the Legislative Assembly. Such a result, while not eliminating the power of ARENA on the national scene, clearly demonstrated that the FMLN and other parties remain substantial political forces. It is also likely that this election provided

something of a prod to ARENA to move more closely to the center and to make concessions that would reduce its identification with hard right political and economic causes and courses of action.

2000

The trend begun in 1997 continued in the 2000 Legislative Assembly elections, with the FMLN actually garnering two more seats in the Assembly than did ARENA. At the same time, the FMLN came within 10,000 votes out of more than 1.2 million cast of tying ARENA in total number of valid ballots. Other moderate to leftist parties also continued to poll at about the same numbers as in the previous election.

Following this election, ARENA was only able to retain its control of the Legislative Assembly by forming coalitions with other parties, something FMLN was not able to do as effectively, indicating that ARENA was more effective in modulating its image of adherence to a rigidly conservative point of view. It is such a willingness to compromise and reach deals that is at the heart of functioning democratic government. That the different partisan participants in the electoral process remained willing to make compromises despite overall reductions in power and influence is promising for the commitment it shows to the process. With each election, evidence mounts that the people and, as important, the political leadership of the country, are experiencing a growing commitment to maintaining the democratic process and avoiding a return to the violence that characterized the previous decades.

Table 7. 2000 Legislative Assembly Election Results

Parties	Percentage of Vote	Number of Deputies
ARENA	36.1	29
FMLN	35.2	31
PCN	8.8	13
PDC	7.2	6
CDU	5.4	3
Others / Independent	7.3	2

(Political Database, 2000: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/leg2000.htm>)

2006

The Legislative Assembly election of 2006 saw a resurgence of ARENA fortune in the Assembly. For the first time in three election cycles, ARENA significantly increased its overall vote in the legislative election. The party may have been in a position as a result of this election to be a bit more forceful in its negotiations with other parties regarding its legislative agenda though the full implications of that possibility may not become evident for some time. With its dominance of the presidential elections and ability to maintain at least a large plurality in the Legislative Assembly, though, ARENA remains positioned to be a powerful force in the political development of El Salvador for the foreseeable future.

Table 8. 2006 Legislative Assembly Election Results

Parties	Percentage of Vote	Number of Deputies
ARENA	39.4	34
FMLN	39.7	32
PCN	11.0	10
PDC	6.8	6
CD	3.1	2

(Political Database, 2006: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/leg2006.htm>)

Note as well that both ARENA and FMLN increased both their percentages of the vote and their representation in the Legislative Assembly. While three other smaller parties held their own, several of the even smaller parties and the independents disappeared entirely from the results. This consolidation trend among the political parties has continued somewhat unevenly throughout the period since the Peace Accord were signed, and its continuation here may indicate a permanent move toward fewer parties with minority positions being incorporated within the larger parties.

Municipal Elections

As is the case in most democracies, municipal and other local elections can be important developing grounds for political movements, parties, and potential candidates for office at higher levels. They also often provide an important part of the machinery necessary to win elections at all levels. Get-out-the-vote efforts must ultimately address

the critical issue of persuading individual voters to go to the polls to cast ballots for the preferred candidates, and it is at this level that politics becomes local. The outcomes of local elections in El Salvador may prove to be especially useful in gauging the future prospects of the different political parties. In this section, we will follow a somewhat different convention from the earlier sections in that we will mostly describe general outcomes rather than explore the trends in individual departments or municipalities. The one exception is San Salvador, the country's capital city and generally viewed as the "crown jewel" among the local electorates in the country.

Municipal and legislative elections in El Salvador have generally followed a less stable pattern than have presidential elections, with preferences swinging back and forth among the parties, even substantially minority parties gaining political power in some localities, and reflecting a general voter tendency to deny absolute political power to one party or the other. In short, the municipal elections, especially, demonstrate that El Salvador since the Peace Accord has been and remains a competitive political environment. Nevertheless, ARENA has been a major political force at this level as well, reflecting its ability to project an image that appeals to large numbers of voters even at the local level.

In the 2000 elections, for example, the FMLN led ARENA in San Salvador by more than 20,000 votes out of slightly more than 120,000 votes cast at the municipal level and actually won a majority of the vote in that election. But over the fourteen departments that make up the country, no fewer than five different parties won local elections. ARENA and FMLN demonstrated rough parity in the number of local elections

won, but ruled a majority of the country's departments (Political Database, 2000: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/leg2000.htm>).

