

REPRESENTING IRAQ: EXAMINATIONS OF POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY
DISCOURSE AND THE POLITICS OF ORDER

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by

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For my family: Ann, Paul, Tommy, and Ben.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
CHAPTER 1: RHETORICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF POST: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT.....	1
Historical Context.....	3
Justification of Study and Review of Literature.....	7
Review of Wartime Rhetorical Criticism	7
Burkean Theory.....	10
Neocolonial Theory.....	12
Justification of Texts.....	16
Preview of Chapters.....	19
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY OF ORDERING AND THE PENTAD.....	21
Realism and Foreign Policy.....	22
Neocolonialism and New World Order.....	23
Burkean Pentad.....	27
Myth and Culturetypes.....	29
CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION OF BURKE’S PENTAD TO POST-WAR DISCOURSE	33
Presidential Discourse: Securing Western Supremacy.....	34
Bremer’s Discourse: Persuading the Iraqi Citizenry.....	39
New York Times Discourse: Emergence of a Chaotic Scene.....	44
Conclusion.....	54

CHAPTER 4: IMPLICATIONS OF ORDER AND CONCLUSIONS.....	56
Part One: The Rhetorical Politics of Order.....	56
Imposing Order on a Chaotic Scene.....	57
The Process of Representation: Ordering of Iraqi Citizens.....	62
Burke and the Language of Common Sense.....	64
Implications of Order.....	65
Part Two: Conclusions.....	67
Rhetorical Implications of Bush's Discourse.....	67
Rhetorical Implications of Bremer's Discourse.....	78
Rhetorical Implications of the <i>New York Times</i> Discourse.....	69
Methodological Implications.....	70
Suggestions for Future Research.....	71
Conclusion.....	73
APPENDIX.....	75
REFERENCES.....	98

CHAPTER I

RHETORICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF POST OPERATION: IRAQI FREEDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT

Operation: Iraqi Freedom, a full-scale military intervention designed to depose Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party, began on March 20, 2003. By May 1, 2003, sustained combat was over, Saddam Hussein was missing, and the war was lauded by the George W. Bush administration as one of the swiftest tactical victories in history (Bush, 2003). In many ways, waging war was the easy part for the United States. Months of bitter international opposition and debate over the justifications for going to war, as well as the attempts to justify post-war Coalition reconstruction, proved to be the biggest challenges to date of the war on terror.

The post-war reconstruction efforts created a compelling political exigence for the United States. The administration faced a proliferation of criticism from three arenas: foreign actors, domestic audiences, and the citizens of Iraq itself. While the war was ostensibly waged in the name of the Iraqi people, post-war Iraqi public opinion greatly fluctuated in terms of support for Coalition action and presence. The administration came under intense criticism from the Iraqi people for its efforts and action in the region. This created a rhetorical window where, absent an official "rhetorical representative" in the region to act as a political spokesperson for the Iraqi people, voices of individual Iraqi citizens were able to filter through into the popular discursive space. As a result, western rhetors faced the

challenge of reframing the criticism they faced, so the war could still be portrayed as a success to domestic audiences.

In order to accomplish military and political goals in the region, the United States engaged in a process of discursively ordering Iraq and Iraqi citizens in the post-war arena, in order to create space for them in the new global arena. Examination of the way that the United States responded to the voices of anti-Coalition sentiment in the post-war arena is the broadest purpose of this thesis. The thesis examines the way in which the scene of Iraq, the purpose of the Coalition, and the Iraqi citizens were strategically framed by western rhetors after the war. To this end, the thesis examines the way in which the administration incorporated and framed the dissenting voices of the Iraqi people into the larger foreign policy message of the administration. The United States crafted a complex rhetorical message that linked Iraqi freedom to submission to the occupying forces. The thesis uses Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatism and the dramatistic pentad to map internal functions of post-war discourse, which is part of a larger project of neocolonial empire building. The pentad provides a mechanism to chart the specific manifestations of neocolonialism within the discourse. The synthesis of neocolonial theory and the pentad provides a comprehensive method for examining the discourse. Three major themes emerge in examination of post-war discourse: an impotent Iraqi public, an all-powerful United States force, and a chaotic, pre-modern Iraqi scene. Each theme contributes to the United States' ultimate goal of ordering the region. This chapter provides a framework and justification for the study, first exploring the historical context of Western intervention in the Middle East and Iraq and how the United States foreign policy towards Iraq precipitated regime change. Then, the chapter reviews rhetorical and critical studies of foreign policy, and argues that previous work provides a

unique justification for the project. Finally, the chapter examines the texts chosen for this study.

Historical Context

Operation: Iraqi Freedom was the culmination of several decades of intervention and strife in Iraq. Because of its strategic geographic location, as well as its abundance of natural resources, chiefly oil, the Middle East has historically been an area of political importance for the West. The Reagan administration formed a strategic alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. They provided Iraq with economic and military assistance, donated 1.5 billion dollars worth of American military technology (Frantz & Waas, 1992), and supplied intelligence information and international support (Pollack, 2002). The Iraqi offensive against the Kurds in the mid-1980s, during which chemical weapons were used against the Northern Iraqi populations, happened with Reagan's knowledge. Despite passage of a U.S. Senate bill that imposed sanctions against Iraq for using chemical weapons, Reagan ultimately convinced Congress to drop the matter (Pollack, 2002). The pro-Iraq stance extended through the end of the Reagan administration.

The first Bush administration initially adopted the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement, with hopes of turning Saddam Hussein into a "regional ally" (Pollack, 2002, p. 28). Relations quickly deteriorated, however, and the Bush administration radically altered American foreign policy towards Iraq. In 1991, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and America responded by deploying troops in Operation: Desert Storm (Chait, 2002). The United States acted in response to dual pressures: threats to its oil supply and the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia. If Iraq succeeded in conquering Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, then Hussein would be postured as the hegemonic presence in the region (Pollack, 2002).

After Operation: Desert Storm, United States' intervention in the region continued. The international community voiced fears of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. In response, the United Nations dispatched weapons inspectors to the country (Ryan, 1998). After Hussein's expulsion of United Nations weapons inspectors in December 1998 (Wolffe & Fidler, 1998), the already weak weapons inspection regime was condemned by the United States and Britain as a failure (Chait, 2002). Bill Clinton issued orders for sustained air strikes against prominent public buildings and governmental compounds (Wolffe and Fidler, 1998). The Clinton administration's policy of regional deterrence and containment toward Iraq continued until George W. Bush assumed power.

The second Bush administration was never shy about its hopes for "regime change" in Iraq. Six weeks after Bush assumed office, top administration officials, including Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, George Tenet, and Donald Rumsfeld, held meetings to determine the Bush administration's policy towards Iraq (Page, 2002). In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush labeled Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, members of the "axis of evil," publicizing the administration's goal to engage Iraq.

Advocates of regime change based their justification for intervention on three critical arguments: that the humanitarian atrocities committed under the leadership of Hussein justified intervention (Chait, 2002; Rushdie, 2002), that the development of weapons of mass destruction put Hussein in material breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (Chait, 2002; Fallows, 2002), and that containment and other alternatives to invasion had failed (Hitchens, 2002; Pollack, 2002). The first Bush and Clinton administrations made similar arguments to justify intervention. George W. Bush shifted the emphasis for war to include the well-being of the Iraqi people, a crucial distinction from previous interventions

(Ignatieff, 2003b). The second Bush administration's rationale for war symbolized a shift away from macro-political justifications for intervention, such as oil and national security, toward more humanitarian justifications that emphasized human rights (Ignatieff, 2003b).

The international community strongly opposed deposing Hussein; many European countries condemned unilateral action or invasion in the Middle East without a United Nations Security Council mandate (Hooper & Norton-Taylor, 2002). While the international community advocated renewed weapons inspections as an alternative to war, the United States quickly lost patience (Kelly, 2002). The threat of a preemptive, unilateral strike was always in the background. The Bush administration argued that Hussein was "actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons," but rejected European attempts to participate in the dialogue about the danger Saddam Hussein posed to the world (Blitz & Wolffe, 2002, p.1). Sennott (2002) cites Toby Dodge, a British specialist on Iraq, who argues that the Iraq debate was "about the whole understanding of multilateralism" in the international arena (p. A6). The Bush administration saw the situation similarly, but argued that "it is U.N., not U.S., credibility that's at stake" (DeYoung & Allen, 2002, p. A6).

On March 20, 2003, the Bush administration began the first strikes against the Iraqi regime. The United States led the "Coalition of the willing" into battle, with Britain, Australia, and Poland providing troops, and 37 other countries offering support (Stephens, 2003). On May 1, 2003, the Bush administration declared an end to heavy combat in the region, saying that Saddam Hussein was gone, and calling the offensive one of the biggest successes in military history (Bush, 2003).

In the following months, while the Bush administration and the Blair administration faced both internal and external accusations of fabricating evidence about the existence of

weapons of mass destruction, the humanitarian atrocities perpetrated under Hussein's leadership received increasing attention. "Tales of Saddam's Brutality" (2003), a collection of newspaper clippings detailing torture and human rights abuses, appeared on the White House website. Major newspapers ran stories about mass graves, torture, and interrogation techniques employed by the Iraqi army (e.g., Chapman, 2003; Constable, 2003; Worth, 2003b). This symbolized the administration's increasing reliance on empathic justifications for the war as the logical arguments appeared increasingly vulnerable.

The administration's decision to emphasize the Ba'ath party regime's human rights abuses placed the Iraqi people in the forefront of governmental rhetoric. The post-war political climate, which lacked a governing body, created the second exigence for direct representations of Iraqi people. After the war, the people of Iraq became real and potential agents of political action in Iraq. The new freedom meant a proliferation of viewpoints and ideologies, as well as different perspectives on American intervention. As a result, the United States government was forced to confront the Iraqi people, and their criticism, directly, without having Hussein as the interceding factor. L. Paul Bremer, the top United States civilian administrator in Iraq, directly confronted the voices of Iraq, speaking to them in a series of speeches and television appearances. Bush's May 1, 2003, speech portrayed the Iraqis as "welcoming" American troops, and "celebrating" their liberation. However, at times the United States media portrayed a different image. Iraqis criticized the looting and lack of water (Simon, 2003) and skyrocketing unemployment (Lyden, 2003), and demanded that the United States government relinquish political power in the region (Tyler, 2003c). As the Iraqi people became "real," so did their complaints. War rhetoric follows predictable patterns, which will be discussed below. Examining the discourse used to sustain and justify

occupation after the war, and the way that it incorporates and frames dissenting voices from the source of the occupation provides unique insight into function of post-war discourse. The remainder of this chapter seeks to provide justification for the examination of this discourse through a rhetorical lens.

Justification of Study and Review of Literature

The post-war climate in Iraq provides an opportunity to explore the intersection of two major areas of scholarship: the theory of wartime rhetoric and neocolonial theory. While much rhetorical literature examines how presidents construct and rhetorically address crisis and wartime situations, little work has considered post-wartime rhetoric. Additionally, few studies examine the function of neocolonialist practices within a rhetorical context. By using discourse created in the wake of Operation: Iraqi Freedom as a case study, this project adds to the rhetorician's understanding of modern foreign policy discourse through the lens of neocolonial theory. Burke's theory of dramatism provides a tool for mapping the internal function of political discourse, and a mechanism by which to tie political discourse to larger social projects. The following section examines existing rhetorical theory concerned with wartime rhetoric. The section then considers Nayar's theory of ordering as a rhetorical theory, particularly within the context of empire building. Finally, it examines Burke's theory of dramatism.

Review of Wartime Rhetorical Criticism

Rhetorical studies of foreign policy discourse primarily concern themselves with wartime rhetoric. From this, two branches of criticism have emerged: examinations of presidential wartime rhetoric, and rhetorical criticism that focuses on the ideological underpinnings of United States foreign policy rhetoric.

Stelzner (1966) argues that “the language of an address by the President of the United States in a time of crisis helps to create and sustain a climate” (p. 434), guiding and at times creating the public response to the war. Campbell and Jamieson (1990) note, “the need for the public and the Congress to legitimate presidential use of war powers for an end that has been justified” is the “central persuasive purpose” of presidential wartime rhetoric (p. 101). Rhetorical theory outlines mechanisms politicians use to create the political climate, such as creating a metanarrative of conflict between good and evil, wherein an adversary is created that must be thwarted at all costs (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990).

Windt (1987) is the first critic to advance a theory of international crisis rhetoric, arguing that crisis rhetoric is a generic category employed by all presidents. Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) further argue that events become crises not because of “situational exigencies, but by virtue of the discourse used to describe them” (p. 307). They argue that crisis rhetoric manifests itself in two genres: consummatory and justificatory crisis rhetoric. Consummatory rhetoric is used in place of military intervention; the president’s speech becomes the nation’s sole response to a crisis. It fulfills the speech act of “demanding.” Justificatory rhetoric is used to announce military intervention, and to provide the rationale behind the use of force, fulfilling the speech act of “announcing.” Dow (1990) argues that crisis rhetoric must be contextualized by the exigence to which it is responding.

Wander (1984) argues that foreign policy rhetoric engages in a process of otherization, wherein rhetors create a metanarrative of good and evil. An us/them dichotomy creates an epic drama between the United States and other nation-states which the United States uses to advance its political agenda. Additionally, Wander argues that foreign policy discourse personifies the nation-state. Rhetors ascribe the role of rational actors to countries who

assume human characteristics with requisite obligations. As a rational actor, the nation-state can make decisions or “act” based on these obligations (p. 353). The rhetorical structure of foreign policy speeches posits nations as “irreducible units in foreign affairs” (p. 353). Conflict arises when the language system of foreign policy attempts to reconcile with a rhetorical system that “centers on human beings as individuals” (p. 353).

Hikins (1983) and Butler (2002) examine rhetorical episodes wherein the people of a country, rather than the government, became the focus of foreign policy discourse. Hikins (1983) argues that the demonization of the Japanese people provided the unique justification the American public needed to support the use of force in World War II; because their hatred toward Japan was channeled toward the Japanese people, nearly 90% of Americans supported the use of the atomic bomb by the time it was employed. Butler (2002) argues that the rhetoric of imperialism creates a rhetorical situation wherein civilians, rather than the government, become the focus of foreign policy discourse. Clinton’s characterization of Somalians as “imperial savages” is part of the neocolonialist rhetorical tradition; because the United States was bestowing civilization on the “savages,” intervention was justified. Shome (1996) argues that the field of rhetorical criticism has been “disturbingly silent about its own disciplinary position in relation to issues of race and neocolonialism” (p. 49). The history of foreign policy criticism in rhetorical studies, then, shows a growing awareness of the need for criticism that moves away from a realist framework. Rather than analyzing foreign policy discourse through the descriptive lens of countries as rational actors, there is a need to examine the way in which the people of countries are portrayed as well.

While existing scholarship suggests that constant patterns emerge within foreign policy discourse, and that the presidential war rhetoric is a generic category, little research

has been done to suggest how wartime rhetoric functions in a post-war arena. Additionally, United States involvement in the Iraqi arena makes representations of Iraqi citizens a particularly salient issue. World War II and United States intervention in Somalia are both instances where the characterization of the citizens and their representative governments are the same; in each instance, the people of the countries are portrayed as extensions of their country. This is not true in the case of Iraq. Justification for the war itself was predicated on the notion of liberation of the Iraqi people, and the post-war reconstruction efforts were arguably conducted in the name of the Iraqi people. Additionally, without governmental officials to function as rhetorical filters, the Western press gave direct voice to the voices of Iraqi individuals in the wake of the war, signifying a significant departure from Somalia and Japan. As such, the way that the American government rhetorically represented the Iraqi people provides insight into a unique instance of foreign policy intervention. Examining the theories of dramatism and neocolonial scholarship provides a theoretical framework for viewing the way in which Western actors constitute the Middle East.

Burkean Theory

This thesis employs Burke's theory of dramatism as a tool to map the internal function of neocolonialist discourse. There is considerable rhetorical precedent for using Burke as a mechanism for analyzing political rhetoric. Dramatism is concerned with the symbolic function of language and the way that language is used to sustain political power (Meister & Japp, 1998). Additionally, Burkean methodology provides a way to conduct multitextual and multipentadic analysis on rhetorically complex situations (Rountree, 2001). Constructing a variety of dramatistic pentads from the available discourse allows the critic to represent various layers of rhetorical transactions, as well as various arguments employed in

a situation. Rountree argues that multipentadic analysis is superior to constructing a singular pentad because it “accounts for the rhetorical work involved in many rhetorical acts,” provides a tool for analyzing “complex rhetorical strategies,” and allows the analysis of a wide array of rhetorical texts (p. 22). Williamson (2002) also references the utility of Burkean theory for analyzing “diffused texts,” arguing that: “the [Jasper, TX] dragging trial is a diffuse rhetorical message, unhinged from the constraints of any single context, and composed of bits of information that ranged in complexity from simple visual metonymy to traditional speeches” (p. 249). Burke (1969b) argues that rhetoric is not just one particular speech, but a general body of identifications that are persuasive due to “trivial repetition” and “dull daily reinforcement” (p. 26). He thus provides justification for analysis of a wide body of texts in rhetorical criticism.

