

**THE MASS MEDIA AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE: TOWARD A MORE
RESPONSIBLE COVERAGE**

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By

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my loving father, Mathias Tim Udomah, whose total self-giving and exemplary life greatly translated me to the person I am today.

Dad, I am eternally grateful for every sacrifice you made and all the inconveniences you subjected yourself to in order to give your children the greatest asset - quality education. Live on in God's Peace.

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ABSTRACT

THE MASS MEDIA AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE: TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE COVERAGE

by

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The Hutus rose against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994 in an unrestricted pogrom that took away 800,000 innocent lives within a short period of hundred days. Proportionately, that number would translate into a whooping 8,000 deaths a day if the cost of the genocide were to be calculated per day.

With the local media on the side of the killers, what did the international media do to help stop the killing? What could they have done? And what should be done so that this sort of disaster does not continue to befall humanity? These questions, considered within the context of media social responsibility, constitute the reason for this ethical investigation into the media coverage of the Rwandan genocide, as well as a reflection on a strategic plan or plans of action that would ensure a more responsible coverage in potential situations.

This study is consistent with many authors who argue that news coverage has to be socially responsible by being existentially objective, promoting respect for the sacredness of human life, and operating from the angle of care-based ethics. Responsible news coverage should not only be truthful, fair and balanced but must also impact the society positively in a tremendous way.

While acknowledging existing media models of intervention in crisis situations, the predicament is a socio-political concern that demands a far-reaching solution, a *sanatio in radice*. To provide the needed solution, the educational base of journalism as a discipline should be broadened and deepened so that journalism students may be well equipped intellectually and skillfully for the difficult job of reporting conflicts of genocidal nature. Moreover, conflict coverage should be considered a necessary and restricted area of specialization in schools of journalism into which only highly intelligent and brave students ought to be admitted.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

From the very beginning of existence, conflict has been the bane of human experience as illustrated in the prehistoric account of the violent murder of Abel by his brother Cain (Genesis 4:8). The retributive pronouncements that followed in Cain's encounter with God are indicative of the cross-cultural truth that life is sacred and so should be respected. In that dialogue, Cain attempted to silence his conscience and to deny his responsibility by asking God the perennial question that has plagued humanity through the ages, "Am I my brother's keeper?" (Gen. 4:9). From this prehistoric moral anecdote about the baseless human animosity and murder until the present, the rhythm of unfounded hatred, killing and the dilemma of responsibility remains unchanged.

Historical records document seven major genocide cases in the 20th Century that cost 17.8 million innocent lives (Jones, 2006; The History Place, 2000). This figure is obviously staggering and portrays a situation of utter disrespect for human life in the different regions of the world. The concern for the sacredness of human life and the fear of a repetition of such carnage in the new millennium is the driving force behind this thesis. The researcher's interest in this topic was whipped up through a project in mass media and society class which focused on the Rwandan genocide, and was consolidated through a term paper in the media ethics class on the same topic.

The basic position in this thesis is the view that the virtue of care should be paramount in human activities and within the circle of human relationships. This care should go beyond the limits of family, ethnic, racial, religious, social, professional and national affiliations to the acknowledgement of the universal brotherhood of humanity. In this humanistic perspective, the ultimate responsibility is to liberate and to save those who have been denied the blessing of freedom and happiness that is proper to every human person. The subjugated members of our global community need assistance from all socio-political and religious groups to untie them from the genocidal stake of the baseless human animosity and extermination.

In view of the above challenge, this thesis will take an evaluative look at genocide situations in the 20th Century with particular and near exclusive focus on Rwanda. The author will use them as a historical foothold to establish a factual basis for the discussion on the indispensability of media social responsibility. In other words, every socio-political group and organization has its proper role to play in saving humanity from self destruction; but in this thesis, the author will focus on media responsibility in genocide situations.

The author will conduct a narrative analysis of the book, *The media and the Rwanda genocide*, edited by Alan Thompson (2007) because this work provides a first-hand account by journalists and other media professionals about press performance during the Rwandan genocide. Based on his analysis of the media role in the Rwandan experience and the ethical implications of that coverage, the author will stress the need for ethics of care and seek reliable ways through which the media could effectively help eradicate the problem that has greatly and unjustly destroyed a good percentage of the

human population in the last century. There are existing proposals for media intervention; the author will examine these strategies here to determine how well they address the problem. To conclude, this thesis will present a more fundamental strategy that would provide the needed solution to the nagging problem.

A. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

I. Historical background:

The history of the Rwandan genocide could be traced back to the evils of colonialism. In 1884, at the Berlin conference for the partition of Africa, European superpowers allotted Rwanda to Germany. Rwanda is a small east central African country with seven million people (The history place, 1999). It consists of three ethnic groups – Hutu (85 percent), Tutsi (14), and Twa (one percent) (Ilibagiza, 2006 ; Melvern, 2006).

The political arrangement in pre-colonial Rwanda was Tutsi monarchy with the majority Hutu serving largely as group heads in the neighborhood while most of the hill, district and provincial chiefs were Tutsi in the highly controlled hierarchy. The king's army also reflected similar arrangement. The warriors were Tutsi, the Hutu were the camp followers and the Twa provided pots and iron implements (Melvern, 2006).

After the First World War, Rwanda was transferred to Belgium under a League of Nations mandate. “The Belgians favored the minority Tutsi aristocracy and promoted its status as the ruling class; therefore Tutsis were ensured a better education to better manage the country and generate greater profit for the Belgian overlords” (Ilibagiza, p. 14), “and the conditions of the Hutu masses worsened” (Melvern, p. 5). In 1933, Belgium classified the Rwandans according to tribes giving them identification cards with the

ethnic grouping clearly marked (ibid). This worked in favor of the Tutsis and created a lingering resentment among Hutus that helped lay the groundwork for the genocide (Ilibagiza, 2006).

In 1957, the Hutu called for an end to their subservient status and majority rule in their published manifesto. Added to this was the belief that the Tutsis were only immigrants who overran the country many years before (Melvern, 2006). Thus, a socio-political struggle began in Rwanda.

In 1959, the Tutsi king died in mysterious circumstances and the Tutsi elites accused the Belgians and Hutu extremists. The rift between the Belgians and their favored Tutsis took root when the Tutsis called for greater independence (Ilibagiza, 2006). In November of 1959, a Hutu leader was attacked by Tutsi youths in revenge and this triggered off series of Tutsi killings from hill to hill and many Tutsi families fled from Rwanda for safety. This was the first of the genocides that took place between 1959 and 1994 (Melvern, 2006).

In 1962, Rwanda was declared an independent republic and with the help of Belgium, Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu became the first president with an entirely Hutu cabinet. Tutsis became eternal enemies (ibid).

On November 14, 1963 about 1,500 men recruited from refugee camps in Burundi tried two times to oust Kayibanda in an attempt to return home. These attempts failed and led to the massacre of 10,000 to 14,000 Tutsis (ibid).

In 1972, the Tutsis carried out genocide in Burundi against the Hutus when the Hutus tried to topple the Tutsi government. After the Hutu coup against their Tutsi rulers

was aborted, an estimated 200,000 Hutus were systematically murdered, and Kayibanda used this tragic Burundi slaughter to attack the Tutsis in Rwanda (ibid).

On July 5, 1973 a coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana ousted President Kayibanda with the purported intention of restoring stability in the country. Habyarimana became the president and made Rwanda a one-party state (ibid).

On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi rebel group, attempted to invade Rwanda but failed because of French and Zairian military support of the Rwandan government. Following this invasion attempt, the Tutsis in Rwanda were regarded as accomplices of the RPF rebels, and the campaign against them began in a journal called 'Kangura,' a Kinyarwanda word which means "wakes others up". From 1990 to 1993, the journal concentrated its attention on hate propaganda against the Tutsis. Another anti-Tutsi propaganda organ was the hate radio station called Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines – RTLM (ibid).

At 8.20 p.m. on April 6, 1994 the presidential jet was shot down in Kigali International Airport as President Habyarimana arrived from a regional summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Both Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed. Without knowing who masterminded the attack, this incident definitively set the stage for the horrific and baneful carnage against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus that was played out in the next hundred days (ibid).

II. The genocide:

Adam Jones (2006) and Linda Melvern (2006) document a very gruesome account of the Rwandan genocide. Immediately the Presidential Jet that carried Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira back from Tanzania was

shot down, the Presidential Guard had started erecting roadblocks around Kigali (Jones, 2006). “The following day, working from carefully prepared lists, soldiers and militias began murdering thousands of Tutsis and oppositionist Hutus” (ibid, p. 238).

At the initial stage of the genocide, ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect the moderate Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the prime minister herself were dastardly and strategically murdered. This led to the withdrawal of the remaining Belgian forces and other nationalities from Rwanda, leaving only an impactless number of UN troops on ground and creating a favorable situation for the killing of Tutsis (Jones, 2006; Melvern, 2006). According to Jones (2006),

Army and militia forces went street to street, block by block, and house to house, in Kigali and every other major city save Butare in the south.... Tutsis were dragged out of homes and hiding places and murdered, often after torture and rape. At the infamous roadblocks, those carrying Tutsi identity cards – along with some Hutus who were deemed to “look” Tutsi – were shot or hacked to death. Often the killers, whether drunk and willing or conscripted and reluctant, severed the Achilles’ tendon of their victims to immobilize them. They would be left for hours in agony, until the murderers mustered the energy to return and finish them off (p. 238).

Tens of thousands of Tutsis who sought safety in schools, stadiums and especially places of worship were sought out and killed by the Hutu extremists. “Parish Churches, along with schools and similar facilities, were soon piled thigh-high with the shot, hacked, and savaged corpses of the victims” (ibid, p. 239).

In the Rwandan genocide, concentrated killings in a few hours or days as opposed to months or years were unprecedented. For instance, on April 20, 1994, approximately 35,000 to 43,000 people were killed at the Parish of Karama in Butare Prefecture in less than six hours; and at Gatwaro stadium in Kibuye Prefecture, 12,000 were murdered in a single day. Throughout the atrocious enterprise, a well

planned strategy was visible. “Killers arrived for their duties at a designated hour, and broke off their murderous activities at five in the afternoon, as though clocking off” (ibid, p. 243). It was not only an affair of the military or the state functionaries. It also involved the ordinary Hutu men and women who participated in the killing of Tutsis and stripping of corpses (ibid).

Jones (2006) significantly remarks that the Hutu extremist government capitalized on several factors which they expected would keep outside influence off the genocide. First they played on the “African tribal conflict” stereotype, making it look like an inter-tribal conflict. Secondly, they fed off the 1993 Mogadishu experience involving the death of Pakistani and American troops that led to foreign withdrawal. Thirdly, they exploited the blind commitment of France to the Rwanda government. Lastly, they capitalized on the limited commitment of the international media and public opinion where Africa was concerned, especially with media overwhelming focus on the inaugural free elections in South Africa at that time. By the end of that genocide, approximately 800,000 Tutsis lost their lives (Jones, 2006; Melvern, 2006; The History Place, 1999).

The quantum of horror evident in the Rwandan genocide also occurred in the six other genocides of the 20th Century as outlined in “Appendix A” on. In his article, *The Killing Fields*, Robert Skidelsky (2004) reflected on these genocides and raised a pertinent question to that effect. “Why did the 20th Century produce so much mass killing of civilians – a phenomenon so terrible and unexpected that it caused a new word, “genocide”, to be coined to describe it?” (p. 18).

Skidelsky's reflection on genocide in the 20th Century should be highly appreciated. However, the point of interest in his article as it relates to this study is the awareness it raises to the historical continental shift in genocide experience, "From Europe, it spread to Asia and Africa" (p.18). The implication of this observation is that genocide has become a pandemic evil whose flame is threatening to engulf the entire world. This explains the need for a solution that would help prevent the return of the monstrous evil.

B. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A review of the 20th Century genocide cases points toward the theories of the press that could have been in operation during the genocide as reflected in the nature of government in those societies. Generally, there are many theories of communication such as

- **Structural and functional theories** which hold that "social structures are real and function in ways that can be observed objectively."
- **Cognitive and behavioral theories** which "tend to focus on psychology of individuals."
- **Interactionist theories** which "view social life as a process of interaction."
- **Interpretive theories** which "uncover the ways people actually understand their own experience."
- **Critical theories** which "are concerned with the conflict of interests in society and the way communication perpetuates domination of one group over

another” (Suresh, 2003,

<http://www.peoi.org/Courses/Coursesen/mass/mass2.html>).

However, the theories of the press that are directly related to this study are those proposed by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm in 1956 which Kalyani Suresh calls “classical theories” (ibid) while Terje Skjerdal (1993) calls them “normative theories” (<http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/2152/siebert.htm#authoritarian>). These include:

- **Authoritarian theory:** It operates in pre-democratic societies and has Plato and Thomas Hobbes as proponents. Here, the media are highly controlled by the government and are not allowed to print or broadcast what could undermine the established authority or offend the existing political values under the pain of punishment (Skjerdal, 1993).
- **Libertarian theory:** This theory which is also called the free press theory has John Locke, John Milton, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson as some of its principal exponents. It advocates the rights of the individual and the absence of control. Granting popular will precedence over the power of state, it sees the press as the fourth estate that should reflect public opinion. In summary, the libertarian theory advocates power without social responsibility (Suresh, 2003).
- **Communist theory:** This theory has its historical roots in the 1917 revolutionary and communist ideologies of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel which considered that “the entire mass media was saturated with bourgeois ideology” (ibid, <http://www.peoi.org/Courses/Coursesen/mass/mass2.html>). Therefore, the press should be taken from private ownership. According to

this theory, “the sole purpose of mass media was to educate the great masses of workers and not to give out information” (ibid). The communist theory resembles the authoritarian system to some extent as the government controls the media in both systems.

- **Social responsibility theory:** According to Skjerdal (1993), this theory is the fruit of an American initiative in the late 1940s referring to the Hutchins Commission of 1948. The commission realized after World War II that the market had failed to fulfill the promise that press freedom would reveal the truth, so, in the report on the Freedom of the Press it provided a model in which the media had to fulfill certain obligations to society. These obligations include “informativeness, truth, accuracy, objectivity, and balance” (<http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/2152/siebert.htm#authoritarian>).

Sifting through all the theories above, it is obvious that the most appealing is the social responsibility theory which is considered to have evolved from the libertarian theory (Merrill, 2004). This theory is appealing in the sense that the media are not controlled by the government who would manipulate them for the fulfillment of its purpose especially in genocide situations; nor are they absolutely free to the point of irresponsibility.

In truth the responsible press should be informative, truthful, accurate, objective and balanced as suggested by the Hutchins Commission (1947) but the social responsibility of the media should not be limited to these professional and impersonal demands. It should also include the ethical dimension of promoting the welfare of the ‘human other’ within the context of universal brotherhood especially in

time of need. It is this welfare dimension with particular reference to genocide situations that this study advocates as a significant component of the entire gamut of media social responsibility. The job of the journalist should not always be impersonal news report of events and occurrences. News that affects the human welfare should be reported with care and concern in a way that it arouses action. Theoretically this is expressed in care-based ethics and implied in John Rawl's theory of justice (Day, 2006). These theories propose care and concern for others as intrinsic aspects of human actions. These will be discussed in greater details in chapter three under the social responsibility theory.

C. JUSTIFICATIONS AND SCOPE OF STUDY

As stated above, the basis of this study is the ethics of care. It should be understood that this research is not undertaken just for the fulfillment of an academic requirement but it is also a sincere effort to find a way of solving the human problem of baseless carnage. The academic requirement constitutes a glorious opportunity for realizing a passionate ambition. Disturbed by the apparent disregard for human life in the 20th Century genocide situations that claimed 1.8 million helpless victims and understanding the influential power of the media (Willis, 2007), the author felt compelled to search for journalistic means through which a continuation of this tragedy could be averted.

Rather than define social relationships on the basis of the French proverb *chacun pour soi, Dieu pour nous tous* – everyman for himself, God for us all – human existence should consist of a global network of solidarity in which everyone contributes according to his own means to the wellbeing of the other.

Different groups and organizations including the media have been indicted in the Rwandan tragedy (Frontline, 2005; Melvern, 2006; Thompson, 2007), but this study focuses specifically on the media, reflecting on how they performed within the hundred-day period of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and how they can impact on societies to prevent a recurrence of such callous disaster in the future. Thus, the primary and important focus of this study is not the evaluation of media in their coverage of the Rwandan genocide but delineating ways that journalism can successfully help tackle the problem of genocide. The evaluation of the media coverage of the Rwandan genocide is only a platform for a more serious discussion or a useful means to a noble end.

Part two of the book *The media and the Rwanda genocide*, edited by Alan Thompson (2007) was used for the ethical and thematic analysis of the media role in the genocide. It is a collection of professional views and evaluation on the subject of media coverage of the Rwandan genocide by mostly journalists who themselves were news reporters on the scene. Since the authors of these articles were active media witnesses to the genocide, and the primary aim was not to evaluate the media coverage per se, their contributions provided the necessary and sufficient data for the analysis enough to contemplate and appreciate the problem of genocide coverage and the urgent need for a more reliable and impacting solution. This research is therefore built on their blocks of comments, turning their observations to a search for solutions aimed at formulating a strategy for more responsible genocide coverage through the ethical lens of the Rwandan experience.