This pattern had been established in the 1997 elections at that level and continued through subsequent elections. The most recent such election, 2006, continued the pattern, and despite a massive effort by ARENA to replace FMLN as the governing authority in San Salvador, FMLN retained its position by winning the municipal elections in that city. At this point, six parties remain in contention in El Salvador, and following the 2006 municipal elections they all remain pretty much where they were. ARENA was able to increase by 36 the number of mayors it elected, and it succeeded in reducing the number of the population governed by FMLN to less than a majority. At the same time, FMLN picked up a legislative seat and retained its role as the deciding factor on votes requiring more than a simple majority. Several of the smaller parties picked up both vote totals and positions in municipal elections, while voter participation continued to rise, indicating growing faith in the political process and, no doubt, a lessened perception of danger arising out of participation (Grigsby, 2006: <http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3252>). In all, the elections of 2006 show promise for the competitive futures of several parties.

IV: LEANING CONSERVATIVE

The results of the elections since the signing of the Peace Accord indicate a clear preference for, but by no means domination by, the conservative ARENA party in El Salvador. That preference, especially evident at the national level, is tempered by reluctance of the electorate to grant absolute power to any of the competing parties. In addition to the checks built into the constitution and form of government, the electorate seems to be exercising its own check on the power of any political organization by diluting its power to a considerable extent. This seems to have the effect of forcing the parties to temper, if not the personal ambitions to power of their leaders, the ideological purity of the parties themselves in order to appeal to broader numbers of people.

Polishing and blunting the sharp edges of ideology are likely a result of a direct response to the wishes of the people as expressed in their voting patterns. But such activities may also have roots in the history of the conflict that preceded the peace. Following a long and bloody civil war, one feature of the political landscape and the public emotions of the populace is likely to be simple exhaustion. As Montgomery (1995: 190-194) repeatedly pointed out, the individual human toll of the civil war was tremendous and widespread. Virtually no family was untouched by the violence, and many have seen about all the radical change they wish to see over the course of their lives. The natural tendency of many such people would be to opt for retaining such institutional stability as still remains.

One thing that seems to be going on in El Salvador is a reversion to the kind of pressure for reform described by Wright (1994: *passim*) and Peterson (1997: *passim*) in separate analyses of the history of the country and of revolution and change in general. Most revolutions do not begin with armed insurrection. Rather, individuals who feel slighted or displaced in a society are likely to turn to such institutions as the church or existing political organizations to attempt to bring pressure on the government for reform. It is only when such actions fail that they resort to violence. Having exhausted itself in a civil war lasting more than a decade, Salvadorans seem to be reverting to the more peaceful means of bringing about incremental changes in their lives. As important, institutions such as ARENA and the other political parties seem to be responding with sufficient attention to the desires of the people for political and institutional stability that faith in the democratic process and in the right to petition government for change is retained. Salvadorans, having taken a step back from violence, seem reluctant to approach its brink once more.

Perhaps the close association with radical reform with the repression that brought on the civil war is one factor in the conservative leanings of the electorate at present. It no doubt plays a part in the willingness of the parties to compete for votes rather than for military victory. Stanley (1996: 178-180) called attention to how the conflicting strategies of the state—radical land reform and radical political repression—ultimately led to the civil war, while Byrne (1996: 169) notes that the peace ultimately derived from the realization by the competing sides that neither could win on the battlefield. After so many years and so many sacrifices, a return to such violence would simply be unacceptable to large numbers, even to large numbers of the original warriors.

That many of the aims of the rebels have not been met is strong evidence that the country is exhausted and trending toward conservatism simply to catch its breath. Certainly civil justice remains an important area in which fundamental reforms remain lacking. Popkin (2000: 210-214) points out that the judicial system in El Salvador remains weak and that justice is often simply not available to ordinary Salvadorans. That is especially true for those who might have reason to challenge the elite, whose access to the justice system has always been considerably stronger and in whose favor the system has consistently been biased in any event.

Hope may be another factor, however, despite the inherent and continued weakness of many of the institutions of the country. The role played by churches in El Salvador has changed markedly over the years, but their activities are still directed at bettering the lives of parishioners despite the renewed emphasis on evangelism by many churches, especially the Roman Catholic Church. In a country such as El Salvador, churches often address the needs and aspirations of those most vulnerable to economic and social hardships. In many communities, churches are now addressing local structural needs and largely remain uninvolved with the large structural issues that led them into conflict with the nationally dominant elites during the run-up to the civil war. But it is precisely those most vulnerable segments of society that are the likeliest participants in radical reform movements, either peaceful or violent. If they can be made to sense that they have a stake in the maintenance of stability, and that their lots will more likely be bettered in a state of stability than in a state of revolt, then they will likely work within the system and accept conservative leadership (Gomez, 1999: 53-71, *passim*).