Rhetorical critics employ Burkean criticism to explore the internal function of hegemonic discourse, the reinforcement of political and hegemonic power, and to connect the specific use of political language to the larger social structure. Kraig’s (2002) pentadic analysis of the “rhetorical structure of realism” uses the pentad to map how realism is defended by politicians (p. 2). Kraig argues that in political discourse, the critical goal for individual agents is “the ability to master the scene - the world of power” (p. 4). By examining the way power is depicted in political discourse, Kraig demonstrates the ability of politicians to construct a political scene that silences alternative voices. Ingram (2002) uses Burke’s theory of representation to analyze the discourse employed by nation-states in the debate over globalization. Ingram uses Burke’s theory of identification and the representative anecdote to map the function of discourse inside hegemonic frames. He connects the strategic use of language to the way that the elite rhetorically constitute hegemony and power. Meister

and Japp's (1998) pentadic analysis of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development provides a framework for how the political goals of states transcend environmental protection, and how language reinforces political power in the international arena. Considerable rhetorical precedent therefore exists for using Burke to examine discourse that creates and sustains power over populations.

Neocolonial Theory

In 1979, Edward Said published *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*, which set forth a sweeping criticism of Western politics towards the "Orient," roughly defined as the Middle East, Far East, and South East Asia. Macfie (2000) defines Orientalism as:

a corporate institution, designed for dealing with the orient, a partial view of Islam, an instrument of Western imperialism, a style of thought, based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between orient and occident, and even an ideology, justifying and accounting for the subjugation of blacks, Palestinian Arabs, women and many other supposedly deprived groups and peoples (p. 2).

Macfie's definition suggests the breadth and the utility of Said's critique. Orientalist philosophy was not only used to justify British colonization in the 1600s-1800s, but also orders present conceptualizations of the Orient.

Intimately related to Said's critique of Orientalism is the Foucaudian notion of a discourse. Ball (1990) defines Foucaudian discourses by noting, "discourses are about what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what authority...the possibilities for meaning and for definition, are preempted through the social and institutional position held by those who use them. Meanings thus arise not from language but from

institutional practices, from power relations” (p. 2). Synthesizing the notion of Orientalism with that of a discourse, we find both the agent and the agency for colonization. The idea of Western imperialism as agent uses the notions of power and knowledge to create a distinction between the East and the West. This is accomplished by creating a discourse through which society orders its perception of individuals and the rhetoric they use. Power determines and defines a discourse, which perpetuates and recreates the meaning and text of the discourse in question.

Said’s work on Orientalism and Foucault’s theory of the relationship between discourse and power provide a framework for post- and neo-colonial criticism. Postcolonial criticism developed as a rejoinder to realism (Darby, 1997). The goal of postcolonial criticism is to empower peoples marginalized by empire building, and to explore the power relations that create the exigence for colonialism. This project interprets postcolonial criticism under Darby’s (1997) definition as criticism used to study the impact of the western imperial project. The notion of the postcolonial has an historical context embedded in it. Outside of specific citations or references, where the thesis remains faithful to the terminology choices of specific authors, this thesis uses the term neocolonialism to refer to modern forays into empire building, a term scholars use to refer to the strategic deployment of military force and diplomacy as a way to solidify global dominance (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003; Ignatieff, 2003a). Thus, this project is classified under the notion of neocolonial criticism because of its examination of current colonial practices.

Neocolonial scholars view rhetorical representations as a tool by which ordering occurs. In this way, the act of representation becomes prescriptive and a tool of action, rather than just descriptive of an external reality. In examining the rhetorical representations of Iraq

and Iraqi citizens, this thesis employs Said's (1998) definition of political representation. Said (1998) defines representations as "a discursive system involving political choices and political force, authority in one form or another" (p. 41). Discursive practices are what make representations fluid in a postcolonial system, and what allow people of another culture to be represented and re-represented. In this way, discourse allows for the consumption of representations, and provides a way to make the depictions persuasive to external audiences.

This thesis employs Nayar's (1999) theory of ordering as the primary methodology used to explore the neocolonial implications of post-war Iraq. Nayar views ordering as a "coercive command" manifest in a "rhetoric of order" that western actors employ in order to accomplish their foreign policy goals. Globalization and military intervention in foreign arenas both emerge as mechanisms of ordering within the global arena. Chapter Two further explores the notion of order within the context of this thesis.

Foreign policy theorists have increasingly turned their attention to America's role as a neocolonial power. In their analysis of American foreign policy in the immediate wake of Operation: Iraqi Freedom, Daalder and Lindsay (2003) observe the renewed emphasis on the notion of America as empire. In the six months proceeding Operation: Iraqi Freedom, the phrase "American Empire" occurred 1000 times in western news stories. The question no longer is whether America is an empire, but what kind of empire America will be (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). Sustained American intervention in the Middle East post-September 11th, and the notion of the American Empire, bring into focus serious questions about neocolonialist American politics. Ignatieff (2003a) synthesizes many of the ideas behind this thesis, making the connection between American imperialism, empire building, September 11th, and Iraq. He argues that both militarily and culturally, empire is the only word to

describe what America has become. September 11th put the past notion of empire building and power projection into perspective, emphasizing the hatred that American intervention has caused across the globe. Unilateral intervention in Iraq has become the symbol of America's self-defined new role. Ignatieff's analysis is a continuation of the Saidian tradition of examining western colonialist practices towards the Middle East.

The existing rhetorical and foreign policy scholarship provides a unique foundation for the scope of this thesis. Butler (2002) and Ignatieff (2003a) suggest the need for increased focus on the way that discourse sustains American empire building and neocolonialist practices. Existing rhetorical studies primarily focus on wartime rhetoric; however, the post-war political climate in Iraq suggests that the discourse used to justify sustained American intervention may speak most directly to the question of empire building. While the purpose of wartime rhetoric is geared towards persuading domestic audiences (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Stelzner, 1966), and there appears to be a specific prescriptive formula followed to create a crisis climate (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Dow, 1989; Windt, 1987), all of these arguments are predicated on two assumptions: the demonization of realist state actors, and rhetoric delivered immediately before or during war. Neocolonial theory suggests that the voices of the marginalized and oppressed exist at the periphery of international relations discourse. The success of the neocolonial project demands successful persuasion of both domestic audiences and the subjects of neocolonialism. If foreign policy discourse is characterized as nation-states talking to each other, the logical extent is that the people of a country are silenced, or at least assumed to be "spoken for" by their governmental officials. This thesis thus speaks to the gap in existing rhetorical literature by examining a situation

wherein administrative discourse is directed not only to the American people as domestic audience, but also toward the Iraqi people.

Post-war discourse does not occur as a monolith; rather, a multiplicity of voices contribute to the internal and external representations of post-war Iraq and the Iraqi people. Both pentadic analysis and Nayar's theory of order provide tools to explore the implications of the discourse surrounding post-war Iraq. This thesis analyzes three distinct threads of voices to discern how post-war Iraq was rhetorically constructed. The first thread is speeches given by George W. Bush from May 1, 2003, to August 31, 2003, which represents one aspect of official administrative discourse. Bush's speeches, primarily directed towards a domestic audience, depict a visionary thread of discourse. The second thread is discourse directed at the Iraqi people. L. Paul Bremer, III, the top civilian administrator in Iraq, delivered a series of speeches on national television in Iraq immediately following the war. Bremer's speeches constitute the administration's message as it manifests itself with the Iraqi people as audience. In contrast to Bush's visionary message, Bremer's speeches are primarily functional and informational. Finally, American newspapers and media provide a critical third piece to the mosaic of discourse. To represent this thread, the series "After the War," published in the *New York Times*, is analyzed. The following section analyzes each piece of this discourse in more detail.

Justification of Texts

This project examines three sources of western discourse in the post-Operation: Iraqi Freedom political arena, considering three sources: George W. Bush, L. Paul Bremer III, the top United States civilian administrator in Iraq, and the *New York Times* series "After the War." There are several justifications for the selection of rhetoric: President George W.

Bush gave only four speeches after the end of combat in Iraq (White House Website, 2003). These speeches are particularly salient texts because they represent officially sanctioned discourse from the administration. L. Paul Bremer III, after being appointed as the top United States civilian administrator in Iraq, became the spokesperson for the White House. The speeches he gave represent the way that the administration's message is communicated to the Iraqi people. The *New York Times* provides the third link, and provides insight into how a media news source interpreted the administration's message to a popular audience.

Bush's discourse provides dual insight into the post-war rhetorical situation. First, it represents officially sanctioned administrative discourse; the above discussion of rhetorical criticism surrounding war rhetoric speaks to the importance of presidential discourse in the rhetorical climate. Additionally, Bush's speeches reveal the strategic choices the administration made in persuading the domestic audience to support the post-war efforts, and the way the administration portrays Iraq and Iraqi citizens in order to obtain that support.

Bremer's speeches represent the second distinct thread of discourse. While still administrative rhetoric, the rhetorical goal of the speeches differs from Bush's in terms of purpose and audience. The stated purpose of his speeches was to provide the Iraqi people with information about the reconstruction efforts, and to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi citizens. Thus, the way in which the role of the Iraqi people is depicted, as well as the way in which the war is discussed, is a vital function of post-war discourse.

The third thread of discourse is the series "After the War" published in the *New York Times*. Articles depicting the scene of post-war Iraq from May 1, 2003, to August 31, 2003, were selected from the series as the textual backdrop. These articles were chosen for three reasons. First, the *New York Times* is considered the newspaper of record. It therefore has a

major effect on the way in which the intellectual community perceived the post-war Iraqi scene. While the *New York Times* attracts a different audience than television or regional newspapers, it plays a major role in setting the intellectual climate for the debate over the post-war political arena. Additionally, the “After the War” series focused specifically on the post-war Iraqi climate; thus, it provides an explicitly self-contained text, dedicated to representations, that provides a verbal representation of Iraq and Iraqi citizens. Additionally, while the television outlets relied on pictures to convey a sense of the post-war, the *New York Times* articles used verbal symbolism and representations, and these provide a good point of comparison to the language used by Bush and Bremer. Finally, analysis of the *New York Times* provides access to the way in which newspapers function as persuasive voices, and use their role in the mass media to create and sustain public opinion. While the newspaper articles do not function solely as dissenting voices, and there is considerable overlap between the administrative message and the *New York Times*’ message, this set of texts provides insight into how the administration’s message was popularized for the general public by a member of the media. Finally, while Bremer and Bush discuss the Iraqi people, the success of the war, and the role of the Coalition in Iraq, the *Times* rhetorically depicts the state of Iraq itself, which gives access to a set of rhetorical representations that are not otherwise available: it provides the scenic element for criticism.

The texts analyzed represent three separate pieces of the overall post-war discursive climate: the administrative message aimed at a domestic audience, the administrative message aimed at the people of Iraq, and how one voice in the larger media climate depicted the scene of post-war Iraq.

Preview of Chapters

The thesis is broken into four chapters. Chapter Two constructs the methodology employed in this project. First, it examines the notion of realist foreign policy, and neocolonialist theory as a rejoinder to foreign policy. Jayan Nayar's (1999) theory of ordering is introduced as the primary methodology used to chart the external rhetorical manifestations of empire building. Burke's theory of dramatism provides a way of mapping the drama that emerges in the larger political context, particularly to examine the relationship between scene/act/agent ratios. Burkean dramatism provides a mechanism with which to internally map the function of discourse.

Chapter Three conducts close textual pentadic analysis on the three threads of discourse. The purpose of this chapter is to chart the specific manifestations of order emerging in the post-war climate. A few significant themes emerge. First, culturetypes and myths permeate the discourse, though they manifest themselves in different forms. Additionally, the supremacy and strength of Coalition forces appears consistently throughout the discourse. The discourse portrays the Coalition and its mission as legitimate and benevolent. The Coalition functions as the mirror image of the Iraqi people, who are portrayed as weak, and tied to the scene. Each rhetor thus constructs a specific pentadic vision that reinforces the legitimacy of Coalition presence in the region.

Burke's pentad provides the foundation for charting the specific representations of Iraq employed in western post-war discourse, as well as a way to clarify the motives of the administration and the *New York Times*. The pentadic representations discussed in Chapter Three reveal specific manifestations of the foreign policy goals and visions of the United States. Chapter Four employs Nayar's (1999) theory of ordering as a mechanism to explore

the implications of the pentadic analysis, and discusses the way in which ordering is rhetorically manifest in the post-war discourse. To this end, Chapter Four is broken into two parts. Part one revisits the notion of ordering, and examines the way in which ordering rhetorically functions within the context of American intervention in Iraq. The second part examines the broader rhetorical implications of this thesis, and offers conclusions and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY OF ORDERING AND THE PENTAD

Western foreign policy discourse is deeply embedded in realist notions of foreign policy. Examination of neocolonial discourse requires an understanding of the rhetorical construction of realism, and its strategically deployment in western foreign policy. This thesis examines the way in which the colonized are represented in the discourse of neocolonial power. This criticism is situated at the intersection of postcolonial theory and rhetorical criticisms of political rhetoric, particularly examinations of wartime discourse. This analysis branches off, however, in two regards. First, it examines as a practical matter discourse that emerges in the midst of empire building. Additionally, while post- and neo-colonial examinations are concerned with the effects of war, few rhetorical critics have examined the function of discourse in a post-war climate. This chapter lays out the methodology used for the examination of discourse, first examining neocolonialist theory, using Nayar's (1999) conception of "ordering" as a guiding principle. Nayar argues that the function of imperialism is to "order" the world to fit into the new world order. Ordering the world requires that voices that conflict with or challenge the dominant paradigm be removed from the realm of accepted discourse, often through reinscribing those voices from the center of discourse to the periphery. This chapter interprets Nayar's theory of "ordering" under Burke's (1954) notion of "orientation," and

the way in which the “language of common sense” contributes to the “ordering” of orientations. Second, it examines Burke’s (1969a) theory of the dramatisic pentad as the method by which to map the internal function of the discourse, and how the Iraqi scene and the Iraqi people are depicted, and thus ordered. Chapters Three and Four apply the methodology to the discourse.

Realism and Foreign Policy

Realism emerged as a dominant factor in American foreign policy in the post-World War I era (Falk, 1999). Foreign policy scholars interpret realism as a doctrine primarily concerned with notions of security and power, and the idea that states inherently act in their own self-interest (Falk, 1999). The notion of realism is inherently reductionist, narrowing the scope of rational discourse to include only the voices of the elite in power. Kraig (2002) argues that realism in foreign policy can also be interpreted as a rhetoric; he conceptualizes the realist framework as a terminological schema with “power” at the apex. The acquisition, maintenance, projection, and protection of power becomes the driving motivation behind foreign policy decisions and interventions.

As such, realism functions as the terministic screen through which United States foreign policy is enacted and conceptualized. Beer and Hairman (1996) conceptualize realism as a conscious project that privileges (selects) the voices of the nation-state and of foreign policy elites, while deflecting or selecting out dissenting voices, thus marginalizing the voices of “the other.” Burke’s (1966) notion that language selects, deflects, and reflects reality is a useful way to understand the way in which realism treats competing voices in the geopolitical arena. Through realism, power becomes a terministic screen that functions as a foreign policy schema through which ideas are filtered, and the voices of those in power are

selected and privileged. Postcolonial criticism developed as a rejoinder to realism. While the primary locus of postcolonial criticism has focused on giving voice to the individuals located at the margins of foreign policy (Darby, 1997), the necessary antecedent to this type of criticism is an examination of the rhetorical mechanisms by which the voices become marginalized. This thesis examines the representations of the colonized in the discourse of post-war Iraq.

Neocolonialism and New World Order

Edward Said's *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (1979) functioned as a catalyst for the advent of post- and neo-colonialist theory. While modern neocolonialist scholars focus on the impact of empire building and neocolonialist foreign policy on culture, neocolonialism also has a profound impact on foreign policy itself, and on the way in which the world is "ordered" (Nayar, 1999). Western discourse rhetorically constructs and reproduces the role of individuals in the process of empire building. This thesis examines the way in which United States intervention in Iraq, and its post-war rhetorical representations of Iraqi civilians, rhetorically construct the role of Iraqi civilians in the post-war arena. This rhetoric becomes part of the larger notion of empire. Examining the United States government's latest venture into empire building requires an understanding of the way that the subjects of empire, in this case the Iraqi people, are depicted in post-war discourse.