Purpose-wise, this study aims at raising media awareness to the overriding necessity of social responsibility in genocide coverage and proposing authentic and reliable solutions through educational structures. In other words, the goal is to remind the media of their moral duty based on the sacredness of life and the universal brotherhood of humanity, and to propose a solid foundation for the fulfillment of that responsibility. It is hoped that this study will help journalism academy to design adequate curriculum that will satisfy the ethical and professional needs of journalism students in a way that will make them worthy ambassadors of the profession. It is also hoped that it will help journalists, especially those covering genocides and oppressive conflicts to see and appreciate their work not only as a duty but more as a vocation and a service to the ‘genocidally’ disenfranchised in our global society.

In line with the purpose of this study, the following questions were formulated to guide the analysis and the discussions in this study:

- What did the authors of the articles in part two of *The media and the Rwandan genocide* say about the media coverage of the 1994 Rwanda genocide?
- What are the ethical implications of their comments and observations in relation to media codes of ethics?
- How should the media be socially responsible in their coverage of genocide?
- What should be done to ensure a more responsible media coverage in potential situations?

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is a case study of the media coverage of the 1994 Rwandan genocide using qualitative thematic analysis approach – textual analysis. The materials for analysis are twelve of the thirteen articles contained in part two of the book, *The media and the Rwanda genocide* edited by Alan Thompson (2007). On March 13, 2004, the School of Journalism and Communication at Carlton University in Ottawa hosted a one-day symposium to mark the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. “The symposium examined in tandem the role of both the international media and Rwanda’s domestic news organizations in the cataclysmic events of 1994” (Thompson, 2007, p. xi). The theme of the symposium was, “The Media and the Rwanda Genocide.” The 12 articles constitute first-hand testimonies and professional evaluations of international media coverage of the 1994 Rwandan genocide by media practitioners themselves.

The research adopted an inductive approach, combining thematic analysis (Jodi Aronson, 1994) with qualitative data analysis (Daniel Chambliss and Russell Schutt, 2006). In line with qualitative thematic analysis method, each of the twelve articles were critically studied and analyzed for comments that indicate the role of media and the nature of their coverage in the genocide. Comments made by respective authors which describe media role and coverage were noted, collected and outlined as data for the analysis. These comments were first outlined under individual authors as shown in “Appendix B”. The data were further categorized into thematic groups or units according to their relatedness of idea as shown under Thematic Categorization in “Appendix C”. The purpose of the groupings was to establish a relatively objective basis for further inquiry. These themes were then ethically classified, interpreted and evaluated for implications and plausibility using Hutchins Commission Report and SPJ code of ethics

as the ethical parameter. In other words, the ethically-themed comments derived from the analysis of the twelve articles were passed through social responsibility test by means of the standards proposed in Hutchins Commission report and SPJ code of ethics. The result of this investigation opened a way for a broader discussion on the imperative nature of media social responsibility.

It is important to reiterate here that the purpose of this method was to delineate significant ethical themes and patterns that ran through in the news coverage of the Rwandan genocide and related conflicts. These themes and patterns were meant to provide socio-ethical perspectives for fruitful discussions on media social responsibility in the coverage of genocide situations, and serve as resources in the attempt to propose a model for genocide coverage in the future.

E. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

It is easy but sometimes perilous to presume an understanding of terms and concepts used in a discussion. In certain situations and under certain circumstances, such presumption may be permissible and harmless. But a study of this nature requires clarification of topical concepts and terms that will guide the discussion and define the perspective. This means explaining what ‘mass media’, ‘genocide’ and ‘responsible coverage’ stand for, especially as they are meant to be understood in this thesis.

I. Mass media:

As Random House Webster’s unabridged dictionary defines it, the media are “the means of communication, as radio and television, newspapers, and magazines, that reach or influence people widely” (Random House Webster’s dictionary, “media”). Evidently,

this definition only covers what are now known as ‘the traditional media’. Yet there have been new entrants over the years such as the Internet which “has become a moving force that has transformed the world of communications and the mass media” (Bagdikian, 2004, p. 58), accelerating the rate of social change around the globe, and introducing a new political battle ground over a range of issues (ibid). Thus, there are different facets of the mass media that are classified under two broad based categories, namely, the traditional and the new media. These different means of communication (configured in diverse ways), are oriented toward the singular purpose of sending information to various audiences.

In the course of writing a series foreword to Jim Willis’s (2006) book, *The media effect: How the news influences politics and government*, Jeffrey Scheuer inadvertently defined the mass media stating that, “As necessary instruments for accessing life on a larger scale than personal experience, the media forever straddle the boundary between what we perceive and how we perceive it” (p. iv). This statement does not only point out the media role in the society but succinctly defines the concept of the media touching on the media power and their *raison d’etre*. Sifting through the intricacies of this comment, the mass media could be subtly but comprehensively defined as the instruments or channels for accessing life on a larger scale than personal experience which unavoidably influence what we perceive and how we perceive it.

On the formal level, there is the tendency to restrict the boundaries of the mass media, and to stage a protracted intellectual discourse about which communication channels should and which ones should not belong in the mass media category. In view of the pragmatic-utilitarian orientation of this study, ‘mass media’ will include the

various means of social communication – radio, television, newspaper, magazine, Internet (World Wide Web), cell phone, etc. (Chalk, 2007) – that are actually and potentially useful for connecting people in various manners and degrees to world events. Journalists and media practitioners will be the umbrella terms used for people who engage in media practice.

II. Genocide:

Until Raphael Lemkin appeared on the scene, genocide had no name although its occurrences date back to antiquity. In terms of historical documentation, “Rome’s siege and eventual razing of Carthage at the close of the Third Punic War (149 – 46 BCE) has been labeled “The First Genocide”” (Jones, 2006, p. 5). As late as 1941, genocide still did not have a name. In his August 24, 1941 radio broadcast, Winston Churchill called it, “a crime without a name” (Lemkin, 1946, <http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/americanscholar1946.htm>). It was Raphael Lemkin (1946), a Polish-Jewish jurist who eventually combined the Greek word *genos* meaning, race or clan, and the Latin suffix *-cide* which refers to killing, to form the word genocide. He then defined genocide as “the crime of destroying national, racial or religious groups” (<http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/americanscholar1946.htm>). This definition in due course became the *instrumentum laboris* for the United Nations convention on genocide as well as a reference note for subsequent definitions of the term from Peter Drost in 1959 to Barbara Harff in 2003 (Jones, 2006).

In article II of the 1948 *United Nations Convention on Genocide*, genocide was defined as “any...acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.” These acts include:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Stein, S. D. 2002, <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/gendef.htm>).

It “covers various means of destruction, be it killing members of a particular group, exposing them to a grave physical or emotional harm, inflicting such physical damage that ends the group’s continued existence, preventing the members from giving birth, or forcefully removing their children and merging them with other communities” (Akcam, 2006, p. 9).

The series of definitions presented in *Genocide: A comprehensive introduction* (Jones, 2006), reveal the characteristic features of the evil act. It is premeditated, structured, and systematic. It is carried out by a dominant group, especially in a position of authority. It usually involves exploitation of the machinery of government; and it is directed toward the destruction of the minority based on racial, ethnic, social, cultural, or religious differences. The genocide cases that will be presented in chapter two all bear the imprints of these characteristics.

III. Responsible coverage:

Responsible coverage in this study derives from the social responsibility theory of the media earlier mentioned in this chapter. Referring to this, Christians (1986) states that “the litmus test of whether or not the news profession fulfills its mission over the long

term is its advocacy for those outside the socioeconomic establishment” (Christians, p. 110). What Christians is suggesting in this definition is that justice and concern must be served to the powerless. In other words, apart from informing, entertaining and doing business, the media must raise conflict to the level of discussion (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm, 1956) in such a way that it creates perceivable impact and liberate the oppressed.

The historical consolidation of this theory could be traced back to the 1947 Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press which published a report titled, *A Free and Responsible Press* (Christians and Nordenstreng, 2004).

As evident in its report, the commission did not preoccupy itself with the interest of media business or of government but on media’s duty to serve the society (Christian & Nordenstreng, 2004). In line with this observation, Christian and Nordenstreng clearly state that, “Responsible journalism does not strengthen the government in power, nor does it insist merely on the individual right to publish and make profit. The press must remain free from government and business pressure and serve society instead. Socially responsible news is defined by its duties to the community” (ibid, p. 4).

The social responsibility imperatives of Hutchins commission formed the bedrock of “the codes of ethics adopted and revised over the years by groups such as the Society of Professional Journalists and the American Society of Newspaper Editors” (Willis, 2007, p. 37).

Notably, there are striking similarities between the contents of Hutchins report and the codes of ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ), the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) and many other media ethics code world-wide.

This will be discussed in details in chapter three. For instance, SPJ code of ethics (<http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>) largely reflects Hutchins Commission's call to media responsibility in the section on "Seeking and reporting the truth." On the other hand, ASNE (2009) Statement of Principles, originally adopted in 1922 as the "Canons of Journalism" and renamed "Statement of Principles" with revisions in 1975 (<http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm>), "call upon newspapers to practice responsibility to the general welfare, sincerity, truthfulness, impartiality, fair play, decency, and respect for the individual's privacy" (Willis, 2007, p. 36). These ethical connections and relatedness of the different groups point to the fact that the social responsibility theory is of utmost importance to journalism as a profession.

CHAPTER TWO

FINDINGS AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS

This chapter embarks on a textual analysis of the twelve articles on international media coverage of the Rwandan genocide which make up part two of the book, *The media and the Rwanda genocide* edited by Alan Thompson. The focus is to delineate the role of the media in the macabre dance of the Rwandan genocide as seen through the ethical lens of media practitioners, especially those who were part of that experience. The question to ask is, “What did the media practitioners say in their articles about the media role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide?”

As already stated, the reason for using the book for a textual analysis is to provide the reliable data needed to delineate significant ethical themes and patterns that ran through in the news coverage of the Rwandan genocide. These themes and patterns will provide the socio-ethical perspectives needed for fruitful discussions on media social responsibility in the coverage of conflict situations, and serve as resources in the attempt to propose a model for conflict coverage in the future.

A. SUMMARY OF ARTICLES

The thirteen articles in part two of the book under review assess the different roles played in different ways by different international groups and organizations in the socio-political affairs of Rwanda and Africa before and during the genocide. The authors indict

every one of these groups and organizations for not acting accordingly toward saving the 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus who perished as a consequence of the collaborative negligence. The analysis in this study however is limited to what pertains to the media as a factor in that tragedy between April and July time-frame during which the genocide took place. As earlier pointed out, the issues on media coverage within this period are contained in twelve of the thirteen articles. A brief comment on the presentations of these authors may provide an insight into understanding and appreciating the findings. They stand as follows:

Mark Doyle's (2007) fourteen and a half pages article is both a personal and professional account of how he understood and reported the Rwandan genocide. It also testifies to the part the media organizations played. Doyle outlines the diverse ways in which he considered the media culpable in the events of that tragedy.

In her article, Anne Chaon (2007) examines the efforts of individual journalists against those of the media and exposes the level of commitment and culpability of each side in the genocide. Her conclusion is clearly that it was the media rather than journalists that failed in Rwanda.

Lindsey Hilsum (2007) focuses on the involvement of both the media and aid agencies in the 'second phase' of the Rwandan crisis, namely, the refugee situation in Goma, Zaire. The article underscores the interaction of political, economic, media and humanitarian forces in the aftermath of the Rwandan tragedy implicitly painting a portrait of misplaced emphasis on the part of the media.

Steven Livingston's (2007) article examines the relationship between US media coverage and policy making in the US, and how that relationship affected the Rwandan

genocide. The main thrust of his argument is that the American media is active where American government is involved, and since the US government did not intervene in Rwanda based on fallacious inference deduced from the American tragic experience in Somalia in the 1992/93 intervention, the American media stood aloof.

The account of the Rwandan genocide proposed by Linda Melvern (2007) is a drama of negligence by the UN, the Western powers and the media expressed in their refusal to readily acknowledge that genocide was taking place in Rwanda. In her article, Melvern clearly states the culpability of these groups.

Taking an introspective look at African media in relation to the Rwandan situation, Emmanuel Alozie (2007) comments on how African media covered the genocide. His contribution derives from his study of two leading African newspapers, namely, Kenya's Daily Nation and Nigeria's Guardian. He also comments on international media attitude toward African issues.

In his brief article, Nick Hughes (2007), a photo journalist, describes the systematic and gory nature of the genocide as he saw it through his camera lens, and laments the lack of photos and videos capturing the killings in action.

Tom Giles (2007) recounts the failure of the media in the Rwandan genocide focusing on BBC. He describes efforts of journalists at reporting the events as they unfolded against BBC's refusal to air these reports.

Edgar Roskis (2007) exposes the meaningless and self-serving engagement of photo journalists and cameramen in the genocide. He points out that the greater amount of media work was not done in the genocide field of Rwanda but in the refugee camp of Goma, Zaire, for possible material reasons such as winning awards.

Mike Dottridge's (2007) article focuses on the crisis situations before the genocide. He finds series of links connecting pre-1994 restiveness in that sub-region to the Rwandan genocide, and concludes that the media did not do a good job of reporting on these pre-1994 crises.

Richard Dowden (2007) like others releases a flurry of fury at the neglect of the different international bodies in the Rwandan tragedy from Britain to the US and the UN as well as the media. He particularly berates the media for insufficient and inaccurate coverage.

In his article, Alan Kuperman (2007) evaluates media role in the Rwandan crisis and finds them wanting in a number of ways. He presents the four lapses evident in the coverage, and points out the three factors responsible for those lapses.

Lastly but very importantly, Melissa Wall (2007) analyzed news magazine coverage of the Rwandan genocide for the entire year of 1994 as they appeared in Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World Report. She discovered patterns and themes in the coverage. Her conclusion is that "The Rwanda coverage continued the adherence to old patterns such as interpreting conflicts in Africa as evidence of backwardness" (p. 270).

Note:

Before proceeding to the next section to discuss findings, it should be noted that the different comments and points made by the authors in their evaluation of media coverage are tabulated thematically under Appendix C; and outlined concisely under each author under Appendix B.

B. FINDINGS

A critical and diligent study of all the twelve articles revealed a stream of comments by the authors describing the media approach and coverage of the genocide in Rwanda. These comments were collected and grouped into several broad-based categories depending on their thematic relationships. These comments fall under the following thematic categories:

- I. Misconstruction of the conflict
- II. Disconnection from the tragedy
- III. Concern for safety
- IV. Use of ambiguous terms and insinuations
- V. Wrong and limited focus
- VI. Sources
- VII. Statistics of death
- VIII. Naming the culprit
- IX. Belated acknowledgement of genocide
- X. Rifts between editors and reporters
- XI. Stereotypical views and remarks
- XII. Misleading reports
- XIII. Media commercial concern
- XIV. Personal efforts of journalists
- XV. Other international focus
- XVI. African media perspective
- XVII. Poor media presence and coverage
- XVIII. Lack of experience

XIX. Dearth of photo and video evidence

XX. Judgmental comments

I. Misconstruction of the conflict:

One of the statements against the media that cut across the wide-ranging spectrum of comments is that the media seriously misconstrued the Rwandan conflicts in the early days of the genocide. Doyle (2007) and Chaon (2007) point this out in direct statements while many others identify this misreading in the way the media described the crisis. The misconstrued descriptions are evident in the use of such words as ‘chaos’, ‘anarchy’ (Chaon, 2007, p. 162; Dowden, 2007, p. 253; Doyle, 2007, p. 145; Melvern, 2007, p. 198), ‘retaliations (Doyle, 2007, p. 150), and ‘furore’ (Chaon, 2007, p. 162) to portray what was happening in Rwanda.

The use of expressions such as ‘militias settling scores’ (Dowden, 2007, p. 253; Doyle, 2007, p. 150; Melvern, 2007, p. 198; Wall, 2007, p. 265), ‘intense battle for the strategic hilltop’ (Doyle, 2007, p. 151), ‘Africans killing Africans’ (Doyle, 2007, p. 155), ‘violence resulting from ancient tribal hatred’ (Melvern, 2007, p. 198; Wall, 2007, p. 265), and “opponents of the late president killed by government and militia forces” (Doyle, 2007, p. 149) created the impression that this was a civil war. In fact, the media actually mistook the genocide for civil war (Chaon, 2007; Kuperman, 2007).

II. Disconnection from the tragedy:

It would be expected that crippled by such magnanimous internal calamity, the genocide victims would find support from the external world. Unfortunately, the findings suggest the opposite. It was difficult for the world of the media and some journalists to connect with what was happening or to identify with the Tutsis of Rwanda in their

vicissitude. Doyle (2007) refers to a situation in which an African ambassador spent more than four hours explaining the dangerous situation to him and begged him not to forget Rwanda, yet he remarks that he did not feel what the ambassador was feeling – the genocide. In another situation, most American newspapers rejected Roger Winter's article that explained the genocidal nature of the Rwandan conflict (Melvern, 2007).

The extent of this emotional and psychological disconnection seemed to know no bounds. In their insensitivity to the horrors of the genocide, newsroom reverted to using “chaos” and “indiscriminate mass killings” in published reports (Doyle, 2007, p. 154). Rushes sent to BBC on the genocide were not aired because they were considered to be “too graphic” for British audience (Giles, 2007, p. 236).