Gomez also notes another factor that may be quite important in maintaining a generally conservative tendency by the electorate. Even among those who were historically among the most oppressed, participation in either Catholic or evangelical churches carries with it a considerable commitment to traditional and family values as well as a sense of extended community despite the considerable disruption of war. Those commitments remain and have been reinforced to a considerable extent by the churches' change in emphasis on evangelism and individual salvation rather than on revolution. The churches themselves foster communitarian networks, and in the absence of other institutions and structures that support community political movements people prefer what they have to other undeveloped networks. The department of Morazán has seen a mass repatriation since the end of the civil war, and many of those returning and those who remained throughout are inclined to vest their futures in the greater stability associated with their churches and more conservative political movements (Gomez, 1999: 54-56). It seems at least possible that ARENA and other conservative political movements could benefit from these tendencies.

Still another source of the generally conservative bent of the electorate in El Salvador may be found in the history of the country. Specifically, James Mahoney proposes that the kind of liberalism experienced in a country sets it on its path to modernization and development. In the case of El Salvador, the liberalism experienced was a radical liberalism that, "...undermined communal landholding structures, promoted rapid agrarian-capitalist expansion and directly threatened the long-term survival of peasant communities and small producers. This pattern saw the establishment of polarised class structures and a militarised state apparatus" (Mahoney, 2001: 222).

In pushing such revolutionary policies, the liberals, with whom the FLMN remain as closely associated as ARENA is to the militaristic state apparatus, essentially alienated themselves from large segments of the population that might otherwise support reform. As ARENA has modified its approach to government, or at least to political campaigning, the association with liberal reform in El Salvador is not sufficiently attractive to risk a return to the upheaval of the civil war years and those immediately preceding it. In short, the radical liberal reforms attempted in El Salvador led directly to the government against which the rebellion arose. It seems many have concluded a return to that kind of radical reform would ultimately lead once more to a repressive response.

Pecaney and Stanley (2001: 163-166) note that one factor in the successful resolution of the civil war in El Salvador was the credibility of internal guarantees of security in the absence of such international guarantees. Central America was somewhat unique in that the most likely international guarantor of security was the United States, which after World War II had spent many years attempting to undermine leftist governments in the region. It was hardly a credible guarantor of security in the circumstance, and therefore such guarantees had to come from within by agreement. These agreements, and institutions that supported them, had come as a result of a five-year United Nations initiative to bring peace to the region. But because the peace process itself required changes in the goals and identities of the contending parties, they all had a vested interest in the success of the process, perhaps a greater desire to see them succeed than had the guarantees been imposed from the outside (Pecaney and Stanley, 2001: 163-166).

Projecting this concept to ARENA in particular, but also to all the contending parties in El Salvador, it seems likely that the public images of the warring factions would already have begun to change and that the leaders of those factions themselves would begin to see the advantages of continuing those changes. With this in mind, it is possible to view changes in ARENA, FLMN, and the other contending parties as being far from cynical marketing ploys. Rather, they may very well be legitimate attempts to change direction in ways that will achieve both partisan ends and peace within a democratic structure over the long term. If large numbers of the electorate perceive them in such a way, then truly favorable impressions rather than fear of a return to violence may be the primary motivating factor in generating a vote.

William Barnes (1998: 63-101, *passim*) argues that the development of a center-left, liberal constituency is a necessary part of achieving full democracy. Historically, he says, such center-left movements, rather than radical movements of either the left or the right, have been key to the development of what he calls “full democracy.” There is merit to this argument. At the time he wrote in 1998, he was decrying the lack of such a development in the transitional democracies of Central America. But this writer believes that it is possible the moderation of both the right and the left in El Salvador may be producing exactly the development Barnes is seeking. Granting there is much wanting in the social, economic, and political development of institutions of government and justice in El Salvador, there may be in the moderation of the contending parties exactly the center-left movement that Barnes believes is necessary for development of full democracy. Of course, it is not likely that the Salvadoran electorate views things in such an academically sophisticated manner. Still, there may be some intuitive sense in which

that electorate believes the movement is overall in the right direction and that stability and a relatively conservative course of action will continue to encourage it.