Foreign policy critical theorists are fairly consistent in their attribution of the motives of American neocolonialism. While power is the ultimate goal of realist foreign policy-making (Kraig, 2002; Beer & Hairman, 1996), operating in the neocolonialist global arena requires western policy makers to mask the true motives of empire building (Spanos, 2000). By masking empire building with a humanitarian guise, the United States paints a worldview

that posits intervention as a “civilizing” mission (Butler, 2000). Western public opinion has shifted to reject overt declarations of imperial motives. As a result, policy makers have been forced to mask their motives for war and expansionism as humanitarian and civilizing missions. Spanos (2000) argues that the motive of American intervention is still increased power; however, neoimperialist military action now cloaks the motives in a humanitarian guise. Additionally, the goal is no longer colonizing nations in the territorial sense, but instead winning the hearts and minds of citizens – in short, global ordering.

While examining the function of realism lends itself to a macrocosmic, ends-oriented conceptualization of foreign policy, the process of empire building also requires microcosmic justifications. Nayar (1999) argues that the shift from foreign policy manifest in dehumanizing projects to foreign policy that brings humanity to the masses has required an “ordering” of the world. Like Said (1979, 1998), Nayar views the process of ordering as a continuous project that can be traced from the colonial era to the current foreign policy environment. The process of ordering occurs on both the macro- and micro-cosmic levels and aims to order nation-states, individuals, and discourse. Nayar writes: “‘Freed’ from the brutalities of the order of historical colonialism, the ‘ordered’ now are subjected to the colonizing force of the ‘post-colonial,’ and increasingly, globalization-inspired ideologies of development and security. Visible, still, is the legitimization of ‘order’ as coercive command through the rhetoric of ‘order’ as evolutionary structure” (p. 608). Through his idea of a “rhetoric of ‘order,’” Nayar provides a tool with which to diagnose the underlying process by which empire building occurs.

A process of naturalization is also inherent within ordering and representation: through legitimizing the notion of “order,” and rationalizing order as part of a larger

“evolutionary structure,” foreign policy discourse continually creates the “language of common sense” for the masses (Burke, 1954, p. 110). Burke (1954) views the language of common sense as a “hegemonic creation” of those in power (p. 110). Creating and sustaining the language of common sense thus becomes a process of ordering of discourse. Because of its appeals to objectivity and to history, the language of common sense fosters consent to domination (Ingram, 2002).

Charting the way in which the United States and western voices construct and describe the role and nature of the Iraqi people after the war becomes a way to measure and examine western attempts to order the post-war Iraqi scene. Campbell (1998) argues that political criticism by academics ruptures the voices of the elite. Criticism makes space for alternative interpretations of foreign policy, and functions as a counter-narrative to the way in which the United States government conceptualizes its role in politics. Additionally, Campbell argues that political criticism must be methodological in scope: it must move beyond description and interpretation to address the way that political discourse functions.

Campbell argues that the goal of political criticism is to chart representations. Rhetorical representations do not merely reflect and describe reality, but are inherently reductionist. Rhetorical representations become prescriptive, and a tool of action used by the elite to further the process of ordering. Said (1998) defines representations as “a discursive system involving political choices and political force, authority in one form or another” (p. 41). In a postcolonial system, discursive practices sanctioned by the elite allow for the consumption of cultural representations, and a means to make the depictions persuasive to external audiences. Representations are “produced by and for a dominant imperial culture” (Said, 1998, p. 41), which means that the function of a rhetorical representation is to further

the goal of imperialism. Rhetorical representations convey a verbal depiction of the subject that inevitably results in two outcomes. The act of representing a subject is reductionist, thus doing violence to the subject while providing a way to gloss over the violence.

Representations create a dichotomy between the act of representing, and the representation itself. The texts used in this analysis provide specific examples of representations of Iraqi people in social and political rhetoric.

Ordering thus seems to occur within the same discursive project as Said's notion of representation; the necessary "violence" and "reduction" occur as part of a larger discursive project of ordering that defines the place of the people that are being represented. Said argues that representations exclude specific characteristics, and thus become a diluted vision of their subjects. Additionally, representations exist for the consumption of foreign audiences; thus, the "actual" character of the individuals is marred. The deployment of representations carves out a rhetorical space for the represented. In this way, the people themselves, as well as their place in the global scene, are ordered.

Neocolonial theory is concerned with the way that Western foreign policy engages in empire building, and how realism is enacted discursively and functionally throughout the world. While imperialist projects are conducted under the notion of a civilizing mission, in reality we see what Nayar refers to as a violent ordering, one in which individuals, cultures, and nation-states are rearranged to fit into the dominant paradigm of the elites.

Understanding the function of ordering requires an examination of the realist discourse used to "order" voices, reinscribing those who are the victims of empire building to the periphery to leave room for the dominant discourse. The process of ordering voices can thus be viewed

as maintenance of orientation, and the way that the global language of common sense is constructed.

Burkean Pentad

The idea of “ordering” fits neatly into the idea of dramatism. Burke’s pentad becomes a useful tool for examining the way in which ordering occurs. Like Burke, Nayar views the process of ordering as a drama; Nayar argues that the “the construction of the ‘stage’ of the world has also occurred, albeit amid the performance of a violence drama upon it” (p. 606). Perhaps Nayar’s drama metaphor departs most significantly from Burke in his conceptualization of dramatism. Burke arguably views dramatism as ontological, and inherent to humanity’s view of the world. Nayar instead views dramatism as an epistemological construction, created by the notion of globalization. Burke (1969a) argues that language allows us to strategically construct the world in such a way that our motives and predispositions are revealed. He opens *A Grammar of Motives* (1969a) with the question: “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?” (p. xv). This approaches the central idea of representation, and the way in which it functions when people are represented through attribution of motive. The pentad helps to clarify the motivation embedded within discourse.

Burke (1969a) argues that “any complete statement about motives will offer *some kind of* answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he [sic] did it (agency), and why (purpose)” (p. xv). How these five terms are ascribed reveals the motivation of the rhetor. Multipentadic analysis provides a mechanism for examining the way multiple rhetors view a given rhetorical situation. Rountree (2001) argues that multipentadic analysis provides a way to examine

complex rhetorical situations. Burke argues that the purpose of pentadic analysis is not to destroy ambiguity, but to highlight places where ambiguity exists: “the scene-act ratio can be applied in two ways. It can be applied deterministically in statements that a certain policy *had* to be adopted in a certain situation, or it may be applied...to the effect that a certain policy *should be* adopted in conformity with the situation” (1969a, p. 13). Burke’s theory of the pentad becomes a way to map the function of rhetoric inside the larger neocolonialist project of ordering, thus uncovering specific strategies of ordering employed by western rhetors.

In *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke (1969a) is most concerned with the relationship between act, scene, and agent. The act, the scene, and the agent must correspond in any rounded depiction of motives: “the scene-act ratio either calls for acts in keeping with scenes or scenes in keeping with acts – and similarly with the scene-agent ratio” (p. 9). Burke (1969a) conceptualizes the scene as the container for the drama, the place where the action occurs. As such, the agent and the act correspond with the attribution of the scene; the scene implicitly contains qualities that explicitly reveal themselves through the agents and the action. Ratios determine which of the guiding principles gains preeminence in an attribution of motives. In a scene-act ratio, qualities of the scene become the driving motivation behind the act. Conversely, in an act-agent ratio, the act becomes the motivating principle, defining the reason the agent performed the act, and thus changing the agent role itself. The way in which western rhetorical spokespersons depict Iraq-as-scene thus has a substantive impact on perceptions of Iraqi citizens.

The scene not only describes the immediate physical surroundings of the event, but also contextualizes the message. Tuathail (1996) argues that “there is no pure original context

or scene of communication. Context is not a structure of presence but a structure of general textuality” (p. 12-13). When conceptualizing the scene, one must not only be aware of the immediate surroundings of the message, but also that depictions of the scene structure the message itself. Tuathail (1998) thus provides substance to Burke’s argument that the scene shapes the act and the agent. Like Tuathail, Burke rejects notions of a static terminology: not only is the scene selectively portrayed in accordance with the motives of the rhetor, the pentad can be used to identify places where ambiguity arises, and as a way in which to study and clarify the “resources of ambiguity” (p. xix). He argues that transformation takes place in areas of ambiguity. A multilayered scene emerges when one views post-war rhetoric against the backdrop of realist foreign policy. War and culture dominate the post-war scene: the next section explores myth and culturetypes as tools that create the scene.

Myth and Culturetypes

Within the scene, myth functions to absolve the tension between the dialectical opposition between imperialism and freedom, the order imposed by the United States government, and the post-war chaos that ensued. In political rhetoric, myth and metaphor provide a framework for understanding the function and scope of international relations (Chilton, 1996). Because they have a direct impact the way that politicians communicate, myths and metaphors thus substantively affect foreign policy decisions. Osborn (1990) identifies culturetypes as a specific subset of myth, which he defines as shorthand symbols that remind individuals of what it means to be American. Unlike myths, which have universal significance, culturetypes are bound to a specific arena or culture. Osborn argues that culturetypes are pre-packaged, readymade cultural symbols; they access a specific set of experiences in the mind of the audience. Just as Americans identify with symbols such as

“American,” “The New Frontier,” and “apple pie,” this project argues that the same linguistic shorthand exists to refer to other cultures. References to Biblical myths permeate western discourse about Iraq. This becomes a shorthand that allows the rhetor to access a specific story and set of assumptions. Osborn (1990) argues that successful myth must include culturetypes, archetypes, and the narratives that sustain them. While Osborn’s analysis is specific to American cultural symbols, this thesis argues that culturetypes and archetypes emerge in discussion of the scene in post-war Iraq. Understanding the function of the discourse means that we have to understand the overarching humanistic symbols, and the culture-specific shorthand symbols. In the rhetoric of post-war Iraq, symbols such as the Garden of Adam and Eve emerge as a specific cultural shorthand that provides the American public a form of identification with the region. The culturetypes are particularly salient in the *New York Times* discourse, which is analyzed in Chapter Three. Holistic myths, such as references to Ancient Babylon and Adam and Eve, function as culturetypes that symbolize the way in which Americans perceive the Middle East.

Myths draw on the language of common sense and a shared cultural consciousness to create a sense of consubstantiality. Moore (1991) argues that myths take individuals out of history to solve the problems posed by history. In doing so, the myth also manipulates space. Myths are part of the process of imposing order on the global geopolitical scene; by using myths to communicate through the language of common sense, a political rhetor can impose order on his or her surroundings in the mind of the audience. Additionally, myths and metaphors function to resolve the dialectical tension between paradoxes; Rushing’s (1983) argument that the Old West represented the meeting point between savagery and civilization sheds light on the function of the scene in post-war Iraq discourse. As discussed in the next

chapter, the post-Iraq scene is the meeting place between neo-imperialism, which promises order and civilization, and post-war wreckage. Resolving this conflict constitutes a rhetorical statement which “both reflects the current societal conditions and projects prescribed change for the future” (Rushing, 1983, p. 17). Rushing’s conceptualization of the function of myth acknowledges the role of myth as not only descriptive, but also evaluative and prescriptive; it not only speaks to the present, but also to the future. The use of political myth and metaphor as the driving force behind political discourse becomes a verbal shorthand that resolves the tension between the contradictory forces, and becomes a tool for inscribing the voices of the Iraqi people to the periphery of the scene.

The rhetoric explored in this thesis employs myths and culturetypes as a mechanism for creating representations of Iraq and Iraqi citizens. Said (1979) substantiates this idea when he argues that the West created pacifying, essentializing myths about the East that allowed the Orient to be subdued and colonized. Rather than viewing the East as a diverse region with diverse cultures, languages, and traditions, western rhetoric conflated the region into a monolith whose reality was produced by the discourse of the time. As such, the East became a rhetorical construction that could be acted upon. Abdul-Malik (2002) argues that the Orient and its people were considered by politicians and academics to be “an ‘object’ of study, stamped with an otherness...passive, non-participating, endowed with a ‘historical’ subjectivity, above all, non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign with regard to itself...both groups adopt an essentialist conception of the countries, nations, and peoples of the Orient under study” (p. 50).

In the neocolonial era, the scene has become the dominant term. Rather than portraying the people of Iraq as a monolithic, docile, “other,” a notion that popular culture

has critiqued and rejected, the West needed a new method by which “ordering” could occur. The people of Iraq are no longer tainted, but arise from a tainted scene, which thus renders them incapable of self-governance. Additionally, the myth continues to play into deep-seated western notions of Middle Eastern inferiority, which are merely transferred into the scene as part of the process of “ordering,” and “civilizing.” Nayar (1999) argues that security of the nation-state has become a primary “motive for ordering” and has facilitated the shift from coexistence of states to globalization and the spread of democracy (p. 612). Security and insecurity necessarily function within the scene. Thus, ordering takes place under the guise of security. Dalby (1998) argues that there are significant security implications to the portrayal of a wild or chaotic scene. The first is that the scene itself demands ordering, and thus becomes a unique impetus for action by the United States. The use of environmental metaphors and imagery that reference the environment are particularly salient in this context because the environment is inherently rooted in the chaotic, or what has not yet been civilized. As such, portrayal of the scene in this sense becomes part of the dialectical opposition present in the scene.

Within the complex scene of Iraq, wherein insecurity and security wrestle with ancient myth and culturetype to gain preeminence, the agents arise. The scene provides the context for the ordering, and serves as the rhetorical backdrop against which the ordering occurs. Application of Burke’s pentad reveals a clear map of the internal function of the rhetoric of order. If Nayar’s theory of ordering is considered in regard to the complex scene, then the use of myths and environmental metaphors become tools with which to order the Iraqi people, and to reinscribe them to the periphery of foreign policy discourse.

CHAPTER III

APPLICATION OF BURKE'S PENTAD TO POST-WAR DISCOURSE

This chapter conducts close textual pentadic analysis of the discourse emerging in the post-Iraqi war arena. The texts analyzed represent three separate aspects of the overall post-war discursive climate: the administrative message aimed at a domestic audience, the administrative message aimed at the people of Iraq, and one piece of the western media voice in the post-war climate. First, I examine the speeches given from May 1, 2003, to August 31, 2003, by President George W. Bush. Then, I explore the pentad emerging from the televised interviews given by L. Paul Bremer III on Iraqi Public Television. Finally, I conduct pentadic analysis on the *New York Times* articles from the series "After the War" from the same time period.

This rhetoric represents significant themes that occur in the post-war climate. President George W. Bush only gave four speeches after the end of combat in Iraq (White House Website, 2003); these speeches are particularly salient examples of rhetoric because they represent officially sanctioned discourse from the administration. An important aspect of Bush's discourse is its relative rarity in the months after the war. Bush's rhetoric after the war was relatively rare; he only gave two full-length speeches, and more minor public communications.

Bremer's speeches represent the second distinct thread of discourse. Each speech televised on Iraqi public television from May 1, 2003 to August 31, 2003, is analyzed. Bremer's depictions of the role of the Iraqi people and discussion the war and the reconstruction efforts constitute a vital aspect of post-war discourse. The third thread of discourse is the series "After the War" published in the *New York Times*. Articles depicting post-war Iraq from May 1, 2003, to August 31, 2003 were selected from the series as the textual backdrop.

This chapter charts the specific manifestations of order that emerge in the post-war climate. First, culturetypes and myths permeate the discourse, though they manifest themselves in different forms. While culturetypes are used in *New York Times* discourse to illuminate the scene, myths emerge in Bush and Bremer's discourse to underscore the purpose of the American mission. Additionally, the supremacy and strength of Coalition forces appears consistently throughout the discourse. Each piece of discourse emphasizes the legitimacy and benevolence of the Coalition and its mission. The way each rhetor communicates the post-war situation constructs a specific pentadic vision of the post-war climate. The following analysis examines each pentad emerging from the discourse. Chapter Four explores the notion of order and the implications of the post-war discourse.

Presidential Discourse: Securing Western Supremacy

Bush's discourse is aimed at protecting and emphasizing the supremacy of American troops and imposing order in Iraq. An act/agent ratio emerges: the act is securing and reconstructing Iraq, and the agent is the United States military. The scene reflects a lack of order, replete with the remnants of Hussein's rule: former Ba'athist party members, terrorists, and "enemies of freedom." The agency is providing aid to the Iraqi people, and the purpose is freedom and security for the region. Bush's speeches have three primary audiences: the

American public, the American military, and Western policy makers. As such, the purpose of the discourse is to reify and reassert the supremacy and legitimacy of American and Coalition presence in the region. The following section examines Bush's discourse particularly in terms of the act/agent ratio that emerges from the discourse.