Alan Kuperman (2007) observed that when the genocide was reaching its peak, reporters were quitting Rwanda. According to Tom Giles (2007), previous negative reactions in Britain to the pictures of Burundi murder on BBC shown at lunch time set the tone for media negligence. Those news organizations who cared enough to publish the Rwandan stories relegated them to the inside pages (Roskis, 2007).

III. Concern for safety:

The authors admit in different ways that covering Rwanda was a dangerous task to accomplish. Lindsey Hilsum laments that “it was a story we wanted to tell but it was appallingly dangerous” (p. 172); and Mark Doyle (2007) confesses that he could only cover the European evacuation stories because it was the only story that could be covered safely.

The dangerous situation did not allow journalists to go out and capture or experience much of the killings in action. Even what they knew, the fear factor prevented

them from reporting. Anne Chaon (2007) clearly indicates that the Interahamwe militias were looking for journalists reporting for Radio France Internationale (RFI) to kill based on the news report they filed. The only available footage that shows the people being killed in the genocide was shot by Nick Hughes (2007) from a concealed spot in a French school building surrounded by Belgian paratroopers. The sense of danger prevented journalists from closer coverage (Livingston, 2007).

IV. Use of ambiguous terms and insinuations:

From the elaborate testimonies gathered from the articles, the outside world could not appreciate the enormity of the genocide situation in Rwanda because journalists did not name the facts straight in their reports. Their stories were shrouded in ambiguity, and they mostly stated the facts by insinuations.

The ambiguities in the news report were evident in the use of expressions like “Rwandan man attacking another Rwandan” (Doyle, 2007, p. 148), “clash of government and rebel forces” (Doyle, 2007, p. 149), soldiers on the street “killing, terrorizing, kidnapping, and looting” (Alozie, 2007, p. 219), “innocent people killed in Kigali” (Doyle, 2007, p. 149), “slaughter of civilians” and “mass killing” (Chaon, 2007, p. 163; Doyle, 2007, p. 154). These expressions did not *ipso facto* define the conflict as genocide to arouse involvement. Rather they toned down the gravity of the massacre, creating a moral fog in public psyche and *laissez-faire* attitude in their reactions.

Some reports only hinted at what was happening without hitting the nail on the head. One example of these was Doyle’s (2007) news report of April 26, 1994 that described the killing as not being a simple tribal conflict without categorically calling it genocide. It might have been more than a simple tribal conflict, but that does not make it

genocide either. Another one is the April 19 report about “militias armed with machetes... directed by soldiers and forms a first line of defence against rebels and rebel sympathizers, who are often taken by the militia to include any ethnic Tutsi” (Doyle, 2007, p. 152). This statement insinuates the tragedy but does not define the situation as genocide.

V. Wrong and limited focus:

The main focus of reports should have highlighted the acts of genocide as they happened, defining them in clear terms and calling the international community to react. This does not seem to have been the case. Evidence drawn from the articles indicates that instead of reporting on the issues that mattered most, journalists focused on other rather subsidiary issues. Such instances were evident in various ways. The media focused on the evacuation of foreigners and closing of embassies (Dowden, 2007). They dwelt on the intensity of the battle between the government army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels and describing the types of weapons they used (Doyle, 2007); and gave prominence to the happenings in the refugee camp (Chaon, 2007; Giles, 2007; Hilsum, 2007; Livingston, 2007; Roskis, 2007). In cases where the focus was on the massacre, it was not broad-based. “For nearly two weeks, Western news organizations focused almost exclusively on Kigali... and did not report the far broader tragedy unfolding around them” (Kuperman, 2007, p. 257).

VI Sources:

Wall (2007) analyzed the sources used by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World Report. According to her analysis, 215 sources were quoted in all. Of this number, 22 per cent were aid workers, 21 per cent were ordinary local people, 14 per cent were

local opposition members, 13 per cent were Western officials, 13 per cent were UN officials, nine per cent were local officials, five per cent were expert sources, and other sources constituted one per cent. Wall expresses dissatisfaction about the low percentage of expert sources and total lack of sources from other African countries, stating that expert and African sources would have provided more accurate information about the facts of the matter.

Apart from Wall, no other author provides statistics of sources quoted. However, other authors argue to the effect that many sources quoted, accepted and used by the media in their news reports were unreliable. For instance, to gratify their implicit agenda, some diplomats explained to the media that “the killing of civilians was an offshoot of the renewed civil war” (Dowden, 2007, p. 253) instead of genocide and many journalists accepted this false account. Doyle (2001) also cites media acceptance of the unfounded claim by Sylvana Foa, UNHCR spokesperson, who told a press conference in Geneva that the Hutus in southwest Rwanda were fleeing for fear of being massacred by the advancing RPF when in fact there was “no evidence of mass killings by the RPF” (p. 155). Similarly, news reports “gave some credence to the Rwandan army claim that the RPF had rounded up 250 civilians and killed them” (Doyle, p. 152) when that claim was actually false. The concern here is that some of the sources that the media used in their news report did not represent the facts as they were. In other words, some of the sources were neither true nor objective. They were pushing their personal agendas in the information they gave to the media.

VII. Statistics of death:

Kuperman (2007) presents a more concise account on this theme. He observes that early published death counts by the media were grossly underestimated, sometimes by a factor of ten. Substantiating this point, he states that on April 10, three days into the genocide, The New York Times estimated 8,000 or "tens of thousands" dead in Kigali, and during the second week, there was no increase in media estimates, at least not to the level that commonly would be considered genocide. On April 16, the Guardian only estimated 20,000 deaths. Two days later, The New York Times published the same figure, thereby underestimating the actual carnage at that point by about ten-fold. The scope of killing rapidly emerged only after a few days later.

Accounts from Doyle (2007) and other journalists like Melvern (2007) and Dowden (2007) imply that the media used generic terms such as 'thousands of people killed', 'tens of thousands' and 'a large number of people killed' to reckon the number of deaths. Thus, the media did not provide a precise day-to-day account of the number of those killed. According to Kuperman's (2007) account, media reports of death counts were grossly miscalculated and underestimated.

VIII. Naming the culprits:

In the articles, the killings are mostly described in passive indirect terms such as "people were being killed" (Nick Hughes, 2007, p. 231) as if the perpetrators and the victims were unknown. Sometimes it leaves the reader confused which ties to the theme of ambiguity earlier discussed. Nonetheless, it is evident in some of the articles that the culprits were named. Doyle (2007) points to the Hutu militias opposed to ethnic Tutsis as the worst culprits. In Alozie's (2007) account, Kenya's Daily Nation and Nigeria's Guardian newspapers blamed the various Hutu-dominated governments for the atrocities

as well as the rebel Rwandan patriotic Front (RPF). On the other hand, Dowden comments that “The Interahamwe – the organized death squad was not mentioned in the press until 30 April” (p. 253). The point here is that they were named, but it came a little late into the killings. In general, only Doyle’s (2007) account roundly names the government forces and the Hutu militias – Interahamwe, as the culprits.

IX. Belated acknowledgement of genocide:

There is a general consensus among the different authors about the delay of the media in using the evil word. As already seen in the misconstruction of the conflict, journalists did not immediately understand what was happening, so they did not address the issues in proper terms. By the time the word was used, thousands of lives have already been cut short.

As evident in many of the articles, the word ‘genocide’ was not used until late into the killing (Chaon, 2007; Doyle, 2007; Kuperman, 2007). Broadcast of the killing events in Rwanda in BBC came too late on June 27, 1994 (Giles, 2007). New York Times editorial of April 23 made reference to “what looks much like genocide” (Melvern, 2007, p. 202). The genocide photograph only made the front page of a French newspaper late on May 18 (Roskis, 2007). It was not until April 25 that The New York Times insinuated the theme of genocide in its report (Kuperman, 2007). These and similar comments characterize the authors’ opinions on the tardiness of genocide report.

X. Rifts between editors and reporters:

In normal circumstances, editors and reporters are supposed to be hooked up in a harmonious chain of cooperation for the flow of news, but the comments in the articles

suggest the contrary. It appears there was a serious lack of trust on the part of the editors as they were not fully depending on or feeding from their reporters on ground.

Referring to his personal experience, Doyle (2007) notes that even when 'genocide' was used some editors at BBC were not convinced. Rather, they used other sources of information and interviewees that gave contrary and unreliable accounts. Similarly, Edgar Roskis (2007) testifies that "the photographers' raw, unadorned images and survivors' simple accounts simply left editors cold" (p. 239). More than that, they persuaded their correspondents to "put the other side" in the report (Doyle, 2007, p. 154). These conducts reveal a newsroom agenda that was not interested in reporting the truth about the Rwandan incidents.

XI. Stereotypical views and remarks:

The socio-cultural and psychological theory of B. F. Skinner (1965) that "man is a product of his social environment" is quite justified in the authors' evaluation of international media coverage of the Rwandan genocide. Skinner states that "the social environment is in part the result of those practices of the group which generate ethical behavior and of the extension of these practices to manners and customs" (p. 419). Simply put, human attitudes and behaviors are largely determined by the social environment to which they belong. From the comments of authors in the articles, this played out squarely in the perception and interpretation of the Rwandan conflict.

According to remarks in the articles, media did not approach the situation with an open mind. The view of Africa as the dark and chaotic continent came through in news reports (Doyle, 2007; Wall, 2007). Roskis (2007) relates the strands of conversation he picked from six American correspondents who were immediately recalled after their

arrival. They considered Rwanda “too dangerous, not enough interest... deep Africa, you know... middle of nowhere” (p. 238). The language used by the press to describe Rwanda reinforced the impression that what was going on was an inevitable and primitive process that had no rational explanation and could not be stopped by negotiation or force (Dowden, 2007; Wall, 2007). New York Times article portrayed Rwanda as small, poor and globally insignificant, and described the crisis as an “uncontrollable spasm of lawlessness and terror” (Melvern, 2007, p. 202). In the same way, Rwanda was not considered by British editors to be important enough. It was seen as “a small country far away in a continent that rarely hits the headline” (Dowden, 2007, p. 251). In Wall’s analysis, keyword results portrayed negative image of the Rwandans and the idea that the conflict was based on brutal tribalism (Wall, 2007, p. 265). The summary of all the comments is that the African stereotype did not allow the media to be committed to Rwanda (Roskis, 2007).

XII. Misleading reports:

Reading through the articles, there were comments by the authors alluding to the fact that many media reports were misleading. The articles expose these anomalies in diverse manners. Some of these involve journalists receiving untrue stories from undependable sources (Dowden, 2007), and the media reporting that violence was decreasing while it was actually escalating (Kuperman, 2007).

Melvern (2007) points out that there was shortage of accurate media coverage. She also states that after Jean-Philippe Ceppi’s use of the word ‘genocide’ in his news report of April 11, the word “disappeared from news reports ... and for the next few weeks, a fog of misinformation shrouded what was happening” (p. 201).

Doyle (2007) records a case involving the United States and British army media relations staff whom he describes as “spin doctors” (p. 155). These staff came to Rwanda in July 1994 with a few dozen American and British soldiers who arrived at the Kigali airport to help distribute some aid. The army media relations staff promptly announced to the world that the British and American soldiers have taken control of the airport, creating a false commando impression of the foreign troops. Hilsum (2007) mentions in her article that within the same July period, media presence in the refugee camp in Goma changed the genocide story in a very damaging way in that their coverage made the public feel that the real crisis was people dying of cholera rather than genocide war.

XIII. Media commercial concern:

“The media are businesses” as Chaon (2007, p. 161) realistically asserts. Robert McChesney (2004) and Ben Bagdikian (2004) strongly warn against the threat of media commercialization that is already in operation. A few comments in some of the articles confirm their fears. According to Chaon (2007), media organizations turned away from reporting because it costs a lot of money. There was no ‘real time’ news because it was too dangerous to send an expensive satellite uplink into Rwanda (Hilsum, 2007). Yet these uplinks are set up in the different countries in the Middle East. The truth seems to lie in Livingston’s (2007) observation that the Western media follow where their respective governments are interested.

XIV. Personal efforts of journalists:

The main focus of Chaon’s (2007) article is on identifying the media component that failed in Rwanda. Testimonies in the various articles point to both journalists and the media. However, many of the authors acknowledge the personal efforts of individual

journalists at revealing the ugly face of Rwanda to the outside world. Prominent among these are: Doyle who was literally and constantly in a tug-of-war with the BBC newsroom in London against diluting the seriousness of the situation in Rwanda (Doyle, 2007), and remained there during a greater part of the genocide (Chaon, 2007). Catherine Bond, Jean-Philippe Ceppi, Jean Helene (who was eventually killed in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire in 2003), Annie Thomas, and Nick Hughes (Chaon, 2007; Melvern, 2007; Dowden, 2007) are the few journalists singled out for their outstanding performance. It means that very few journalists were committed to the cause of the genocide victims. Kuperman (2007) testifies that when the genocide was reaching its peak, reporters were quitting Rwanda. Hilsum (2007) adds that "Few journalists were advocating that Western countries take a political stance" (p. 174).

Placing the role of individual journalists within the context of their subordination to their media employers may be insightful. The helpless circumstances that they found themselves in might have hindered their total commitment. Dowden (2007) recounts the media ordering their reporters to leave the country after covering the evacuation of foreigners and closing of embassies. Added to this, the difficulty of transportation into and within Rwanda during this period (Dowden, 2007; Roskis, 2007) as well as the telecommunication problems that did not allow them to get their stories out (Dowden, 2007) might have constituted a real burden to reporters. Thus, individual journalists cannot be justifiably judged as having failed without putting the difficulties they faced into consideration. After all, "he who pays the piper dictates the tune" as the saying goes.

XV. Other international focus:

At the same time that the genocide was raging in Rwanda, there were many other events around the globe. Outside Africa, there was the Bosnia genocide, O. J. Simpson's trial in the US, and in France the people were concerned about the death of Ayrton Senna, the Brazilian Formula One driver (Chaon, 2007).

In Africa, the media focus at the time was South Africa that was holding its first multi-racial election after many years of apartheid rule (Chaon, 2007; Dowden, 2007; Giles, 2007; Melvern, 2007). Against this background, "many Western commentators were also predicting a ghastly bloodbath in South Africa" (Dowden, 2007, p. 251). So, the country was filled with 2,500 accredited press compared to a maximum of 15 in Rwanda (Melvern, 2007). But the bloodbath never happened (Dowden, 2007).

XVI. African media perspective:

Out of the thirteen articles, the only author who addresses the issue of African media coverage of the genocide is Emmanuel Alozie (2007). He analyzes the reports of two African newspapers – Guardian (Nigeria) and Daily Nation (Kenya) – on the conflict.

In his analysis, Alozie remarks that among other things the newspapers commented on the historical aspects of the hostilities between the two tribes. They called for truce and gave advice for peaceful co-existence, and indicted various governments in the continent for the suffering of their people. Alozie also noted that at the earlier stage of the crisis, the Guardian and the Daily Nation reported the genocide on daily basis. But later, the Daily Nation published more articles over a longer period of time than the Guardian.

XVII. Poor media presence and coverage:

In their evaluation of the media role in Rwanda, many of the authors commented on the unimpressive presence of journalists and poor media coverage. According to them, this accounted for the world's inability to understand the scale of the massacre (Giles, 2007; Melvern, 2007). Hilsum (2007) remarks that the genocide was given far less space and airtime in the media than it should have been with "no more than 10 – 15 reporters in the country at any time" (p. 168). Put differently, there were many journalists in Rwanda but only at certain times, and so many images sent out but only certain places (Roskis, 2007).

Again, Chaon (2007) compares the media situation in Rwanda to Bosnia and states that there were twice as many articles on Bosnian conflict than Rwanda. Once again, the blame compass among the different authors points in the direction of media organizations who called the shot.

XVIII. Lack of experience:

Genocide is a conflict of an incredible magnitude. Reporting it requires some special skill-sets and intellectual knowledge that will enable the journalists to understand and deal with the intricacies of the hate crime. Apparently the journalists who reported Rwanda did not have enough skill-sets and intellectual background. Kuperman (2007) and Wall (2007) agree that the media did not recognize the extent of the carnage to mobilize the world attention to it.

Chaon remarks clearly that most journalists are not genocide savvy and those who were in Rwanda were not familiar with the geography of that region. Their lack of expertise in the area of genocide made it difficult for them to understand the scale and the

systematic way in which that genocide were organized (Dowden, 2007; Hughes, 2007). The result was confusion especially in the early stage of the conflict (Hilsum, 2007).

XIX. Dearth of photo and video evidence:

According to some of the authors in their articles, so much horror took place but so little evidence is available to see. The issue is not about pictures of what happened, but pictures and videos of genocide scenes as they happened. These are what were grossly lacking in the view of the authors. It was only on three occasions that killings were filmed as they took place (Hughes, 2007). “Photographers arrived quickly, but what they got were pictures of corpses, never photos of massacres at the moment they took place. To my knowledge, there is only one video image of a massacre taking place” (Chaon, 2007, p. 163). In the same way, Giles (2007) affirms that the real genocide was “never captured in still or moving images” (p. 238). The photographs and the recordings were done after the fact, and these photos were old and small (Roskis, 2007).