Of course, there are some purely mechanistic reasons that might be offered for ARENA's success in selling itself. As Joe Rubin noted in 2004, ARENA or its supporters own a large share of the print and broadcast media in El Salvador.

The three highest-rated television stations are owned by an ardent ARENA supporter, and the coverage shows it. The two major newspapers and the vast majority of radio stations are also sympathetic to the ARENA.

President Saca himself owns several radio stations, and he recently purchased a television station. So much friendly media is probably why Saca didn't even bother to debate his FMLN opponent in the last election.

(Rubin, 2004: <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/elections/elsalvador/index.html>)

Finally, it may be giving too much credit to ARENA to claim that its electoral success is the result exclusively or even primarily because of its own strategies. All political parties exist in opposition to other political parties, and ARENA's successes may be a result of the failure of the opposition to win support. Ibarra and Uggen (1997: 114-127) argue that the left in Central America has been suffering an identity crisis that prevents it from attracting the votes or participation of large parts of the electorate. It seems to be content at the time with incrementalism within a minority status in the larger political structure. It has abandoned the basis for its earlier attractiveness as a political and social movement and exists at present as merely an economic program. Under the circumstances of reconstruction following a national trauma, such incrementalism may

not be likely to attract a majority of the electorate, though it may retain a substantial following.

Given the many possibilities for explaining the success of ARENA in maintaining its mostly dominant position in Salvadoran politics, the present study attempts to ascertain how Salvadorans themselves view the political process since the Peace Accord in general and ARENA and its campaigns in particular. The remaining chapters describe that effort.

V: DESIGN OF THE STUDY

In an attempt to determine how Salvadorans might view ARENA and its campaigns as they have developed in elections since the signing of the Peace Accord, a questionnaire was designed that attempted to address some of the possibilities of perception raised in the preceding discussion. Recognizing that average voters may not consider such matters in the theoretical or academic terms often expressed by scholars in the field, an attempt was made to phrase the questions in ways they might commonly be expressed by the electorate. The exact phrasing of each question in both English and Spanish is shown in Appendix A.

Participants

Participants in the study were 60 Salvadorans in El Salvador and the United States. Forty of the participants were male and 20 were female, and overwhelming majorities had participated in each of the presidential elections since the beginning of the peace process in 1989. The distribution of participation in the presidential elections is shown in Table 9. In general, there was greater participation by the study participants in the earlier elections than there has been in the more recent elections. This is not consistent with the results of the elections themselves, which have shown increasing vote totals over time. It is important, however, that this group is not representative of Salvadorans as a whole since a number have been resident in the United States during some elections.

Table 9. Participation in the Presidential Elections
Did you participate in these Presidential Elections?

1989		1994		1999		2004	
Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
# 54	# 6	# 56	# 4	# 48	# 12	#50	# 10
% 90	% 10	% 93	% 7	% 80	% 20	% 83	% 17

Participants in the study ranged broadly in age, as demonstrated in Table 10.

Table 10. Demographics of Study Group

Demographics Total 60

Males 40=67%

Females 20=33%

Age 20-29		Age 30-39		Age 40-49		Age 50-59		Age 60-69		Age 70-79	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
6	10	25	42	15	25	10	16	4	7	0	0

As can be seen, the participants were broadly representative of most Salvadorans with the exception of the age bracket age 70-79. Since some Salvadorans doubtless exist in this age range and typically participate in elections, this should be viewed as a shortcoming in the data. The extent to which including participants in this age range would affect the results, however, is not known. The ratio of male to female subjects was also skewed somewhat in the direction of male participants. The 2007 estimate of Salvadoran population indicates the proportion of females to males over the age of 15 to

be 52.5 percent to 47.5 percent (CIA World Factbook, 2007: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/es.html>). Thus, males are significantly overrepresented in the survey population.

The educational levels of participants in the study were equally varied, though it is expected that there is some overrepresentation of persons with university-level training. The reason for this, of course, is that participants were selected more for their availability and participation in the political process than to pick a true cross representation of Salvadorans in general. A disproportionate number of participants (10) were Salvadorans who are also university educated and live in the United States. Still, because one objective of the study was to describe perceptions of those who are definitely involved in the political process and aware of campaign messages and appearances, it is likely this is a reasonable distribution for the purposes of the study. The distribution by educational level is shown in Table 11.

