

WHEN DOES PEACEKEEPING LEAD TO PEACE?

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of
Southwest Texas State University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements

For the Degree

Master of ARTS

By

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San Marcos, Texas
May, 2003

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to begin by thanking my husband, John, for his encouragement and support. Thanks to my mother, Nancy Hadley, for talking me through this lengthy process and encouraging me to achieve my goals.

I am also thankful to my thesis committee, all of whom have made this process a rewarding experience. Special thanks to Dr. Gorman, who has guided me through my graduate experience from beginning to end.

This manuscript was submitted on April 18, 2003.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO STUDY: WHEN DOES PEACEKEEPING LEAD TO PEACE?

During the early 1990s, the United Nations became increasingly involved in regional conflicts with the mission to facilitate, maintain, and enforce peace. These military actions, commonly referred to as peacekeeping missions, traversed several continents and represented a variety goals and agendas. Some missions were successful in achieving their goals while others are considered to be great failures. In this thesis, I seek to examine the external and internal factors contributing to a mission's profile and their subsequent effect on its outcome. To facilitate this study, I will use a case study approach. Selecting two similar missions with outcomes representing both failure and success, I plan to compare the cases in an effort to identify key factors contributing to either the success or failure of a mission.

The first case I explore is the United Nations operation in Somalia from 1992-1995. Plagued by civil war, Somalia's anarchical state combined with drought resulted in widespread famine and death. In 1992, approximately 4.5 million people were threatened by starvation. Thus, the United Nations began a series of humanitarian operations in an effort to bring some relief to the people of Somalia. In order to implement sustained humanitarian relief, however, the United Nations sought to stabilize the chaotic environment through the facilitation of peace negotiations between the opposing clans and the

rehabilitation of political institutions. The first official UN mission in Somalia was UNOSOM I in April, 1992. With little progress achieved by December, 1992, the United States also deployed troops to Somalia and together with other UN member states, formed UNITAF, a United States led force, with the purpose of ensuring a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid. Despite these increased efforts, violence continued and in May, 1993, the United Nations began UNOSOM II, with a broader mandate and ultimate goal of reconstructing Somalia. Violence not only continued but increased between rival Somalis as well as between the Somalis and peacekeepers. After numerous incidents including the highly publicized attack on U.S. soldiers on October 3, 1993, UNOSOM II troops were evacuated by the United Nations in the spring of 1995. Though numerous Somali's received humanitarian aid, the UN operation in Somalia is considered largely to be a failure.

The second case examined is the UN operation in Mozambique from 1992-1994. After achieving its independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique entered a period of civil war. By 1992, combined with a lingering drought, many natives had fallen victim to war or starvation, or had fled the country. In an effort to facilitate a previously negotiated peace agreement, the United Nations deployed troops under the name ONUMOZ in December, 1993. ONUMOZ eventually succeeded in enforcing a cease-fire, administering humanitarian aid, and facilitating the creation of an election process.

These two peacekeeping missions occurred almost simultaneously in the same general region, yet each yielded starkly different outcomes. What were the factors contributing to the success or failure of each mission? What conclusions

can be drawn from such factors? How should this information effect future UN policy and implementation of future peacekeeping missions? Through the examination and comparison of the missions in Somalia and Mozambique, I offer insight to the dynamics of peacekeeping missions and their outcomes as well as suggest answers to these important questions.

CHAPTER 2

GETTING INVOLVED

In order to fully understand the purpose and nature of peacekeeping, it is necessary first to establish working definitions of related vocabulary, detail relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, and examine the evolution and characteristics of the peacekeeping paradigm. Such discussion is offered to create a foundation for the analysis presented in later chapters.

Vocabulary

“Any discussion of peacekeeping is complicated by the fact that there is no common definition of the term.”¹ The term peacekeeping has been applied to a wide variety of situations by journalists, diplomats, academics, and historians and in layman’s terms generally refers to the negotiation, facilitation, and maintenance of peace in an area by an outside force in an effort to maintain collective security. The proliferation of peacekeeping operations over the last century, in particular the 1990s, and their variance in mandate and scope, however, has created the need for more tailored definitions. Peacekeeping as applied to the United Nations is defined by the International Peace Academy as “the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using a multinational force of soldiers,

¹ Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), 13.

police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”² This broad definition, encompassing a vast array of possible scenarios, was narrowed further by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in 1992 who delineated four specific operations:

Preventive diplomacy: action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peacemaking: action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter.

Peacekeeping: the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

Peace building: action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.³

Thus, Boutros-Ghali separated peacekeeping from other UN actions by specifically detailing the consent of all parties concerned. In this context, peacekeeping could take the form of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and/or peace building if the consent of the concerned parties is obtained. Interestingly, U.S. military experts have continued to develop further the definition of peacekeeping, some addressing the issue of consent while others do not. For example, Quinn defines peacekeeping as “non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) conducted by UN authorized forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate an existing truce agreement.”⁴ On the other hand, Lewis defines peacekeeping as “involving military personnel as monitors/observers under restricted Rules of Engagement

² Definition used by the International Peace Academy in its study of international control of violence; *Report from Vienna: An Appraisal of the International Peace Academy Committee's 1970 Pilot Projects*, quoted in Bjorn Egge, Michael Harbottle, and Indarjit Rikhye, The Thin Blue Line (London: Yale University Press, 1974), 11.

³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace,” A/47/277-S/24111, (1992), quoted in Jett, 14.

⁴ D. Quinn, Peace Support Operations and the U S Military, (1994), quoted in Jett, 14.

once a cease-fire has been negotiated.”⁵ Though both U.S. definitions specify peacekeeping as a military engagement once a truce or a cease-fire has been reached, they are not consistent as to whether the consent of the belligerent parties is necessary. Furthermore, Quinn specifies peacekeeping within the framework of the United Nations while Lewis leaves his definition open to other bodies. Thus, the definition of peacekeeping truly is complicated by a lack of consensus on key components. For the purposes of this paper, however, I offer the following description as an amalgamation of leading definitions:

peacekeeping is the deployment and presence of UN military and/or police personnel with the mission of monitoring and facilitating peace between belligerents in an effort to preserve security with the initial consent of the belligerents and taking place after a peace treaty or cease-fire has been reached.

The above definition of peacekeeping is further clarified in comparison to the terms peace building and peace enforcement. Peace building would include actions focused on rebuilding institutions and infrastructure in an attempt to foster an environment conducive to peace and therefore may fall under the penumbra of peacekeeping as previously defined. The term peace enforcement typically applies to “military combat operations conducted by UN authorized forces in which combat power or the threat of combat power is used to compel compliance with UN sanctions or resolutions.”⁶ This type of action may be encompassed by the greater concept of peacekeeping as well. Peacekeeping may

⁵ W. Lewis, “Peacekeeping: Whither U.S. Policy?,” Quinn (1994), quoted in Jett, 15.

⁶ Quinn, quoted in Jett 15.

include peace building, peace enforcement, or both at the same time. These terms simply further clarify characteristics of a peacekeeping operation.

The motive behind a peacekeeping action also is often used in order to differentiate one particular action from another. According to Haass, peacekeeping interventions generally fall into one of three categories: humanitarian, nation-building, and compellence/peace making.⁷ Humanitarian interventions have the purpose of protecting the basics of life, usually providing food, shelter, and medical supplies to victims of a belligerent or failed state. Nation-building interventions are characterized by the desire to “make a country secure and stable, a goal that requires replacing the existing political authority, or creating one where none exists, so that peoples can lead relatively normal lives.”⁸ Nation-building is a significantly more ambitious endeavor than a humanitarian intervention because it requires the establishment of a stable political authority as opposed to providing basic supplies and normally takes the form of a peace building action. Compellence/peace making interventions tend to be the most aggressive because they employ nation-building tactics while choosing sides among belligerents. Such actions seek to “tilt the balance in favor of a contending individual or group,” thus placing into position the political authority needed for nation-building.⁹ Humanitarian, nation-building, and compellence/peace making interventions represent different “levels” of peacekeeping operations determined by motive and level of intended commitment.

⁷ Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the post-Cold War World (Washington D.C : The Brookings Institution, 1999), 132.

⁸ Ibid., 134.

⁹ Ibid., 132.

Transition peacekeeping operations are a continuation of humanitarian, nation-building, and compellence/peace making interventions, beginning once the original goal has been accomplished. In this type of operation, “the peace force is expected to assist the parties in changing the status or condition of a country...and requires a high degree of consent – not just acquiescence, and active cooperation in achieving the new status or condition” in order to be successful.¹⁰ Transition operations include demobilization efforts, the facilitation of elections, and in some cases the creation of a new constitution or government. These types of peacekeeping actions also may take the form of peace building and peace enforcement.

Before the level of success of a mission is determined, an appropriate definition of success must first be established. I offer the following questions as criteria for evaluating success:

1. Was the original goal of the mission fulfilled at the time of withdrawal?
2. Did the improved conditions and objectives originally achieved by the mission continue after outside involvement ceased?
3. Does a cost/benefit analysis justify engagement in the mission?

If the answer to all of the above questions is “yes,” then the operation will be considered a success. A mission will be considered a partial success if two of the above criteria are met. If less than two of the measures are affirmed, then the operation will be considered a failure.

¹⁰ Bruce R. Pirnie and William E. Simons, Soldiers For Peace: An Operational Typology, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996), 24.

The UN Charter and Peacekeeping

Though never specifically mentioned or defined, the concept of peacekeeping is validated and provided for under the Charter of the United Nations. In an effort to strengthen collective security in the post-World War II environment, the United Nations created the Security Council empowered with swift decision-making authority. Equipped with this authority, the Security Council could become an effective mechanism to combat “threats to, and breaches of, the peace” in distinction from its vacillating predecessor, the League of Nations.¹¹ Articles 24 and 25 of the United Nations Charter state:

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”¹²

Thus, the powers of the Security Council were granted with the intent of it maintaining collective security and international peace as a primary function of the United Nations.

In addition to the creation of the Security Council and its mandate to facilitate peace, the United Nations Charter provides both specific mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes in Chapter VI and a plan of action for managing threats to peace or acts of aggression and breaches of peace in Chapter VII. Regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes, Chapter VI provides:

“Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek

¹¹ McCoubrey, 24.

¹² United Nations Charter, (1945), quoted in McCoubrey, 24.

a solution by negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”¹³

The United Nations Charter demonstrates a further commitment to peace by creating a framework to settle international disputes peacefully. However, Chapter VII of the Charter explicitly provides for intervention measures in the event a peaceful settlement cannot be reached. Selected Articles of Chapter VII follow:

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41

The Security Council May decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.¹⁴

¹³ United Nations Charter (1945).

¹⁴ Ibid.

Thus, Article 42 explicitly provides for the use of more aggressive UN sponsored interventions should the actions described in Article 41 fail to resolve the conflict.