XX. Judgmental comments:

This part on judgmental comments forms the last segment in this section. It consists of some authors’ general remarks on the media role and coverage in Rwanda. Notably, most of the authors did not make direct judgmental statements on the media. However, there are those who passed judgment categorically either against the media organizations or against journalists who covered the genocide.

Referring to Western media organizations as an entity, Melvern (2007) declares that “the press, in generally characterizing the genocide as tribal anarchy, was fundamentally irresponsible” (p. 208).

Roskis (2007) directs his anger toward photographers in the refugee camp in Goma. First he states that “it was there in Zaire, that most of the other images of ‘Rwanda’ that are imprinted on our memory were photographed” (p. 240). Then he berates the photographers, “At best these images of the dead and dying attract our charity. They don’t keep us from living, or even sleeping at night, and they don’t keep the people who take these pictures from winning awards” (p. 241). In these statements, he condemns the commercial and material interests concealed in the professional activities of these photo journalists. To drive the message home, he made reference to “a Pulitzer prize won at Auschwitz” (ibid). This expression could allegorically alludes to exploiting the sufferings of others for personal benefit.

Lastly, Giles (2007) contritely reviles the reporters on the field for not offering their best for the butchered Tutsis and moderate Hutus of Rwanda. “Many of us who tried to cover this appalling story still harbour, as I do, a lingering sense of helplessness – a sense of guilt, perhaps shame that we didn’t do more to apply pressure for action when it might have made a difference” (p. 237). Without much ado, Giles could be correctly interpreted as saying that the journalists failed in their own way. The impression created by these comments is that journalists did not do enough to impact the international public in their coverage of the Rwandan genocide.

C. OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

There are a good number of seeming contradictions as discernible in the tabulated ‘thematic categorization’ and appendix. For instance Melvern (2007) remarks that Jean-Philippe Ceppi used the word ‘genocide’ in the early stage of the conflict (p. 201) while many others (Chaon, 2007; Doyle, 2007; Kuperman, 2007) claim otherwise (See IX

above). Chaon (2007) states in her account that journalists were not present in Rwanda while many other authors claim they were. Again, Hughes (2007) names three occasions of filming the genocide in action while Chaon (2007) claims there was only one. There are many of such virtual discrepancies in the articles. Yet, the contradictions are neither real nor entire.

The truth of the matter is that all the articles convey the same idea on each issue when their comments are considered on the macro level. But they appear contradictory when the minute details are taken into consideration. For instance, on the issue of late acknowledgement of genocide, Hilsum (2007) states that the world was aware of Rwanda on May 29, Melvern (2007) remarks that it was on April 23 that New York Times made reference to “what looks much like genocide” (p. 202), and Giles (2007) reports that BBC broadcast of the killing events in Rwanda came too late on June 27. In these observations, the particular dates with reference to lateness differ and appear conflicting but all the dates testify to the fact that the genocide which started on the night of April 6 was not reported early enough. Taking another case into consideration, it is evident that behind the seeming contradiction between Hughes’ (2007) claim that there were three occasions of filming the genocide and Chaon’s (2007) claim that there was only one, there is the truth that there were not many scenes of the genocide caught in camera as they occurred.

It is also interesting to note the connectedness of the twenty different themes to one another in the arrangements. For instance, ‘misconstruction of the conflict’ connects with ‘use of ambiguous terms and insinuations’ in such a way that it appears to be a duplication of themes. Rather than duplications, the connectedness explains the

relationship between attitude and action, and the diverse ways in which these impact human responsibility.

The findings in this analysis are obvious. They extensively give the media thumbs down suggesting that the media failed in the coverage of the genocide. However, it is important to point out as evident in the findings that the failure in the coverage is not attributable to journalists on the most basic sense. What could be deduced from authors' comments is that journalists were culpable in the second degree while media organizations were culpable on the first degree. As noted by Giles (2007), Doyle, (2007) and Melvern (2007), some journalists made personal efforts to bring the news to the outside world but there was limited or no cooperation from news organizations that either abandoned the reports or censored them to suit their organizational, political or commercial agenda. Secondly, journalists were not equipped with necessary and sufficient *instrumentum laboris* that would have enabled them to function adequately. Some instances are poor means of transportation (Roskis, 2007), lack of communication equipment as well as commercial concerns (Chaon, 2007; Hilsum, 2007). The news organizations for whom the journalists work should have made these required materials available. Based on the findings of the various authors as analyzed in this chapter, it could be said that the media failure in Rwanda was more structural than professional.

Proceeding further in the discussion, the findings in the analysis reveal some media characteristics that point to patterns in tandem with other studies on conflict coverage. For instance, the Rwandan coverage analysis reveals safety concerns, wrong and limited focus, unreliable sources and misleading reports as some of the dominant themes in the coverage. The level of safety determines the nature of focus, the types of

sources used and the nature and volume of the news coverage. This observation corresponds to the findings in Paraschos and Rutherford's (1985) analysis of CBS, ABC and NBC coverage of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel which implied that coverage may be influenced by "ease of reporter access to the two sides" (p. 464).

Doyle's (2007) remarks about newsroom 'doctoring' of news reports at BBC and Wall's (2007) regret about the very limited use of expert sources and exclusion of African sources confirms the findings of Martin A. Lee and Tiffany Devitt (1991). In their study on Gulf War coverage Lee and Devitt concluded by stating that the networks engaged in their own form of censorship by excluding peace activists and dissident foreign policy experts "who are fully capable of speaking in more than slogans and sound-bites" (p. 22). Similarly, BBC resolved to create their own news neglecting the input of the correspondents on ground (Doyle, 2007); and Times, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report chose their own prominent sources excluding experts and African sources who would have spoken in more than slogans and sound-bites (Wall, 2007).

Livingston's (2007) comment about the American media following where the American government shows interest finds justification in Tom McCoy's (1992) study of the New York Times coverage of El Salvador. The general finding in this study implied that the media do pay loyalty to the government in its coverage of issues especially where government interest is at stake. With specific reference to El Salvador, it contended that The New York Times was not objective, and that the nature of its coverage reflected the government position. Analyzing coverage of the same crisis in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report, William Solomon (1992) concluded like McCoy that "the

range of views in the coverage corresponds to the range of views among ruling U.S. elites” (p. 56).

The prejudice found by Ryan Barber and Tom Weir (2002) in their research into the coverage of the Vietnam conflict also finds expression in the stereotypes pointed out in the Rwandan case. David K. Perry (1987) arrived at similar conclusion in the general sense in his study on coverage of developing countries. In this study he found that “the globally dominant Western news agencies cover Third-World nations in a sparse and unrepresentative manner” (p. 416) with more distortions than news from developed countries.

On a concluding note, it should be pointed out by way of information that the article by Mike Dottridge (2007), one of the thirteen articles, is not included in this analysis. The reason is that Dottridge’s article analyzes pre-1994 media coverage of Rwandan conflicts whereas this paper focuses on articles that comment on media performance during the genocide. It may be worth stating that this analysis is not exhaustive due to its qualitative implications. However, it presents more than enough dependable evidence toward understanding how media practitioners evaluated media involvement in the 1994 tragic events of Rwanda. That understanding is needed for a meaningful transition to the next step of this discussion.

CHAPTER THREE

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF COVERAGE THEMES AND MEDIA SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Having thematically laid out the trend of media involvement in the Rwandan genocide through the critical comments of the various authors, let us now consider the underlying ethical issues suggested in those themes. In other words, this chapter will rewrite the media coverage themes of chapter three in their ethical interpretations and delineate media social responsibility as needed in news coverage. The interpretation will require an ethical parameter or parameters that will serve as a reference code and set the bar for a laudable performance in media professional engagement.

There are several media codes of ethics world-wide (see page 80 for a list of these media organizations), and they all define the ethical standard for media practices in the different media groups. Reading through the various media codes of ethics from different countries and groups, it is interesting to note that they all find convergence in Hutchins' Commission report of 1947. Granted that Hutchins' Commission was constituted to address the post World War II deteriorating media climate in America, nevertheless the ethical provisions in its "code of social responsibility for the press" seem to have resonated and inspired ethical formulation of media codes around the world (Christian & Nordenstreng 2004) directly or indirectly, consciously or coincidentally.

The Hutchins' Commission report states that the press should:

- Provide a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning;
- Serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism;
- Project a representative picture of the constituent groups in the society;
- Help in the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of the society; and
- Provide full access to the day's intelligence
(<http://www.cci.utk.edu/~bowles/Hutchins-recommendations.html>).

Notably, the commission uses the press to refer to the mass media in general – newspaper, radio, television and by extension, the Internet. Apart from the fact that the stipulations of Hutchins' Commission find expressions in all the media codes of ethics the world over, it is also evident that all the codes propose, uphold and promote similar or related ethical values. There is such similarity in content and language that their unity of purpose cannot be mistaken. For instance, the ethical demands of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) are the same as those of the other media groups though worded differently. The SPJ code of ethics (2009) demand that journalists should:

- Seek truth and report it
- Minimize harm
- Act independently, and
- Be accountable (<http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>)

The first ethical demand of the SPJ code – seek truth and report it – reflects Hutchins' code of social responsibility for the press in its entirety as do other media codes. In view of the similarity of these codes, using Hutchins' Commission report in conjunction with applicable sections of SPJ code of ethics to evaluate the coverage themes that were analyzed in the previous chapter makes a good representation of all media codes of ethics world-wide. The reason for proposing the use of these codes for the ethical evaluation of the coverage themes is because the media codes of ethics contain

ethical standards set by media groups for media practitioners as earlier stated. On that note, the ethical implications of the coverage themes will be examined using Hutchins' Commission report and SPJ code of ethics. This examination will lead to our understanding of the level of ethical responsibility that the media displayed in the coverage of the Rwandan genocide, in order to appreciate the need for a more responsible coverage.

A. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF COVERAGE THEMES

The first recommendation of Hutchins Commission (1947) on social responsibility for the press is that the press or the media should provide “a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning.” From the textual analysis, this statute seems to have been radically flaunted in the 1994 coverage of Rwanda. As the findings showed, the conflict was seriously misconstrued in the coverage. The media described the crisis variously and inaccurately as “eruption of tribal violence”, “gangs of youths settling tribal scores hacking and clubbing people to death”, “continuing tribal slaughter between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority”, “chaos”, “score settling” (Dowden, 2007, p. 253). Apart from misconstruing the genocide, the terms used to describe the conflict were ambiguous and did not set the tone for a clear understanding of what was involved. For instance, Doyle (2007) reports, “I looked down to see a Rwandan man attacking another Rwandan ... I saw several dead bodies of people who had been killed with machetes” (p. 148). The expressions, ‘A Rwandan man attacking another Rwandan’ and ‘dead bodies of people who had been killed’ do not label the attack and the killing as genocide in any way, shape

or form. If anything, they generically describe the massacre as a tragic event. Another point in the coverage against truth, comprehensive and intelligent account is that journalists focused on issues that did not properly highlight the genocide (Chaon, 2007; Dowden, 2007); and where the focus was on genocide, it was very limited to the capital (Kuperman, 2007). Therefore a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of what was happening was lacking in the coverage.

Moreover, the coverage was presented in a way that did not give meaning to the events. The findings testified to the presence of stereotypical comments in the coverage (Dowden, 2007; Doyle, 2007; Wall, 2007). Expatriating on seeking truth and reporting it, SPJ code (2009) insists that “stereotyping by race, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, geography, sexual orientation, disability, physical appearance or social status” (<http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>) should be avoided. Yet, the authors have shown that there were massive displays of stereotype both in media attitude and news report (Roskis, 2007; Melvern, 2007). Such stereotypical approach would not “give voice to the voiceless” (SPJ code, <http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>) or allow the conflict to be understood in its proper context and magnitude.

In terms of giving meaning to the events of the day through truthful, comprehensive and intelligent coverage, many other lapses were observed. Death statistics were not accurate (Kuperman, 2007). Sources quoted were sometimes not reliable (Doyle, 2007); and media presence and coverage were poor (Chaon, 2007; Hilsum, 2007). The use of unreliable sources and inaccurate death statistics failed to communicate the truth comprehensively and intelligently, and went against SPJ ethical

requirement to “test the accuracy of information from all sources and exercise care to avoid inadvertent error” (<http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>).

The second recommendation of the Hutchins’ Commission (1947) is that the press should serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism. The findings point to the fact that the media failed to provide that forum. This was evident in many ways according to the analysis. In the first place, the media were disconnected from the genocide in many ways (Giles, 2007; Roskis, 2007). Those who were involved were late in acknowledging it as genocide (Hilsum, 2007; Kuperman, 2007; Melvern, 2007). Because of commercial concerns, they were not meaningfully present throughout the catastrophic massacre (Chaon, 2007; Hilsum, 2007). Added to these, the dearth of photo and video evidence did not provide the resources necessary for comments and criticism (Giles, 2007; Hughes, 2007; Roskis, 2007). Therefore, the media which should “support the open exchange of views” (SPJ, <http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>) appear to have failed in their duty by holding back their invaluable services at the most critical moment in Rwandan history.

The only segment in the analysis that seems to have satisfied the demands of Hutchins’ second recommendation to some extent is Alozie’s (2007) lone voice on African media involvement. But since his testimony has no corroboration among the articles analyzed, it is difficult to rely on the veracity of his claim for lack of objectivity in any form.

Thirdly, Hutchins’ Commission code stipulates that the press should project a representative picture of the constituent groups in the society. Recommending the same ethical rectitude, SPJ code states that the journalist should “tell the story of the diversity

and magnitude of the human experience boldly” (<http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>). From the analysis, the dismal picture of the Tutsi plight was not adequately and effectively projected. These lapses showed themselves in news reports, in the use of sources, and in naming the culprits. The news reports painted a picture of civil war in a chaotic and primitive country out there in the dark continent of Africa (Dowden, 2007; Wall, 2007). In the reports, the genocide story was presented as an unstoppable internal conflict between two violent tribes bent on destroying each other (Melvern, 2007; Wall, 2007). They did not depict the conflict as a systematic program of extermination designed by the majority Hutu against the minority Tutsi within the context of socio-political and cultural resentment.

In its fourth recommendation, Hutchins’ Commission requires the press to present and clarify the goals and values of the society. This stipulation implicitly designates the media as guardian and teacher of societal values. In other words, the commission expects the media to lead the general population in the right direction. They should present and clarify the ideals that put the society on the right path in decisions and actions.

The findings in chapter three show that media performance in this regard was wanting. Rather than present and clarify, the findings showed that it held back and complicated the conflict. The rift between editors and journalists bordering on editors’ refusal to publish reports from their reporters attests to this fact (Doyle, 2007). The refusal to publish the genocide photos taken by photo journalists also testifies to their failure (Roskis, 2007).

Lastly, the commission stipulated that the media should provide full access to the day’s intelligence. Apparently, this ethical directive is based on the truth that the

society in general has access to what happens around the world through media reports. So, the commission perceives the job of the media as predominantly that of making sure that access is granted to news in the fullest sense. Did the media fulfill this role in Rwanda? Findings from the analysis imply the contrary. First, there was the issue of safety. Journalists could not fully and properly access the news on genocide because of the dangers involved (Doyle, 2007; Hilsum, 2007; Livingston, 2007). Consequently, they could not lead the public to encounter the genocide in the news because *nemo dat quod non habet*. What they could give was what they could gather from their safety zones even when it did not represent the genocide as it unfolded.

The *nemo dat quod non habet* circumstance proceeded also from journalists' lack of experience. One of the factors that affected good coverage as pointed by some authors was lack of experience (Chaon, 2007; Hughes, 2007). Journalists who do not have the skill-set or the intellectual knowledge to cover conflict will be lost in the sea of confusion becoming a disappointment to themselves, to the media and to the people who depend on their news report. That was the situation in Rwanda with journalists who eventually made the cholera in the refugee camp at Goma the headline news in the conflict rather than the genocide that claimed 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Hilsum, 2007).

When the media are not there to report the news, there is no way the public will substantially grasp the day's intelligence. However, in the case of Rwanda, the authors in their evaluation indicated that journalists made enormous efforts to provide the needed access (Chaon, 2007; Melvern, 2007). But then on the scale of one to hundred, the number of journalists who gave their best stood out like an insignificant drop in a wide ocean of need (Hilsum, 2007). The need to provide full access to the day's intelligence is

best understood against the background of the fourth segment of SPJ code of ethics that “journalists are accountable to their readers, listeners, viewers and each other” (<http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp>).

Using the provisions of the Hutchins’ code of social responsibility for the press which are substantially reflected in every other media code of ethics worldwide, it is clear that ethical standards of the media were greatly violated, neglected or compromised in the coverage of Rwanda. In the words of Alan Thompson (2007), what happened in Rwanda was “a genocide that deeply implicated the media” (p. 436). These ethical implications, in tandem with “judgmental comments” in chapter three open the way for meaningful discussions on media social responsibility in journalistic practice.

B. MEDIA SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Historically, social responsibility is a doctrine that dates back to the time of Plato and Aristotle, and has been reaffirmed in every generation since Milton (Altschull, 1990). As seen earlier in this chapter, it forms the bedrock of Hutchins’ Commission (1947) code. This theory “suggests that journalists have a duty both to promote community and to promote the individual within it. Those who are in significant ways outside the community – economically, socially or culturally different – need a voice” (Patterson & Wilkins, p. 187).