Coalition Forces: Agents of Order

In Bush's speeches, the Americans are given primary agent-status, occasionally along with the rest of the Coalition. On May 1, 2003, Bush announced the end of major combat in Iraq, giving sole credit to "the members of the United States military, who achieved" military victory. The United States troops are always active, and in the process of "securing and reconstructing that country" (May 1). Coalition troops conduct each aspect of the act-portion of the pentad. Bush makes reference to the troops "engaging remnants of the former regime, as well as members of terrorist groups" (Bush, July 1). It becomes clear that the military is in sole command in the region. The act/agent ratio emerges throughout all aspects of the discourse, and is interwoven through all of the arguments Bush makes. The act defines and clarifies the agent in Bush's discourse, and justifies the presence of Coalition troops in the region.

Agency: Achieving Supremacy through Aiding the Victims

While the United States is clearly the agent in this drama, the agency of the drama is the notion of "helping the Iraqi people" to achieve security, establish a new government, and to reconstruct the region. The acts in the drama are achieved through the tool of lending aid to the Iraqi people. A type of paradox emerges: while the United States military is the agent, the agency is that of the United States aiding the Iraqis, which provides a kinder view of the occupation and of security. When announcing the end of major combat, Bush (May 1) says:

“we thank all the citizens of Iraq who welcomed our troops and joined in the liberation of their own country.” Here, the Iraqis are joining in rather than playing a predominant role in the proceedings. In terms of government, Bush says: “we’ll stay to help the Iraqis form a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people, and then we’re coming home” (May 5). Thus, the act of reconstruction, in this instance manifested through the creation of a government, is achieved through the agency of the Coalition lending aid to the Iraqis. On July 1, he repeats the sentiment: “we will help that country to found a just and representative government, as promised.”

While Bush (May 5) argues that “Iraqis are plenty capable of running their own government” a distinction emerges between running and creating a government. Running the government occurs after the United States has ordered the scene. The notion of a sovereign Iraqi government emerges repeatedly in Bush’s discourse, generally in the context of a “hopeful future” for Iraq (July 1). Before a government can be created, however, the Coalition must order the scene, thus ensuring that “the environment is such that a democratic government emerges” (Bush, May 5). Bush counsels the audience to be patient, and reminds them that “the transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort” (Bush, May 1). Additionally, the United States is “helping Iraqis to establish a representative government,” rather than imposing a government upon the Iraqi people (Bush, July 1). Bush repeatedly emphasizes that the end to the process of reconstruction will be a “free Iraq” (May 1) where Iraqi citizens “will be secure” (July 1). Finally, Bush emphasizes that “a free society is one in which will mean more likely a peaceful partner in a troubled neighborhood [sic]” (May 5). Here, the metaphor of a troubled neighborhood makes reference to the larger scene of the Middle East and the future strategic importance Iraq plays

for the United States in that area. Additionally, the metaphor localizes the conflict. Through intervention in the region, the United States has joined the Iraqi neighborhood. Future action in the area, then, is justified because the United States is merely helping out neighbors.

Post-War Scene

Bush's discourse emphasizes the threat posed by "remnants of the former regime" and "members of terrorist groups" much more strongly than either Bremer's discourse or coverage by the *New York Times* (July 1). The scene is still a battleground. The greatest "challenge" to the act of securing Iraq emerges from "former Ba'ath Party and security officials who will stop at nothing to regain their power and their privilege" (July 1). The Bush discourse thus frames all anti-American action as "vicious acts of terrorism" (August 29). Additionally, all perpetrators of anti-American action are depicted as members of the "old regime" and enemies of the Iraqi people (May 1). In this way, Bush underscores the severity of each anti-United States action, without referencing specific instances. This helps to create the notion of an epic battle, while underscoring the military might and mission of the United States.

Bush's (July 1) depiction of anti-Coalition forces encompasses remnants of the former regime, as well as "members of terrorist" organizations that are "enemies of freedom" inside of Iraq. He rhetorically de-emphasizes the looting, arguing that it "remains a challenge in some areas." He argues, however, "A greater challenge comes from former Ba'ath Party and security officials who will stop at nothing to regain their power and their privilege" (July 1). Interestingly, the looting, chaos, and terrorist acts each become attacks against freedom, and the three groups are described as a monolith: "those who threaten the order and stability of that country will face ruin, just as surely as the regime they once served" (July 1).

Terrorists, former regime members, and looters become conflated, and Bush's depiction becomes a chance for the United States to reassert its authority.

Purpose: The Mythic Battle between Good and Evil

The discussion of anti-American sentiment gives rise to the mythic notions of "security," "evil," and "freedom," which Wander (1984) refers to as God terms in American foreign policy. The mythic battle between good and evil, freedom and oppression, becomes a justification for American presence: "we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world" (May 1). The purpose thus becomes embedded within the scene. As in the *New York Times* discourse, Bush's speeches embed looting and "chaos" within the scene; however, he elevates the problems to mythic terms. Bush notes: "It comes as no surprise that freedom has enemies inside of Iraq" (July 1). Additionally, this statement asserts American dominance in the region. The "looting and random violence...[remain] a challenge in some areas," and is perpetrated by enemies of freedom who desire a "return to tyranny" (July 1). This creates the epic battle between good and evil, embodied in the "ageless appeal of human freedom" (May 1). The scene, however, is being acted on by American troops who are "bringing order to parts of [Iraq] that remain dangerous" (May 1), which provides a practical emphasis of the act-agent privilege.

Representations of Iraqi Citizens

Iraqis emerge primarily as abstract representations within Bush's discourse. Bush (May 1) says, "When Iraqi civilians looked into the faces of our service men and women, they saw strength and kindness and goodwill." Here, the Iraqi citizens are mentioned, but only as a mirror for the image of Americans. Additionally, Bush (May 1) makes reference to the "images of celebrating Iraqis," which provides evidence that the operation was justified

and that “decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors.” Additionally, Bush (May 5), reminds troops that “The Commander-in-Chief really appreciates the job they’re doing. So do the Iraqi people, by the way,” which again provides a removed representation of the Iraqi people, with Bush as their rhetorical spokesperson. Finally, Bush makes reference to the Iraqi people in terms of the process of constructing an Iraqi government: “We believe that the Iraqi people are plenty competent of running their own government [sic]” (May 5).

The exception to the depiction of Iraqis as abstract representations occurs on August 29th, when Bush condemns the mosque bombing in Najaf. Bush (August 29) subordinates the United States troops to Iraqis: “I have instructed American officials in Iraq to work closely with Iraqi security officials and the Governing Council to determine who committed this terrible attack and bring them to justice.” Additionally, the president argues, “the united efforts of Iraqis and the international community will succeed in achieving peace and freedom,” which portrays Iraqis as partners within the international community. When extending sympathy, rather than asserting dominance, Bush subordinates the United States within the pentad to appeal to the Iraqi citizens.

Bremer’s Discourse: Persuading the Iraqi Citizenry

L. Paul Bremer III’s discourse reflects a slightly modified pentad as the second thread of governmental rhetoric. While Bush speaks in his role as Commander-In-Chief, Bremer’s position as the Coalition administrator is to disseminate information and to persuade Iraqis to accept and support American presence. This is the discourse most directly responsible for creating and imposing order in the region itself; persuading Iraqi citizens to accept the Coalition is critical to success. The agency is the work done by the Coalition, rather than the

Coalition itself. The Coalition's efforts are the tool by which reconstruction occurs. The agent is the Coalition, the act is the reconstruction of Iraq and the imposition of order, the scene is post-war Iraq, and the purpose of the drama is to establish a better future for Iraqi citizens. Iraqi citizens emerge under the purpose term; their lack of a role in the scene, and the fact that the Coalition is working for the Iraqis themselves, makes the Iraqis part of the purpose.

Agent: Coalition as Saviors

The Coalition assumes sole agent-status in Bremer's discourse: "We, the Coalition, are continuing to do all we can to improve the lives of all Iraqi citizens" (July 3). Bremer portrays the Coalition as the benefactor of freedom and prosperity; his discourse is primarily structured as explanatory, and only implicitly persuasive. Bremer says: "We came here to give you those freedoms, and to protect them as we help you build your own democratic future" (July 3). He portrays the Coalition as "liberators" who have "made all Iraqis free" (July 12). Bremer (May 15) portrays his role in the Coalition as helping "the Iraqi people to turn Iraq into a stable, safe, peaceful and prosperous country." While the rhetorical depictions of the United States helping Iraq are consistent with the rhetoric employed by Bush, the rest of the discourse leaves little room for Iraqis as agents within the discourse. The Coalition is "paying...Iraqis" for work, "hiring and training" Iraqis for police service, (29 August) and "right now, today the Coalition works with millions of Iraqis to make your hopes a reality" (21 August). Interestingly, the emphasis is on Iraqis, but not on the ones he is addressing – the Iraqis the Coalition is employing and training appear to be outside the realm of this specific audience. As such, Bremer appears to be addressing those who have not yet been persuaded to trust the Coalition.

Ordering the Iraqi People out of the Drama

There is almost no role for the Iraqi people as a whole within Bremer's discourse. He poses the rhetorical question, "What can you do to fulfill your hopes for the future?" which he then answers with a request for information about the perpetrators of attacks on Iraqi infrastructure and buildings (August 29). Bremer requests that civilians provide "information...to Coalition military or civilian" members regarding looters or anti-Coalition activity (July 7). Bremer tells Iraqis that their "cooperation is needed" to "improve the intelligence available to the Coalition and the Governing Council by reporting suspicious activities" (August 29). Additionally, Bremer frames pleas for information as messages of empowerment: "Ultimately you, ordinary citizens of Iraq, will provide the information that the Iraqi police and the Coalition need to stop" the attacks (August 21). Other messages carry implied admonitions and implicit accusations of complicity with anti-United States action: "Some of you know where the evil doers are" (August 29). When discussing the attack on United Nations headquarters, he advises the Iraqi citizens that "the next time you are sitting in the dark, remember the bombing on UN headquarters" (21 August).

When discussing the location of Saddam Hussein, Bremer accuses Iraqis of hiding information, and provides an ultimatum: "If you know Saddam's whereabouts, you can stay close to him and share his fate while someone else collects the \$25 million. Or you can collect the \$25 million and let Saddam decide if he wishes to surrender or fight" (8 August). Even when Bremer (August 21) portrays Iraqi citizens as victims, there appears to be a hidden threat. When discussing the attacks on the United Nations, he says "make no mistake, it is the Iraqis who absorbed the blows." The United Nations, however, "has been damaged and slowed" as well, and thus emerges from the incident as a victim.

Aside from being informants, there appears to be little role in the status quo for active Iraqi citizens. Bremer promises greater political transparency in governmental decision-making, saying, “I want to stress that all this money will be spent in a way that the Iraqi people will know what it was spent on. For the first time, you will know what is being done with your money” (7 July). In short, in terms of money and in terms of government (7 July, 12 July, 1 August), the Iraqis are being informed, but not included. Iraqis are instead told to be “patient” and “you need do nothing” in regards to preparing things, that things will be done for them (29 August). By doing nothing but acting as supporters of the Coalition, the Iraqis are told that they are “creating a better future for you and for you [sic] children and their children down through the generations” (August 21). As in Bush’s discourse, their role emerges only after the departure of the Coalition: once the constitution is written, “you, the Iraqi people, will have an opportunity to approve it. Then you will elect a sovereign Iraqi government” (July 12). While Iraqis may participate in the end result of governance, they are excluded from the process. In short, they are given a say in the specific manifestation that democracy and government may take, but are given no say in the form or structure of the government.

Images of Chaos

While the *New York Times* attributes blame to looters for the attacks, Bremer’s attribution of blame is much more harsh; he variously depicts those attacking Iraqi services as “renegades” and “elements of the old regime” who “continue to attack you, to attack us, and to attack the services vital to you – electricity, water, and healthcare” (July 3). By attacking targets, Bremer (July 3) argues that they are “attacking the Iraqi people.” However, his depiction is never consistent. On May 15th, Bremer argues that “Saddam released over

100,000 convicted prisoners onto the streets” which has resulted in “a serious law and order issue.” While the chaotic scenic depiction remains consistent, the agency for the chaos fluctuates; the “common, violent criminals” referred to on May 15 become “members of the old regime” on July 3. The newspaper articles attribute responsibility for pipeline and electricity sabotage to looters, but Bremer, again, is more forceful, calling them “saboteurs and terrorists.” No longer “common criminals,” (May 15), Bremer now refers to the perpetrators as “not common criminals, but equally dangerous” (July 3). Bremer (August 1) emphasizes that those responsible for the damage are “enemies of the Iraqi people.” Finally, the anti-United States faction is the minority: “There are very few Iraqis left who are attacking change and progress in this country. These vicious men target the services you need...as we work together to transform this country.” Interestingly, those who have alternative conceptualizations of the scene “reject progress” and “know that they are losing” (7 July).

Securing the Scene

Bremer and Bush conceptualize the scene similarly. “Security” (Bremer, 7 July) and “safety” (Bremer, August 8) are depicted as the paramount goal of the Coalition. The theme appears to be a dual notion of the newfound “freedom” (May 15; July 3; August 29) and the escape from Saddam’s regime (July 3). Saddam Hussein is blamed for the state of the scene; he “did untold damage to this country’s citizens, to its economy, to its infrastructure, and to its relations with the rest of the world” (July 3). Additionally, the scene is depicted as exemplifying the horrors of the Hussein regime, with “dozens and dozens of buildings, built purely for his own self-aggrandizement...and poverty in which he forced so many of his

people to live” (May 15). Finally, Hussein still dominates the scene, casting a “shadow of fear” across the country, which necessitates Coalition action (July 3).

Finally, the government emerges from the scene. Bremer (August 1) tells the Iraqi people that the “path that leads to a full sovereign Iraqi government” because “many Iraqis are interested in understanding” the process. Everything required, though, has already been accomplished and “established...three weeks ago” (August 1). In short, while the government is important, there is no role for the Iraqis; what is being reported has already been done.

New York Times Discourse: Emergence of a Chaotic Scene

The scene is the dominant term in the *New York Times* rhetoric, and it reflects chaos, disorder, and despair. The rest of the pentad is rhetorically bound to the scene. A chaotic scene gives rise to a chaotic, fractured agent. While the Coalition is in charge, looters emerge as agents within the discourse as well, playing the role of a scapegoat. The act is reconstruction in both successful and unsuccessful aspects.

Scene

A consistent scene emerges from the *New York Times* discourse, with three closely intertwined themes emerging. The first theme depicts the scene as an ancient culture replete with mythic references. The second is a chaotic, war-torn scene. Finally, the notion of a poor, desolate region emerges. Looking first to the notion of an ancient culture, rhetors highlight the notion of Iraq as ancient Mesopotamia. Culturetypes, shorthand cultural references (Osborn, 1990), are used not only as a geographical place marker, but also as an enthymematic way in which to place blame. Hussein is credited with the fall of Qurna “and other important settlements from ancient Mesopotamia” (Lacey, 2003b, p. 16). Andrews and

Sachs, (2003) providing background information on a town ravaged by Hussein, argue that the sanctity of the area is due to the fact that Ali, Adam, and Noah are buried in the area (p.1). There seems to be a 10,000-year jump in history, as the article progresses from the beginning of history to post-Hussein wreckage. Not only does this discount the multi-millennia in between, but it also roots Islamic cultures away from civilization and modernity. The scenic depiction doesn't allow people to move; they become judged by and tied to the scene. The scenic depiction is rooted in Biblical references as well, which displace history to allow Adam and Eve to pass judgment on the present: "Adam would not recognize this town at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rives, where local legend has it that the Garden of Eden once bloomed" (Lacey, 2003b, p. 16). Biblical references in this article set up a constant juxtaposition, referred to throughout the article, such as Eve "star[ing] wide-eyed at the decay that has come with modern times – the war-damaged buildings, the stinking sewage, the decaying stump that locals say marks the spot of the fruit tree the Bible says proved too tempting for the first couple" (p. 16). Lacey's use of culturetypes creates an ongoing juxtaposition between mythic perfection and the status quo scene of "war-damaged buildings" and the like.