Finally, participants were asked to select the socioeconomic strata to which they believed they belonged. Three classifications were labeled, and the distribution is shown in Table 12.

Table 11. Educational Level of Participants

Elementary School		High School		Technical or Trade School		Some University Courses		Bachelor's Degree		Master's Degree	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
10	17	25	42	5	8	5	8	10	17	5	8

Table 12. Social Class of Participants

Working Class		Middle Class		Upper Class	
#	%	#	%	#	%
35	58	20	33	5	8

As can be seen, the majority of those participating in the study described themselves as belonging to the working class, a distribution that is probably fairly representative of the electorate as a whole. For purposes of this study, definitions of socioeconomic class were not offered to the study participants. Thus, classification into one or the other categories was according to each individual's definition and perception of what was meant by the term. The participants were self-classified.

VI: RESULTS

The results from each of the questions posed to participants were tallied and the results are given in Tables 13–22. The first question posed consisted of two parts which gauged the extent to which participants thought ARENA’s successes were the result of a single factor or more than one factor. Part two asked them to describe in general whether they felt the party had changed since the Peace Accord. The results are shown in Table 13. Clearly participants believed the successes ARENA has enjoyed are the result of more than one factor and that the party has changed since the end of the civil war.

The next question attempted to discover what participants thought was the most

Table 13. Factors Leading to ARENA Success

ARENA has won every election with the exception of the 2000 legislative election.

A. Do you attribute this string of victories to any single factor or to several factors?

B. Has ARENA changed since the end of the civil war?

Question 2- Single Factor		Question 2-A Various Factors		Question 2-B Yes		Question 2-B No	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
25	42	35	58	40	66	20	33

effective tactic or issue ARENA was able to use in its campaigns. The results are shown in Table 14.

Table 14. Most Effective Part of ARENA Campaign

What do you think has been the most effective part of ARENA's campaign?

Economy		Media Access		Candidates		Distorting The Truth		Lying	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
15	25	15	25	10	17	12	20	8	13

It seems likely there is a strong partisan response in the answers to these questions. Perhaps this is not surprising given the closeness of many of the elections at all levels since the Peace Accord were signed. Still, it is clear there is a strong element that believes ARENA is able to achieve its electoral success with outright deception, approximately one-third of participants expressing such a view. On the other hand, the majority of those polled believe that the party's success stems from its economic programs, having greater access to media resources than its opponents, and to having more attractive candidates. Note, however, that access to media is not a substantively positive attribute in the same manner as an economic program or attractive candidates.

The distinction between "distorting the truth" and "lying" was not defined for the participants. As with classification into socioeconomic class, the distinctions were of the participants' individual perceptions. However, an example of distorting the truth might have been an ARENA advertisement that claimed that because of U.S. administration support for the more conservative candidates the election of other candidates might cause

the deportation of Salvadorans from the United States. Since such a possibility could be neither proved nor disproven, it represents a distortion of the truth rather than an outright lie.

The next question attempted to gauge the extent to which ARENA's message has been consistent over the course of the several campaigns. Participants were asked to rate both the consistency of the messages and the extent to which they felt they were positive. Not all participants answered this question, but the results, shown in Table 15, are revealing.

Table 15. Constancy of the ARENA Political Message

Has the ARENA message been consistent or changed from election to election?

Consistent				Change			
Positive		Negative		Positive		Negative	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
10	17	8	13	30	50	12	20

Only 17 percent of those responding thought ARENA presented a consistently positive message that emphasized its own ability to govern effectively and on behalf of a majority of citizens. But another 50 percent agreed that ARENA's message evolved in positive ways in order to address the dominant issues of each election. This is a strong endorsement. At the same time, 20 percent felt that ARENA changed, but that it was responding in negative ways to the campaigns and characteristics of its opposition. Whatever else might be the case, clearly a majority of those responding to this question felt that the overall ARENA message was positive whether it had changed or not.

The next question (Table 16) explored the reasons participants felt the opposition was failing to overcome the ARENA political advantage over the course of so many elections.

Table 16. Reasons ARENA's Opposition Has Not Won

What reasons would you give for ARENA's opposition not winning the 1989, 1994, 1998, and 2004 elections?