Despite such explicit measures for dispute resolution, conflict has not ceased to exist and nor does it easily fall into the neat categories of the Charter. Though UN intervention in general is discussed in Articles VI and VII, peacekeeping in particular is not. “Recognizing that peace operations fall somewhere between diplomacy (Chapter VI) and use of force (Chapter VII), Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld observed wryly that they might be described in a new Chapter Six and a Half.”¹⁵ The practice of peacekeeping has invoked both Chapter VI and Chapter VII as an ad hoc response to situations that fall somewhere in between the scenarios presented by the two Chapters in the opinion of the Security Council. Pirnie reports, “Invoking Chapter VI has implied lethal force is authorized in self-defense while accomplishing the mandate while invoking Chapter VII has implied that lethal force is authorized to accomplish the mandate, coercing parties if necessary.”¹⁶ In addition, peacekeeping operations authorized by either Chapter presuppose at a minimum the initial consent of the belligerent parties and impartiality by the Security Council.¹⁷

Historical Overview of Peacekeeping

Over the past fifty years, the practice of peacekeeping has experienced a number of phases, the characteristics of which are helpful in understanding modern peacekeeping operations. The distinct stages, as described by Henry

¹⁵ United Nations, The Blue Helmets, (1990), quoted in Pirnie, 11.

¹⁶ Pirnie, 11.

Wiseman, are: (1) the Nascent Period, 1946-1956, (2) the Assertive Period, 1956-1967 (3), the Dormant Period, 1967-1973, (4) the Resurgent Period, 1973-1978, (5) the Maintenance Period, 1978-1985.¹⁸ More recent analyses of peacekeeping operations include Fetherston's Expansion Period, 1988-1993, and Jett's Contraction Period, 1993-present.¹⁹ Though the specific cases examined in this paper occurred during the Expansion Period, a brief examination of its predecessors is needed to understand the historical context of intervention decision making.

During the Nascent Period, the first decade of UN existence, the term "peacekeeping" had yet to be coined, and few missions of this nature were launched.²⁰ Modest in size and expense, operations during this period stemmed primarily from border or colonial disputes. These operations relied on the consent of the belligerent parties, and in situations where full consent was withheld, the operation was severely limited.²¹ According to Wiseman, "This was a slow growth period largely concentrated in the early years of the UN before the failure of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations for the creation of the large-scale UN military force to repel aggression and maintain international peace and security under the direction of the Security Council became evident."²²

The Assertive Period in peacekeeping history is characterized by innovation and action. Decolonization struggles worldwide and unrest in the

¹⁷ Pirnie, 12.

¹⁸ Henry Wiseman, "United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview," Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, (Elmsford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 22-53.

¹⁹ Jett, 21.

²⁰ Jett, 23.

²¹ Wiseman, 31.

²² Ibid., 31.

Middle East provided the UN with the opportunity to engage in larger operations with complex duties, such as UNEF I in Egypt and ONUC in the Congo.²³ “For the first time, the UN assumed temporary authority over a territory in transition to independence, added civilian police to a PKO (peacekeeping organization), became involved in a civil war, established a large-scale operation, and allowed the peacekeepers to carry arms.”²⁴ Initially, the more expansive missions achieved a noteworthy degree of success, and the UN proved itself in the world arena as a body able to preserve international peace and stability by engaging in active peacekeeping, “notwithstanding the severe enfeebling effects of the destructive and persistent Cold War during this period.”²⁵ However, the international community, namely the Soviet Union and France, remained skeptical of the UN’s willingness to assert itself due to the cost of the operations both in lives and dollars, causing this period to end with an aura of disenchantment as troops withdrew under fire in 1967.²⁶

Ushered in by controversy surrounding the operations of the Assertive Period, the Dormant Period saw no new operations authorized or implemented. Regional conflicts continued, throughout the world, but none were considered to be crises warranting UN attention. This period, however, is not without contribution. The International Peace Academy was established in 1969 and has since been the source of invaluable research and training in the realm of peacekeeping.

²³ Jett, 23-24.

²⁴ Ibid..

²⁵ Wiseman, 45.

²⁶ Jett, 25.

Sparked by renewed conflict in the Middle East, the Resurgent Period is limited in scope to this volatile region. The mandates of the three large-scale operations of this period were less complicated than that of the Assertive Period, limited to assisting in the resolution of interstate conflicts, but all remained lengthy involvements.²⁷ Thus, the Resurgence Period was limited in function, but not in size or commitment.

The Maintenance Period is characterized by a second phase of dormancy, due primarily to the contentious relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unable to garner a consensus from the superpowers and therefore the Security Council, the UN limited peacekeeping operations to the maintenance of ongoing operations.²⁸

The Expansion Period marked a new era of UN peacekeeping activity due to the improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This new relationship coupled with a reemergence of regional conflicts, this time fought by terrorists, guerrillas, and bandits with civilians as targets, created an environment ripe for UN peacekeeping.²⁹ In addition, the conflicts of this period were overwhelmingly internal instead of the interstate conflicts of the past. These civil wars were not often located in areas of vital strategic interest to any one world power; therefore unilateral military intervention was not given great consideration.³⁰ According to Jett, "This left it to the international community to take action on a multilateral basis, and the UN

²⁷ Ibid, 26.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 27.

³⁰ Ibid., 28.

was almost always the organization best able to act. The increase in intrastate conflicts gave it ample opportunity to do so.”³¹

In contrast to the more traditional role of peacekeeping operations as arbitrators between conventional belligerents, intrastate peacekeeping during this period became more complex. Often fought by rebel groups using guerrilla tactics such as land mines and ambushes, the peacekeepers of this period were more at risk making the situation more likely to escalate.³² Furthermore, because of the difficulty associated in determining the legitimate government in an intrastate conflict, such peacekeeping operations often lacked the consent of the natives. To return stability to these regions, the peacekeepers could not simply negotiate and administer a treaty of peace. Nation building activities were required as well. Thus, the peacekeeping operations, or multilateral rescue attempts, of this period proved to be numerous, dangerous missions with more complex mandates. It is within the Expansion Period that the operations examined in this study took place.

Despite both successes and failures during the Expansion Period, the failures proved to be the most memorable to the public and paved the way for a period of contraction. Since 1993, peacekeeping interventions have reverted back to more traditional mandates requiring less time, money, and risk. The Period of Contraction has also sparked intense debate and scholarship as to the role of peacekeeping operations in the future. Can they succeed in the post-Cold War era of civil war and underdevelopment? If they are able, at what cost will it be to

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

the more developed members of the United Nations? In order to answer these provoking questions, an in-depth examination of key factors effecting modern peacekeeping is necessary. The following case studies are provided in an effort to identify such factors not just in theory, but in the context of field experience.

CHAPTER 3

SOMALIA (1992-1995)

“Few writers have failed to notice the formidable pride of the Somali nomad, his extraordinary sense of superiority as an individual, and his firm conviction that he is sole master of his actions and subject to no authority save that of God.”³³

The danger and complexity of modern peacekeeping operations is evident in the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), and the subsequent second mission, UNOSOM II. Originally intended to be limited in scope to humanitarian aid, the intervention in Somalia was quickly met with the challenges associated with post-Cold War intrastate conflicts. Creating a stable environment in this war-torn land proved not only to be a challenge the United Nations was not prepared to face, but also a challenge to the very idea of peacekeeping as a practice.

Conflict Background

Prior to the European colonial era, Somalia, located in the Horn of Africa, was a homogenous, nomadic society organized by clan families. In comparison with Greek or Hebrew tribes, the Somali clans shared a common ethnicity and language but differed as to lineage and culture.³⁴ Despite harsh terrain and a

³³ Said S. Samatar, “Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil,” Minority Rights Group Report, quoted in John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, (Washington, D C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 4.

³⁴ John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 3

scarcity of resources, the Somali clans traveled in search of food and water with relatively little conflict.

The opening of the Suez Canal brought European interest to a relatively untouched region. During the 1880s, as a consequence of colonization, the lands of the Somali clans were divided into five states: British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ethiopian Ogaden, and Northern Kenya. Overshadowed by the neighboring Kingdom of Ethiopia, the Somalia territories remained virtually overlooked by the European powers despite this organization into colonial states.³⁵ However, their presence was not without consequence. Colonization introduced a centralized structure to a nomadic and pastoral political environment, and as a result, the original Somali sociopolitical system eroded, without replacement.³⁶ After World War II, the British continued to administer Somaliland and the Italians retained loose control over their former colony. However, following World War II European interest in the region declined, and on July 1, 1960, the former colonies of Britain and Italy merged and an independent and unified Somali Republic was declared.

“Traditionally, Somali clans have played two apparently contradictory roles, as centripetal and centrifugal forces, whereby there has been solidarity against external threats and antagonism when the threat has vanished.”³⁷ With the absence of the European presence, the Somali political, economic, and social activities were maintained by the lineage systems based on the six major clan

³⁵ Ibid., 4.

³⁶ William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990's*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 313.

³⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, “Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia,” (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 18.

families, Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Issaq, and Rahanwein, which can be traced back to two brothers, Sab and Samaal.³⁸ 75 percent of the Somali population trace themselves to Samaal, the originator of the Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Issaq clans.³⁹ After achieving independence in 1960, clan affiliations characterized by rivalry and conflict undergirded this struggling parliamentary democracy. An overabundance of parties, at times up to 60, coupled with the occasional assassination of officials and candidates created unstable political conditions at best. Attempts to replace clan loyalty with nationalism generally were unsuccessful. For example, in 1964, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Abdirazak Haji Hussein, chose his advisors based on qualifications and merit without regard to clan affiliation, and his administration failed due to a vote of no confidence.⁴⁰ Competition among clans led to corruption and created an environment in which democracy could not thrive. The apparent homogeneity of the Somali people in terms of language, religion (Islam), and culture, was in sharp contrast to their multi-linguistic, and multi-religious neighbors, making Somalia in the view of outsiders a likely success story for democratic implementation. However, the depth of the allegiance to the clan as well as clan rivalry were underestimated, and in October of 1969 President Abdirashid Ali Sharma'arke was assassinated paving the way for the armed forces headed by General Mohamed Siad Barre to install a military dictatorship that would rule for over 20 years.

³⁸ Ibid., According to Makinda, traditional history suggests that Sab and Samaal were sons of Aqil who was descended from the Quraysh of Arabia, the tribe of the prophet Mohammed.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 20.

Initially, General Barre and his newly established Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) seemed promising. He denounced the segmented clan system as a divisive and detrimental force and promoted Somali nationalism by implementing various programs to eradicate clan allegiance. His ideology for national development, “Scientific Socialism,” became the guiding force behind his unification efforts.⁴¹ According to Makinda:

“Barre sought to undermine the actual functions of clans and lineages through the institution of a variety of political and administrative offices that took over some clan functions. Furthermore, he sought to promote sexual equality and to prohibit the use of language that was disparaging to clans traditionally thought to be inferior, requiring all Somalis to refer to each other as *challe*, or comrade.”⁴²

In addition, Barre launched a country-wide literacy campaign, rejecting the colonial languages of Italian and English, making a new form of written Somali mandatory in all schools.⁴³ Because of his advances and unification efforts, Barre enjoyed a broad base of public support in the first year of his rule.

Recalling previous support from the Soviet Union, Barre turned to his ally for military aid; the Soviets responded favorably seeing the strategic value in Somalia’s location for the development of a significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean and to offset US influence in Ethiopia. This relationship with the Soviets during the Cold War alienated Somalia from Western support, and what little relationship was severed by President Nixon when Somali-flagged ships were discovered delivering arms to North Vietnam.⁴⁴ Ties to the Soviet Union, however, provided Barre with significant military strength which he used in

⁴¹ Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 222.