The images of "stinking sewage" and "decay" emerge in other articles as well. Iraqi cities are portrayed as wastelands, and the responsibility for the scenic circumstances is attributed to sources other than the United States. Basra is depicted as a "slum" with streets filled with "stinking green sewage," (Worth, 2003a, p. 7), and Sadr City becomes a "rancid slum filled with Shiite Muslims from Iraq's south" (Rhode, 2003, p. 9). The agents thus arise from the scene – the slum is "filled with" them. The articles contain the juxtaposition between the ambiguous past and the present. Basra was once "a city of palm-shaded

boulevards lined with restaurants and cafes,” which is now a “vast, desiccated slum. The water that once fed its parks and squares disappeared when Saddam Hussein drained the marshes in the southeastern part of the country in the early 1990s” (Worth, 2003a, p.7).

While this article gives some glimpse into pre-war Iraq, the imagery of the sewage overpowers the rest of the article.

The backdrop that progresses from Biblical perfection to sewage-filled slums gives birth to the final scenic element of chaos. Whereas there are nebulous attributions for the scenic elements above, looters become the agent of chaos. The looters and the chaos serve three purposes in the discourse. Initially, the chaos in the scene calls for order, which provides a role for the United States and the Coalition to fill. Additionally, chaos is antithetical to the notion of civilization, or of the United States as a civilizing force. Finally, the chaos is a ready answer to why the United States hasn’t provided more security or gotten further. Significantly, looters are the only Iraqis given agent status in the discourse. Except when Iraqis are looting, the scene is so overpowering that it draws Iraqis back into the scene. Strategically giving looters agent status provides a way to shift blame away from the Coalition, and to explain away the chaos.

Agents of Chaos

The rhetors are unambiguous in their depictions of a chaotic landscape. While Baghdad has a semblance of order by day, at night the city “reverts to a war zone, where looters, bandits, and hundreds of army patrols own the streets” (Tyler, 2003b, p.16). The “violence and lawlessness in Iraq” is described as “chronic street crime” (Andrews, 2003a, p. 10). Lacey (2003a) describes Basra as “nowhere near as chaotic as Baghdad,” but blames looters for the chaos: “Officials said that every time they completed some improvement for

the city's infrastructure, looters managed to chip away at the progress" (p. 10). The "looters" are consistently referenced as the agents of the chaos; this appears to be the one area in which the agent overwhelms the scene. While the violence is "mostly among Iraqis themselves," (Andrews, 2003a, p.10), the looters are at once separated from the Iraqi people, and yet blamed as part of them. This paradox does two things. The construction absolves Americans from blame for the chaos while putting them in control of the ordering/civilizing mission. The notion of chaos provides a way to scapegoat the looters for the myriad reconstruction problems and destruction caused by war. While the western forces are engaged in productive activities such as "rebuilding" and "improvement of the city's infrastructure" (Lacey, 2003a, p. 10), the Iraqis are engaged in uniquely destructive activities. At times, the reporting appears openly critical of the complaints of Iraqis. Andrews (2003b) writes, "Many residents of Baghdad seem to ignore the fact that the electricity disruption was caused at least in part by sabotage and looting" (p. 1). Despite the fact that electricity clearly existed in Iraq before an American invasion, the commentary seems to suggest that Americans are not being given their due.

Finally, the looters allow the rhetors to displace blame from the Americans. The looters are at fault for "Iraq's descent into lawlessness [that] has stalled its return to normalcy, increased the costs of reconstruction and squandered much of the good will Iraqis felt for their new American overseers" (Andrews and Sachs, 2003, p. 1). In short, the looters become a convenient scapegoat for all of the chief complaints, including lack of electricity, lack of economic recovery, and lack of law.

Coalition Members: Agents of Order.

While the articles are replete with anti-American sentiment voiced by Iraqis, there are positive accounts as well. Oppel (2003) argues that Iraqis are “depending on American officials to strongly supervise the new government” (p.6). Americans are portrayed as having greater experience in matters of governance than Iraqi citizens, and thus ought to have greater “influence” and provide a “guiding hand” to the Iraqis (p. 6). Thus, the Americans deserve a paternalistic role in rebuilding the Iraqi government.

Coalition forces are also portrayed as victims: “After riding into Iraq on a wave of popular euphoria, American and British forces are unexpectedly finding themselves the brunt of criticism for everything that goes wrong these days” (Andrews, 2003b, p. 1). Indeed, anger at America is depicted as frustration over western “impotence in peace” (Andrews and Sachs, 2003, p.1). Though the Americans are unjustifiably the targets of all complaints, the complaints are inevitably filed by poor Iraqis. One Iraqi complains to reporters as he “push[es] his broken-down Volkswagen bus to the front door of his house” and another Iraqi who espouses anti-American sentiments is “a 46-year-old shop owner in the poor neighborhood of New Baghdad” (Andrews, 2003b, p.1). Portraying Iraqis in this light reinforces the scene. Those who are complaining and discrediting Americans are drawn back into the scenic elements of poverty, which reinforce their place in the chaos, poverty and sewage.

The reporters consistently describe the Americans as powerful. While Iraqis from poor areas of town file unjustifiable complaints, United States Army Humvees fill the streets and soldiers in full-body armor attempt to maintain order (Andrews, 2003b, p. 1). The complaints are also discussed simultaneously with anti-United States attacks, which, while

discouraging, “do not endanger the overall military plan” (p.1). While the soldiers are unjustifiably blamed, they manage to rise above the scene. The scene, however, continues to bind the Iraqis, discrediting their complaints and placing them below the Coalition forces. American troops are also portrayed as strong, and intent on responding to attacks, “greatly increas[ing] the number of troops on street patrols and [becoming] much more aggressive about arresting suspects in looting” (Andrews, 2003a, p.1).

Additionally, the soldiers continually project a “friendly image,” despite the fact that it gets them killed by “mobs who corner them” (Andrews, 2003b, p. 1). In response, the British, who are used interchangeably with the United States as Coalition members, return with what, to an outsider, may seem like a contradiction in terms. They show up with five tanks and helicopters, but, to ease tensions, they have distributed leaflets begging residents to believe in the soldiers’ peaceful intentions. “Do not let rumors and misinformation split us apart,” the leaflets say. “We will not return to punish you. That was the tactic of Saddam’s regime.” (Andrews, 2003b, p. 1). The comparison is stark, and meant to appeal to different, yet equally important, western sensibilities. First, the comparison demonstrates uncontroversial armed superiority: mobs kill Coalition forces, who retaliate with Western helicopters and tanks. Simultaneously, a friendly, compassionate image of the military is also portrayed, one that reaches out to Iraqis and emphasizes the good intentions of the Coalition. A paradox emerges of the power and victimage.

Act: Reconstruction, Governance, and Order

One of the major problems in post-war Iraq was the establishment of a government. Iraqis and Americans learned the hard way that democracy creation was not a matter of waving a magic wand, and that the synthesis of religion and government was not an easy

matter. As reconstruction began, the Coalition was the only actor with agent-status. In Basra, the British go to great lengths before the “unveiling of the new government” (Lacey, 2003a, p.10). Through organization of the “infrastructure,” and creation of a city hall, the British are the only ones with concrete plans for Iraq’s future, which the Iraqis promptly reject.

Describing the Iraqis as “angry protestors,” the discourse only specifies dissatisfaction with Western ideas, rather than outlining specific concerns and objections raised. Their anger, in short, is portrayed as whining: the Iraqi people refuse to judge the governing council on its own merits, even when the British create “a separate civic forum to allow those interested in local issues to hold discussions without any decision-making authority” (Lacey, 2003a, p.10). Indeed, the military are the only ones acting in a productive way. While the British are “eager to be flexible,” the Iraqis “walk out” of the meeting and choose “not to fill the seat” on the City Council which the British offer as a compromise (p. 10). Finally, the Iraqis “decline invitations” for future meetings (p.10). All of this places the British military in the role of agent; they are the only ones describing “reasonable” solutions, and also, the only ones acting, rather than reacting. Iraqis, in contrast, are depicted as creating a “clamor for democracy,” yet they are unaware of the complexities of holding elections and building a democracy; they are, in short, immature and naive (Lacey, 2003a, p.10).

When direct comparisons are given between United States and Iraqi versions of democracy, the juxtaposition becomes even more distinct. Tyler (2003a) depicts a sharp contrast between United States and Iraqi attempts to construct a government. To illustrate the Iraqi approach, Tyler (2003a) describes “hundreds of tribal sheiks in colorful robes sat in plastic chairs outside the royal mausoleum” who are gathered on the north end of town to watch a political debate (p. 16). The scene is depicted as an impotent political function where,

where, “In the sweltering heat, the sheiks stirred, then they started to leave. Some grumbled that they could not hear the speech, but others complained that it lacked practical content. By the time it was concluded, half of them” had left (p. 16). As such, there is a disorganized, ancient set of governing leaders, and speeches without practical content, outside in the elements. Bremer, on the other hand, has a plan that will actually work. Specific ideas are articulated, and he holds a news conference in “the air-conditioned hall of a convention center” (p. 16). The rest of the article is dedicated to discussing the practical changes such as “a \$100 million public works program to start rebuilding the country’s infrastructure” Bremer has put on the table (p. 16).

An alternative conceptualization of Iraqi governance progresses from merely impotent complaints to evil. In the battle for power, Shiite clerics are described as having “moved quickly to constrain the freedom of women as a show of their authority” (Fathi, 2003, p. 16); the only Iraqi politicians portrayed in this article are anti-women. Remarkably, this is one of the few favorable references to Hussein, under whose reign “Iraqi women worked and studied with fewer restrictions than in neighboring Muslim countries... they could vote, choose their own husbands and maintain custody of their children after a divorce” (p. 16). Additionally, Iraqis are portrayed as having a conceptualization of democracy based on Hezbollah and the Ayatollah Khomeini, both of which resonate with American audiences as antithetical to Western conceptions of democracy; this becomes a covert condemnation of the Iraqi opinions and radically non-Western conceptions of democracy (Rhode, 2003, p. 9). References to Hezbollah and the Ayatollah become an enthymematic justification for privileging United States notions of democracy over burgeoning notions of democracy. The young Iraqis who attempt to grasp democracy are “being barraged by ideas, ideologies, and

political concepts they scarcely understand” because of a “life of isolation and war under Saddam Hussein” (Rhode 2003, p. 9). This is not limited to youth; while young people attempt to “put together a jumble of ideas that often seem contradictory,” this reflects “the state of flux that exists in Iraqi politics today” (Rhode 2003, p. 9).

Not all of the *New York Times* articles depict Iraqis as politically inept reactionaries. Tyler (2003b) depicts Iraqis as productive and self-motivating, describing “grass-roots politicking” (p. 1) and in-depth discussions of the goals of Iraqi political groups. This article, however, stands out as the exception, rather than the rule. It reflects a self-contained set of images, rather than the overarching mood that permeates the discourse.

Act: Anti-Coalition Sentiment and Response to Reconstruction

Protests and anti-United States sentiment emerge consistently within the *New York Times* discourse. Protests are characterized as “storms” resulting from a “lack of communication” between Americans and Iraqis (MacFarquhar, 2003, p. 6). The protests are characterized as insincere and childish, as well as impotent: “Graffiti mar a nearby wall – ‘Down with the U.S.A.,’ somebody scrawled” (Lacey, 2003a, p. 16). One of the most interesting parts of the anti-United States sentiment is the juxtaposition between confrontations of United States troops and Iraqi protestors. The following paragraph exemplifies the comparison:

The cleric and the lieutenant colonel stood just inches apart under the broiling noon sun today, white turban to camouflage helmet, trading invective about the deployment of American troops in this holy city. Behind the American officer, a line of about two dozen marines stood vigilant, their bayonets newly fixed to their rifles. Behind the cleric, a sweep of thousands of demonstrators, most of them trucked in

from Baghdad, chanting slogans like “No Americans after today” and “No to America, no to colonialism, no to tyranny, no to the Devil!” So lies the suddenly uneasy state of relations between the United States forces and the younger, more militant clergymen of Iraq’s majority Shiite community (p. 16).

This discourse underscores the juxtaposition of modern and ancient embedded in the Iraqi scene: “clerics” versus “lieutenant colonel,” and “turban” juxtaposed with “camouflage helmets” all taking place under a “broiling noon sun” in a “holy city.” Additionally, the image of “two dozen marines” facing off against “thousands of demonstrators” who are “sweeping” into the city, suggests a chaotic scene. The protestors are also “trucked in from Baghdad,” which implies that they are not genuine, and are as alien to the area as the Americans. Finally, the protestors are described with a quadruple qualifier: they are young, militant, clergymen, and Shiite, which implies that they are not the norm. Additionally, no explanation is given for what makes these individuals “militant,” particularly in comparison the United States troops with bayonets and rifles (MacFarquhar, 2003, p. 6).

The American response to anti-United States sentiment occurs in two forms: complaints regarding the lack of “order” to the protests, and emphasis on American strength and resolve. Americans soldiers rely on “security reasons” as a rationale for not explaining their presence to Iraqis, and wish that “demonstrators would take their complaints to the new city council” (MacFarquhar, 2003, p. 6). Frustration over a lack of appropriate channel for the discourse reinforces the issue.

Religious leaders are also portrayed as manipulating Iraqi citizens, “determined to harness [Iraqi] frustration to wrest a greater say in Iraq’s future” (MacFarquhar, 2003, p.6). The protestors are also looked down upon by the “respected ayatollahs” in the village, the

ones to whom “the faithful look for guidance on virtually all aspects of daily life” (p. 6). This implies that the people of Iraq lack agency, and the protesters are “little more than young hotheads determined to make a name for themselves by stirring up violence against the occupation” (MacFarquhar, p.6). In short, the people who should be respected are the ones who defer agent status to the Americans. The Iraqis worthy of respect view the protests as invalid: they believe the protests occur because people want to make a name for themselves, and because the protestors are young and impressionable. Additionally, the clerics in the town say that “the new militancy in the Shiite community is being pushed by former Baathists, happy to find any channel they can to create unrest. Support for the demonstrators came from Iran, too” (p.6). The final conclusion of the article is that no one respects the protests, and the militancy is “new” and is only supported by former Baathists and axis of evil member Iran.

Conclusion

Through viewing the three threads of discourse in combination, a few significant aspects emerge. The Iraqi citizens are always present, but never the as the primary agents in the dramas. The only exception lies in the ambiguous looter/terrorist agent that emerges throughout each thread of discourse. While the *New York Times* indicates that the looters are most likely Iraqi citizens, this fact is obscured in both threads of presidential discourse. In the Iraqi citizens’ sole role as agents, they emerge as a form of anti-agents; they are dominating the action, but it is against the ultimate purpose of the discourse. Additionally, despite the fact that the agent and the act are flipped in the governmental pentads, the goals remain the same: to reemphasize the primacy of United States troops, and the legitimacy of the Coalition.

The discourse surrounding the post-war climate provides the justification given to the Iraqi people and the American public for the process of ordering. Creating order is vital to American success in the region. Doing so relies on both the Iraqis and the American public, as well as the international community, accepting both American presence in the region, and the specific way in which the West conceptualizes the future of Iraq. As such, each thread of text plays a persuasive as well as a descriptive role. Chapter Four examines the patterns of discourse that emerge in the texts in terms of the notion of order.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF ORDER AND CONCLUSIONS

Three pentads emerge from the post-war discourse analyzed in Chapter Three. Burke's pentad provided a way to chart the specific arguments and representations deployed by rhetors, and a way to clarify the motives of the Bush administration and the *New York Times*. The pentadic representations discussed in Chapter Three reveal specific manifestations of the foreign policy goals and visions of the United States. Chapter Four employs Nayar's (1999) theory of ordering as a mechanism to explore the implications of the pentadic analysis, and discusses how ordering is rhetorically manifest in the post-war discourse. To this end, Chapter Four is broken into two parts. First, the chapter examines the manifestations of order that emerge from the Burkean analysis conducted in Chapter Three. Then, the chapter considers the rhetorical implications of the thesis, and offers suggestions for future research.

Part One: The Rhetorical Politics of Order

Burke's pentad provides a framework for mapping the function of rhetoric. Chapter Three employed multipentadic analysis to reveal the way in which Bremer, Bush, and *New York Times* conceptualized the Iraqi war and rhetorically framed the Iraqi people and Coalition presence in the war's immediate aftermath. The previous analysis thus maps the internal functions of the post-war rhetoric. Post-war discourse, however, is not self-contained, but rather exists as part of a larger project of ordering. The

implications of Chapter Three largely reside within the neocolonial project of ordering that the rhetoric attempts to create and to sustain.