Economic Resources		Access to Media		Lack of Good Candidates		Voter's Participation		Fraud	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
15	25	11	18	20	33	8	13	6	10

Not surprisingly, a very large percentage rated economic resources and access to media as being important in the opposition parties' failure to overcome the ARENA advantage. These two factors are closely related, since access to media is largely determined by the ability to purchase space and air time. A lack of good candidates, the largest single category, may also be related to the lack of resources as well. Political candidates are, above all, personally ambitious. While many, perhaps most, honestly intend to be of service during their tenures, they also see themselves as leaders. They want to lead, and many of the best candidates will gravitate to the party that will offer them the best chance to achieve that end as well.

Table 17 reveals what participants thought about ways in which ARENA's opposition might improve its chances of winning in the future. In this respect, the ways in which ARENA has succeeded in recasting itself as a voice of moderation may be seen as

particularly important. ARENA has clearly been able to move to the center, and many of the participants seem to believe that the opposition parties should do likewise.

Table 17. How Opposition Can Improve Election Prospects

How could ARENA's opposition improve its prospect of winning an election?

Better Mobilization of Their Base		Move to the Middle of the Political Arena		Better Candidates	
#	%	#	%	#	%
10	17	30	50	20	33

By the same token, offering better candidates would also seem to be an important issue for many of the participants. This may very well reflect the continued association of FLMN in particular with the revolutionary tactics of the extreme left during the civil war. In support of this view is a comment made by former Ambassador Corr in his recent interview with this writer. Noting the recent death of the FMLN candidate for the presidency, Handal, Corr offered the opinion that with the thinning of the ranks of the former revolutionaries, the FMLN, like ARENA, might now find it possible to move to the Center and offer more attractive candidates. In his view, the natural pendulum of politics is for an electorate to become disenchanted with parties that hold power for a long time and for parties that are out of power to develop strategies and candidates that take advantage of this normal trend in democracies (Corr, 2007).

A very strong majority (Table 18) feels that the lives of most citizens have improved considerably since the end of the civil war. This is to be expected. We have already discussed how the civil war affected almost all families in the country, many of

them tragically. It is a strong indication as well, of the likely continued commitment of most participants to the continuation of the democratic process as it develops over the near term.

Table 18. Perceptions of Whether Citizens' Lives Have Improved

Have the lives of most citizens improved since the end of the civil war and the establishment of a freely elected government?

Strongly Agree		Agree		Somewhat Agree		Somewhat Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
10	17	20	33	20	33	0	0	10	17	0	0

The next question was a followup to the preceding question explored in Table 18.

If participants agreed that the lives of citizens had improved considerably, then it is helpful to know in what ways they think lives have been improved. Table 19 reveals their responses.

Table 19. Perceptions of How Lives Have Improved

If you answered Strongly Agree, Agree, or Somewhat Agree that lives of most citizens have improved since the end of the civil war, then how have their lives been improved?

Economic Growth		Improved Social Conditions		Better Access To Education	
#	%	#	%	#	%
25	42	10	17	15	25

The largest single factor was that economic growth since the end of the civil war had contributed to a steady increase in living conditions for most citizens. Coupled with that, and the next highest factor, was better access to educational opportunity. Still, improved social conditions were an important factor for a significant number of participants in the study.

Table 20 deals with political freedoms and the extent to which ARENA is viewed as being committed to maintaining those freedoms that have been obtained since the end of the civil war. This is an important consideration for many, since maintaining those freedoms is instrumental in avoiding devolution once more into chaos.

Table 20. Perceptions of Opposition's Commitment to Maintaining Freedom

Do you think ARENA's opposition is committed to maintaining the freedoms that have developed since the end of the civil war?

Strongly Agree		Agree		Somewhat Agree		Somewhat Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
30	50	20	33	5	8	0	0	5	8	0	0

A solid 50 percent of participants strongly agreed that ARENA is committed to maintaining a politically free society now that El Salvador has one. Only eight percent of respondents disagreed with this proposition, with the rest either agreeing fully or somewhat. This is a remarkable achievement for a party that was originally associated with an elite oligarchy that forcibly repressed its opposition throughout its existence prior to the end of the civil war.

The closeness of many of the elections and the ability of the FLMN and others to win outright majorities in some legislative and local elections, though, indicates the presence of an effective political opposition in a competitive environment. Obviously, these parties and candidates appeal to many members of the electorate, and some of the questions posed attempted to gauge the source of that appeal. Table 21 addresses some of the possibilities.