⁴² Makinda, 19.

⁴³ Hirsch, 5.

October 1977 in an attack against Ethiopia with the aim to reclaim Somali land lost due to colonization and to unite the Somali peoples (an estimated two million ethnic Somalis lived in Ethiopia's Ogaden region at the time).⁴⁵ The closeness of the relationship to the Soviets was overestimated by Barre, however, and the USSR shifted their support to the newly established Marxist government in Ethiopia. Intervention by the Soviets and their close ally Cuba on behalf of Ethiopia proved to be too much for Barre and his military, and in March 1978 the Somali forces retreated. The Somali military defeat was compounded by a collapse in their economy after a decade of "Soviet-style collective agriculture, discouragement of the private sector, and establishment of clan-controlled state monopolies. By the end of the decade, Somalia had hit rock bottom, and Siad Barre decided to turn westward once again."⁴⁶

Despite Soviet expansion in the region and the rise of Islamic extremism, the United States declined Siad Barre's offer to use Somali land as headquarters for Central Command (CENTCOM), a concentration of United States bases and support facilities in Africa and the Middle East as a result of the "Carter Doctrine's" strategy to defend the oil-reserves and sea routes of the region.⁴⁷ However, the United States engaged in a large-scale economic assistance program to Somalia in the 1980s. In an effort to reinforce the struggling infrastructure, \$200 million was given in military aid as well.⁴⁸ By the mid-1980s the United States assistance program to Somalia was the largest in sub-

⁴⁴ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁵ Ramsbotham, 221.

⁴⁶ Hirsch, 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ramsbotham, 222.

Saharan Africa, and hopes were high that the private sector would flourish. But outside economic aid was not enough for Barre to continue to combat clan allegiance and retain the support of the Somali people. Barre himself relied on his clan affiliations to manipulate his position of power, “which he used to ruthlessly oppress entire clans.”⁴⁹ Specifically directed at clans that openly opposed his tactics, Barre manipulated economic aid from the outside to benefit his allies alone, and his fellow Marehan clan members, a sub-group of the Darod clan, controlled every money making ministry.⁵⁰ With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Somalia’s strategic importance declined, and the human rights abuses once overlooked were used as justifications to end economic support to Barre’s regime. Somali political scientist Hussein Adam asserts that “by openly pitting his Darod clan against the others, Barre dropped all pretense of promoting socialist and nationalist ideology and engaged in a raw power struggle that ultimately led to the collapse not only of his regime but of the state.”⁵¹ By 1988, anti-Barre forces had organized, and the fragmented Somali state was in an all out civil war.

In northern Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM), based on the Isaaq clan, asserted its control over three major cities in the region. In response, Barre sent forces led by his son-in-law General Mohamed Siad Hersi, “Morgan,” to end the rebellion, which he accomplished with great brutality.⁵² According to the United States State Department, 5,000 Isaaq civilians were murdered in

⁴⁹ Hirsch, 9.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁵¹ Hussein Adam, telephone interview with John Hirsch, quoted in Hirsch, 9.

⁵² Durch, 314.

order to set an example for any who wished to revolt.⁵³ Barre's forces recaptured the cities, and the SNM retreated to the countryside. At the same time, Colonel Omar Jess of Barre's forces mutinied along with several thousand of his troops and formed the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), clashing with Somali army units along the Ethiopia border.⁵⁴ The United Somali Congress (USC), based on the Hawiye clan, also organized and asserted control over central Somalia including Mogadishu, the capital city. By October, 1990, the three main opposition groups, the USC, SNM, and SPM, had united with the goal of defeating Siad Barre.⁵⁵

By December of 1991, Mogadishu was under attack by the united militias opposing Barre. Proving to be a sustainable force Barre could not counter, the Somali government fled to the south, leaving the country that had had no nationally accepted government with no government at all.⁵⁶ While in retreat, Barre's forces adopted "scorched earth tactics," burning farmland and destroying water supplies, which compounded with a lingering drought, caused the Somali famine of 1992.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, Mogadishu remained under fire due to a rift between rival Hawiye sub-clan militia leaders Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aideed, who turned the city into a "free fire zone, firing at anything that moved and most things that didn't. The city in which they fought had no public administration, no police, no courts, no power, and little of value that had not

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 315

⁵⁷ Ibid.

long since been looted.”⁵⁸ Besieged with more than 500,000 weapons left by the fleeing Somali army, arms were readily available and cheap (\$50 for an AK-47, \$100 for a rocket launcher).⁵⁹ Overall, by 1992 the Somali civil war displaced over a half a million people, 300,000 lives had been lost to the famine, and more than half of the country’s population, an estimated 4.5 million people, were threatened with starvation and malnutrition. The humanitarian situation was disastrous, and without any government, relief by internal means by all intelligible predictions was unlikely, if not totally beyond reason.

UN Intervention

UN involvement in Somalia in the realm of humanitarian assistance had been steady and significant since the late 1970s. When conditions in Mogadishu deteriorated to the point of chaos in January, 1991, the United Nations and most other aid organizations closed their offices to insure the safety of their personnel. No functioning embassies existed in the war-torn capital, and journalists for the most part stayed away because of the impending threat to safety.⁶⁰ Consequently, images of starving Somali children had yet to penetrate homes across the international community via cable news and Somalia retained a relatively low international profile.

The United States, however, donated 12,000 metric tons of food in 1991 via the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other non-

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ramsbotham, 223.

⁶⁰ Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, The United Nations and Somalia (1992-1996), (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 16.

governmental organizations (NGOs) remained active.⁶¹ But the power struggle between Aideed and Ali Mahdi was fought in terms of international aid as well. It became clear that the starvation in Somalia was not due to lack of food or supplies but the looting, stealing, and hoarding of supplies by the feuding war lords. An ad hoc administering of food and supplies was not going to work; thus, in order to continue humanitarian aid to Somalia, a more organized effort from the United Nations was necessary. Mahdi, weaker militarily than Aideed welcomed UN involvement. Aideed, on the other hand, remained suspicious and critical of UN humanitarian intervention, arguing a “Somali solution to a Somali problem” was needed.⁶² On January 23, 1992, Security Council Resolution (SCR) 733 was passed, imposing an arms embargo on Somalia and placing the country on the international agenda.

UNOSOM I

Secretary General Boutros Boutros- Ghali recalls the initial purpose and challenges facing the first organized intervention in Somalia:

“The involvement of the United Nations in the search for peace in Somalia began with an attempt, as I took office in January 1992, to bring about a negotiated cease-fire in Mogadishu. The United Nations then attempted to deploy a small number of cease-fire observers and a small force of security personnel for the protection of humanitarian relief operations in the capital, based on conventional peacekeeping premises, including the consent of the parties. However, weak cooperation on the part of the factions, and outright opposition by some of them, led to long delays in the development of these units. As the famine toll rose, reaching appalling proportions in mid-1992, it became clear that a much larger force was needed to protect relief supplies and that it had to be deployed quickly, whether or not the faction leaders agreed.”⁶³

⁶¹ Hirsch, 19.

⁶² Makinda, 33.

⁶³ Boutros-Ghali, 17.

The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was authorized on April 24, 1992 under SCR 751, providing for the dispatch of fifty unarmed observers to monitor a cease-fire agreement between Mahdi and Aideed and a possible future deployment of a force of 500 peacekeepers. After extensive negotiations conducted by Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, both Mahdi and Aideed agreed to the deployment of 500 “security personnel” to protect UN observers in Mogadishu.⁶⁴ Pakistan committed to send 500 lightly armed troops to fulfill this mission and arrived in Somalia on September, 14 1992. With the mandate of maintaining a permanent cease-fire among belligerents, thus creating a safe environment for the administering of humanitarian aid, UNISOM I was underway.

Over the course of 1992, the humanitarian conditions in Somalia worsened. In his July 22 report, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reported that while the cease-fire in Mogadishu had held reasonably well since the adoption of SCR 751, banditry and looting remained major problems in the capital city. Furthermore, the food situation in rural areas remained critical with some 4.5 million people in need of immediate assistance, the sanitary situation was ominous posing a major threat to public health, and even the most basic medical supplies, including clean water and electricity, were non-existent.⁶⁵ In response, SCR 767 was adopted on July 26, 1992 authorizing an emergency airlift to provide food and medical supplies to the “Triangle of Death” in southern Somalia

⁶⁴ Durch, 317.

⁶⁵ “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, proposing the expansion of UNOSOM and the creation of four operational zones,” (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 172.

and providing for the establishment of four operational zones to better organize the effort.⁶⁶ President Bush acted with Operation Provide Relief, a US sponsored airlift distributing humanitarian relief.

From August 1992 to February 1993, the United States flew almost 2,500 flights of relief to various cities in southern Somalia.⁶⁷ Though the 28,000 metric tons of food and supplies limited the extent of the crisis, it was unable to come close to stifling it. The situation continued to deteriorate despite the increased delivery of supplies due to looting and hoarding, and the 500 Pakistani troops were hardly effective in safeguarding deliveries across the country. Consequently, the Security Council authorized the deployment of an additional 3,000 troops. Aideed, uncomfortable with the presence of more outside forces, ordered the immediate withdrawal of the Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu whose mission was to secure the port, safeguard food shipments to and from the airport, and escort convoys to feeding stations throughout the city.⁶⁸ Not willing to comply with Aideed's demands because of the necessity of the peacekeepers to safeguard relief shipments but also unwilling to remove the restrictions on the Pakistani forces rules of engagement and authority to move without consent of the local "authority," the UN left the peacekeepers in the shelter of the airport unable to carry out their mission and targets of the local factions.⁶⁹ Without the consent of Aideed, a major military intervention implementing more forceful measures in Somalia would be necessary.

⁶⁶ "Security Council resolution approving the establishment of four operational zones," *Ibid.*, 179.

⁶⁷ Hirsch, 25.

UNITAF

By the summer of 1992, television news was beaming images of looting and chaos as well as starving women and children in Somalia. Public distress over the catastrophic humanitarian conditions mounted, and the Bush administration began to feel pressure from the media, Congress, and humanitarian agencies to act.⁷⁰ Made more of an issue by the presidential election campaigns in the fall of 1992, Operation Provide Relief was criticized for being ineffective and weak in support for the United Nations by then Governor Bill Clinton.⁷¹ Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, recognizing the ineffectiveness of UNOSOM, given General Aideed's expulsion of peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies, suggested that it was becoming necessary for the Security Council to "review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia" and adopt more forceful measures of humanitarian involvement in his letter to the president of the Security Council on November 24, 1992.⁷² In this context, the United States pledged to take the lead in conducting military action in Somalia and to provide 24,000 troops at an estimated cost of \$450 million if the Security Council authorized participants to use forceful means if necessary to secure the delivery and administration of humanitarian aid.⁷³ According to US military policy, the U.S. troops would remain under U.S. government control

⁶⁸ Ibid., 27.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 35.

⁷¹ Durch, 319.

⁷² "Letter dated 24 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council," (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 207.

⁷³ Makinda, 70.

while working hand in hand with other UN forces. On December 3, 1992, the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment in Somalia.