Imposing Order on a Chaotic Scene

Discursive representations reflect the order of the scene. The idea of ordering the scene, and acting within the scene, emerges as the act in each thread of discourse. Tuathail (1998) argues that context is not objective, but “a structure of general textuality” (p. 12-13). This argument suggests that rhetors interpret and create the substance of context subjectively. Rather than examining the three threads of rhetoric as descriptive, objective accounts of the American presence in Iraq, they can better be viewed as prescriptive, actively creating the context. The goal of this section is to chart the way in which the notion of order functions on a prescriptive level, actively creating the future of Iraq. Bush, Bremer, and the *New York Times* emphasize the importance of acting within the scene because an ordered country is critical for the foreign policy goals of the Coalition within the region. There are several components to this ordering: the rhetors emphasize the existence of a chaotic scene and then assert that the preeminence of Coalition action within the scene is the only possible solution for a positive future for Iraq.

The idea of an ordered scene serves rhetorical and functional purposes, particularly within the *New York Times* discourse. The chaotic scene explored within Chapter Three calls for order, which the Coalition, in its role of actor, steps in to impose on the scene. Additionally, it provides a unique justification for the United States to create and frame the future of the region. Each thread of discourse plays a role in the creation of the framework used to establish the region’s future. Bush portrays the creation of the future in both abstract and pragmatic terms. Abstractly, the depiction of the future is purpose-driven, and one that

promises freedom and prosperity through the accomplishment of the act. On the pragmatic level, Bush frames military operations and democracy building and the establishment of an infrastructure as specific examples of what the future holds. Both the abstract and pragmatic aspects of the future, however, are predicated on the success of the act. The act-agent ratio that emerges in Bush's discourse creates a clear mandate for how the future is being constructed.

Nayar (1999) articulates ordering as a "coercive command" predicated in the logic of development and security (p. 608). Ordering has become part of the mandate of a civilizing mission. It is not surprising, then, that western rhetors conduct ordering under the guise of "helping the Iraqi people" (see, e.g., Bush, May 5). The ideas of freedom and security occur simultaneously in the discourse. Hope of freedom is necessarily tied to any hope of security in the region. The fact that the Coalition is given sole agent-status underscores the idea that the security must be imposed by the Coalition forces. The idea of ordering is particularly interesting because the word itself is used solely in a military context, such as American troops "bringing order to parts of [Iraq] that remain dangerous" (Bush, May 1). However, the rationale for ordering, and thus for American presence in the region, is driven by the purpose term in the pentad: freedom from tyranny. While the act of ordering permeates all action within the region, Bush employs the word "order" only in terms of military action. The military administers violent ordering to clear and create the scene for the Iraqis to inhabit. Additionally, the Iraqis are given no role in their ordered future. The relationship of ordering to military action distances other actions that fall under the guise of ordering, such as establishment of a government and imposition of ideology, from the notion of ordering itself. The fact that the administration's rhetoric also discusses democracy building and other social

programs under the auspices of “helping” Iraqi citizens also distances actions that could be construed as empire building from the act of ordering. While Bush (May 5) argues that “Iraqis are plenty capable of running their own government,” a distinction emerges between running and creating a government. Running the government occurs after the United States has ordered the scene. In essence, the United States orders, and then the Iraqis get to inhabit the ordered scene. Both Bremer and Bush underscore the fact that Iraqis, while they can help to create that future, do not have a role in shaping it. As discussed in Chapter Two, western policy makers cloak modern empire building under the guises of “civilizing missions” (Butler, 2002) and humanitarian missions in attempts to make neocolonialism more persuasive to the masses. As the analysis of Bremer’s discourse illustrates, policy makers not only mask the purpose of empire building as a tool to persuade domestic audiences, but also to persuade the subjects of empire building.

The specific mandate for ordering comes not only from the chaotic scene, but also from “vicious acts of terrorism” (Bush, August 29) and other anti-Coalition action. Additionally, all perpetrators of anti-American action are depicted as members of the “old regime” and enemies of the Iraqi people (May 1). No mention is made by the administration of anti-American action perpetrated by Iraqis themselves. As shown in Chapter Three, even the *New York Times* rhetorically condemns peaceful protests by Iraqi citizens. The *New York Times* frames dissent not as a constructive, democratic process, but rather one that is rhetorically devalued by the community. When dissent becomes radicalized, the dissenters become ordered into the scene: enemies that need to be dealt with and eliminated from the new world order. The rhetors do not give opposition to the Coalition act-status, nor do they grant the participants in dissent agent-status. When opposition becomes violent, the discourse

conflates dissenters with terrorists and members of the old regime. It becomes clear, then, that there can be no alternative conceptualizations of Iraq's future; the order constructed by the United States is the monolithic choice forced upon Iraqis.

A rhetorical hierarchy of violence emerges in the discourse surrounding dissent. While all three threads of discourse obscure violence committed by the United States with labels such as "military operations," it is clear in each thread that the United States is perpetrating military violence in the region. Most significantly, the act of securing Iraq advocates securing the region through military maneuvers. This violence, however, is never condemned. Rather, it is portrayed as a necessary reaction to scenic demands. The violence perpetrated by the Iraqi dissidents, however, is portrayed as uniquely destructive. Bremer and Bush both call upon the Iraqis to reject the violence, and threaten them with "sharing the same fate" as terrorists if they contribute.

The discourse omits the fact that the Iraqi citizens are denied a peaceful option. They are forced to choose between competing sets of violence, both of which create Iraqi citizens as victims and order them into the scene. As such, a rhetorical ordering of violence takes place that has Burkean motives at its core. Even though the Coalition has killed more Iraqis than the dissidents, that violence is excused because of its motives. Additionally, there is a critical distinction between residual violence perpetrated by the old regime, which is a continuation of the war effort, and violence and dissent from the Iraqi citizens themselves. Through eliminating the differences between genuine war fighters and concerned Iraqi citizens, the rhetors deny the Iraqi people a voice in the new order, and their right to freedom of speech is called into question. Nayar (1999) argues that voices that challenge the dominant worldview are removed from the realm of accepted discourse, often through reinscribing

those voices from the center of discourse to the periphery. By devaluing and denying Iraqis the right to dissent, not only does western discourse reinscribe Iraqi voices to the periphery, it also asserts that Iraqi citizens are not a part of the dominant worldview unless they believe in the United States' vision of the future. The only positive actions are Coalition plans for reconstruction and imposing order.

Finally, myths and culturetypes permeate the discussion of the scene and become enthymematic justifications for the act of ordering. Mythic terms are used to emphasize the epic battle between good and evil, as well as to mask the true motives of empire building (Spanos, 2000). By masking empire building with a humanitarian guise, the United States paints a worldview that posits intervention as a "civilizing" mission (Butler, 2000). The mythic terms are also prevalent in the discussion of the purpose of the act; ordering is done to provide freedom to Iraqi citizens. Culturetypes complement the function of myths by ordering time and space. Images of the Garden of Eden and Ancient Babylon are superimposed on the status quo images of filth and sewage. It is on this scene that the act of American occupation is imposed. In this way, we see civilization brought to the pre-modern, pre-industrial scene.

The interaction of act and scene within the discourse justifies Coalition presence in the post-war arena, and establishes an order for Iraq that is guided by the western principles of development and security. The ordering of the Iraqi scene, then, is portrayed as inevitable by western voices. Tuathail's (1998) notion of context as presence functions as a persuasive tool where western ideology is framed as the only possible future for the region. The Coalition-as-agent rhetorically dismisses alternative acts and future scenes, which become ordered out of the discourse. Chapter Three argues that post-war discourse denies Iraqi

citizens agent-status and ties them to the scene. The way representations order Iraqi citizens, and the way in which the act/scene terms reflect the representations of Iraqis, is discussed in the following section.

The Process of Representation: Ordering of Iraqi Citizens

Coalition rhetorical portrayals of Iraqi citizens is a manifestation of the politics of representation. Discursive practices sanctioned by the elite allow for the consumption of cultural representations and a way to make the depictions of Iraqi citizens and culture persuasive to external audiences. As Said (1998) argues, rhetorical representations convey a verbal depiction of the subject that inevitably results in two outcomes. The act of representing a subject is reductionist. Because representations provide a one-dimensional, simplified vision of the subject, Said argues that representations do violence to the subject while providing a way to gloss over the violence. Representations create a dichotomy between the act of representing, and the representation itself. Two sets of representations emerge in the post-war discourse: that of the Coalition, and that of the Iraqi people. This section explores the way in which depictions of each serve to reinforce American supremacy, ultimately reinscribing Iraqis to the scene.

Coalition forces appear in the role of agent status throughout each thread of discourse. The representations form a constant comparison between the Coalition and Iraqi citizens, either implicitly or explicitly. Coalition forces essentially become a mirror image for Iraqi citizens. Positive portrayals of Americans become a justification for the act of ordering, as well as a rationale for the Coalition being the agents of order.

Not only do Coalition forces mirror Iraqi citizens in these representations, but Iraqi citizens reciprocally serve to mirror Coalition forces when they are portrayed in a positive

light. Bush (May 1) consistently uses images of Iraqi citizens as justifications for the legitimacy of American action. Bush (May 1) says, “when Iraqi civilians looked into the faces of our service men and women, they saw strength and kindness and goodwill.” Here, the Iraqi citizens are mentioned, but only as a mirror for the image of Americans. Additionally, Bush (May 1) makes reference to the “images of celebrating Iraqis,” which provides evidence that the operation was justified.

New York Times discourse offers a set of juxtapositions that provide two competing representations: one of the Coalition, and one of Iraqi civilians. This juxtaposition permeates the discourse and provides an extended comparison that reasserts American hegemony. Competing notions of governance (Tyler, 2003a), democracy building (Rhode, 2003), and protestors (MacFarquhar, 2003) provide a set of comparisons of Americans and Iraqis. There are two implications to this. First, these depictions provide a set of representations of Iraqis for American audiences to consume that is grounded in the familiar: images of the Coalition. Very likely, the only conception of Iraqis that Americans have access to comes from media outlets. As such, the representations created by media such as the *New York Times* create our images of Iraqis. Additionally, the images portray Iraqis as fractured, tied to a chaotic scene, poor, and unable to govern. These images become our conceptualization of Iraqis as a whole.

Representations, then, convey the way in which people, not just the scene, are ordered. Representations can be seen as the link between ordering and individuals. In post-war Iraq, representations are self-reflexive and projected by the discourse onto the Iraqi citizens: the representations communicate not only what American citizens should think about Iraqis, but also how the Iraqis should imagine themselves.

Burke and the Language of Common Sense

Chapter Two discussed the language of common sense in regard to the neocolonial notion of ordering and representations. Burke's (1954) notion of the language of common sense appears within post-war rhetoric in two manifestations. First, representations of the war that are created for a western audience fit within western notions of the East. Additionally, Bremer creates a language of common sense that orders the future world of the Iraqis. The process of marginalizing Iraqi voices that are engaged in dissent also contributes to establishing a framework of orientation for Iraqi citizens.

Ingram (2002) argues that the language of common sense fosters consent to domination. Taking Burke's notion of the language of common sense as a "hegemonic creation," the process of ordering places Iraqi citizens within the new world order and orders their future. Additionally, the way in which the Iraqis' role is depicted within the language of common sense provides a terministic screen that the Iraqi citizens are expected to adopt and employ. Just as the discourse creates representations that access the western language of common sense, and to which western audiences are expected to subscribe, in the same way Iraqis are provided a set of self-referential representations that they are expected to consume and thus adopt. Bush and the *New York Times* employ representations that access the western language of common sense and which shape the direct impressions Americans form of Iraqis. Bremer's discourse illustrates the process of naturalization for the Iraqi people. His rhetoric attempts to alter the orientation and perspective of Iraqi citizens so that it fits into new conceptualizations of the good life. Ideally, this creates a perfect synthesis of representations, where the Iraqis come to embody the representations that are deployed. The notion of order depicted by the Americans is consumed by the Iraqi citizens, and thus there is a parallelism

between representation and reality. This seems to be the ultimate impact of Nayar's argument; if the new world order provides the opportunity for the West to remake the globe in its own image, then the representations that are so persuasive to western audiences, the notion of bringing civilization to the masses, becomes a mechanism by which to assimilate cultures and ultimately have them consume the manufactured images. They will become caricatures of themselves. Bush's notion of Iraq functioning as a "peaceful neighbor in a troubled neighborhood" becomes particularly significant here, because, ideally, globalization becomes self-replicating. Iraqis further project the representations and use those to remake their neighbors into those images. The emphasis that Bush and Bremer place on the Iraqi citizens themselves underscores the importance of ordering not only the scene, but the people contained within the scene; the new world order will fail without ordering the people as well.

Implications of Order

Neocolonial theory is concerned with the way in which Western foreign policy engages in empire building and the way in which realism is enacted discursively and functionally throughout the world. While imperialist projects are conducted under the notion of a civilizing mission, in reality we see what Nayar refers to as a violent ordering, one in which individuals, cultures, and nation-states are rearranged to fit into the dominant paradigm of the elites. Understanding the function of ordering requires an examination of the realist discourse used to "order" voices, reinscribing those who are the victims of empire building to the periphery to leave room for the dominant discourse. The process of "ordering" voices can thus be viewed as maintenance of orientation – the way in which the global language of common sense is constructed.

While war receives the bulk of popular and scholarly attention, war is only one mechanism of ordering. While Nayar (1999) argues that ordering can occur without war, when military conflict exists, empire building occurs mostly in the post-war arena, when the peace is won or lost. There are two reasons this is true. First, prior to a war, policy makers spend little energy attempting to persuade the people of the country that will be invaded. Post-war, however, the war-making country must persuade the populace that the war was justified, and that things will now be better. Additionally, the majority of empire building actually occurs after the war. As such, there is a new emphasis on the people of the nation who need to be ordered for the project to be successful and to obtain the long-term foreign policy objectives. The people are divided into those who must be forcibly ordered, or ordered out of the system, and those who acquiesce to ordering more voluntarily. Bremer urges passivity in the ordering process. He gives the Iraqi citizens a forced choice: aid the Coalition, or share the fate of terrorists. Implicit in Bush's argument is the idea that the Iraqi citizens have already acquiesced to this new world order. There is no mention of Iraqis who disagree, but who are not violent. More importantly, the Iraqis who disagree and are violent should still probably be considered Iraqis, though the American government does not classify them as such. As discussed above, violent Iraqis are rhetorically ordered out of the scene. All of this is a part the "necessary reduction" that takes place through the act of representation.

The pentadic map that emerges in Chapter Three has implications for furthering scholars' understanding of order, and the way in which western rhetors create order. Additionally, Campbell (1998) indicates that conducting critiques of political discourse that work to unravel the function of the discourse, disrupt the dominant ideology, and open a space for change. Depictions of both the act and the scene, as well as representations of Iraqis

themselves, contribute to the way in which the post-war world is ordered. The broader implications of the project of ordering were explored above. Part Two examines the rhetorical implications of this project, and explores possibilities for future research.

Part Two: Conclusions

This thesis illustrates the utility of examining immediate post-war rhetoric. Wars don't end when major combat is over; while they often fade out of the public's interest, they often require the president or the media to give official rhetorical responses. There are both textual and methodological implications to this study. This section explores the value of examining post-war rhetoric, as well as the methodological implications of this project, then concludes with suggestions for future research.

Rhetorical Implications of Bush's Discourse

The Iraq war was unique because of the maintenance of a Coalition presence in the post-war arena. Because of this, the administration's rhetorical burden extended from wartime discourse into the post-war arena as well. As this analysis shows, the persuasive burden of the president shifted after the war. As previous rhetorical scholars (e.g. Campbell & Jamieson, 1990) have documented, wartime discourse is considered a generic category. After the end of major combat, however, the president's rhetorical burden neither remains consistent with wartime rhetoric, nor does it cease to exist. Rather, in situations such as Iraq where the administration decides that continued military presence is required, the president must simultaneously convince his or her primary audience that victory in the region has been achieved, and must also advocate continued presence in the region. Additionally, without an adversary such as Saddam Hussein to demonize, the president must rely on a new type of argument to justify sustained intervention. The president's burden expands to convincing his

or her primary audience of victory in the region, while still advocating continued presence. This analysis suggests that the notions of security and order become the act emphasized within post-war presidential discourse. The president now has to frame the argument to persuade the audience that victory was accomplished, though the mission still demands support.

Rhetorical Implications of Bremer's Discourse

The examination of Bremer's role in post-war western discourse has interesting rhetorical implications as well. Bremer's presence as a rhetorical spokesperson suggests that new voices are added to the conversation after the war. While Iraq was unique in that Bremer was appointed the official rhetorical spokesperson after the war, continued intervention in any arena demands communication with the invaded audience. Traditionally, this occurs on a micro level, with discourse that is not widely available, or from a centralized source. The Iraqi war is unique because the United States appointed Bremer as the Coalition administrator. With a rhetorical and leadership void in the region, an American fills the space. This provides easy access to the way that Bremer disseminates the information to the Iraqi public. One of Bremer's functions is to fulfill a rhetorical role similar to the one that Bush assumes after the war. Bremer must frame the post-war situation and convey the rhetorical vision of the Coalition to the Iraqi people.