Fully one-third of respondents thought that no part of the opposition's platform was appealing to the electorate. This is surprising given the closeness of many of the elections. At the same time, such issues as social issues and healthcare reform were

Table 21. Greatest Appeal in Opposition Platform

What parts of the opposition political platform has been most appealing to the voters?

Social Issues		Healthcare Reform		Economic System Reform		None	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
25	42	10	17	5	8	20	33

important to a majority of participants. The low rating given to economic system reform, however, clearly indicates that ARENA has a substantial advantage on this set of issues. The category of "Social Issues" was not defined for participants, but those indicating social issues were of greatest appeal in the opposition's platform generally mentioned such areas of concern as crime, education, and poverty.

Finally, participants rejected the proposition that ARENA's success is due to fears by the electorate that they may resort again to violence if they are decisively turned out of

office. This finding is reflected in Table 22, and is consistent with the earlier findings that most participants viewed both ARENA and its opposition as being committed to the democratic process and to maintaining the freedoms that have been gained since the civil war ended and the Peace Accord were signed. Perhaps this is less remarkable given the elements of hope that would have accompanied the Accords and each succeeding election. Still, a substantial number of participants obviously felt that democracy was fragile enough at this stage that a major electoral upheaval might lead to a return to violence.

Table 22. Perceptions of Whether Elections are Driven by Fear

ARENA's success in elections has been partly because of fear of a return to war or terrorism if they are not elected.

Strongly Agree		Agree		Somewhat Agree		Somewhat Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
15	25	10	17	0	0	0	0	30	50	5	8

In addition to the questions and quantitative responses presented here, the questionnaire offered respondents opportunities to express opinions in their own words. Some of these responses are revealing.

In response to the question of why ARENA's opposition was not succeeding, respondents indicated such factors as "a lack of new ideas," "still living in the revolutionary past," and a "lack of organization." Such answers clearly indicate that

many respondents are unimpressed both with the ideology and with a lack of professionalism on the part of those in the political opposition.

In response to a question about constancy of message, one respondent wrote, “The same. We know how to govern.” Clearly this respondent believes that a consistent message is one quality of effective governance and leadership.

Another respondent to the question of how the opposition could improve its chances indicated, “Better message. They need to move away from the past.”

In one response to the question regarding the appeal of ARENA’s message, one respondent wrote that “ARENA tends to address its message to all classes.” The implication, of course, is that opposition parties, but in particular FLMN, are addressing their messages to members of particular social classes. It is important to address the needs of these classes, but in an environment in which the lives of all are perceived to have improved such targeted message may be of even more limited appeal than was the original intention.

Clearly, there was a desire on the part of participants in this study to move toward the future and away from the past. The strong desire to avoid a repetition of the violence that racked the country for so long appears overwhelming. But there is also a desire simply to maintain freedoms, to avoid a return to repression, and to continue the growth of economic and educational opportunity the populace has enjoyed since the civil war ended and political development of the country began in earnest.

VII: CONCLUSIONS

We began with the observation that ARENA has enjoyed the greatest political success of any of the contending political parties since the end of the civil war in El Salvador. While it clearly exists in a competitive political environment, it has succeeded in presenting an essentially conservative message while at the same time shedding its earlier image of violence and repression. This is a remarkable achievement in itself, but it would not have been possible had not all members of the agreement that ended the violence been committed to the new political process and landscape. As noted at the very beginning, for the process to even begin, let alone to develop and flourish, the overwhelming majority of actors in the drama must buy in.

Both the results of a number of elections at all levels and the answers obtained in the questions asked in this study reveal that has indeed happened. There is no hint in the responses obtained here of a lack of confidence in the overall process or a desire to return to the past. There is the normal disagreement one expects in a competitive political environment, and the expectation that competition will continue. One senses that a genuine threat to this process would only be perceived if one party became truly dominant and competition was brought to a halt.

Another interesting feature of the results obtained is how neatly they dovetail with the explanation for ARENA's success offered by its own public information officer. His explanations that ARENA was better at listening and that it had better candidates are

consistent with the responses offered by the participants in the study. Similarly, respondents' acknowledgement that ARENA had superior access to media is consistent with the reality that ARENA leaders and sympathizers own a dominant share of both broadcast and print media. Still, the overwhelming impression is of a people that is both committed to and that values a competitive environment.