UNITAF's objectives included securing the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu, opening supply routes, and securing other towns as feeding centers in southern Somalia. The US-led Unified Task Force, referred to as Operation Restore Hope, was designed to work with the UNOSOM forces to secure the environment for humanitarian relief. In an address to the American people on December 4, 1992, the outgoing President Bush clarified the purpose of the operation to the public:

"First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, once we have secured that environment, we will withdrawal our troops, handing the security mission back to the regular UN peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for UN peacekeepers to keep it moving...We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary."⁷⁴

Making it clear that the US intention was not to fix the broken Somalia state, but addressing the humanitarian issues tugging at the public conscience, Bush was able to garner widespread support for UNITAF. A poll taken days after the address found that 81 percent of those questioned agreed "that the US is doing the right thing in sending troops to Somalia to make sure food gets to the people there."⁷⁵ Even Ali Mahdi and General Aideed agreed with the US-led

⁷⁴ "Bush's Talk on Somalia: US Must Do It Right," (transcript of Bush's address), quoted in Durch, 320.

⁷⁵ "Troops in Somalia: How Americans React," NYT/CBS News Poll, quoted in Durch, 320.

intervention, Mahdi welcoming a counterforce to Aideed and Aideed welcoming an alternative to the United Nations forces.⁷⁶

Under the command of General Roger Johnston of the United States Marines and in conjunction with the UN ground commander Pakistani General Imitiaz Shaheen, the multinational force included thousands of soldiers from over 20 nations. (See Table 2.1)

Table 2.1 International Troop Commitments for Somalia (Estimates)

Country	No. of Troops
Australia	900
Belgium	570
Botswana	300
Canada	900
Egypt	250
France	2,500
India	3,000
Italy	3,800
Kuwait	230
Morocco	1,250
New Zealand	60
Nigeria	550
Norway	80
Pakistan	4,000
Saudi Arabia	700
Sweden	130
Tunisia	130
Turkey	300
UK	90
USA	24,000
Zimbabwe	400

Source: Samuel M. Makinda, "Seeking Peace From Chaos," (Boulder, Colorado. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 73

According to Durch, UNITAF's objectives were defined in terms of four phases:

⁷⁶ Durch, 320.

“Phase One objectives included establishing a base of operations in Mogadishu; gaining control of relief supplies into and through the city; introducing other forces into the city; and securing the town of Baidoa. This phase was scheduled for three weeks and was accomplished in one.

Phase Two of the plan called for expanding operations to additional ports and airfields; expanding security in the country’s interior via relief convoy escort and creation of additional relief distribution sites; and establishing further security bases of operation. Phase Two was allowed 30 days and was completed in 12.

Phase Three called for further expansion of regional security and control of additional ports and airfields in hotly contested areas in the south. Though no timetable was specified, it was considered complete two months into the mission.

The final phase was the handoff to the UN, considered complete when US forces had been relieved of their responsibilities in Somalia. The plan estimated 240 days from the initial UNITAF deployment to the complete handover; officially it occurred at the 146-day mark.”⁷⁷

Based on the objectives defined by the Operational Plan, UNITAF is considered by most political scientists and historians to have been effective and successful, particularly in light of Somalia’s anarchical state. Large supplies of food and medicine reached the neediest areas in the south, and a civilian-military operation center (CMOC) was established to better assist humanitarian-military cooperation.⁷⁸ UNITAF also was successful in establishing an indigenous Somali police force with the cooperation of the two main Somali factions.⁷⁹ Crediting the United States with the success of Operation Restore Hope, Durch states, “Not only did US military professionalism show through but forces demonstrated adaptability to a difficult situation and an unfamiliar culture.”⁸⁰

UNITAF, however, was not without problems. Within a week of its arrival in Mogadishu, dispute over UNITAF’s responsibility to disarm the Somalis ensued between UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and the US military.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 322.

⁷⁸ Ramsbotham, 224.

Boutros-Ghali argued that Security Council Resolution 794 presupposed the disarmament of the Somalis in the establishment of a “secure environment,” while the US commander of UNITAF argued that this was not part of his mission.⁸¹ Recognizing the difficulty the UN would face in a follow-on mission in Somalia against armed resistance, both due to the lack of control structure to execute Chapter VII as Resolution 794 authorized and to the general unwillingness of member states to “die for the UN Charter,” Boutros-Ghali pushed Somali disarmament.⁸² UNITAF was successful to a certain extent and did require the seizure of some assault weapon on sight in Mogadishu, but when UNITAF passed the reigns of control to UNOSOM II on May 4, 1993, incidents of violence were continuing with weapons readily accessible to warring factions.

UNOSOM II

The transfer of military command from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM signaled the beginning of UNOSOM II. Granted powers of enforcement under Chapter VII, Security Council Resolution 814 of March 26, 1993 initiated the first peace enforcement mission in UN history with the authority to employ force not only in self-defense, but to advance the objectives of the mission as well. Resolution 814 broadened the UN mandate to:

“1) monitor the cease-fire between the warring factions and take action against any faction that violated the cease-fire; 2) supervise the factions after disarmament and encampment; 3) maintain a register of small arms seized, 4) ensure the security of ports, airports, and communications for the delivery of humanitarian aid; 5) protect personnel, installations, and equipment of

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Durch, 352.

⁸¹ Makinda, 71.

⁸² Durch, 321

humanitarian agencies; 6) establish a program to remove land mines; 7) repatriate refugees and displaced Somalis; 8) reestablish national and regional political and civil administrations; and 9) rehabilitate the economy.”⁸³

The mandate broadened the scope of the intervention to northern Somalia, an area that continuously resisted outside aid, instead of the southern region to which the previous missions had been limited. Furthermore, it mandated full compliance with the Addis Ababa Conference in which Mahdi and Aideed were to cooperate in a cease-fire and voluntary weapons surrender.⁸⁴ Essentially, the objectives of UNOSOM II were to rebuild the entire country of Somalia, to force warring factions to disarm, and to institute a new government with popular support out of years of chaos, using force if necessary.

In 1993, Samuel Makinda predicted, “It is clear that with the expanded mandate, a confrontation between UNOSOM II and Somali factions, whether over ceasefire violations or disarmament matters, is inevitable.”⁸⁵ Makinda’s speculation came into fruition in mid-1993, as General Aideed perceived the UN forces as favoring his rivals by implementing mandatory disarmament (garnering more power as the conflict continued, he stood to lose more than Mahdi) and accusing him of using Mogadishu radio as vehicle for propaganda. Escalating tensions between Aideed’s SNA faction and UNOSOM II forces turned into all out urban guerrilla warfare in the beginning in June of 1993, when Pakistani peacekeeping forces were attacked when trying to disarm members of the SNA. On the first day of fighting, 24 Pakistani troops were killed and 61 UNOSOM

⁸³ Ramsbotham, 226.

⁸⁴ John Drysdale, “Foreign Military Intervention In Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and its Consequences,” *Learning From Somalia*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 131.

⁸⁵ Makinda, 80

soldiers, including three Americans, were wounded.⁸⁶ The confrontation continued throughout the month of June, and the United Nations found itself entrenched in a military struggle with the SNA, prompting the Security Council Resolution 837, which authorized the arrest, detention, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for the attacks on UN peacekeepers.⁸⁷ General Aideed and his SNA were now the enemy.

The United States remained involved militarily in Somalia during UNOSOM II, although its initial goal was to withdrawal troops completely after UNITAF. Recognizing that the USA was best equipped to supply UNOSOM II forces with logistical and intelligence support, President Clinton pledged US military support, though at a drastically lower number than UNITAF. As the fighting in Mogadishu between the peacekeepers and the SNA intensified, President Clinton answered the request of the UN by deploying the elite Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos with the mission to capture SNA officers as well as Aideed himself.⁸⁸ The US soldiers were initially successful in capturing dozens of SNA officers in August and September of 1993, but not without sustaining casualties. In his decision to fire on US soldiers, Aideed was successful in boosting the morale of his faction as well as that of his rivals, despite the thousands of Somali lives that had been lost in the fighting. During an attempt to capture Aideed and several other SNA senior members on October 3, 1993, three Black Hawk helicopters were downed and 18 American and an estimated 200 Somali lives were lost. Images of an American pilot, who had been

⁸⁶ Durch, 343.

⁸⁷ Hirsch, 118

killed, being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu with cheering onlookers were seen on television around the world. Three days later, President Clinton announced the complete withdrawal of US troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994.⁸⁹ The United Nations would have to continue the fight without the United States.

Fighting continued between UNOSOM II forces and Aideed's SNA militia throughout 1994. Preoccupied with the ensuing war, virtually all humanitarian aid throughout Somalia by UN peacekeepers ceased, and looters pillaged the once secure ports and airports. By May of 1994, the UN had settled on March 1995, the planned withdrawal date of UN forces assuming a secure environment and a new provisional Somali government had been achieved, as the termination date for UNOSOM II.⁹⁰ No request for further UN aid was made by Somali factions, and as the final peacekeepers withdrew from Mogadishu, hundreds of Somali looters were there to seize anything of value.

Mission Outcome/Somalia After Intervention

The United Nations intervention in Somalia marked the first of its kind, a multilateral attempt to save a failed state. Originally implemented as a humanitarian relief effort, UNOSOM I learned first hand the difficulty of limited interventions in a lawless state. It was the inability of UNOSOM I to secure the administration of humanitarian relief that spurred the more aggressive Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF was able to secure the distribution of food and medicine in the southern region of Somalia and though not eradicating it completely, bring

⁸⁸ Ramsbotham, 226.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 227.

the widespread famine under control. However, it UNITAF was unable to disarm the warring factions, making UNOSOM II's broad mandate of rebuilding the entire country next to impossible.

Initially, UNOSOM I engaged in humanitarian peacekeeping with the goal of supplying humanitarian relief with the consent of the belligerent forces through the use of UN peacekeeping forces. Was this particular intervention successful? Applying the three established criteria for evaluating the success of an intervention:

1. Was the original goal of the mission fulfilled at the time of withdrawal?

No. Further use of force was necessary in this case to secure the administration of aid.

2. Did the improved conditions and objectives originally achieved by the mission continue after outside involvement ceased?

No improved conditions were achieved.

3. Does a cost/benefit analysis justify engagement in the mission?

This question is not applicable in light of the answers to questions 1 and 2.

Thus, UNOSOM I was a failure.

Initiated in response to the growing needs of UNOSOM I, UNITAF employed an escalation in humanitarian peacekeeping with the consent of the belligerent parties. In addition, UNITAF engaged in limited peace enforcement in its attempt disarm rivaling factions, though this function was not a component of UNITAF's original mandate. Applying the criteria for evaluating the success of an intervention:

⁹⁰ Durch, 350

1. Was the original goal of the mission fulfilled at the time of withdrawal?

Yes. At the time of withdrawal, large amounts of relief supplies had been successfully delivered and administered to those in need within the defined territory of the mission mandate. Furthermore, a secure environment had been established for the purposes of humanitarian relief. A secure environment for purpose beyond humanitarian relief had not been established, i.e. disarmament of warring factions, but this condition was a part of the original mission mandate.

2. Did the improved conditions and objectives originally achieved by the mission continue after outside involvement ceased?