Revisiting the etymology of the term “media” may make this point clearer. According to Jim Willis (2007), the term was coined by Marshall McLuhan and it “hints at some of that uniqueness in that it suggests a go-between, a middleman, possibly a facilitator” (p. 137). Even at a glance, this statement implies that the media as an

institution is an entity that exists and is defined by its functions. In other words, the existence of the media makes no meaning unless they perform their roles in the society as “go-between,” “middleman” or “facilitator.” Following from this, it could be logically deduced that the media - plural of medium, took and keep that name on the basis of the mediating role they play in the society as dominant players that “contribute to the correction of social ills” (Day, 2006, p.37). In this role, they amplify public debate and reconstitute the argument so that they become “an important public forum where significant issues of social justice are fruitfully raised and resolved” (Christians, 1986). Here lies media social responsibility which as the analysis showed, was seriously needed in Rwanda.

To place the issue of media social responsibility in the right perspective, Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel (2007) asked the question, “What is journalism for?” (p. 9). Pottker (2005) repeated the question in his discussion on Professional Ethics between Philosophy and Practice. This question creates a significant opening for a meaningful enquiry into media social responsibility as a valid expression of the media identity in their essence and existence. Obviously, the primary responsibility of the media is to provide sound news and commentary on which the public could base critical decisions about a situation (Ryan, 2006). The Quill staff report states:

Every day, journalists are challenged – to work harder and faster; to understand and convey complex information; to do more with less; to get past the ‘he said, she said’ and to the heart of the matter; and to report accurately and responsibly, with the highest of ethical standards (Staff Report, Quill, 2006, p. 6).

The facts expressed above are indicative in appraising the media coverage of Rwanda. The analysis demonstrated that the conflict coverage was tasteless to a great

extent with a considerable lack of accuracy or sense of responsibility. Re-echoing the Quill staff report, Woo (2002) states that “The purpose of journalism goes beyond reporting and writing stories. It has to do with something more fundamental...serving the public trust” (p. 106). The implication is that the media “have an ethical responsibility not only to uphold basic precepts of good journalism, such as balance, fairness, and accuracy, but also to make an extra effort to provide socially responsible coverage that gives voice to multiple perspectives” (Bunton, 1998, p. 232).

There are elements that make news coverage socially responsible. These elements will be enumerated as the discussion progresses. To begin with, Kevin Stoker (1995) advocates existential objectivity as a journalistic element that would free media practitioners to be ethical. He cites an example of Michelle Caruso, a journalist whose efforts at communicating the truth to the public were stalled by the demands of objectivity just like Mark Doyle (2007) in his coverage of the Rwandan genocide. “In essence, the rules of objectivity moved Caruso from actor to spectator. Guided by group norms, Caruso was relegated to what existentialists would term an ‘inauthentic existence’” (Stoker, 1995, p. 6).

Stoker’s position is a rebuttal of the objectivity approach to news coverage which demands journalists to be impersonal players focused on reporting information that is “complete, precise, balanced, and accurate” in order “to achieve an impartial report” (Ryan, 2006, p. 5). In some significant way, the ‘failure’ of the media in the Rwandan coverage could be linked to objectivity approach in which media people at different levels were expressively disconnected from the tragedy for inauthentic reasons.

Contrary to the objectivity approach, Stoker (1995) proposes existential journalism which “focuses on the journalist as an autonomous moral agent who can choose to promote the overall welfare and freedom of others” (p. 12). From this brief discussion it is evident that objective approach emphasizes duty-as-such while existential objectivity emphasizes concern. In conflicts of genocidal nature, where should the emphasis be?

In this seeming dilemma, Clifford Christians and Kaarle Nordenstreng (2004) point out the suitable ethical stance. Their contribution is significant especially in conflict situations. They propose an approach in which the sacredness of human life is acknowledged and respected. This proposal is based on their conviction that “embedded in the protonorm of human sacredness are such ethical principles as human dignity, truth-telling, and non-maleficence” (p. 3). What Christians and Nordenstreng are advocating is acknowledgement of the importance of human life in media activities, and preserving it should be the media’s primary and ultimate concern. “The socially responsible press is brought to judgment before the ultimate test: Does it sustain life, enhance it long term, contribute to human well-being as a whole?” (ibid, p. 25). These questions would help journalists in their decisions as moral agents in situations like Rwanda where journalists focused on reporting the evacuation of foreigners and turned their backs on Tutsi victims of the Rwandan genocide (Chaon, 2007; Dowden, 2007).

Christians and Nordenstreng’s position imply care-based ethics. In this regard, Steiner & Okrusch (2006) argue that “The long tradition and rhetoric of objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality notwithstanding... journalists are urged ... to care” (p. 103). They point out that in its ethical sense, caring is more of an acquired and motivated

disposition than a natural and intuitive quality. Caring within the framework of the profession is a virtue that journalists have to learn. Care-based ethics becomes more meaningful when the golden rule is applied, “Treat others as you would have them treat you” (Matt. 7:12). “This is a classic case of role-reversal in which we are asked to put ourselves into the shoes of others and ask how we would like to be treated if we were the recipient rather than the perpetrators of our actions” (Day, 2006, p. 57). With reference to the Rwandan case where journalists and media organizations ignored the plight of the genocide victims by their uncommitted news reports, stereotypical remarks, quitting when the war was becoming intense, misconstruction of the conflicts, ignoring the plea of the victims when they begged for help, etc., as the findings suggest, what would they expect of others if they were to be in the position of those Tutsis and moderate Hutus?

That question is the hallmark of John Rawl’s social responsibility theory of ‘the original position’ which involves taking a decision behind ‘the veil of ignorance’ (D’Agostino, 2003, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/>). This theory proposes that the moral agent should rationally place himself in the position where he has to take a decision about an unknown future situation “free from the knowledge of special talents, socioeconomic status, political influence, or other prejudicial factors concerning the other parties to the arrangement” (Day, 2006, p. 384). From this position of ignorance, the moral agent should decide how he would want the different classes of people to be treated without knowing where he would belong. Rawl believes that this process would enable individuals to appreciate justice and fairness. Applying this thesis to journalism, Day (2006) states that “journalists should report on the activities of an

individual based on the person's inherent newsworthiness rather than merely on the person's social status" (p. 384).

The sense of caring gave birth to public journalism which "calls for revitalizing civic participation in democratic processes and for reconnecting people to one another, to their government, and to the press" (Steiner, Okrusch, 2004, p. 117). Thus, in public journalism, strong emphasis is laid on care, connection and attachment (Merritt, 1995; Steiner and Okrusch, 2004). Journalists should report news in ways that will move people to care about the struggles of other people, groups and communities (Steiner and Okrusch, 2004). This is the type of journalistic coverage that is needed in conflict situations such as Rwanda because in the course of genocide, it is not just something bad that is happening; it is people, a large number of innocent and helpless people that are being murdered for no justifiable reason.

Another significant element in appreciating the need for media social responsibility is to see it from the perspective of development journalism which places great emphasis on "common good" (Musa, 2007, p. 321) with "existentialist motivations" (p. 320). Though development journalism has a partisan origin in terms of its anti-colonialists and pro-national government background and questionable legitimacy when the atrocity is committed by the government itself, it is still useful because it principally orientates toward fighting the forces that militate against the common good. If the government it supports becomes atrocious, development journalism becomes at the same time a viable tool as civil advocate to fight the atrocity. As Musa (1997) remarks, "Many African journalists, in recognition of the fact that the vast majority of the people are disempowered by the political and economic system, have taken on themselves the role

of the people's advocate. They act as the conscience of the society and the voice of the voiceless" (p. 138). The watch word as it applies to media social responsibility is "the common good" when the common good refers to what promotes the wellbeing of the ordinary powerless citizens.

Another vital element is journalists' self perception. To be able to act according to the demands of the social responsibility expected of the media, journalists will have to see themselves as global citizens, coming from somewhere but belonging everywhere – called to serve global needs. One of the media setbacks in the Rwandan crisis is the fact that most of the international journalists saw themselves outside the circle of conflict without integrally identifying with the victims in any notable manner. They saw themselves as Europeans and Americans geographically and racially detached from Rwanda and Africa. So their work amounted to mechanical actions aimed at providing income, rather than a purpose-driven service aimed at saving fellow human beings. This identification gap explains the stereotypical attitudes and remarks observed by the authors (Dowden, 2007; Doyle, 2007; Melvern, 2007; Roskis, 2007; Wall, 2007). Care-based ethics attitude, development journalism disposition, existential objectivity orientation, and socially responsible reports demand journalists to define themselves broader than their biological or racial background. It requires them to see themselves as 'citizens sans frontiers', belonging to every culture and ethnicity and called to serve global needs especially where there are threats to life and assaults on the dignity of the human person.

In conclusion, a journalist has to be existential, serving "as an interested reporter and interpreter and not as an amoral, disinterested observer" (Stoker, 1995, p. 20).

According to Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007), “the principles and purpose of journalism are defined by...the function news plays in the lives of people” (p. 11). When this fails, then the real value of journalism is questionable. Without being radically teleological, it is obvious that in the context of genocide, the teleological theory of ethics that promotes action based on consequence (Day, 2006) is one of the ethical courses to adopt. The crux of the matter is about saving lives that are in harms way.

Thompson (2007) rightly remarks that “Political figures, such as US President Bill Clinton, later claimed that they did not have enough information to fully grasp what was going on in Rwanda. More likely, because the public was not very engaged by the Rwanda story, there was little pressure for leaders to do anything” (p. 434). Romeo Dallaire (2007) adds that “The events in Rwanda simply did not break through to such an extent as to create momentum” (p. 15). Based on these comments, the media should be considerably responsible by representing public interest in their coverage in order to hold respective authorities accountable in their duty (Schudson, 1995).

To restate the fact, the task of the media goes “beyond the limited mission of telling the news to the broader mission of helping public life go well” (Merritt, 1995, p. 113). The public expects a corporate culture of the media that rests upon social responsibility (Day, 2006, p. 36), otherwise called “journalism of attachment” (Bell, 1998). In a way, this means that mass media corporations, together with journalists should assume the role of advocates for the culturally, socially and politically marginalized segments of the society (Patterson and Wilkins, 2008). This is what social responsibility means in the practical sense of the word, and it is the way it should be understood in media coverage of conflict situations especially genocide

CHAPTER FOUR

MEDIA ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: MODELS AND CRITIQUE

The ultimate aim of this study is to delineate ways in which the media can render better service in view of their role as the watchdog of the society. The goal is to generate media organizations and practitioners that are dedicated to serving humanity especially when life is actually or potentially in jeopardy. In chapter two where the historical cases of genocide in the 20th Century were presented, the number of death in the different massacres was seen to be astronomically appalling. From Armenia in Turkey to Rwanda in Africa, the number of genocide victims added up to 17.8 million (see table below).

Table 4.1: STATISTICAL TABLE OF GENOCIDE DEATHS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

GENOCIDE	PERIOD	NO. OF DEATH
Armenians in Turkey	1915–1918	1,500,000 Deaths
Stalin's Forced Famine	1932-1933	7,000,000 Deaths
Rape of Nanking	1937-1938	300,000 Deaths
Nazi Holocaust	1938-1945	6,000,000 Deaths
Pol Pot in Cambodia	1975-1979	2,000,000 Deaths
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-1995	200,000 Deaths
Rwanda	1994	800,000 Deaths
TOTAL		17, 800,000

This chapter aims at discussing some existing models proposed for media engagement in conflict situations. In addition, it will critique the effectiveness of these models in the light of the complexity and enormity of the problem of genocide as revealed in the Rwandan case. Such modus operandi will inform the final act of proposing a more fundamental and substantial line of action that may serve as a reliable design for the attainment of the intended goal.

The horrendous genocide cases occurring over time in the different corners of the world obligated members of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to devote themselves to securing help for the needy in states where human rights may be violated to the extent of genocide (AbsoluteAstronomy.com, 2009). They pursued this objective by advancing the concept of humanitarian intervention which “refers to armed interference in one state by another state(s) with the stated objective of ending or reducing suffering within the first state” (http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Humanitarian_intervention). The goal of the intervention is to preserve common humanity with the suffering people of the state even if it means disregarding the state sovereignty to achieve that purpose.

The report of the ICISS on the “Responsibility to Protect” was published in 2001, and was formally adopted by the United Nations in 2005 (Thompson, 2007). It refers to “a state’s responsibility towards its population and the international community’s responsibility in case a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities” (http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Responsibility_to_protect).

The elements in the responsibility to protect are three-fold:

- **The responsibility to prevent:** to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.
- **The responsibility to react:** to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.
- **The responsibility to rebuild:** to provide ... full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert (<http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#synopsis>).

In their report on the responsibility to protect, the commission duly pointed out that the evil of genocide is “one of perennial concern” which the different segments of the international community should tackle together. It states:

Effective conflict prevention depends on disparate actors working together strategically. States, the UN and its specialized agencies, the international financial institutions, regional organizations, NGOs, religious groups, the business community, the media, and scientific, professional and educational communities all have a role to play. The capacity to conduct preventive diplomacy ultimately relies on the international ability to coordinate multilateral initiatives, and identify logical divisions of labour (ibid).

The role of the media is not well defined in this document, but like other institutions in the global socio-political order, they are called upon to be a part of this struggle to free humanity from the murderous grip of humanity. Saddened by the lackadaisical outcome of the Rwandan coverage as testified to in the thirteen articles directly involved in this study, journalists and media organizations should step back and ask, “How could the media do a better job in a potential situation of genocide or any conflict of genocidal magnitude?”

A. MEDIA ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

Many scholars and activists have attempted to proffer solutions to this nagging problem in different ways, directly or implicitly. Some of these scholars have proposed models for media response in a situation of real or perceived genocidal tragedy. Two of these models are Chalk's intervention model and Frohardt and Temin's intervention model.

I. CHALK'S INTERVENTION MODEL

As a background to his proposal, Frank Chalk (2007) distinguishes between utilitarian genocide and genocide motivated by the search for a perfect future inspired by a utopian ideology. Accordingly, utilitarian genocide is "largely motivated by the desire to create, expand and preserve formal states and empires" (p. 375). Here, the perpetrators directly use the military power of the state to accumulate wealth and suppress or even eliminate 'the other'. This was the case in Ukraine in the years of Joseph Stalin (Gregorovich, 1974; The History Place, 2000). In the second type of genocide "the state demonizes the victim group and its members, excluding them from the universe of mutual human obligations" (Chalk, 2007, p. 375). It does this through an intensive and sustained propaganda aimed at mobilizing violence on a grand scale. In this case, the local media become very effective tools as exemplified in the Rwandan genocide with the use of the newspaper *Kangura* and the *Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines* – RTLM to disseminate hate propaganda against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Chalk, 2007; Melvern, 2006). When the media are used to promote genocide, in what way or ways can they be used to combat it?

With reference to historical cases such as Rwanda, Chalk (2007) proposes strategic use of the media in preventing genocide, depending on the stage it has reached.

For that reason he recommends three stages of media intervention, namely: Early-stage interventions, middle-stage intervention, and late-stage intervention.

1. Early-stage intervention:

This applies in a situation where acts of genocide have not actually started. The intervention at this stage involves domestic and foreign monitoring of the media, implementing training programs and codes of conduct for the purpose of raising the skills and standards of local editors and journalists as well as strengthening the local independent media. Local and foreign broadcasts should include serial drama programs addressed to children and soap operas addressed to adults, all geared toward emphasizing the benefits of inter-ethnic cooperation. Chalk (2007) concludes this proposal by stating that “the real benefits of compromise and peaceful solutions to problems are useful methods for lessening conflicts” (p. 378).

2. Middle-stage intervention:

Intervention at this stage applies when the genocide is just beginning, and “it must be swift and aggressive” (ibid). When it is impossible for local journalists and other groups and organizations within the state to act against hate propaganda in the local media due to government threats and intimidations, the international community and organizations should step in. They should place the disseminators of hate propaganda on notice, informing them that their broadcast is monitored, recorded and transcribed for eventual prosecution of the media practitioners involved. At the same time, foreign media should broadcast accurate news aimed at countering the false, misleading and propaganda broadcast of the local media, and supplement the efforts of domestic anti-hate

broadcasters. Moreover, “electronic jamming of hate transmitters should be initiated” (ibid).

3. Late-stage intervention:

This type of intervention should be launched when genocide is underway and may require the actual destruction of the transmitters and printing presses of the hate media. At this stage of the genocide, foreign media should repeatedly warn the international community of the genocide. They should report credible threat that would deter perpetrators from continuing the genocide, and provide information to dissuade potential victims from congregating where they would become easy targets. Foreign media should appeal to ordinary citizens to hide and protect potential victims, promising them rewards to be given at the end of the conflict. In addition to these, the media should announce routes to safety and give practical suggestions for survival.