APPENDIX A

Questions for El Salvador: English

Demographics

Please circle your answer

Sex:

Male
Female

Age:

20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79

Highest Level of Education:

Elementary School
High School
Technical or Trade School
Some University Courses
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree
Doctorate Degree

Are you:

Working Class
Middle Class

Upper Class

Did you vote in the 1989 elections: yes___ No__ Can not remember___

1994 Yes No

1999 Yes No

2004 Yes No

Has political conservatism been the dominant political force in El Salvador since and including 1989?

Strongly Agree

Agree

Somewhat Agree

Neither Agree or Disagree

Somewhat Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

If you strongly agreed, agreed, or somewhat agreed, why do you think political conservatism has been dominate?

ARENA has won every election with the exception of the 2000 legislative election.

Do you attribute this string of victories to any single factor or to several factors?

Has ARENA changed since the end of the civil war?

What do you think has been the most effective part of ARENA's campaigns?

Has the ARENA message been consistent or changed from election to election?

What reasons would you give for ARENA's opposition not winning the 1989, 1994, 1998, 2004 presidential elections?

How could ARENA's opposition improve its prospect of winning an election?

Have the lives of most citizens improved since the end of the civil wars and the establishment of a freely elected government?

Strongly Agree

Agree

Somewhat Agree

Neither Agree or Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

If you answered Strongly Agree, Agree or somewhat agree that lives of most citizens have improved since the end of the civil war, then how the lives been improved?

Do you think ARENA's opposition is committed to maintaining the freedoms that have developed since the end of the civil war?

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree or Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

What parts of the opposition political platform has been most appealing to the voters?

ARENA's success in elections has been partly because of fear of a return to war or terrorism if they are not elected

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

Please write your answers on a different piece of paper and attach them to the questionnaire. Thank you!

Preguntas para El Salvador

Datos demográficos

Circula tu respuesta

Sexo:

Varón
Mujer

Edad:

20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79

Tu nivel de educación: Escuela primaria Escuela Secundaria

Escuela técnica o comercial
Algunos cursos universitarios
Licenciatura Universitaria
Maestría
Doctorado

Tu clase social:

Clase obrera
Clase media
Clase alta

Usted votó en las elecciones de 1989: si_ No_ no puedo acordame__

1994 Si_ No
1999 Si_ No
2004 Si_ No

El conservatismo político ha sido la fuerza dominante en El Salvador desde 1989?

Esta totalmente de acuerdo
De Acuerdo
Mas o menos de acuerdo
No tiene ninguna opinion
Discrepa completamente
Discrepa un poco
Discrepa

¿Si estas de acuerdo o mas o menos por qué piensas que el conservatismo político ha dominado?

ARENA ha ganado cada elección con excepción de las elecciones legislativas del año 2000.

- a. ¿Atribuyes esta cadena de victorias a un factor o a varios factores?
- b. ¿ARENA ha cambiado desde el final de la guerra civil?

Qué piensas has sido la parte más eficaz de las campañas de la ARENA?

El mensaje de la ARENA ha sido constante o ha cambiado de elección a la elección?

Qué razones darías porque la oposición de ARENA no gano en las elecciones del 1989, 1994, 1998, 2004 elecciones presidenciales?

¿Cómo puede la oposición de ARENA mejorar su perspectiva de ganar una elección?

¿Las vidas de la mayoría de los ciudadanos han mejorado desde el final de la guerra civil y el establecimiento de un gobierno libremente elegido?

Esta de acuerdo completamente
De Acuerdo
Mas o Menos De Acuerdo
Esta en desacuerdo
Mas o Menos en desacuerdo

¿Si contestastes que estas de acuerdo que las vidas de la mayoría de los ciudadanos han mejorado desde el final de la guerra civil, explica cómo las vidas han mejorado?

¿Piensas que la oposición de ARENA está dispuesta a mantener las libertades que se han producido desde el final de la guerra civil?

De acuerdo totalmente
De acuerdo
Mas o menos de Acuerdo
Estoy en desacuerdo
Un poco en desacuerdo
Totalmente en desacuerdo

¿Qué piezas de la plataforma política de la oposición han sido las más atractivas para los votantes?

¿El éxito de ARENA en elecciones ha estado en parte debido al miedo de regresar a una guerra civil o al terrorismo si no son ellos elegidos?

Totalmente de acuerdo
De Acuerdo
Mas o menos de acuerdo
Completamente en desacuerdo
En desacuerdo
Mas o menos en desacuerdo
Convenir algo
Ni convenir ni discrepar
Discrepar
Discrepar fuerte

Escribe tus respuestas en otro papel ¡Gracias!

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VITA

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