While the Iraqi situation is unique because Bremer is a central authority in the region, the above analysis could provide insight into how neocolonial powers communicate with the people in post-war arenas. *New York Times* discusses leaflets distributed in Arabic by the British government that assure Iraqis of the Coalition's peaceful intentions (Andrews, 2003b), as well as reporting that Coalition authorities blame Iraqi unrest on a lack of communication

(MacFarquhar, 2003). The continued reference to the importance of communication between the occupying power and the occupied citizenry underscores the importance of conducting rhetorical analysis of post-war communication. Additionally, the rhetorical goals of the Coalition authority's communication with the Iraqi public are largely different than the goals of the president when communicating with a domestic audience. The United States had already achieved military victory in the region; subsequently, the goal had shifted to winning the peace. The administration's goal in communicating with the Iraqi public then is to persuade the Iraqi people of the utility of Coalition presence, and to assuage any fears the public has. The terminal persuasive goal is to persuade the public not to participate in or to condone anti-Coalition sentiment, and instead to ideologically endorse Coalition leadership. Further rhetorical analysis of post-war discourse with occupied peoples would further investigate whether these goals are consistent, or vary in terms of the specific rhetorical situation. Even so, analysis of Bremer's discourse provides a foundation for examining other wartime discourse. Particularly valuable is the fact that Bremer's discourse was not crafted for domestic dissemination. While available on the web page of the Coalition Authority, these documents were not widely consumed by American audiences. Therefore, Bremer's speeches provide a glimpse into the way persuasion functions away from the gaze of the domestic public.

Rhetorical Implications of the New York Times Discourse

The analysis of *New York Times* articles provides insight into how a mainstream media source functions in a post-war climate. Perhaps the most significant finding is the consistency of pentads that emerge from administrative and media discourse. While the news media are supposed to assume the function of governmental watchdog, and report in an

unbiased fashion, this analysis raises serious doubts as to the validity of that claim, at least in a wartime or post-war setting. There are differences in the pentads that emerge, namely the scene emerging as the dominant term in *New York Times* discourse. Nevertheless, the Coalition, the Iraqi citizens, and the act are surprisingly consistent across the three threads of discourse. Additionally, the newspaper articles create depictions of the scene and the Iraqi people, as well as the Coalition forces, for the domestic audiences to consume. Media news sources are the only access most Americans have to Iraqi voices and images of Iraqis. This creates little room for American dissent, because there are few negative portrayals of American action in the region. Rather, the *New York Times* creates a series of self-contained representations that justify American presence in the area.

The emergence of scene as the dominant term in the pentad suggests that, at least in terms of the *New York Times* articles, the media's contribution to the post-war conversation might best be viewed as supplemental, rather than detached or objective. The descriptive roles provide a mechanism for enriching the vision Americans have of the arena; the monolithic images, however, merely provide a more rich imagery of American supremacy from which American audiences can draw.

Methodological Implications

This analysis illustrates the utility of blending rhetorical methods as a mechanism for conducting more complex analysis. Using the pentad as a mechanism to map the internal function of discourse, and then the notion of order to map the implications of the Burkean analysis provides a more complete image of the discourse.

Additionally, multiple post- and neo-colonial scholars discuss the notion of discourse in terms of empire building, but few use a rhetorical methodology to explore the implications

of “discourse.” Using rhetorical methods as a tool to unpack the function of discourse adds an additional layer to the work of neocolonial scholars. Burkean analysis provides a systemic tool for examining rhetoric. This analysis sets further precedent for examining rhetorical artifacts in the process of neocolonial scholarship. As this analysis illustrates, Burkean theory, as well as other types of rhetorical criticism, can map the specific ways in which discourse functions to further the neocolonial project. Additionally, using textual analysis to ground criticism of empire building provides insight into the specific persuasive practices of western discourse. This project adds to knowledge of the way that ordering functions on a rhetorical level, thus making the argument of neocolonial scholars more complete.

Also, there are implications to using multiple threads of discourse. Each of the three threads not only complement each other, but also fill in narrative gaps. The three sources appeal to largely different audiences, but articulate the same basic message. There is a tapestry of discourse to criticize. While obviously the selections of texts do not reflect the entirety of post-war discourse, the implications of multi-textual criticism are significant to rhetorical scholarship.

Suggestions for Future Research

This thesis sets a precedent for future scholarship in multiple areas. First, Nayar’s (1999) notion of ordering deserves future examination in rhetorical scholarship. Rhetorical scholars should further explore neocolonial theory in order to chart the exact ways in which ordering functions within the process of empire building. The second avenue for future research involves increased examination of neocolonialism as a process rather than an isolated instance, frozen in time. Because it involves persuading a foreign audience of people

who are the subjects of empire building, there is a rich field of unexplored rhetoric that focuses on foreign audiences in post-war arenas.

Additionally, there are multiple aspects of post-war rhetoric that deserve further examination. First, consideration of post-war rhetoric in terms of empire building, and the importance of winning the peace as a component of empire building, is an area that has not been explored by rhetorical scholars. This analysis suggests that the administration attempts to gloss over the notion of ordering in any but a military sense. Whether this is true in other instances would add to our understanding of the way that administrations craft messages in post-war arenas.

Presidential rhetoric in post-war environments deserves future consideration for a few reasons. Initially, one should be able to chart the way in which post-war rhetoric deviates from the already established genre of wartime rhetoric. Additionally, the burdens of a president and the rhetorical tools used by presidents after a war need to be more widely explored. Finally, an understanding of the specific rhetorical exigencies that demand rhetorical responses from presidents, as well as the ones where the president does not appear to have a rhetorical responsibility, would be a valuable contribution to rhetorical theory.

Rhetorical investigations of how occupying or neocolonial powers communicate directly with citizens of the occupied country provide a rich field of rhetorical texts that have not been explored. Comparison of the rhetorical strategies of a Coalition authority, such as Paul Bremer, to more dispersed communications (such as leaflets or newspaper advertisements) would provide a better sense of the rhetorical strategies used to persuade people who are the subject of occupation.

In terms of the media, the *New York Times* provides insight into only one strain of post-war media rhetoric. Examining televised post-war coverage, as well as local papers, would further enrich the subject of representations and scenic analysis for two reasons: first, because different media sources have different target audiences, and second because visual imagery would enhance the ideas presented.

This thesis examined only a small segment of the rhetoric produced after the Iraqi war. However, the administration makes strategic choices when deciding who will communicate what message. Examining the exigence that provokes communication by Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, or other members of the administration, and analyzing when they speak instead of the president, and what it is they say, would provide a more complete view of the administration's discourse.

Conclusion

The broader implications to America's war on Iraq remain to be seen; whether Iraq will emerge as a capitalist democracy, or recede into civil war and regional strife, will only become clear in the decades to come. Regardless, this project suggests that a violent ordering must occur in the immediate aftermath of war for western forces to achieve regime change and nation-building in the Middle East. Neocolonial theory provides a broader framework that allows a rhetorician to step outside of the realist arena, and to examine the specific manifestations of foreign policy discourse. Additionally, this project suggests that the function of neocolonial rhetoric is most completely revealed through multipentadic analysis that takes into account rhetoric from multiple sources. Charting neocolonial rhetoric in this way hopefully uncovers mechanisms used by the elite to deny dissent in the new global order, and to marginalize competing visions of the future that may be espoused by colonized

citizens. The ultimate goal of this criticism is to unmask the motivations and strategies employed by the political elite. Only through this unmasking can critics work to create alternatives within foreign policy discourse, and towards a world without rhetorical violence.

APPENDIX

Author's note: while there is some certainty that President Bush's speeches and the *New York Times* articles will be preserved in archives and on the internet, the relative obscurity of L. Paul Bremer's discourse leaves some doubt about whether it will be preserved permanently. As such, I have included each of the speeches here. The speeches appear on the Coalition Authority's website in a fairly rough form; I have preserved the formatting here as it is on the webpage.

Press Release Coalition Provisional Authority, PR no 0014, 7 July 2003

TEXT OF AMBASSADOR BREMER'S ADDRESS TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE:

BUDGET AND BANKNOTES 7 JULY 2003

Mesaa al khair. I am Paul Bremer, Administrator for the Coalition Provisional Authority. My number one priority remains, as always, security: providing the security which Iraq needs in order to rebuild. Those who reject progress in Iraq know that they are losing. They are now targeting you and the basic services like water and electricity which you need. If you have information about these renegades, you should tell a coalition military or civilian person. We have already hit them hard. And we will defeat them. Our second priority is to get the economy going again so that we can create jobs for you. Here , I have a couple of important announcements on the economy. First, I have just approved the Iraqi budget for the remainder of this year. This is a very important step in getting Iraq and Iraqis back to work. For the last few weeks, coalition officials have been working hard alongside Iraqi officials in all the ministries of state to put together a Iraq

and Iraqis back to work. For the last few weeks, coalition officials have been working hard alongside Iraqi officials in all the ministries of state to put together a budget that will serve the Iraqi people. The officials who used to steal most of Iraq's resources, and misuse what little was left, have gone. All of Iraq's resources will now be spent on you, the Iraqi people, and on projects which directly benefit you. With this budget, ministries will be able to spend money on important projects. Many state companies will be able to begin operating again. Your budget allocates over 9 trillion to these key projects and the key challenges ahead. A little over half of the money will come from oil revenues. It is the coalition's policy that Iraq's oil will finally be used for the benefit of all the Iraqi people. I might add that the US government is contributing an additional 4 and a half trillion dinars towards the reconstruction of Iraq. The key priorities in the budget are to improve the lives of all Iraqis. Some of the key areas are: Projects in the areas of security and justice worth around 350 billion dinars. Improvements to the electricity system worth around 440 billion dinars. Construction and other reconstruction spending of around 385 billion dinars. Public health improvements worth around 315 billion dinars. Water and sewerage improvements worth around 110 billion dinars; and Spending on telecommunications to the value of 225 billion dinars. Together, these programs will have an enormous impact on your lives. But some will take time to come into effect, so you and we, working together, will have to be patient. And, again, I want to stress that all this money will be spent in a way that the Iraqi people will know what it was spent on. For the first time, you will know what is being done with your money. Secondly, I am announcing today that the Coalition on behalf of the Iraqi people will print and distribute new banknotes for all of Iraq. Iraqis need banknotes which are both high quality and

easy-to-use. Neither the so-called "print" dinars in circulation in most of Iraq, nor the formal national currency (or "Swiss" dinar) still used in some parts of the North are suitable. "Print dinars" are poor quality, and in practice circulate widely in only two denominations – the 250 dinar note, and the 10,000 dinar note. This makes them very inconvenient to use. The "Swiss" dinars, while of higher quality, are so old that they are literally falling apart in people's hands. Everywhere I have traveled in recent weeks, Iraqis have told me about these problems. So I have consulted with Iraqi political, economic and business leaders to find a solution. The Solution is to print new bank notes. On October 15, new Iraqi dinar banknotes will be available to the Iraqi people. They will replace the existing Iraqi "print" dinars at parity: one new Iraqi dinar will be worth the same as one "print" dinar. The new dinar will replace the "Swiss" dinar at the rate of 150 new dinars to one Swiss dinar. These different rates reflect the different prices, expressed in local currency, in different parts of the country. For the first time in 12 years, all of Iraq will again use one set of banknotes. We have not designed a new currency for Iraq. Only a sovereign Iraqi government could take that decision. So we have taken the designs from the former national dinar (the "Swiss" dinar). But the new notes will be impossible to confuse with the "Swiss" dinar, as both the colours and the denominations will be different. Let me show you an example [show slide]. The new dinars will be printed in a full range of denominations: in 50s; 250s; 1,000s; 5,000s; 10,000s; and 25,000s. They will be higher quality and last longer. They will be very hard to forge, and thus be notes in which all Iraqis can be confident. On 15 October, these new notes will be ready. Until then, you need do nothing. When the time comes we will provide practical instructions on how to trade your old notes for the new ones. After Oct 15 you will have three months

to swap your existing notes for the new ones, so there will be no need to rush. There will be plenty of new notes available. And you won't need to withdraw money from your bank accounts to change over to the new notes: that will be done automatically for you.

Together, these two new developments underline that the coalition, working closely with Iraqis at all levels, is determined to improve the economy of this country, and the lives of all its citizens. Shahrān

DATE: 12 July 2003 PR No. 00017

TEXT AMBASSADOR BREMER'S WEEKLY TV ADDRESS

12 JULY 2003

Masaa al Khair. I am Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Last week was a good week for Iraq.

- The Baghdad City Advisory Council held its first meeting, and I was honored to attend.

Across the country, new Councils have been formed to represent the views of citizens in the management of their towns and cities. Democracy is on the move in Iraq.

- We finalized the state budget for 2003, a budget of over 9 trillion dinars, which includes huge increases in spending across the board, especially on public services. For example, the Ministry of Health will spend in the second half of this year 35 times more on health than it did in the second half of last year under Saddam Hussein.

- We announced new banknotes for Iraq, to deal with all the problems of the existing notes: poor quality or old banknotes, not enough denominations, and two separate currencies in one recently unified country. These new notes, which will be ready on October 15, will make you rightly proud of your currency again.

- I visited Najaf and announced a number of new development initiatives for that region.

Across the whole of Iraq, there is an enormous amount of development and reconstruction work underway, to repair some of the damage done by Saddam's regime, and to invest in your future. To date, the coalition has carried out almost 2000 reconstruction projects across the country, to help make life better for all Iraqis.

- We arrested more remnants of the last regime, include 2 of Saddam Hussein's inner circle: Mizbar Kkudr al-Hadi and Mahmud Dhiyab al-Ahmad. Both were members of the inner

circle of bad men responsible for repressing you, the Iraqi people. We now have in custody 34, about two-thirds, of Saddam Hussein's top cohorts.

And we will find the rest in the weeks ahead, including – if they are still alive – Saddam Hussein and his sons. If you have information on any of these people, then please give it to any coalition official – military or civilian.

You will be helping to complete the process of change in this country. You will be helping to bring these people to justice. You will receive a financial reward. And we will ensure your safety.

There are a very few Iraqis left who are attacking change and progress in this country. These vicious men target the services you need, like electricity and water. They target, as we work together to transform this country. But rest assured that we are targeting them aggressively.

Together, we will defeat them, to ensure that your new freedoms are safe, and that the momentous changes in Iraq in the last few weeks are never reversed. The coalition came as liberators. We have made all Iraqis free, and we will protect and entrench these freedoms.

This week, the new Governing Council will be formed. This will be a momentous step for Iraq:

- The launch of the Governing Council will mean that Iraqis play a more central role in running their country. The Governing Council will be involved in all the significant decisions which the Iraqi Government and the Coalition need to take in the months ahead. The Council will name the new Ministers to lead Iraq's Ministries. And its members will be able to represent Iraq internationally. It will determine the budget for next year.
- The formation of the Governing Council will also mark the start of the process leading to full, free and fair democratic elections in Iraq.

- The Governing Council will bring together, for the first time in Iraq's history, a balanced representative group of political leaders from across this country. It will represent the diversity of Iraq: whether you are Shi'a or Sunni, Arab or Kurd, Baghdadi or Basrawi, man or woman, you will see yourself represented in this council. But, more importantly, the Council as a whole will represent all Iraqis. I look forward to the Council taking decisions on the basis of what is right for all Iraqis.
- One of the Governing Council's first jobs will be to help launch the constitutional process: the process by which you, the Iraqi people, write your new constitution. It will be a constitution to cement your freedoms, and to enable these democratic elections to take place. The constitution will be written by Iraqis and for Iraqis. It will not be written by the Coalition. Once the constitution is written, you, the Iraqi people, will have an opportunity to approve it. Then you will elect a sovereign Iraqi government. And the Coalition's job will be done.

The Governing Council will be an interim body. A body to ensure that all Iraqis' views and needs are properly represented in this interim period. It will be a huge step forward in all the ways I have just described. But the Council is the first step on an important journey for all Iraqis. The end-goal is full, free and fair elections: real democracy and real accountability for the first time in Iraq's political history. That will mark a truly momentous moment for Iraq, when this country can once again lead this region by example, and by its modernity.

L. Paul Bremer, III Weekly Address to the Iraqi People

As prepared for delivery for Broadcast on Iraqi Media Network at 2000 (Baghdad Time) 8

August 2003

Mallah Bil Khair.

I am Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition

Provision Authority.

This week I would like to talk to you about the quest for law and order.