II. FROHARDT AND TEMIN’S INTERVENTION MODEL

Frohardt and Temin’s (2007) model is focused on the proper use of the media based on their acknowledgement of how powerful the media can be as tools in the hands of genocide instigators. They observe that “as part of a larger matrix of factors, media can be extremely powerful tools for promoting violence as witnessed in Rwanda, the former Soviet Republic of Georgia and elsewhere” (p. 389). Combating the possibility of abuse therefore requires strengthening the media by monitoring them closely, mitigating their pernicious effects and magnifying their positive output. However, they contend that training journalists and advising legislators on drafting media legislation are the fundamental measures. Their philosophical position could be translated as follows: strengthen the media against susceptibility in a state, and the success of genocide in that

state is greatly reduced. In tandem with this philosophical point of view, Frohardt and Temin (2007) propose three levels of media intervention – structural intervention, content-specific intervention and aggressive intervention.

1. Structural intervention:

This is the broadest based and most fundamental of Frohardt and Temin's model because they consider it to be the most effective strategy for strengthening the media sector against any form of abuse especially if carried out early. Structural intervention has to do with reforms in media structure. "Once in place, these reforms are no longer dependent on foreign assistance, so they tend to maintain legitimacy and build popular support" (Frohardt and Temin, 2007, p. 305). They outline eight different types of structural interventions. These include:

a. Strengthening independent media: This is done through media plurality and longevity which both make exploiting the media for detrimental purposes rather difficult. With plurality, there will be numerous media outlets such that there will still be legitimate media outlets left to inform and mobilize the population even if some of them are successfully co-opted by genocide promoters. Longevity works in the sense that the longer the independent media exist in an area, the more it is ingrained in the life of that society. If they are shut down or abused, it may cause substantial public outcry. Their example of independent media is the Serbian B92 radio station which played a prominent role in informing and mobilizing the people against Milosevic's government.

b. Developing journalist competence: According to the proponents, this intervention is geared toward enhancing both physical and human resources. Physical resources include computers, vehicles, cameras, etc. which the journalist needs for his

work. On the other hand, human resources refer to the writing ability, editing skills and contextual knowledge of the journalist. Since the physical resources are used by the journalist, they make no meaning on their own unless the journalist knows how to use them properly. “Consequently, addressing human resource needs is a top priority” (ibid, 396). In other words, journalists need adequate training to be able to create impacts in their coverage of conflicts.

c. Working with the legislator and judiciary: Here, experts in comparative media should work with legislatures to make necessary media legislation especially with regard to protecting the independence of private media outlets and prosecuting media abuse. Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) should help strengthen the mechanics of the judiciary so that they may implement the laws.

d. Promoting diversity in the journalist corps and media ownership: This intervention presupposes that when diversity is lacking, the possibility of abusing the media by dominant group becomes greater. One way of promoting diversity is to talk media managers and owners into understanding the importance benefit of diversity for them. Another way is to work with members of certain political, ethnic, religious or regional group. A third way is to promote incentives for outlets to promote diversity in their hiring. At the end of these proposals, Frohardt and Temin admitted to the complexity of this strategy casting doubt on the possibility of implementing the diversity plan.

e. Licensing and regulation of media outlets: With the understanding that developing democracies may find it difficult to design and implement licensing and regulation of media outlets, Frohardt and Temin suggest that domestic and international

NGO communities should assist and encourage the government of these countries in order to shield the media from heavily political or corrupt influences.

f. Strengthening domestic and international network: This has to do with professional bonding for effectiveness. On the domestic level, journalists can form organizations or unions. These organizations or unions will provide “journalists with information and ideas on how to report in a particular context... defending journalists’ rights and freedoms and providing journalists with legal counsels” (ibid, p. 398). On the international level, this network will give journalists around the world a strong sense of belonging, and inform them on international journalistic standards.

g. ‘Demand-side’ intervention: This intervention challenges media consumers to verify the veracity of the news they receive from the media. The media should get consumers to think about the dependability and truthfulness of the information they receive rather than remain passive consumers of news. This will increase public education and enhance their awareness of how the media operate.

h. Media monitoring: Someone should keep watch over the media as well as over the forces influencing them. “Monitoring for indicators... can inform policymakers about societies at risk of media manipulation” (ibid, p. 399). Such monitoring should be done in conjunction with local NGOs to develop local monitoring capacity.

2. Content-specific interventions:

According to Frohardt and Temin, these are often based on content indicators of conflict. They are more effective when media abuse is involuntary rather than calculated because they offer alternatives to structural interventions. Content-specific intervention can be carried out in the three following ways:

a. 'Repersonalization': In genocide, the media are used to dehumanize or depersonalize individuals. Journalists should be trained on how to move beyond partisan factors to address the true source of grievances and to portray people first as individuals thereby upholding the dignity of the human person. This way, media become positive tools for reconciliation and conflict prevention.

b. Issue-oriented training: Sensitive issues especially those that affect people's livelihood – economic and political, can be distorted and twisted in such a way that they generate ethnic hatred and animosity. Journalists should be trained on how to professionally frame those issues in a way that distortions are eliminated.

c. Entertainment-oriented programming: In this intervention, dramatic television series intended to facilitate cross-ethnic understanding are produced and aired. Radio programs such as soap operas designed to encourage dialogue and discourage violence are also produced. Frohardt and Temin cite Macedonia, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone as examples of places where this has been done.

3. Aggressive interventions:

According to Frohardt and Temin, these interventions tend to be the last resort and are to be used as reactive rather than proactive measures. They are externally imposed and may not be effective without other drastic measures like military intervention. These are carried out in two different ways.

a. Alternative information: In this intervention, foreign media and other groups offer sources of information other than or different from what is provided by domestic media and groups. These international media groups broadcasting from outside the

conflict territory serve as veritable sources of information about the realities on ground, mobilizing the population and injecting new ideas into the society.

b. Radio and television jamming: Though Frohardt and Temin propose this as one of the intervention measures, they also acknowledge the legal implications that go with this strategy. In their opinion, it is a measure that “would only be seriously considered once violence is already widespread” (p. 401).

In view of the convoluted use of the media, Frohardt and Temin conclude their contribution by recommending a four-fold measure to the international community in addressing the use and abuse of media in vulnerable societies. These are:

- Media in vulnerable societies should be monitored.
- There should be greater collaboration between media organizations and conflict resolution organizations.
- Media organizations need to build a better case for monitoring and early intervention and encourage appropriate donor support.
- A systematic review of media behavior in vulnerable societies should be conducted (pp. 401 – 402).

III. A CRITIQUE OF THE INTERVENTION MODELS

The two models of intervention presented above are largely different sides of the same coin, and therefore propose near identical measures using different expressions and terminologies. The power of the media to foster change and alter the direction of conflict cannot be underestimated. As observed by Eytan Gilboa (2005), “The mass media, global television in particular, have become a central source of information about world affairs, and it is a nation or leader’s image and control of information flow...that help determine their status in the international community” (p. 3). The media could therefore be strategically used at various stages of the conflict to reduce or eliminate destruction. But

whether the media could positively impact conflict states through ways suggested by the proponents above is a different question.

One issue of concern in these intervention models is the confidence of the proponents in the local media to the extent they seem to oversimplify the complexity of the problem. In Chalk's 'early-stage intervention' and Frohardt/ Temin's 'strengthening independent media' they seem to overemphasize the use of local media practitioners. Historical cases as seen in chapter two show that genocide is an attack of the powerful against the powerless. It is an invasion of the minority by the majority. Genocide does not occur in democratic states where the media is relatively free and independent. It happens in autocratic societies and nascent democracies where the media is susceptible to manipulations and abuse, and media practitioners may share the partisan dreams of genocide promoters. It is understood that the intervention models are oriented toward seizing the media apparatus from the control of genocidaires. But what gives the assurance that the local media personnel who may pretend to cooperate with anti-genocide designs are not 'enemies within' or saboteurs, actually serving the cause of genocide promoters. What indicators are there to show that the proposed models are a sure bet or at least reliable measures? When people live in mutual suspicion, and genocidal dispositions have a retributive gratification ingrained in their subconsciousness for decades as in the Rwandan case (Melvern, 2006), it takes more than superficial and mechanical media actions and programs to uproot the deep seated antagonism lodged in the hearts of the perpetrators.

Intervention strategies that appear largely reliable in Chalk and Frohardt/Temin's models are the second and third level strategies that have to do with broadcasting from

outside and jamming local broadcasts. With the susceptibility of the local media to government manipulations, the helplessness of the victim group or groups within the population, and the fact that local media practitioners could be party to perpetrators, nothing or very little could be achieved from within. Salvation lies outside the shores of the conflict territory.

Another observation is that “an international conflict may not necessarily move linearly from one phase to another” (Gilboa, 2005, p. 7). It may erratically and irregularly move back and forth. The proposed models do not specifically address such situations. However, this problem seems implicitly addressed in their suggestions about monitoring the media for conflict indicators.

Again, Frohardt and Temin’s proposal on plurality of media outlets for the purpose of checking genocide actions is pragmatically appealing. At the same time, the financial strains of implementing and sustaining that proposal sound unrealistic in developing countries. To run the number of media outlets that will incapacitate the manipulative designs of genocide perpetrators will demand such funding that may not be realistically possible. Except they are to be funded from outside by powerful conglomerates, the idea is altogether utopian and therefore practically impossible.

Though these proposed media intervention models appear on the one hand to be novel generic sets of anti-genocide prescriptions, they are implementable as second-level strategies that are largely based on probability. But beyond these on-site second level solutions, there is real need for a more fundamental and substantial measures that touch the heart of the matter and stand the test of time. What are these measures?

CHAPTER FIVE

TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE COVERAGE: A RECOMMENDATION

Having discussed the intervention models of Chalk and Frohardt/ Temin with their limitations and set backs, this chapter intends to look further and deeper, and explore ways of ensuring a more substantial sense of social responsibility and quality commitment in media coverage of large scale conflicts such as genocide. In other words, the aim of this chapter is to drive the proposals of chapter five to their logical conclusion and establish a firmer basis on which the media could operate more meaningfully in crisis situations.

To start with, it may be pertinent to recall the question already asked in chapter four, “What is journalism for?” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007, p. 9). In essence, this question demands an explanation of who a journalist is or ought to be, and what the media or journalism should do. In clarifying these issues, it is imperative to understand the basic media focus and ultimate aim. Before proceeding further, two distinctions should be made by way of questions. As a profession, is journalism about people or about things? Is the central role of the media that of stating facts and explaining the phenomena of nature or is it about impacting people positively and enhancing their integrity and dignity? In response to this question, the American Society of Newspaper Editors - ASNE (2006) code of ethics states that “The primary purpose of gathering and

distributing news and opinion is to serve the general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to make judgments on the issues of the time”

(<http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principi.htm>). A simple interpretation of this statement is that journalism is basically people-driven and welfare-oriented or so it should be.

The strong humanistic focus of journalism removes it from the category of those sciences that are basically concerned with investigating and explaining phenomena in nature and society which could be described as services *per se*. The media institution is not like a grocery store, an auto garage, a construction company, a science laboratory or the bank where ‘things are done’ as such. It is comparable to the hospital, school, law firm, Church, police or fire department where the welfare of the human person is at the heart of every decision and action. Similarly, journalists are not like cashiers, accountants, technicians, engineers, office administrators, etc. who are involved with human activities as such. They are to be categorized with doctors, lawyers, priests and pastors, teachers, law enforcement and fire officers, etc. whose services are basically and directly formulated toward enhancing the welfare of the human person. This understanding of the importance of journalism as a profession side-by-side other person-oriented professions calls for seriousness in the education of journalists.

A. EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

I. Curriculum and course contents:

The recommendation in this regard will begin with a significant reference to Romeo Dallaire’s (2007) remarks on journalism in the event of media coverage of the Rwandan genocide. In the last paragraph of his article *The Media Dichotomy*, Dallaire wrote,

The media can be both a weapon and a conscience to humanity. Journalists can be powerful, individually and collectively. But they can also be manipulated very easily if the depth of the subject is not there. For future journalists, my advice is get yourselves a lot more cultured, learn some geography, some anthropology, and sociology and maybe even some philosophy. Bring more depth to your questions and to your analysis. And stay dynamic in the search for truth, for you are an instrument of the absolute called 'justice'. If you abdicate or if you are perfunctory, then we will all be weakened (pp. 18 – 19).

On the surface, this comment appears to be an unjustified slap on the face of journalism as a profession and even of the media as an institution. But on a deeper reflection, by the benefit of hindsight from the point of view of historical conflict situations such as Rwanda, it greatly expresses the fact as it stands in what concerns the educational content of journalism as a discipline. Interpretatively, Dallaire is stating that journalists are not able to do because they do not know. Imperatively, what he is advocating is that the educational curriculum of journalism and mass communication should be reexamined, overhauled and updated for journalists to be able to deliver a professionally satisfactory service to humanity especially in the area of conflict coverage. Notably, Dallaire was the military general who led the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) whose original duty was to help implement the Arusha accords. He was in Rwanda throughout the conflict. His comment is borne out of his personal encounter with journalists in Rwanda and his perception of the media role in that genocide. Dallaire is asking for quality education in journalism as the foundation and prerequisite for excellent performance.

Apart from General Dallaire, there are a good number of scholars who see the need for a much broader and qualitative curriculum in journalism education. Elliot King (2008) traces the low level of effectiveness and efficiency in journalism practice to

educational shallowness pointing out that “university-based journalism education has suffered from lack of respect in the academy and the profession” (p. 166). In her remarks, Terry Hynes (2001) notes the lack of quality and insight in journalism education and among other things suggests that journalism educators and practitioners should challenge themselves “to regularly ask fundamental questions about the profession and education for it” (p. 11). William Woo (2002) perceives the need for a qualitative and broad-based journalism education stating that the great task for journalism educators is to equip students “with a great sense of the public trust – how it developed, what it means..., how it manifests itself or is betrayed by the work that individual journalists and news organizations do” (p. 106) . As way back as the 1980s, Willard Rowland and Robert Blanchard lamented the narrowness of the curriculum and called for its broadening. Rowland (1988) complained that “the college curriculum has become excessively vocational, and that it is necessary to restore liberal education to its central role in undergraduate education” (p. 59). In the same way, echoing Claude Sitton, Blanchard (1988) added that “journalism students need an education grounded in the traditional liberal arts, sciences and social sciences and some education (or training) in the skills of journalism. Generic courses in communication theory will have little utility for them” (p. 29).

In the light of the curriculum and intellectual setbacks pointed out by the aforementioned scholars, and with regard to the socio-political needs of our time, it is obvious that the first step in addressing the problem of proper media coverage of conflicts is to go back to the educational contents of journalism. Just as doctors essentially rely on the knowledge they acquired in the medical school for an outstanding practice in the field

as well as other professionals in their respective areas of study, journalists would depend on the knowledge they acquire in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication to excel in the practice of their profession. To explain the concern more clearly, King (2008) asks the question, “So apart from the skill set associated with journalism, does a body of knowledge equivalent to say organic chemistry in medicine or economics and accounting in business exist for journalism? ... Indeed, is there even a “field” with certain definable boundaries that can be called journalism, about which, people can be educated?” (p. 167). This question points to the need for “core knowledge” which King defines as essential foundational knowledge; knowledge to develop cultural competency and literacy within a specialized community; and knowledge for building an occupational identity (ibid, p. 169).

Towing the line of King’s argument, this study holds that core knowledge in journalism is a necessity for qualitative education in the field. It should consist of an in-depth philosophical interpretation of events in media history in a way that raises the issues from the level of narrative discourse to the level of philosophical reflections that will serve as points of reference in media practice. In other academic disciplines there are courses in philosophy of medicine, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of religion, philosophy of nursing, philosophy of education, and political philosophy. But there is no course in philosophy of journalism. These philosophical courses in the various disciplines introduce the students to the academic traditions of their disciplines and provide a solid theoretical base for studies in the field.

Philosophy of journalism or of the media should delineate important themes in historical situations, relating individual media events at a given time to an objective

theoretical understanding and interpretation in our socio-political experiences. For instance, the role of the media in the struggles of the colonial years with the stamp acts, the sugar acts, Boston Tea Party, etc. (Fellow and Tebbel, 2005) should be more than narrative accounts of media historical development and impacts. They should constitute veritable data for theoretical formulation of media principles aimed at inculcating the traditional sense of social responsibility in students of journalism. The partisan involvement of the media in the Tory, the Patriot and the Whig political struggles in American history should not only be left hidden in history books and told as a story in media history classes. There should be a dynamic intellectual connection between the media historical partisanship of the 18th Century and the media partisanship of today as evident in conservative and liberal perspectives of some media organizations like Fox News and CNN respectively.

Documentaries like “Peace, Propaganda and the Promised Land,” “Outfoxed,” “Fahrenheit 9/11” (2004), “Bowling for Columbine” (2002), and so many others should constitute genuine educational tools for broadening students’ understanding of the dialectics of the media in real and ideal terms. Investigative competence as exemplified by the likes of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, and professional demeanor of broadcast journalists like Walter Cronkite should be objectified into an intellectual reflection course on personal commitment to excellence. Connecting with other historical media situations worldwide, the American diverse experiences in media history should constitute solid theoretical and intellectual resources that would define the essence and existence of journalism, and enrich the profession in its practice. These experiences could be theorized into media paradigms by relating them to the socio-political insights of

contractualists, epistemologists, ethicists and political philosophers. These would provide the core knowledge that is lacking and for which King and others ardently advocate.