No. UNITAF was unsuccessful in paving the way for the more extensive UNOSOM II, and subsequent UNOSOM II difficulties jeopardized the distribution of humanitarian aid.

3. Does a cost/benefit analysis justify engagement in the mission?

Yes. Though monetarily expensive, UNITAF was responsible for saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somali civilians. Furthermore, Operation Restore Hope was implemented and completed without great risk to peacekeeping forces. Therefore, Operation Restore Hope was a partial success.

For the first time in UN history, UNOSOM II attempted aggressive peacekeeping in the form of peace building, actions focused on rebuilding institutions and infrastructure in an attempt to foster an environment conducive to peace, and peace enforcement, UN authorized forces using combat power to compel compliance with UN policy. Again, applying the criteria for evaluating the success of an intervention:

1. Was the original goal of the mission fulfilled at the time of withdrawal?

No. At the time of withdrawal, none of the mission objectives of UNOSOM II were achieved.

2. Did the improved conditions and objectives originally achieved by the mission continue after outside involvement ceased?

No. The conditions in Somalia at the time of withdrawal are not considered an improvement in comparison to the beginning of UNOSOM II.

3. Does a cost/benefit analysis justify engagement in the mission?

No. Essentially no benefit was achieved at considerably high cost, both in terms of money and human life.

Therefore, UNOSOM II was an utter failure.

Somalia remains a state in chaos, plagued by warlords and famine, despite five years of significant efforts by the United Nations to bring peace and stability to the region. What lessons can be learned from this experience? Can peacekeeping bring about peace? Before conclusions are made as to the answer of these questions, a second examination of modern peacekeeping is offered.

CHAPTER 4

MOZAMBIQUE (1992-1994)

“In light of the recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists.”⁹¹

From 1992-1994, while struggling to bring order and humanitarian aid to Somalia, the United Nations also was engaging in peacekeeping operations in Mozambique. The bleak humanitarian situation and almost 20 years of ongoing civil war created an environment wrought with devastation, and once again a United Nations peacekeeping intervention was underway. In contrast to the Somalia debacle, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was able to implement a cease-fire agreement between belligerents, administer humanitarian aid, and facilitate the creation of an election process with the aid of a relatively small amount of peacekeepers. An important victory for the practice of peacekeeping, ONUMOZ demonstrated to the world the capabilities of a UN intervention.

Conflict Background

Located on the southeast coast of Africa, Mozambique's long history has been one of conflict and strife. European involvement in the small country dates

⁹¹ Boutros-Boutros-Ghali on recommending the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ to the Security Council, www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/ONUMOZ, January 17, 2003.

back to 1498 with the arrival of the Portuguese. Over the next four hundred years, Portuguese traders and their families settled along Mozambique's expansive 1500 mile coast line, establishing control of the economy and trade. At first, the economy was primarily focused on gold and ivory, but as the demand for human labor grew, the slave trade moved to the forefront.⁹² With the threat of slavery, most natives remained inland, living in traditional tribal societies and interaction between the natives and the Portuguese settlers was minimal.

In order to maintain control over Mozambique, Portugal relied on British support, whose interest in southern neighbors South Africa and Rhodesia made Mozambique's coastline of strategic importance. With the help of Britain, rail lines were laid and cities developed in exchange for Mozambican labor to work in the South African mines.⁹³ In 1932, however, fascism arrived in Portugal and cooperation with Britain ceased. Exploiting the newly developed infrastructure, the Portuguese moved in droves to Mozambique, increasing the European population from 30,000 in 1930 to 200,000 in 1975.⁹⁴ The predominately white coastal communities remained separate from the rural Mozambican tribes, and few opportunities in the areas of education and skilled labor were available to blacks. When the Portuguese withdrew from Mozambique in 1974, the country was hardly prepared for independence.

When the nearly 200,000 European settlers, including the educated, merchants, professionals, and skilled-workers fled the country, Mozambique was left in shambles, and the Frente da Libertacao Mocambique (FRELIMO),

⁹² Hume, 4.

⁹³ Ibid., 5.

consisting of Mozambicans educated in Tanzania and opposed to Portuguese rule, was there to pick up the pieces. Founded in 1962, FRELIMO mounted an armed struggle against the ruling Portuguese during the 1960s, and was successful in creating a significant annoyance but not independence. When Portugal, however, was ready to give Mozambique its independence, FRELIMO was the only organized Mozambican nationalist group. Portuguese authorities suggested a “transition” period for the newly independent Mozambique, including the creation of an elections process, but “FRELIMO insisting that, as the sole legitimate representative of the Mozambican people,” it should be responsible for the new government, convinced Portugal to hand over power directly without elections being held.⁹⁵ With the aim of creating a “modernized, disciplined, and socialist country,” Samora Machel, the FRELIMO leader, was sworn in as Mozambique’s first president on June 25, 1975.⁹⁶

The new FRELIMO government was in fierce opposition to the minority controlled governments in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa and began enforcing the UN-sanctioned embargo against Rhodesia by cutting off access to rail lines and subsequently the Indian Ocean.⁹⁷ Feeling threatened by FRELIMO’s newly gained power, the Rhodesian government began training and providing armaments to anti-FRELIMO forces inside Mozambique.⁹⁸ Tensions grew as Mozambique in turn sheltered members of the Zimbabwe African

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 9.

⁹⁷ Pamela L. Reed, “The Politics of Reconciliation. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique,” *Durch*, 278.

⁹⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique*, (New York. United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995), 9

National Union (ZANU), an anti-Rhodesian government group.⁹⁹ Angered by the FRELIMO – ZANU alliance, Rhodesian troops invaded and destroyed many of Mozambique’s communication, transportation, and agricultural centers, and established the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Resistenci Nacional Mocambicana – RENAMO) to serve as an intelligence network for the white-minority Rhodesian government.¹⁰⁰ When Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, South Africa’s white-minority government became RENAMO’s primary source of support, and RENAMO’s presence grew inside of Mozambique.

President Machel and the FRELIMO regime were embraced by the Soviet Union as Mozambique was of strategic interest for containing Western influence in Africa during the Cold War. In an effort to establish its legitimacy to the people of Mozambique:

“FRELIMO proclaimed itself as a vanguard party that would protect the revolution and promote development. The government removed or subjugated traditional local authorities who had been left in place during centuries of Portuguese colonialism. The government nationalized private homes, rental property, other private holdings, the practice of medicine and law, and educational institutions...Consequently, these policy choices deprived private initiative of any reward, retarded community development, and concentrated power in the hands of a central government unprepared to exercise it.”¹⁰¹

To carry out the nationalization of industry and resources, Mozambique received ample economic support from the Soviet Union as well as Cuba. To protect itself from RENAMO, FRELIMO was given Soviet military aid.

Alienating large portions of the population with its domestic policy, FRELIMO delivered recruits to the growing RENAMO. In addition, FRELIMO’s

⁹⁹ World Geography, abc-clio, subscription database, Cedar Park High School, January 15, 2003.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Hume, 9.

policy on agriculture was failing, creating even poorer living conditions. With South African aid and an increase in opposition to FRELIMO, RENAMO was able to organize about 6,000 to 7,000 fighters operating within Mozambique by 1981.¹⁰² The RENAMO fighters targeted railway corridors, power supply systems, communication centers, hospitals, and schools throughout Mozambique, and treated fellow civilian Mozambicans as no better than property.¹⁰³ Earning the reputation as the “Khmer Rouge” of Africa, civilians were tortured, maimed, murdered, and kidnapped and forced to serve in the RENAMO army to make them accomplices to the human rights atrocities.¹⁰⁴ Professionals were targeted as symbols of FRELIMO influence, and foreign aid workers including missionaries and human aid workers were captured and held for ransom.¹⁰⁵ Though RENAMO proposed no political agenda or demands, the civil war raged onward throughout the impoverished country.

The late 1980s were a turning point in a seemingly endless conflict. Joaquim Chissano became the leader of FRELIMO in 1986 after the death of Samora Machel in a plane crash. At the time of his death, Machel had begun to reverse the Marxist-Leninist policies of the past, and Chissano, continuing Machel’s policies introduced liberalizing reforms to the country. Chissano also brokered a new and improved relationship with South Africa in an effort to contain RENAMO support. Offering assistance in repairing the Cabora Bassa Dam, South Africa would reap the energy benefits of a partnership with

¹⁰² Reed, 279.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Hume, 14.

¹⁰⁵ Reed, 279.

Mozambique in this endeavor.¹⁰⁶ South Africa agreed and discouraged any interference from RENAMO, leaving RENAMO without its valuable support. At the same time, Cold War tensions were easing in Africa, and Soviet and Cuban influence in the region was declining. With RENAMO in check, FRELIMO announced its willingness to reach a peace settlement in June of 1989.¹⁰⁷ Feeling its loss of resources and realizing that without South African aid it did not have the capability to defeat the government, RENAMO accepted FRELIMO's invitation.

The first peace talks between FRELIMO and RENAMO, orchestrated by the Catholic bishops of Mozambique, began in August, 1989 in Nairobi, Kenya, but were unsuccessful in reaching any agreement due to both parties reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of the other. A year later, direct peace talks resumed in Rome, mediated by the Sant' Egidio Community (a Catholic lay organization associated with the Vatican), and the Italian government.¹⁰⁸ A limited six-month cease-fire was reached, but RENAMO, now headed by Alfonso Dhlakama, broke the cease-fire after only two months. Dhlakama became convinced of the need to seek a peaceful resolution with FRELIMO after diplomatic intervention by the United States, Italy, and the Soviet Union, and in October, 1991, a preliminary peace agreement was accepted by both factions, and included aid from the United Nations in a supervisory role.¹⁰⁹ Peace talks continued, and little by little, Chissano and Dhlakama were able to resolve their differences. The leaders agreed to seven protocols including a cease-fire to be followed by a rapid

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 280.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

demobilization of both factions and an establishment of a united Mozambican Defense Force.¹¹⁰ In addition, new political parties would be formed, including the transformation of RENAMO into a party, and preparations for elections would be made.¹¹¹ On October 4, 1992, the General Peace Agreement was signed, ending 16 years of civil war.

Despite an end to the fighting in sight, Mozambique was rated “the most unhappy nation on earth” by the *International Index of Human Suffering*.¹¹² By the time the General Peace Agreement (GPA) had been reached, over 1 million Mozambicans were estimated to have lost their lives in the war, including hundreds of thousands lost to starvation. An estimated 1.3 million refugees had fled the country over the course of the war, and internally displaced persons numbered from 4 to 5 million.¹¹³ The country was in shambles and its people, including the belligerents, were exhausted. A peace agreement had been signed, but an end to the fighting and suffering would take more than a piece of paper. Thus, Mozambique turned to the United Nations for help.

ONUMOZ

The United Nations answered the call of Mozambique despite its many other obligations at the time. Security Council Resolution 797 created the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) on December 16, 1992. The

¹⁰⁸ Ibid , 281

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ “United Nations Operation in Mozambique,” www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onumoz, January 17, 2003.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ramsbotham, 159.