The Governing Council, in its political statement, named security as its number one priority. The Council said it want to emphasize Providing security and stability for citizens and the protection of their properties as well as activating and rebuilding state institutions, specifically the Iraqi police force and army. The Coalition Authority agrees with that goal. We are working with the Governing Council to help achieve it. We understand, as does the Governing Council, that Iraq is not as safe as it once was and not as safe as it must become. Rebuilding the police service is an urgent and critical problem, but the rebuilding requires careful thought and implementation. In Iraq, as in many countries, some individuals in the police force participated in repression by the state. Right now there are almost 34,000 Iraqi police on the streets. Of these, over 4,500, plus 1,200 traffic police, are in Baghdad. We are reviewing the backgrounds of an additional 4,500 candidates for police work in Baghdad. Within the next week we will begin an aggressive campaign recruit over 31,000 additional men and women for the police service. Once recruited, these 31,000 potential police officers must pass a background investigation and complete a rigorous, eight-week training course. Only after completing training will they be on the street.

Final Version approved 2124 Thursday 07Aug 03

Some retraining of current police has already begun. Police have been graduating from several police training programs around the country— here in Baghdad, in Al Fallujah and elsewhere. As they complete their training these retrained officers will resume their duties. You should know that the Iraqi police are working harder than ever to make your streets safer. In the past few weeks they have been involved in many operations that have resulted in the arrests or deaths of kidnappers, carjackers, robbery suspects and violent criminals. This activity will continue and as the new police are recruited, trained and assigned, the streets will become safer. I know this is a frustrating time for you and that the high crime rate makes everything worse. Programs to solve the crime problem are underway and before the end of 2003 you will start to see more and more Iraqi policemen and fewer and fewer soldiers on your streets.

A larger and better police service will help. But, police work is only part of a criminal justice system. While the police must investigate crimes and arrest those suspected of crimes, judicial systems must determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. And, if the individual is found innocent, determine punishment— usually a term of imprisonment. There is progress here as well. Right after the war, most of Iraq's courthouses were badly damaged and only a few were operating. Today about 300 of Iraq's 400 courts are operating. Not only are the courts functioning, they functioning in way that protects society and while assuring that the rights of the accused are respected. Apart from the regular courts the Governing Council has directed the creation of:

specialized courts to prosecute officials of the former regime who collaborated in the commission of crimes against the Iraqi people and humanity and to exact just punishment of those who are convicted of such crimes.

The Governing Council has now set up a committee to create these specialized courts. We at the Coalition Provision Authority completely support these actions by the Government Council. We work daily with them providing advice and assistance on how such a tribunal might function.

Additionally, Coalition holds 34 senior members of Saddam's regime. When the Governing Council opens the Special Courts we will turn over these 34 prisoners.

* * *

Page 6 of 9

Final Version approved 2124 Thursday 07Aug 03

Convicted criminals are often sent to prison as punishment for their crime and as a means of protecting society.

Here too there is progress. Although many of the Iraq's 151 prisons were badly damaged, many are now open and operating, often with funds made available by local Coalition commanders. We are also rebuilding prisons to humane standards.

While many prisons are not yet open, there is one kind of prison Iraq should never see again—the secret prison. We know that secret prisons existed under Saddam.

The very fact that they were secret makes it hard for us to be certain how many there are and where they are.

We think most of them were underground and in rural areas, though some were in the city.

Page 7 of 9

Final Version approved 2124 Thursday 07Aug 03

However many secret prisons we find, whatever atrocities were committed there, you may be sure of one thing: Imprisonment without cause, imprisonment in secret places, ended with Saddam and his Baathist thugs. In a few cases, we are keeping unusually dangerous prisoners, mostly Saddam's henchmen, in separate detention facilities. But these places are very different from Saddam's secret torture chambers. The International Committee of the Red Cross is permitted access to any prisoner anywhere in Iraq at any time. We encourage their visits so that an independent organization can verify that all prisoners are humanely treated. Additionally, we are developing a tracking system which will permit family members and friends to obtain information about prisoners.

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Page 8 of 9

Final Version approved 2124 Thursday 07Aug 03

In closing, I want to say again that we understand the desire of you, the Iraqi people, to end your fear of both political oppression and the depredations of common criminals.

We are going to remove that fear from your lives.

L. Paul Bremer, III

Weekly Address to the Iraqi People

1 August 2003

Drafted by Donald R Hamilton: File on Hamilton's C Drive

MAllah Bil Khair.

I am Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provision Authority.

This week I want to talk to you about four subjects: the death of Uday and Qusay, the continuing search for Saddam, economic conditions and the process which will bring about a government of Iraqis, by Iraqis and for Iraqis.

Most of you know that Coalition Forces killed Uday and Qusay in a firefight last week. Similarly, I am sure you know that we learned their whereabouts from an Iraqi informant.

This week, the United States Government approved paying that informant \$30 million. This is the largest reward ever paid by the U.S. Government and payment was approved within one week. The informant's identity will be protected forever. He and his family are now safely out of Iraq.

We continue to offer \$25 billion for information leading to the capture or death of Saddam. We are prepared to respond to information about him as quickly as we were for information about sons.

If you know Saddam's whereabouts, you can stay close to him and share his fate while someone else collects the \$25 million. Or, you can collect the \$25 million and let Saddam decide if he wishes to surrender or fight.

I am pleased to report some progress on economic matters.

Our plan to generate employment in irrigation and construction projects continues on track. These projects have already created tens of thousands of new jobs. Of course the projects not only create new jobs, but useful public works. Working with the Governing Council I will be focused on creating even more new jobs in the month ahead.

In the city of Baghdad every branch of the Rafidain and Rashid banks is open or its customers are served by a nearby branch. This work will continue until all parts of the country have full banking services.

Not all economic news is good. There is a shortage of diesel fuel and it will continue for several weeks.

The problem has three parts.

Refinery production has been limited at all three refineries during July due to sabotage by enemies of the Iraqi people and mechanical difficulties.

Second, there is a distribution problem getting diesel from Basra, where inventories are plentiful, to other areas of the country where it is needed. Also, this is good news, economic activity is picking up, thus increasing the demand for diesel.

Unfortunately, a lot of diesel is leaving the country illegally by smuggling. The Coalition, working with Iraqi officials has an aggressive program to stop these criminals who are stealing Iraq's wealth.

Iraq's state oil marketing organization has contracts for importing diesel but the shortage will continue for at least a few weeks more.

I know that many Iraqis are interested in understanding the path that leads to a full sovereign Iraqi government.

There is no reason Iraq should not have a fully independent government by this time next year.

Three steps are needed to reach that goal.

First, a Governing Council, a political body with real responsibility, had to be established. This was done three weeks ago.

Next, Iraq must have a written constitution. That constitution must provide for elections.

Those elections, which are the third step, must be carried out transparently so that the legitimacy of the resulting government is obvious to you, the people of Iraq, and obvious to the rest of the world.

How is this going to happen?

The Governing Council has appointed a preliminary committee to determine the best means for writing a constitution.

Writing a constitution is no easy task. In every society around the world different, legitimate rights come into conflict:

- Where is the balance between the right of an individual Iraqi to be let alone and the duty of the Iraqi state to protect its citizens?
- When does the right to express ideas become incitement to violence?
- How should Iraqis distinguish among:
 - o the power to create laws,
 - o the power to enforce laws,
 - o the power to interpret laws?

Iraqis must make these decisions after the Preliminary Committee and the Governing Council determines the best mechanism for writing the new constitution.

In the coming months, I expect peaceful, but intense discussion and debate on the form and content of new constitution. Once a constitution is in place, it will take some time to put the

administrative process of elections into place. While that is going on, those individuals who wish to participate in government will no doubt be organizing in hopes of electoral victory. The coalition will not control this process or its schedule. That is the responsibility of the Governing Council and whatever organization they create to write a constitution. It is possible that all this can be done in the space of one year, but that will be up to the Iraqi people.

Once a free, legitimate and sovereign Iraqi government is in place, the powers of sovereignty now exercised by the Coalition will be given to the elected Iraqi government. At that point, the Coalition's job will be over. We will work with Iraqis in the months ahead to move this process along as quickly possible.

Thank you very much.

L. Paul Bremer

Address to the Iraqi People

Taped 21 August 2003 For Broadcast at 2000 Local Time 22 August 2003

I am Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Last week I told you that your future was full of hope. It still is, but there is no denying that this has been a hard week.

You all know of the sabotage of Iraq's oil and water pipelines and Tuesday's terrorist attack on the United Nations. These are hard blows, but you have withstood worse and your trials have made you stronger.

And make no mistake; it is Iraqis who absorbed the blows:

All those who died in the attack on the Jordanian mission were Iraqis.

Although bodies are still being pulled from the rubble, it appears that many of those who died in the attack on the UN were Iraqis.

The humanitarian mission of the United Nations, which is not part of the Coalition, has been damaged and slowed. One of the things the UN was working on was the restoration of electric power. The next time you are sitting in the dark, remember the bombing of UN headquarters.

More than 100,000 Iraqis lost all running water when a water main was sabotaged in Baghdad.

· Blowing up the oil export pipeline is costing Iraqis \$7 million for each day the pipeline is closed.

Sometimes it is hard to grasp what you can do with \$7 million. Let me put it this way:

- The money lost on Friday and Saturday could have renovated 400 primary schools.
- The money lost on Sunday and Monday could have renovated 130 courthouses.
- The money lost on Tuesday and Wednesday could have reconstructed two water treatment facilities big enough to bring safe water to over 200,000 people.
- The money lost on Thursday could have purchased 46 ultrasound machines to bring better health care.
- The money lost today, Friday, could have renovated a hospital.

That is the money already lost. Every day that pipeline does not pump means greater losses to you, the Iraqi people.

What can be done to bring you closer to the fulfillment of your hopes? What can be done about the threats you face daily?

More and better trained Iraqi police will begin to bring down the unacceptably high rate of common crime. They will begin to remove from the streets the carjackers, the rapists, the kidnapers and thieves that Saddam released from prison.

The saboteurs and terrorists are not common criminals, but can be equally dangerous. They sing a song of brave deeds, but stop and think:

How brave do you have to be to break a water pipe?

Where were they when Saddam had his foot on your neck?

Their aim is to make your lives miserable. Their plan is simple:

One: Make a bad situation worse by preventing you from getting electricity and fuel and water.

Two: Blame the Governing Council and the Coalition because you do not receive enough electricity and fuel and water.

Three: Reintroduce Baathism or introduce some fresh hell.

How will they be stopped?

Ultimately you, ordinary citizens of Iraq, will provide the information that the Iraqi police and the Coalition need stop them.

You understand too much to be swindled by the people who brought you Saddam and his family and his Baathist friends.

You are too smart to believe that the people who blew up UN headquarters, who destroy electrical line and oil and water pipes, are going to bring you security and prosperity.

What can you do to fulfill your hopes for the future?

You can improve the intelligence available to the Coalition and the Governing Council by reporting suspicious activities. Some of you know where the evil doers are. Tell us and we'll arrest them sooner, before they destroy more, before they murder more.

If you want to stop the violence,

if you want your oil to be sold so the money can buy school books and medicine,

if you want water to flow,

if you want more dependable electric supplies,

you can help. Report suspicious activity to the police or to the Coalition.

Your cooperation is needed. Otherwise the evil doers will respond with truck bombs, the evil doers will pour your oil and water onto the ground, the evil doers attacks will mean that schools and hospitals are not built as soon as they could be.

I spoke to you last week about hope, about an Iraqi future full of hope. The hope will be fulfilled.

The people of Iraq are not going to be denied a chance for a better life.

Even in this grim week, good things have continued to happen:

This past week Iraqis working for the city of Baghdad repaired the damage from the attack on the water main. Damage was severe and repairs were expected to take days. Instead, the workers had some water flowing in 12 hours and repairs were complete in 24 hours.

This past week work was completed on rehabilitation of the Baghdad Electric Distribution Centers at Al Karkh and Al Rusafah.

This past week work continued on a \$5.1 million restoration of Rustimiyah South Sewage Treatment Plant.

This past week work continued in Kirkuk on the rehabilitation of four public health clinics serving nearly 95,000 people.

This past week work continued on a project to bring adequate irrigation to 35,000 farmers in the Wasit Governorate. The same project is bringing adequate drinking water to 3,000 residents of Abdallah village.

These are just a few examples of dozens of Coalition projects worth millions of dollars that are underway every day all over Iraq.

The work to build a better life for all Iraqis did not stop. That work will not stop.

The Coalition is going to stay until you can stand on your own feet, but not one day longer.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has announced that the UN is staying.

Turning your hopes into realities will take time. It will be difficult. But you have the strength to endure. You are creating a better future for you and for you children and their children down through the generations.

Thank you.

L. Paul Bremer Broadcast to the Iraqi People

29 August 03

Masaa al Khair.

I am Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

When I spoke to you two weeks ago I told you all Iraqis had a future with hope.

- You will live in dignity.
- You will live in peace.
- You will live in prosperity.

- You will live in the quiet enjoyment of family, of friends, and of a decent income honestly earned.

- You will live in an Iraq governed by and for the people of Iraq.

Tonight, I am going to offer concrete examples of the things that are happening now, not in the distant future, but the daily tasks that are fulfilling your future hopes.

You have a future full of hope in public health care.

Right now every hospital and clinic in Baghdad is operating, as are most of the others around the country.

Right now the clinics and hospitals of Iraq have 7,500 tons of medicines distributed by the Coalition since May, an increase of 700 percent of the levels at the end of the war.

Right now the Coalition is installing 128 generators and uninterruptible power supplies in hospitals and clinics.

You have a future full of hope in education.

Right now the Coalition is preparing five million new science and math textbooks for delivery to schools in the fall.

Right now the Coalition is rehabilitating 1,000 primary schools.

They will be ready for the new school year.

Right now the Coalition is preparing kits of essential school supplies for 1.2 million Iraqi school children.

Right now the Coalition is preparing 3,900 sets of essential supplies for school teachers and administrators.

Right now the Coalition has ended the intellectual and academic isolation imposed and enforced by Saddam.

- Iraq's ties to the scholars of the world are being reestablished. Iraq's academics are now free to travel abroad to attend conferences and exchange ideas with their counterparts.
- The U.S. will donate \$20 million to establish partnerships between specific U.S. universities and specific Iraqi universities.

You have a future full of hope in every area.

Right now water systems nationwide are operating at 70 percent capacity.

- Right now the Coalition is paying 90,000 Iraqis to clean your country's irrigation canals of invasive weeds.
- Thousands of kilometers of irrigation canals working more efficiently.
- The Coalition has paid workers more than 7.5 billion dinars in wages.

Right now Iraqi workers are producing over 1 million barrels of oil per day.

- All the money received for that oil belongs to you, the Iraqi people.

Right now the two largest banks are accepting loan applications from private businesses.

- This means that all Iraqis are now free to open their own businesses—even if they are not Baathists.

Right now 92,000 Iraqis receive social security and welfare benefits four times higher than they received under Saddam.

Right now 1.3 million Iraqi civil servants are drawing salaries. Under a new salary scale the Coalition has established for public workers, many of them, such as teachers, are paid four times what they were paid under Saddam.

Right now 10,000 Iraqis have been hired and are being trained, uniformed, and armed to guard Iraq's electrical and oil facilities as well as its bridges and dams.

Right now the zoo in Baghdad has reopened.

Right now, and for the first time in history, all of Baghdad has garbage collection service.

- No longer is garbage collection a privilege reserved for neighborhoods favored by the government.
- No longer do ordinary citizens have to pollute their neighborhood by burying or burning their own garbage.

Right now the Governing Council is preparing special tribunals to judge members of the Saddam regime.

Other things, while not complete, are progressing.

Contracts have been signed so that by December Baghdad will have as many telephone lines as it has ever. More will follow.

By the end of the year you will have a functioning mobile phone service.

- This is new to Iraq because Saddam and his security services did not trust you with mobile telephones.

At the time of liberation, Iraq produced only 300 megawatts of electricity daily

Today Iraq produces eleven times as much, 3,300 megawatts of electricity daily.

Working with Iraqis, the Coalition has developed a plan to restore power to the same levels as before the war. So that by October first Iraq will produce almost 4,400 megawatts per day—almost 15 times as much at war's end.

About one year from now, for the first time in history, every Iraqi in every city, town and village will have as much electricity as he or she can use and he will have it 24 hours a day, every single day.

* * * * *

This list is not complete, but I offer it to you as evidence that your future of hope is more than words.

Hopes for the future are important. They guide daily activities.

But hopes are made reality through daily effort and perseverance.

Right now, today the Coalition works with millions of Iraqis to make your hopes a reality.

Thank you.

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