II. Media ethics as compulsory course:

One of the problems impeding high performance in journalism may be attributed to lack of designating media ethics as a required course in journalism education. Ethics inculcate values and tune up individuals' sense of responsibility. Exposure to journalistic values through media ethics class would increase the commitment of students of journalism to ethical values and responsibility than lack of it. Admittedly, there are media ethics classes offered in the academy in many institutions, but these classes are not *obligatoire*. Fewer than one in five instructors interviewed by Edmand Lambeth, Clifford Christians and Kyle Cole about teaching classical ethical theories considered them necessary, although half of them deemed these courses important. Beyond being important, ethics courses are necessary and "must begin early in journalist's career while also being a vital part of continuing education programs" (Meyers, 1990, p. 25).

Media ethics course should be a requirement for all journalism students. The importance of character formation in the practice of journalism requires its study at the basic and advanced levels within the undergraduate program. If students from other disciplines pursue journalism and mass communication on the graduate level, they should be made to take media ethics as a required course. The content of this course should focus on ethical theories substantiating these with historical situations and challenging the students to see themselves as moral agents in these situations. Among other reasons that truncated media coverage of the Rwandan genocide was disconnection from the tragedy as evident in the analysis in chapter three. One possible reason for the

disconnection might have been the fact that reporters did not have a personal sense of responsibility in that tragedy. By examining media coverage of conflict situations in media ethics class, and placing students in the position of moral agents in those conflicts, they will be brought to appreciate the need to act for the wellbeing of the victims especially with the application of theories like care-based ethics. As pointed out by Michael Bugeja (1997), topics such as “truth, falsehood, manipulation, temptation, unfairness and power (among other abstractions)” should be analyzed (p. 63) within the context of moral duties. Those abstractions should be made concrete by relating them to historical instances especially in media history and in daily occurrences.

B. SPECIALIZATION

In almost all disciplines of academic endeavor, there are general studies as well as specializations. General studies have courses that are applicable to all the students in that discipline, and specializations are the courses that students who want to professionalize in specific aspects of the discipline have to take in order to prepare them for their field of specialization. For instance, apart from general studies in medicine, surgeons, dermatologists, physicians, gynecologists, and the different branches of medicine have core courses that prepare them for their specific areas of specialization. The same goes for law, engineering, teaching, etc. Journalism lacks this specialized education for students who would practice in important and demanding fields like conflict coverage. In Rwanda, Doyle (2007) and other journalists “got the story terribly wrong” (p. 145) because they had no specialized knowledge in genocide coverage. They reported the conflict as “chaos” (Chaon, 2007, p. 162; Doyle, 2007, p. 145), “militias settling scores” (Doyle, 2007, p. 150; Melvern, 2007, p. 198; Wall, 2007, p. 265), “civil war” (Chaon,

2007, p. 162; Kuperman, 2007, p. 256) and many other misguided terms because they could not see beyond the obvious. Journalism needs specialization especially for journalists covering conflicts. This specialized formation should cover important educational needs and skill-sets.

I. Academic courses:

Going back to Dallaire's comments, he advised journalists to be more cultured and to learn some geography, anthropology, sociology, and philosophy. History should be added to the list for obvious reasons. The purpose of these studies is to make media reports and analysis more qualitative and in-depth. Very often, journalists assigned to cover conflicts find themselves in the heart of social, cultural, historical and political quandary that they have to make sense of. To be able to interpret and report meaningfully on such situations, journalists will have to be intellectually well grounded in the human sciences and critical reasoning, with a good knowledge of geography to help them find their way in the unknown region of conflict. These intellectual qualities mixed with vocational skill-set in journalism are the requirements for a commendable work in conflict coverage. As Woo (2002) remarks,

Young journalists who know how to report and write but are ignorant of the social, historical and theoretical context of their profession are doomed to live in the shallows. Similarly, journalists who have been taught all about theory, history, ethics and the law of the press but who cannot go out, get the story, and write it are equally useless and ought to be in another line of work (p. 106).

The truth is that conflict coverage is not a wishy-washy venture in media practice. It is far removed from the "he said, she said" ordinary domain of media news. The responsibility

and duty it entails sets it apart as a reputable and challenging area of study that only highly intelligent and brave persons should be admitted.

II. Military tactics and survival strategy:

The issue of safety is an important question that affects media coverage of conflicts as seen in the Rwandan case (Chaon, 2007; Doyle, 2007; Hilsum, 2007; Hughes, 2007; Livingston, 2007). Considering the death toll of journalists in conflict coverage, the option seems to be either/ or. Either the journalist risks his life covering the conflict or he backs off for safety and there is no news. On a sad note, Michael Parks (2002) remarks that “around the world in 2001, thirty-seven journalists were killed while doing their jobs, up from twenty-four the previous year, according to the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists. Over the decade of 1992-2001, the deaths totaled 399” (p. 19). Understandably, this may explain the withdrawal of journalists from Rwanda at the beginning of the genocide (Kuperman, 2007; Roskis, 2007). But can there be a third option different from ‘deadly risk’ or withdrawal?

The third option – constructive involvement – in the view of this study would be for journalists who will specialize in conflict coverage to undergo some substantive training in military tactics centered on survival strategy as part of their training. The intention is not for the journalists to be ranked as soldiers but to enable them survive in conflict situation with the military knowledge gained. Logically, the journalist who goes to cover conflict with some knowledge of military tactics and survival strategy will be more confident and has more survival probability than the one without any.

C. CONCLUSION

The issue of responsible media coverage of genocide and conflicts in general is at the same time a very convoluted and relevant subject of study. It is convoluted for the fact that it is tangled with politics, the selfish human nature, and personal interests among other related factors. At the same time, the 17.8 million deaths arising from genocide alone in the 20th Century makes it a compelling issue. The pursuit of this study was founded on the respect for the sacredness of human life of which humanity itself should be the custodian.

The media as an institution is an influential segment of that humanity with the principal duty of supplying reliable information and framing news in a way that will command action. The power of the media is elaborately expounded by Jim Willis (2007) with historical instances of how they influence politics and governments. Whether that power was actuated in the different conflict situations in history - with particular reference to Rwanda, became the subject of investigation in this study. If not, why not? And do the media have the responsibility to act for the safety of the helpless in serious conflict situations such as genocide? How could this be done?

Using the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a case situation, this study was able to show the lapses that were evident in the media coverage of that genocide through the analysis of twelve articles which constitute media people's evaluation of media performance in Rwanda. Comparing this evaluation to other conflict situations, it came through that Rwanda was not a case in isolation. Through unseemly framing, ignorance, stereotype, media commercial concerns, and government influence among other things, the media fell short of their responsibilities. These responsibilities were identified to include: Being a voice to the voiceless, playing the go-between, middleman or facilitator, and generally

serving the public trust. For news coverage to be socially responsible it has to be existentially objective, it should promote respect for the sacredness of human life, and operate from the angle of care-based ethics. Good news coverage should not only be truthful, fair and balanced but must also impact the society positively in a tremendous way. In other words, the human angle should be outstanding.

In an attempt to fashion out ways of enhancing media responsibility in conflict coverage, Chalk (2007) and Frohardt/ Temin (2007) proposed intervention strategies that involve both the domestic and international media. In line with the view of this paper, other scholars see the real solution more in the area of educational development – creating or consolidating the core curriculum of journalism and mass communication in a way that goes beyond vocational skill-set. With particular reference to conflict coverage, this study proposed specialization for journalists intending to practice in this area. The specialization has to be double-faceted, namely, broadening the intellectual base and acquiring military tactics for survival.

The proposals of this study call into focus the media reality of our time in terms of technological assets for news reports. To that effect, every available means of communication should be maximally exploited to make news available in a meaningful way from the traditional media to the new media. The interactive power of the internet constitutes a dominant force in accessing the world of information. That is why even the cell phone was considered a veritable means of mass communication in the clarification of concepts. As technology continues to develop and evolve, more efficient ways may be available for the transmission of news and information in less time and to a broader audience. On this media equation, the educational base becomes the ‘constant’ while the

changing technology-scape constitutes the ‘variable’. This way, the media will continue to be efficient and effective through the shifting scenery of time in their duty as the watchdogs of the society.

As a final word, it may be most appropriate to end with a remark that summarizes the arguments in this study:

When news reaches the general population, it shapes public opinion. When there is a lack of statesmanship, public opinion can force a government to make decisions. Getting information out to the general population and holding decision-makers accountable – by continuously berating them about what is going on and what they are doing or not doing – is more crucial than a few talk shows and a couple of newscasts (Dallaire, 2007, p. 15).

It should be noted that this study was not intended to condemn or scorn the media efforts so far, nor does it pretend to proffer a definitive answer to the problem of media coverage of conflicts and genocides. As a qualitative study, it was investigating the “how” of media coverage of the 1994 Rwandan genocide from the angle of media people’s comments, objectifying the issues raised and suggesting the “ought” that it considered to be fundamental and indispensable for professional practice in the continuous search for the ultimate answer.

The strong points in this thesis are the coordination of views and ethical interpretations of the twelve articles on media coverage of the Rwandan genocide, the emphasis laid on the ethics of care in genocide coverage and the educational recommendations for journalism especially for journalists intending to cover genocide.

Theoretically, ethics of care in conflict coverage is not the original idea of the author but he has tried to raise it to the level of an alarming concern with particular reference to genocide based on the high regards he holds for the human life. It is for that reason that he has proposed media ethics as a required or compulsory course for all

journalism students both on the basic and advanced levels because their jobs directly affect the welfare of human beings in very many situations and ways – conflicts or otherwise.

Regrettably, the scope of the research did not cover a very wide range as would be expected in an academic study of this nature. As stated in the introduction, the main objective of the thesis was not to evaluate the Rwandan genocide per se but rather to propose ways of curbing continuous destruction of innocent lives in worthless acts of genocide. The analysis was mainly to provide a foothold or to point out an ethical direction which it has done by demonstrating, albeit to a limited extent, the fact that the media coverage of the Rwandan genocide was ethically wanting mostly in terms of social responsibility.

From the vantage point of the author's experience in this thesis, he would suggest that anyone wishing to take up a similar project or to develop this thesis should undertake a primary research. This entails a quantitative analysis of the articles and news clips from the media organizations that covered the genocide thereby avoiding the subjective limitations of an individual's comments. It may even be a comparative study of findings from the original articles and news clips and documented comments on the genocide. Where possible as in the case of still being alive, the researcher should also interview journalists and personnel of other groups who were a part of the genocide experience. Other ways of enriching the research include visiting the countries, important sites and museums connected to the genocide and talking to the people who lived the experience or feel the effect of the incident. In spite of the limitations of the study, it is indeed gratifying to be able to achieve what is contained in this thesis. The main point is to

remember the sacredness of life and the right of every person to respect and dignity, and to find ways of achieving that objective.

D. POSTSCRIPT

The journalist who steps out to cover a conflict of genocidal nature should note the following areas of importance that will make his coverage meaningful. These include:

I. The context of the conflict

The context of the conflict is about the historical dimension that the journalist should be familiar with. Covering a story without situating it in its proper context will not give proper meaning to that story. For instance, the historical seed of the Rwandan genocide was planted by Belgium in the colonial days who favored the Tutsis over the Hutus thereby creating ill-feelings between the two tribes that have long existed peacefully before the colonial rule (Ilibagiza, 2006). This evil became institutionalized when the Belgium colonial masters initiated the indication of an individual's tribe in his identification card which eventually made it possible for the Hutus to track down and kill the Tutsis during the genocide (Melvern, 2006). It was absolutely important for the journalists to let the outside world know that there was a colonial implication in the genocide and therefore the need for the western world to step in and help destroy the monster the European nation created.

II. The main issue in the conflict

Understanding the main issue or issues in the conflict constitutes the philosophical dimension. Journalists should rightly understand the conflict issue in order to be able to report it properly and meaningfully. The questions that would clarify this

point are: What is the real issue of contention in this conflict, and what are the objectives of the perpetrators? As explained in the “misconstruction of the conflict” and “use of ambiguous terms and insinuations” in chapter two, the journalists did not have the critical insight into the conflict that was so necessary to make the world understand exactly what was happening in Rwanda.

III. The nature of the conflict

The nature of the conflict addresses the social dimension of the problem. This refers to understanding the relationship between the distinct antagonizing groups prior to/ during the conflict and identifying the perpetrators and the victims as well as delineating other social implications. In reporting this, the journalist presents a perspective that would arouse the concern of the international public thereby influencing the authorities into action.

IV. The human concern in the conflict

The human concern issue in the conflict is about the ethical dimension – the human rights issue. The main goal of all the efforts that is called for in a conflict is to save lives and protect the dignity of every person. To some extent, this was lacking in the Rwandan coverage. The journalist should note the different forms of human suffering and degradation in this situation and capture them in his news reports and images. Visual evidence is very essential in this context. The aim in this area is to bring the general public to feel what their fellow human beings are suffering, and both the journalist and media organizations should work vigorously to achieve this.

V. The relevant method of communication

To gather all the necessary information is one thing but to communicate it efficiently in an impacting manner is another thing. In this professional/communication dimension, the journalist needs to constantly ask himself, “How do I bring the outside public to receive the news I have on this conflict?” It is to communication’s advantage that there are many media avenues in the 21st Century to boycott gate-keeping that would censor news clips and images, and prevent them from reaching the public. The journalist should take advantage of these technological blessings and ensure that news of the conflict reaches the outside world.

VI. The position and efforts of other governments and organizations

This refers to the political dimension in the conflict coverage. The journalist should do well to keep track of and report on the involvement of the different governments and groups. When a particular government or group notices that others are contributing and it is not, the shame of being labeled may force it to get involved. If no government or significant group such as the UN is responding to the conflict, the media should raise questions to that effect.

VII. The necessary cautions

The safety dimension is of utmost importance because the journalist has to stay alive to report the conflict. He must therefore work out ways in which he can safely report on the happenings in the conflict without putting himself unnecessarily in harm’s way.

These are suggestions necessary for journalists and the media in order to make conflict coverage intelligent meaningful impacting and safe.

APPENDIX A
OTHER GENOCIDE CASES OF THE 20TH CENTURY

A. ARMENIANS IN TURKEY (1915 – 1918)

The Armenian genocide is the first in the 20th Century. Adam Jones (2006) provides three key factors that shaped the Armenian tragedy. These include:

- The decline of the Ottoman Empire, which provoked desperation and humiliation among Turkey's would-be revolutionary modernizers, and eventually violent reaction;
- the vulnerable position of the Armenians in the Ottoman realm; and
- the outbreak of the First World War, history's most cataclysmic war to that point, which confronted Turkey with invasion from the west (at Gallipoli) and from the Russians in the northeast (p. 102).

Armenia was a Christian nation that was absorbed into the Ottoman Empire through Turkish invasion in the 11th century. At the decline of the empire in the 1800s, other vassal states achieved their independence except the Armenians and the Arabs of the Middle East who still remained under the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid. By the 1890s, young Armenians called for political reforms that will guarantee their civil rights but instead of being given their rights, they were persecuted. In a dramatic turn of events, The Sultan lost his power through a coup to the reform-minded triumvirate known as "Young Turks" whose ambition was to "create a new Turkish empire, a "great and

eternal land" called Turan with one language and one religion" (The History Place, 2000, <http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/armenians.htm>).

With "Turanism" came Islamic fundamentalism that rose against the Armenian Christians who were considered to be infidels i.e. non-believers in the Muslim sense. Moreover, the Armenians were the educated ones open to new scientific, political and social ideas from the West, whereas the Turks were illiterate peasant farmers and small shop keepers. So the Young Turks exploited these religious, cultural, educational, economic and political differences and presented the Armenians as strangers among them (ibid).

With the outbreak of the World War I, the "Young Turks" saw in it the opportunity to put the "Armenian question" to rest. Taking side with the central Powers (Germany-Austria-Hungary), the Turks disarmed the Armenians under the pretext that the latter were sympathetic toward Russian Christians. The weapons of the forty thousand Armenians serving in the Turkish Army were confiscated while the Armenian soldiers were put into slave labor where they experienced high death rate. In their program of total extermination of the Armenians, the "Young Turks" actually gave orders to all provincial governors in coded telegrams throughout Turkey.

From the evening of April 24, 1915, the Turks began armed round-ups, taking 300 Armenian political leaders, educators, writers, clergy and dignitaries from their homes in Constantinople. These Armenians were briefly jailed and tortured, then hanged or shot. This was followed by mass arrests of Armenian men throughout the country by Turkish soldiers, police agents and bands of Turkish volunteers. They were tied together with

ropes in small groups and taken to the outskirts of their town where they were shot dead or bayoneted by death squads.

Armenian women, children, and the elderly were deceitfully ordered on a very short notice to pack a few belongings and be ready to leave for a non-military zone for their own safety. These were death marches southward toward the Syrian Desert. These marches covered hundreds of miles and lasted for months using indirect routes through the mountains and the wilderness to prolong the ordeal and have them die from exhaustion or dehydration. In some places, they “were being bundled off to the hills with their children and families, as if to a slaughterhouse and killed there” (Akcem, 2006, p. 179).

By the end of this genocide, 1.5 million Armenian Christians lost their lives through torture, death march, shooting, butchering, starvation and deportation.