¹¹³ Worldgeography

mission initially had four defined components: military, political, electoral, and humanitarian. In short, the mandate of ONUMOZ was:

- “1) To monitor and verify the cease fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
- 2) To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and to provide security in the transport corridors;
- 3) To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;
- 4) To authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures and to provide security for the United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process;
- 5) To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process;
- 6) To coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel, and the affected population.”¹¹⁴

In addition, the United Nations, under the direction of the GPA, would chair three commissions: the Supervision and Control Commission, the Cease-Fire Commission, and the Reintegration Commission (for demobilized soldiers).¹¹⁵ In the words of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, “It was clear from the outset of the operation that a substantial UN presence was needed to ensure the success of peace.”¹¹⁶

The governing document of the peace process, the GPA, set up an ambitious timetable for the implementation of its provisions, estimating the total process to be no more than a year. This document, however, did not take into account the already large commitment of UN peacekeepers worldwide at the time, and the number of personnel needed to undertake a mission of this magnitude. Initial deployment was slow as was the approval of ONUMOZ’s first

¹¹⁴ “United Nations Operation in Mozambique.”

¹¹⁵ Synge, 24.

¹¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique*, 25.

interim budget of \$140 million.¹¹⁷ It was not until the early summer of 1993 that a significant presence of UN peacekeepers existed in Mozambique. Gaining international support, ONUMOZ grew to a multinational force of close to 6,000 in August of 1993. (See Table 3.1)

Table 3.1 International Troop Commitments for Mozambique (August 1993)

Country	No. of Troops
Bangladesh	1,363
Italy	1,010
India	899
Zambia	831
Uruguay	816
Botswana	721
Portugal	280

source: adapted from "The United Nations and Mozambique (1992-1995)," (New York: Department of Public Information, 1995).

Though major violations in the cease-fire agreement were reported across various regions of the country, Mozambique was for the most part able to maintain the provisions of the GPA in the sense that it did not totally collapse while the UN's deployment was delayed. As a consequence of the reported skirmishes, however, neither party was willing to disarm without the UN present. In particular, RENAMO refused to begin disarmament until 65 per cent of UN forces had been deployed.¹¹⁸ Elections could not be feasible until demobilization had taken place. Thus, the original timetable for the peace process set forth in the GPA was badly stalled. In order to keep the peace process on track, a revised

¹¹⁷ Synge, 29.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

timetable was proposed by the UN sponsored Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, targeting October of 1994 as the date for full implementation.¹¹⁹

With UN peacekeeping troops in place by August of 1993, negotiations between President Chissano and RENAMO leader Dhlakama were able to resume. Two key agreements, the first of their sort since the GPA, were signed on September 3, 1993. In the first accord, the FRELIMO-controlled government and RENAMO agreed to incorporate into state administration all lands under RENAMO control, in an effort to restore stability to the country and promote unification.¹²⁰ The second agreement invited the UN to secure the impartiality of the national police, a primary concern of RENAMO, and to monitor all such activities in the country in an effort to ensure citizens their liberties.¹²¹ Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali accepted Mozambique's request, and UN police observers were added to the scope of ONUMOZ.

Component 1 - Military

ONUMOZ's military component was composed of three main objectives: the demobilization of Mozambique's warring factions, the establishment of a secure environment to administer the peace process and maintenance of the cease-fire agreement, and a facilitation of the creation of a Mozambican peace force.

The demobilization of Mozambique's opposing factions was difficult. First, troops had to be assembled by the UN peacekeepers, then disarmed and sent home. After several incidents of violence and a general apprehension by the

¹¹⁹ Synge, 36.

¹²⁰ "United Nations Operation in Mozambique."

forces to disarm after 16 years of fighting, FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed to allow the soldiers to choose freely between demobilization and the newly established and loosely organized united Mozambican army.¹²² The assembly of troops formally commenced on November 30, 1993 with the opening of 20 assembly camps by UN peacekeepers.¹²³ Although FRELIMO sponsored government troops were initially assembled at a much faster pace than RENAMO, likely due to an early mistrust of the process by the latter, a large portion of the RENAMO militia was assembled by mid-December 1993.¹²⁴ The actual demobilization of troops took place several months later, with the average soldier spending eight weeks in an assembly camp.¹²⁵ Weapons collected from the camps were transferred to storage site under the control of the UN observers. The process steadily continued until August of 1994, resulting in the successful demobilization of over 57,000 government troops and over 20,000 RENAMO troops.¹²⁶

In addition to the overseeing of the demobilization process, ONUMOZ forces maintained the security of trade corridors and main roads through the use of road and aerial patrols as well as vehicle and train escorts.¹²⁷ Security was also provided to airports, oil reserves, and weapons warehouses in an effort to stabilize the volatile environment while the FRELIMO and RENAMO troops were being demobilized. This action sustained conditions conducive to maintaining

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Synge, 91.

¹²³ "United Nations Operation in Mozambique."

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Reed, 293.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 294.

¹²⁷ "United Nations Operation in Mozambique."

the cease-fire.¹²⁸ The Cease-fire Commission, headed by the UN, was designed to investigate alleged violations of the agreement with ONUMOZ forces, but banditry turned out to pose the greater threat to the peace process. Underemployed soldiers and guerrilla fighters contributed to the looming sense of chaos, undermining the stabilizing presence of ONUMOZ.¹²⁹ However, ONUMOZ forces were able to contain the threat, thus successfully maintaining the GPA.

The United Nations also oversaw the Joint Commission for the Formation of Mozambican Defense Force with the mission of training officers from RENAMO and FRELIMO volunteers. The Commission convened in July, 1993 and training of 100 officers (50 from each side) began one month later.¹³⁰ By late October, the newly established army had about 10,000 UN trained soldiers.

Component 2 – Political

The key responsibility of ONUMOZ's political component was to establish an environment conducive to "free and fair" elections.¹³¹ UN advisors transformed RENAMO from an insurgent group to a recognized political party within Mozambique's newly established multi-party system in conjunction with the GPA. This feat was not easy, given the mistrust between RENAMO and the government, and both sides stalled this implementation. Negotiations facilitated by the international community were unsuccessful in producing a post-election pact between the Government and RENAMO, but "ordinary Mozambicans

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Reed, 292.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 295.

¹³¹ Ibid., 290.

provided ample proof that a more substantial reconciliation was taking place throughout society as a whole, and that they were determined to exercise their first opportunity to declare their political preferences.”¹³² Despite delays, funding for RENAMO was received in May, 1993 to procure accommodations, transportation, and communications in order to establish themselves as a political party with offices in the capital city of Maputo.¹³³ Consequently, RENAMO was made to give up territory it held for political leverage, uniting the country under one administration with freedom of movement throughout the previously segmented Mozambique. In addition, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in an agreement with the Mozambican government and in conjunction with ONUMOZ, set up shop in May 1993 in order to help “organize and carry out free and fair elections in Mozambique...and thus ensure one of the basic conditions for political stability and the reconstruction and development of the country.”¹³⁴ Ultimately, the political function of ONUMOZ and its the transformation of RENAMO into a political party as well as the political unification of the country paved the way for “free and fair” elections to take place in Mozambique.

Component 3 – Electoral

With the help of UN observers, the Government of Mozambique presented a draft of the new electoral law to RENAMO and other political parties on March 26, 1993.¹³⁵ A multiparty conference was called to initiate discussions over the new law, but RENAMO, as well as other smaller parties, refused to participate on

¹³² Synge, 116.

¹³³ Reed, 290

the grounds that they had not had adequate time to study the draft. In August, 1993, a second conference convened, this time with the full participation of all political parties, but no agreement was reached due to disagreement over the composition of a proposed National Electoral Commission designed to be an impartial body overseeing national elections in Mozambique. During his October, 1993 visit, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was able to broker an agreement over this contentious issue by giving RENAMO what it considered adequate representation on the Commission.¹³⁶ Further negotiations between President Chissano and RENAMO leader Dhlakama were administered by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and on January 12, 1994, one full year behind the original scheduled date provided for in the GPA, the electoral law was finalized.¹³⁷

Voter registration began on June 1, 1994 with over 1,500 registration teams in place.¹³⁸ When registration ended that September, 81 per cent of the eligible population was registered to vote.¹³⁹ 2,300 electoral observers, including 900 from the United Nations, were put into place across the country on the eve of the October elections to verify that results were untainted and fair. However, when the polls opened on October 27, RENAMO leader Dhlakama withdrew from the race alleging "irregularities in the election process" and called for a boycott of the election.¹⁴⁰ Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued a statement that same

¹³⁴ Synge, 116.

¹³⁵ "United Nations Operation in Mozambique."

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Reed, 229.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ "United Nations Operation in Mozambique."

day reminding Dhlakama of his obligations under the GPA to participate in the election; the next day, Dhlakama reversed his decision. When the polls closed in October 29, 1994 over 90 per cent of the registered electorate chose among 12 presidential candidates and over 3,100 national assembly candidates representing 14 political parties.¹⁴¹

The counting process took longer than its provided 15 day window, mainly due to excessive scrutiny by both political party and UN officials, but when the counting had finished, the National Elections Commission announced incumbent President Chissano the winner with 53.3 per cent of the vote.¹⁴² RENAMO leader Dhlakama received 33.7 per cent of the vote.¹⁴³ Despite RENAMO's contention that irregularities were widespread, the elections held in Mozambique were declared "free and fair" by the United Nations.¹⁴⁴

Component 4 – Humanitarian

In order to secure a lasting peace in Mozambique, ONUMOZ committed itself to improving the dire humanitarian situation. Two primary concerns were the resettlement of refugees and displaced Mozambicans and the removal of land mines scattered throughout the country.

Initial projections estimated that approximately 6 million Mozambicans would resettle during the administration of the GPA including 1.5 – 1.8 million Mozambicans who had fled to surrounding countries. The United Nations Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Coordination (UNOHAC) organized refugee camps and settlements, establishing humanitarian assistance in every province

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

with the cooperation of both FRELIMO and RENAMO.¹⁴⁵ With the focus of building an independent Mozambican capability to improve humanitarian conditions after ONUMOZ ceased, UNOHAC emphasized community involvement of the displaced persons, promoting projects for “road repair, water supply and sanitation, health, education, and agricultural production.”¹⁴⁶ The international community voluntarily provided over \$650 million to facilitate ONUMOZ’s humanitarian assistance.¹⁴⁷ In addition, over 40 other organizations, coordinated by ONUMOZ, FRELIMO, and RENAMO, brought humanitarian relief to more than 300 delivery points throughout the country, and over 700 primary schools and 250 health care facilities were established in rural areas.¹⁴⁸ Consequently, the demobilization and resettlement efforts were successful in replacing 4.5 million people to their original place of residence.

Hundreds of thousands of land mines were scattered throughout the Mozambican countryside as a consequence of the 16 year civil war. In May, 1994, ONUMOZ facilitated the creation of a National Mine Clearance Program and began the initial phase of clearing roads to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian aid. Mine awareness programs as well as mine clearing technology development programs and a UN Mine-Clearance Center were also initiated. By the end of 1994, 450 Mozambicans had been trained in mine clearance, and

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Reed, 301.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 297.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ramsbotham, 164.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

though total de-mining was far from accomplished when ONUMOZ withdrew, Mozambique had the training and the tools to continue the process.¹⁴⁹

Mission Outcome/Mozambique After Intervention

At midnight on December 9, 1994, ONUMOZ's mandate officially ended. By the end of January 1995, the last ONUMOZ troops had been withdrawn from Mozambique and a new democratically elected government had been installed. Seemingly, ONUMOZ had completed its mission mandates. Therefore, can ONUMOZ be considered a success? Applying the three criteria for evaluating the success of a mission:

1. Was the original goal of the mission fulfilled at the time of withdrawal?

Yes. The original goals of the ONUMOZ were outlined in four main components;

- 1) military – monitoring and enforcing the cease-fire agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO and facilitating the demobilization of belligerent forces,
 - 2) political – providing a stable environment for the transition of insurgent groups (RENAMO) to political parties and paving the way for a fair electoral process,
 - 3) electoral – facilitating the creation of fair electoral law, administering voter registration, and ensuring a fair outcome for the parliamentary and presidential elections,
 - 4) humanitarian – providing humanitarian assistance in the form of direct aid, refugee placement, and the clearing of land mines throughout the country.
- At the time of withdrawal, the cease-fire agreement between the belligerents had been maintained, the demobilization of troops had been administered, RENAMO had transitioned into a political party, a fair and

¹⁴⁹ Reed, 299.

free election had established a democratically elected government, millions of refugees had been resettled, and substantial progress had been made in the removal of thousands of land mines.

2. Did the improved conditions and objectives originally achieved by the mission continue after outside involvement ceased?

Yes. FRELIMO and RENAMO, despite their differences, have remained peaceful.

In December, 1999, Mozambique successfully administered its second democratic election. Incumbent President Chissano narrowly won re-election with 52 per cent of the vote.¹⁵⁰ The RENAMO party gained representation in the National Assembly with 117 seats to FRELIMO's 133.¹⁵¹ Since 1994, Chissano has remained committed to free market principles, and in 1997, the economic growth rate was 14 per cent.¹⁵² In addition, the inflation rate in 1997 fell 6 per cent, an accomplishment compared to the 70 per cent inflation rate in 1994.¹⁵³

Furthermore, with the help of international donors, Mozambique has remained diligent in its efforts to rebuild the country's infrastructure.

3. Does a cost/benefit analysis justify engagement in the mission?

Yes. At the height of involvement, ONUMOZ consisted of 6,576 military personnel and 1,087 civilian observers.¹⁵⁴ The expenditures for ONUMOZ totaled \$492.6 million, and a total of 24 fatalities occurred over the course of the two-year intervention. As a consequence of ONUMOZ, over 6 million people returned

¹⁵⁰ "Worldgeography"

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ "United Nations and Mozambique."

to their homes, and a democratic government replaced 16 years of violent civil war.

Therefore, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique was a success.

Today, Mozambique continues on the forward path of progress due to the commitment of the United Nations. For this reason, ONUMOZ is considered a prototype in the modern peacekeeping experiment. Why was ONUMOZ able to succeed where similar missions could not? What indicators exist to predict a successful intervention? The next section will employ the SWORD model to compare the peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Mozambique.

CHAPTER 5

MISSION COMPARISON

“Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, yet only a soldier can do it.”¹⁵⁵

The success of a peacekeeping intervention does not rest entirely in the hands of the soldiers themselves, but in the partnership between the soldier and the statesman and their ability to understand and evaluate the elements of a mission. In order to conduct a systematic evaluation, a model or paradigm of peacekeeping operations must be employed. For the purposes of this study, the SWORD model, or Manwaring Paradigm, has been chosen due to its great deal of success when applied to insurgencies.¹⁵⁶ After a close evaluation of the missions in Somalia and Mozambique using the SWORD model, key indicators of success can be identified.

SWORD Model Development

In 1984, General Maxwell Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army, was faced with an ongoing insurgency in El Salvador and subsequently the strategic ramifications of US involvement in such a situation.¹⁵⁷ Thurman sought help from the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania to investigate “correlates of success in

¹⁵⁵ John T. Fishel, “War By Other Means? The Paradigm and its Application to Peace Operations,” The Savage Wars of Peace, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 3.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 4.

counterinsurgency.”¹⁵⁸ This task was undertaken by analyst Max Manwaring, and after substantial data analysis, seven specific dimensions were identified and correlated individually as well as collectively with the success or failure of counterinsurgencies.¹⁵⁹ The study resulted in a high degree of confidence in explaining the outcome of most of the 69 insurgency cases examined, and the Manwaring Paradigm, or SWORD model, became the intellectual answer to General Thurman’s questions.¹⁶⁰

The model itself consists of seven dimensions derived from 72 individual variables. In the realm of peace operations, the dimensions are: Unity of Effort, Legitimacy, Support to Belligerents, Support Actions of Peace Forces, Military Actions of Peace Forces, Military Actions of Belligerents and Peace Forces, and Actions Targeted on Ending Conflict.¹⁶¹ Specifically, Unity of Effort encompasses the “clarity of mission mandate, the perception of coincidence of interests between the Peace Force and the belligerents, and the degree of political polarity between the belligerents.”¹⁶² Legitimacy involves the “degree of support of the peace operation” and the public perception of the legitimacy of the peace operation.¹⁶³ Support to Belligerents includes the amount of active support to their cause as well as the degree which they receive support, and Support Actions of Peace Forces refers to the perceived strength and length of commitment to the mission and the consistency of military support.¹⁶⁴ Military Actions of Peace

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Forces refers to the number of troops involved and the type of military activity whereas the Military Action of Belligerents and Peace Forces is concerned with the professionalism, aggressiveness, and risk aversion of both military units.¹⁶⁵ Finally, Actions Targeted in Ending Conflict primarily focuses on intelligence and civic operations used in the reconciliation process.¹⁶⁶

The SWORD Model in the Context of UN Intervention of Somalia and Mozambique

An evaluation of these dimensions will be employed regarding the UN interventions in Somalia and Mozambique in an attempt to identify the key components of a successful mission outcome.

Unity of Effort

The Unity of Effort dimension is specifically concerned with the mandate of the mission, the convergence of the mission mandate with the goals of the belligerents, and the political polarity of the belligerents. In the context of the UN intervention in Somalia, it is necessary to examine this dimension in the separate context of UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II because of the variance of mandate.

UNOSOM I had the mandate of maintaining a permanent cease-fire among belligerents, thus creating a safe environment for the administering of humanitarian aid. Though the warring belligerents Aideed and Mahdi approved this mission, the rival factions were interested in a cease-fire agreement for their own benefit. In other words, both Aideed and Mahdi wanted to win rather than

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 10.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

simply stop the fighting. The belligerents themselves were responsible for the corruption of the distribution of humanitarian relief to their own advantage, therefore threatening the UNOSOM commitment to providing humanitarian aid. The extreme political polarity of the two belligerents is evident in the war zone created in Mogadishu. Therefore, in terms of Unity of Effort, the UN involvement in Somalia was off to a bad start.

UNITAF's mandate of securing the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu, opening supply routes, and securing other towns as feeding centers in southern Somalia, using any means necessary, broadened that of UNOSOM I, but was less political in nature. Though it did not necessarily converge with the goals of the belligerents, it was not in opposition to them either, and through a massive military build-up UNITAF was able to accomplish this task. The political polarity of the belligerents remained high, however, signaling continued difficulty in intervention.

UNOSOM II's mandate of enforcing full compliance with the cease-fire and voluntary weapons surrender agreed to by Mahdi and Aideed as well as rebuilding the entire country and instituting a new government with popular support created significantly more ambitious objectives. Though the belligerents initially agreed to the cease-fire, neither was in favor of an entirely new government chosen by the people. The absence of Unity of Effort led to a shift in the belligerents, from Aideed and Mahdi to Aideed and the UN. The level of political polarity again was tremendous, not only between the belligerents but between the belligerents and peacekeepers as well. Thus, the UN involvement in

Somalia over the course of three separate mandates generally lacked Unity of Effort.

The UN intervention in Mozambique, ONUMOZ, was given the broad mandate of monitoring and enforcing the cease-fire agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO and facilitating the demobilization of belligerent forces, providing a stable environment for the transition of insurgent groups (RENAMO) to political parties and paving the way for a fair electoral process, facilitating the creation of fair electoral law, administering voter registration, and ensuring a fair outcome parliamentary and presidential elections, providing humanitarian assistance in the form of direct aid, refugee placement, and the clearing of land mines throughout the country. These goals were outlined in the General Peace Agreement signed before the initiation of the mission by the belligerents themselves. Therefore, the goals of the UN mission reflected the goals of the belligerents and thus a significant convergence of objectives was established. In addition, the GPA minimized the level of political polarity between the warring factions because they were able to establish common goals for the peace process. It can be concluded, therefore, that ONUMOZ possessed Unity of Effort as defined by the SWORD model.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy, closely related to Unity of Effort, “is a matter of perception.”¹⁶⁷ Essentially, “the community authorizing the operation needs to see its objectives both as worthwhile and capable of being accomplished while the belligerents and the people of the area of operation need to see the peacekeepers as an impartial

arbiter of their conflict.”¹⁶⁸ Thus, Legitimacy rests on the perception of the peacekeepers as capable and committed to a good cause and the perception of the belligerents that the peacekeepers are impartial.

In the case of Somalia, establishing Legitimacy was a problem from the beginning. Though the peacekeepers employed in UNOSOM I generally perceived themselves as engaged in a worthwhile mission due to the grave humanitarian environment, solving the country’s dire and expansive problems was simply not possible. Furthermore, though Aideed consented to the deployment of UN peacekeepers, he remained cynical of their impartiality realizing that he had more to lose than his rival Mahdi. UNITAF, on the other hand, was successful in the administering of widespread humanitarian aid and therefore a positive perception of the mission by the peacekeepers followed. Also, in the eyes of the belligerents, UNITAF generally was perceived as an impartial arbiter because of its humanitarian focus. The issue of Legitimacy in UNOSOM II proved to be the most problematic. In the face of Aideed’s opposition to the establishment of a new government, unless it was on his own terms, UNOSOM II could not remain impartial. Fighting between Aideed’s militia and UN peacekeepers challenged the legitimacy of UNOSOM II in the streets of Mogadishu as well as across Somalia, in New York, and on CNN. In Aideed’s eyes, UNOSOM II forces were not impartial and therefore his consent of UN involvement was withdrawn.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 158.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

Regarding ONUMOZ, Legitimacy was established from the beginning. The warring factions did not trust each other to implement the GPA and therefore turned to the United Nations, who they perceived to be impartial. Impartiality was retained throughout the demobilization process of both sides, despite the natural insecurity accompanying disarmament. In addition, ONUMOZ peacekeepers perceived themselves as not only capable, but vital to the peace process and the administration of humanitarian aid. Legitimacy was maintained throughout the duration of the intervention.

Support to Belligerents

The Support to Belligerents dimension generally refers to the degree to which the belligerents are isolated from their base of support and active outside support for their cause. The more support a belligerent has access to, the more difficult it becomes for UN forces to subdue the conflict.

In its intervention in Somalia, the United Nations was unable to isolate the belligerents from their base of support. Weapons in Mogadishu were readily available as were unemployed and hungry combatants. The city itself was divided into zones, or fortresses, controlled by the belligerents. By retaining geographic control of a region, both Aideed and Mahdi were able to create sanctuaries from which they could carry on the fight. When the UN attempted to interfere with these sanctuaries, violence erupted, forcing UN withdrawal. Thus, during the intervention in Somalia, the belligerents retained sufficient support that ultimately perpetuated the conflict.

In the case of Mozambique, RENAMO was cut off from sustained support from first the Rhodesian and then the South African minority controlled

governments due to internal problems in the respective countries. Without this support, RENAMO had little on which to fall back. The FRELIMO government was facing an abysmal economic situation and had exhausted all of its resources over the course of the 16-year civil war. Thus, the belligerents in Mozambique were out of options. At the advent of ONUMOZ, the warring factions were unable to garner any support whatsoever, making sustained conflict beyond their reach. Therefore, the Support to Belligerents during ONUMOZ was minimal.

Support Actions of Peace Forces

The Support Actions of Peace Forces dimension relies on the perception of the strength and duration of the commitment and the perceived consistency of the commitment with the posed threat. This dimension requires a perception of commitment to the mission in proportion to prospective threats.

During UNOSOM I, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognized that the strength and duration of the current mission was not adequate in comparison to its lofty goals and threat of violence. Consequently, the Secretary-General addressed the Security Council requesting the establishment of UNITAF, demonstrating a commitment to the mission. The increase in military support under UNITAF, from 500 Pakistani troops to a 28,000 strong multinational force, improved the perception of the peacekeepers as to the commitment of the UN to the mission. This perception changed, however, with the withdrawal of UNITAF forces, particularly and critically the United States, and the advent of violence between the peacekeepers and the belligerents. Essentially, the escalation of threat was countered by a troop withdrawal instead of build up,

signaling a lack of commitment on the part of the United Nations not only to the peacekeepers but to the world.

The Support Actions of Peace Forces during ONUMOZ remained steady. The initial deployment of several thousand troops created the perception of a commitment to the intervention by the United Nations in the eyes of the peacekeepers and the warring factions. The delay in the deployment of troops caused some concern and consequently delayed the initial phases of the GPA and the subsequent timetable. However, an extended mandate period correlating to the altered timetable reassured the belligerents of the United Nations' commitment to the mission. The fair amount of troop deployment also secured the perception that commitment of military forces was consistent with the threat posed by the warring factions.

Military Actions of Peace Forces

The Military Actions of Peace Forces dimension refers to the military strength of the operation and the tactics it employs. Ideally, a peacekeeping mission would maximize traditional military strength and minimize “unconventional” military acts such as intimidation, vandalism, and looting.

During UNOSOM I, the traditional military capabilities were low. UNITAF, however, greatly strengthened the military component of the mission, increasing the likelihood of success in the context of this dimension. UNITAF arrived quickly and gave the impression of a cohesive force, despite the multinational coordination involved. UNOSOM II, on the other hand, numbered half of UNITAF in the wake of increased fighting, decreasing the capabilities of the peacekeeping force. Deployment of UNOSOM II was slow and segmented,

giving the perception of a piecemeal operation, suggesting to the Somali people that their security might be jeopardized. In addition, Aideed drew the peacekeepers into non-traditional military operation as well, strengthening his position at the expense of the peacekeepers and their reputation with the Somali people.

The Military Actions of Peace Forces during ONUMOZ, though smaller than that of UNOSOM II, maintained a steady presence in an effort to establish the perception of safety in the Mozambicans under UN protection. ONUMOZ was able to act in a cohesive manner despite its multinational nature throughout Mozambique due to its clarity in mandate and the cooperation of the belligerents. In retaining a traditional military presence, ONUMOZ was able to maintain a positive perception in the eyes of the Mozambican people.

Military Actions of the Belligerents and the Peace Forces

The Military Actions of the Belligerents and the Peace Forces dimension examines the professionalism of both the peace forces and the belligerents. This dimension also includes the willingness of both parties to sustain casualties and the general aggressiveness of both forces.

During the UN involvement in Somalia, the coalition forces maintained a high degree of professionalism in the field. Aideed's forces, however, engaged in the regular harassment of coalition forces as well as civilians, thus the level of professionalism is considered to be low on the part of the belligerents.

Conversely, the willingness of the coalition forces to sustain casualties was considerably lower, particularly with regards to the United States who for the most part withdrew from the mission after a battle in Mogadishu that left 18 US

soldiers dead. It is estimated that in the same battle, however, between 300 and 500 Somali militia were killed, and over the course of the entire conflict, the Somali militia sustained numerous casualties as did civilians. Therefore, the belligerent forces were more willing to sustain casualties than were the coalition forces, undoubtedly because in their eyes they were defending their homeland from outside forces. This willingness to sustain casualties coupled with the lack of professionalism of Aideed's militia posed significant resistance to the achievement of the UN's goals.

During the intervention in Mozambique, ONUMOZ forces also maintained a high degree of professionalism in performing their duties. FRELIMO and RENAMO forces participated in the orderly disarmament of troops on both sides, displaying professionalism as well. Neither of the military actions of the peacekeepers or the belligerent militias suggested a willingness to sustain substantial casualties as well. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO troops previously had been engaged in fighting producing bloodshed, and their exhaustion in the field contributed to the initiation of a peace agreement. Therefore, in the case of Mozambique, the belligerents and the peace forces both maintained military professionalism and were casualty averse, thus aiding the peace process.

Actions Targeted on Ending the Conflict

The dimension of Actions Targeted on Ending the Conflict first focuses on intelligence, in the sense of "basic intelligence" of the host society and culture as well as "strategic intelligence" regarding the belligerents. In addition, actions relating to civic participation and development and the readiness of the host

country to resume sovereignty and implement a stable government are taken into account.

This dimension above any other contributed to the demise of the intervention in Somalia. Recognizing the state of utter chaos during UNITAF, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expanded the mission mandate of UNOSOM II. However, no attention was paid to understanding the clan structure of Somali culture nor was it presented to the peacekeepers themselves. A lack of “basic intelligence” by the peacekeepers existed during the intervention in Somalia meaning this same lack of intelligence carried over to the statesman designing the mission creating barriers to success. Furthermore, disregarding the inter-workings of the clan structure prevented the peacekeepers from penetrating the minds of the belligerents. Little attention was given to civic education and development quite frankly because the mission never reached the appropriate threshold to administer such a program. Therefore, when UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia, the country was unprepared for self-government.

The UN intervention in Mozambique, on the other hand, gave specific attention to civic education and development. Granted, the Mozambican society did not revolve around a complicated clan structure as in the Somali society, therefore the need of extensive “basic intelligence” training was not equivalent to that in Somalia. Consequently, ONUMOZ leaders could more readily identify with the FRELIMO and RENAMO leaders and therefore develop a better framework for “strategic intelligence” as well. ONUMOZ actively engaged in civic development such as voter registration and voter education as well as facilitate a

fair elections process. When ONUMOZ withdrew from Mozambique, the appropriate tools for self-government were left in the hands of the Mozambicans.

Conclusions

The SWORD model in the context of the UN interventions in Somalia and Mozambique is an effective tool for comparison. Once applied, the intervention in Somalia appears to be doomed from the beginning, while the intervention in Mozambique signals a likelihood of success. Though all dimensions seem to point in these general directions through the eyes of hindsight, several of these dimensions can be employed before an intervention takes place and therefore become of vital importance in the decision making process.

The dimensions of Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, and Actions Targeted on Ending the Conflict are critical indicators of mission success and can be employed before the initiation of an intervention. If a situation presents itself as necessitating UN intervention, then these three dimensions should be carefully considered with the ultimate decision of whether to intervene determinant on these key dimensions. For this purpose, these dimensions will be considered necessary criteria for intervention.

In this context, the issue of Legitimacy is captured in two key questions:

- 1) What are we fighting for?
- 2) Do they want us here?

If the peacekeepers or initially the international community see the mission as legitimate (worthwhile) and the belligerents see the peacekeepers as legitimate (necessary and impartial), then it is appropriate to proceed to the next criteria. If

not, then the small likelihood of success in such a situation should discourage involvement at this time.

The next criterion, Unity of Effort, is captured in the following question:
Are the belligerents ready for and committed to peace?

If the belligerents have demonstrated a strong commitment to peace, the UN intervention can be of great benefit. However, if the belligerents desire peace on their own terms, as in the case of Somalia, a UN intervention will likely lead to a UN sponsored action against a particular belligerent. Thus, a purely peacekeeping operation will be insufficient to the desired goal.

The third criterion, Actions Targeted on Ending the Conflict, is proposed by the following questions:

1) Does the international community have a good understanding of the host country's culture and therefore capable of structuring a stable government fitting of that culture?

2) Is an adequate support system in place for the implementation of self-government after an intervention? If not, is this part of a mission mandate?

If the international community does not actively engage in basic and strategic intelligence, then the appropriateness of the mission mandate cannot be determined. Without an accurate mission mandate, success is unlikely.

Furthermore, if an adequate support system is not in place for self-government, then such a support system must become part of the mission mandate if sustained success is to be achieved.

If these vital criteria are considered before the initiation of a mission, then the likelihood of a successful outcome is favored. The international community

did not take lightly the failure of the costly mission in Somalia, and some even questioned the practice altogether. In order to build the confidence of the international community in the practice of peacekeeping, an assurance must be made as to the nature of the UN's commitments. What can be learned from the experiences in Somalia and Mozambique is that the intentions of the mission may be good, but the right conditions surrounding the mission determine its success or failure.

CHAPTER 6

FUTURE POLICY OPTIONS


The 1990s proved to be a challenging decade for the United Nations and its peacekeeping endeavors. With the end of the Cold War, the modern era of peacekeeping began, and the international community proceeded with interventions in uncharted waters. Some were great successes and others were costly failures. In the case of Somalia, the United Nations first attempted a humanitarian intervention with the aim of relieving the abysmal humanitarian conditions as a consequence of years of fighting and a severe drought. This goal proved to be more than difficult because of the adversary relationship between the UN and the belligerents. In Mozambique, the United Nations also responded to a humanitarian crisis resulting from years of civil war, and through a cooperative relationship with the belligerents was able to administer the creation of a democratic government.

Important lessons can be learned from these two experiences as to critical indicators of mission success. First, a legitimate purpose for the mission must be evident in the eyes of the international community as well as the belligerents. Without active belligerent support, a mission will not succeed. Second, unity in the effort to achieve the mission goals between the United Nations and the belligerents must clearly exist. Cooperation between the peacekeepers and the belligerents is vital to the mission outcome. Third, there needs to be an adequate understanding of the host country's culture and needs as well as an infrastructure


for self-government. Without a self-sustaining element in place, the mission will be in vain.

These three key criteria should be implemented as decision making instruments as to the question of intervention if the international community is to learn from the experiences of the 1990s. If these three criteria are not met, then a reevaluation of the possibility of intervention is warranted prior to troop commitment. Steps should be taken to meet these vital criteria before intervention is initiated in order to decrease the likelihood of future mission failures that undermine the practice altogether. Peacekeeping can be as successful as it is noble if the international community is discerning in its deployment. Thus, if peacekeeping is going to lead to peace in the current political environment - and it can - then the international community must learn to be mindful of the critical indicators of success.

APPENDIX




Mogadishu




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ONUMOZ military deployment at time of elections, October 1994



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VITA

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