B. UKRAINE – STALIN’S FORCED FAMINE (1932 – 1933)

The genocide situation in Ukraine was a socio-political atrocity of Joseph Stalin who came to power after the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924. The History Place (1999), reports that Ukraine had been under the domination of the Russian Czars for 200 years, and was working toward their independence someday. They saw an opportunity for the fulfillment of their dream when the Czarist rule collapsed in 1917. However, they lost this opportunity in 1921 with the defeat of their national troops by Lenin’s Red Army and other forces in their struggle for independence. Even with that defeat, they still kept their national revival movement alive in the hope of independence. But when Stalin came to power in 1924, he was set on crushing that hope with his genocide strategy that nearly wiped out the entire Ukrainian population. From 1929, he arrested over 5,000 Ukrainian

scholars, scientists, cultural and religious leaders falsely accusing them of plotting an armed revolt. These Ukrainian elites were shot without trial or deported to prison camps in remote areas of Russia.

On Jan. 5, 1930, Stalin imposed the Soviet collectivization system of land management on the Ukrainians (Gregorovich, 1974; The History Place, 2000). This led to the seizure of all privately owned farmlands and livestock from the local farm owners especially the Kulaks who were wealthy farmers that owned many acres and employed workers. Stalin made the Kulaks his number one target believing that any insurrection will be led by them. He declared them “enemies of the people” leaving them homeless and without any possession. It was forbidden by law to help the dispossessed Kulaks (The History Place, 2000). The Kulaks were sent in millions to concentration camps (the Gulag), or into internal exile such as the wilderness of Siberia where they perished in the frigid living condition of the wilderness (Jones, 2006).

As Stalin continued reducing the once proud village farmers of Ukraine to mere rural factory workers in large collective farms, the people continued to resist through rebellion and sabotage. They burned their own homes rather than surrender them, took back their property, harassed and assassinated the local Russian authority. In response, Stalin sent Soviet troops and secret police to break the people’s will and crush the rebellion. As the defiance continued, Stalin instituted a policy of mass starvation that led to the death of millions in Ukraine (ibid).

By the middle of 1932, Stalin had shipped out so many foodstuffs from Ukraine to Russia that there was no food left for the Ukrainians. A request by Ukrainian Communists for food aid brought Stalin’s wrath against them.

The Soviets then sealed off the borders of the Ukraine, preventing any food from entering, in effect turning the country into a gigantic concentration camp. Soviet police troops inside the Ukraine also went house to house seizing any stored up food, leaving farm families without a morsel. All food was considered to be the "sacred" property of the State. Anyone caught stealing State property, even an ear of corn or stubble of wheat, could be shot or imprisoned for not less than ten years (The History Place, <http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/stalin.htm>).

The result of this situation was mass starvation that ended in the death of about 25,000 persons a day in Ukraine. By the end of that genocide, seven million Ukrainians lost their lives “against a backdrop of persecution, mass execution, and incarceration clearly aimed at undermining Ukrainians as a national group” (Jones, 2006, p. 136).

C. JAPANESE RAPE OF NANKING, CHINA (1937 – 1938)

With the invasion of Korea and Taiwan in the late 19th Century, Japanese imperialism began to grow outstandingly under the military regime established in the 1930s (Jones, 2006). In December of 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army invaded Nanking, the capital city of China and proceeded to murder 300,000 people. This atrocity became known as “The Rape of Nanking”. It was the single worst atrocity during the World War II era (The History Place, 2000).

After defeating the poorly led and loosely organized Chinese soldiers at Nanking, the Japanese proceeded to eliminate their prisoners of war (POW). These POW were taken to the outskirts of the city of Nanking where they were brutalized and decapitated. Some of them were mowed down by machine-gun fire while others were tied up, soaked with gasoline and burned alive. Women of all ages numbering over 20,000 were gang-raped by Japanese soldiers, then stabbed to death with bayonets or shot to conceal any testimony. Even pregnant women were raped, had their bellies slit open and the fetuses

torn out. Chinese men were forced to rape their daughters, and sons to rape their mothers while the rest of the family watched (ibid).

Methods of extermination and destruction generally included citywide burning, shooting, burying alive, stabbing, drowning, strangulation, rape, theft, and massive property destruction. By the end of this genocide, 300,000 were killed (ibid).

D. JEWISH HOLOCAUST BY NAZI GERMANY (1938 – 1945)

Adam Jones (2002) states that “The holocaust inflicted upon European Jews by the Nazi regime was arguably the most systematic and sadistic campaign of mass extermination ever mounted” (http://www.gendercide.org/case_jews.html). It started as a simple boycott of Jewish shops and ended in gas chambers in Auschwitz following Adolf Hitler’s plan to exterminate all European Jews (The History Place, 1999).

The genocide was set in motion by Hitler repeatedly blaming the Jews for Germany’s defeat in World War I and subsequent economic difficulties. He classified the Germans as the master race, and the Jews as the racial opposite actively engaged in international conspiracy to stop the master race (Germans) from assuming its rightful position as world rulers (ibid).

The Holocaust began on November 9 and 10, 1938, popularly called “The Night of Broken Glass,” after Herschel Grynszpan shot and killed Ernst vom Rath, a German embassy official in Paris, in retaliation of Nazi harsh treatment of his Jewish parents. Using vom Rath’s death as an excuse, the Nazis carried out the first State-run pogrom against Jews. “Ninety Jews were killed, 500 synagogues were burned and most Jewish shops had their windows smashed. The first mass arrest of Jews also occurred as over 25,000 men were hauled off to concentration camps. As a kind of cynical joke, the Nazis

then fined the Jews 1 Billion Reichsmarks for the destruction which the Nazis themselves had caused during Kristallnacht” (ibid, <http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/holocaust.htm>).

In this genocide, the different methods of extermination were:

- Ghettoization: confinement of Jews in festering, overcrowded zones of major cities (Jones, 2006, p. 151).
- Open air point-blank shooting: Rounding up and shooting hundreds of thousands of Jews (ibid, p. 152)
- Gas chambers: Industrialized death camps where Jews were asphyxiated with cyanide gas (ibid, p. 153).
- Slave labor on insufficient food: Death by overwork, disease and starvation (ibid, p.154).

According to Cathal Nolan (1995), “It was not the largest mass killing of the twentieth century.... But in ferocity, hate, sadism and horror, the Nazi genocide of the Jews of Europe has no peer” (p. 159 in Jones, 2002).

By the end of that genocide, six million Jews were exterminated – Approximately three million in Poland, one million in USSR, 550,000 in Hungary, 275,000 in Romania, 150,000 in Lithuania, between 135,000 and 140,000 in Germany, and 100,000 in Netherlands.

E. CAMBODIA (1975 – 1979)

The history of Cambodian genocide bears the mark of intertwining factors – cultural attitude, Vietnamese War, colonial influence, and political ideology. However, the proximate factors could be linked to the deteriorating political and economic

situations in Cambodia under the then military government, as well as the loss of American military support for the government in place. Under these tumultuous state of affairs, Saloth Sar, leader of the Khmer Rouge rebel movement, who also took the name Pol Pot, meaning “Brother Number One,” seized power on April 17, 1975 (Jones, 2006; The History Place, 1999).

The History Place (1999) reports that having ascended to power with his communist ideology, Pol Pot began a radical experiment to create an agrarian utopia following Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution in Communist China. He began by announcing the purification of the society. This meant doing away with Capitalism, Western culture, city life, religion, and all foreign influences in favor of an extreme form of peasant Communism. Consequently,

All foreigners were thus expelled, embassies closed, and any foreign economic or medical assistance was refused. The use of foreign languages was banned. Newspapers and television stations were shut down, radios and bicycles confiscated, and mail and telephone usage curtailed. Money was forbidden. All businesses were shuttered, religion banned, education halted, health care eliminated, and parental authority revoked. Thus Cambodia was sealed off from the outside world (ibid, <http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/bosnia.htm>).

Pol Pot forcibly evacuated all of Cambodia's cities into the countryside. For instance, two million people were evacuated from Phnom Penh into the countryside at gun point resulting in the death of about 20,000 along the way.

In the countryside, life became a nightmare for millions of Cambodians who were accustomed to city life. They fed on one tin of rice (180 grams) per person every two days. Work began in the fields around 4 a.m. and lasted till 10 p.m., with only two rest periods. Armed supervisors of Khmer Rouge made work decisions with no participation

from the workers. The workers were given a day of rest every tenth day as well as three days-off during the Khmer New Year festival.

Throughout the country, Pol Pot conducted deadly purges to eliminate remnants of the "old society." In this process, the educated, the wealthy, Buddhist monks, police, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and former government officials were exterminated including ex-soldiers along with their wives and children. Anyone suspected of disloyalty to Pol Pot was killed even if they were members of Khmer Rouge leadership.

In summary, the Cambodian genocide could be described in terms of its ideological basis and characteristic features. Adam Jones (2006) identifies four ideological foundations, namely:

- Hatred of “enemies of the people” – Against the rich, professionals, “imperial stooges” and the educated class.
- Xenophobia and messianic nationalism – Toward reclaiming the lost Cambodian territories of Kampuchea Krom in Southern Vietnam.
- Peasantism, anti-urbanism, and primitivism – Drawing support from the rural rather than the urban population and resentment of existing technologies.
- Purity, discipline and militarism – Emphasis on racial purity, self discipline and military prowess.

The characteristic features of this genocide include:

- Forced labor – Too much work with no benefit.
- Mass execution – Against “class enemies” and ethnic minorities.
- Violent internal purges – Paranoiac elimination of Communist Party members.

By the end of this genocide, two million people lost their lives, mostly ethnic minorities such as the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Cham Muslims as well as twenty other smaller groups (The History Place, 1999).

F. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1992-1995)

Yugoslavia as a country was made up of ethnic and religious groups that had been historical rivals and bitter enemies. These included the Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Croats (Catholics) and ethnic Albanians (Muslims). During World War II, Nazi Germany invaded and partitioned the country. Following the defeat of Germany, Josip Broz, a Croatian, known also as Tito, reunified Yugoslavia under the slogan "Brotherhood and Unity." He merged together Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, along with two self-governing provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina (The History Place, 1999), and "worked to ensure that no ethnic group dominated the federation" (Jones, 2006, p. 213).

After the death of Tito in 1980, Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian and former Communist, turned to nationalism and religious hatred to gain power. He started inflaming the long-standing tensions between Serbs and Muslims in the independent province of Kosovo. This situation eventually degenerated into a genocidal conflict. At the end of it, "over 200,000 Muslim civilians had been systematically murdered. More than 20,000 were missing and feared dead, while 2,000,000 had become refugees" (The History Place, 1999, <http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/bosnia.htm>).

The Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide was strategically planned to ensure both victory and total removal of the Muslims from the Serbs. The process which was

considered “ethnic cleansing” emphasized gender-selective mass killing in which civilians were killed, especially “men of battle age” (Jones, 2006, p. 216).

Mark Darner (1999) describes the strategy as follows:

1. *Concentration*. Surround the area to be cleansed and after warning the resident Serbs – often they are urged to leave or are at least told to mark their houses with white flags – intimidate the target population with artillery fire and arbitrary executions and then bring them out into the streets.
2. *Decapitation*. Execute political leaders and those capable of taking their places: lawyers, judges, public officials, writers, professors.
3. *Separation*. Divide women, children, and old men from men of “fighting age” – sixteen years to sixty years old.
4. *Evacuation*. Transport women, children and old men to the border, expelling them into a neighboring territory or country.
5. *Liquidation*. Execute “fighting age men”, dispose of bodies (p. 8).

By the end of this genocide, 200, 000 Muslims were killed (History Place, 1999).

APPENDIX B

HIGHLIGHTS FROM INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES

A. Reporting the genocide – Mark Doyle (2007, pp. 145 – 159)

- “I have to admit...I, like others got the story terribly wrong”:
 - “I used the word chaos”
 - “What I could see clearly in the first few days was the shooting war...”
 - “...the shooting war was easy to describe. The genocide war took a little longer to confirm.” (p. 145).
- An African ambassador spent “more than four hours” explaining the dangerous situation to the journalist but the journalist did not seem to feel what the ambassador was feeling – the genocide (p. 146).
- He could only cover the European evacuation stories “because it was the only story I could cover safely” (p.148).
- “...I looked down to see a Rwandan man attacking another Rwandan” (p. 148).
- April 13 report describes the conflict as:
 - A clash between government and rebel forces struggling for Kigali
 - Massacre of civilians
 - Innocent people being killed in Kigali
 - Thousands of opponent of the late president killed by government and militia forces
 - Thugs mounting roadblocks and killing people they consider to be their ethnic or political opponents (pp. 149 and 150).
- “Many reports, including my own, made reference to the ‘tribal’ nature of the conflict and militias settling scores” (p. 150).
- April 14 report described:
 - The battle for the capital
 - Division of the city into rebel and government-held zones
 - Killing of opponents and retaliation
- April 15 report described:
 - Intensity of the battle
 - Types of weapons used
 - Thousands of people executed by bullets or by knife (p. 150).
- Report over the next few days focused on:
 - the withdrawal of Belgian troops
 - The appointment of Augustin Bizimungu as the new Rwandan army chief of staff
 - The government’s claim that two million people had been displaced by the fighting

- And the intense battle for strategic hilltops south of Kigali (p. 151).
- April 16 report described:
 - The killing of the president's political opponent
 - The two warring military sides as well as militias, bandits and looters on the street
 - Unhealthy political climate (p. 151).
- April 17 report described:
 - Tens of thousands of people killed
 - Political opponents massacred by president's supporters
 - Rebel entry into the city and clash with the military (p. 152).
- April 18 report described:
 - Credence to the Rwandan army claim that the rebel group had rounded up 250 civilians and killed them
 - Eye witness accounts accusing government soldiers and militias loyal to the government of killing political opponents in large numbers
 - Claim by Rwandan army officers that camps full of ethnic Tutsis fleeing the violence are created in several parts of the country (p. 152).
- April 19 report described:
 - Militias directed by soldiers against rebels and sympathizers who are often taken by militia to include any ethnic Tutsi.
- April 20 report described:
 - Thousands of people killed by machetes and clubs by the government militia targeting opposition sympathizers and members of the minority Tutsi tribe (p. 152).
- April 22 report described:
 - Militia loyal to the late president killing his political and ethnic opponents in large numbers (p. 153).
- April 23 report described:
 - Massacres of ethnic or political opponents of the late president committed by loyal militias in the presence of the government army soldiers.
 - Number of massacres in two weeks estimated at 100,000 people (p. 153).
- April 24 report described:
 - The gory situation and scale of human disaster
 - Efforts of Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UN forces for a cease-fire
 - High number of killing done by machete-wielding militias who seek out ethnic and political opponents
 - The worst killing as taking place in the capital
 - Worst culprits as militias opposed to ethnic Tutsis
 - Conventional war between the government and the rebel armies while the slaughter continued (p. 153).
- April 26 report described:
 - The killing as not being a simple tribal conflict
 - Amnesty International's perception of the killing as part of deliberate political plan

- Culprits as supporters of late president who systematically executed known or suspected opponents
- Amnesty's estimate of the number of people killed as 100,000 with majority of the dead being Tutsis
- The intricate relationship between politics and ethnicity in Rwanda (p. 153).
- No use of the word 'genocide' until 29 April but reports replete with references to massacres of Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutus by government-backed militias (p. 154).
- Even when the word 'genocide' was used, some editors at BBC were not convinced P. 154).
- Lack of trust of correspondence on ground evident in BBC use of other sources of information and interviewees that give contradictory account (p. 154).
- View of Africa as the dark continent and chaotic (p. 154)
- Editors persuasion that correspondent should 'put the other side' in report (p. 154)
- Newsroom reverted to using "chaos" and "indiscriminate mass killings" (p. 154)
- Acknowledgement of the misrepresentation in the description of the killings as "the slaughter of civilians" or "the mass killings" (p. 154)
- Acknowledgement of the act of genocide by government militia and government army against Tutsis (p. 155)
- Testifying to news agencies' misleading descriptions of "Africans killing Africans" (p. 155)
- Spin doctoring by British and American army media relations staff with misleading report of Western troops taking control of the situation (p. 155)
- Inaccurate highlight of rebel killings by Western media (p. 155)
- Media dependence on misleading information by a UN spokeswoman about the situation on ground (p. 155)
- The risks in coverage of genocide (p.156)
- Journalists' appearance on the scene after the events (p. 158)

B. Who failed in Rwanda, journalists or the media? – Anne Chaon (2007, p. 160 – 166)

- Chaon first presents the testimony of Annie Thomas of Agence France-Presse (AFP) who left Kenya for Rwanda immediately after the event of April 6, 1994. Thomas testified to:
 - The inability of journalists to describe properly the events of the genocide during the first few days (p. 160).
 - 'Acts of genocide' or 'genocide' are words which only came later
- Thomas was in Rwanda most of the three months of genocide and reported the massacre scene she witnessed at Kigali hospital "the very same day on the wire" (p. 161)

- The situation was very risky for journalists in Rwanda with the war and the massacre, and the militia looking for Radio France Internationale (RFI) journalists to kill (p. 161)
- Journalists did not fail, they were “very strongly committed... to report and to testify” including French journalists whose authorities were involved with Habyarimana regime (p. 161)
- “During three months of genocide... AFP was one of the rare media outlets to speak out, and sometimes the only international agency on ground (p. 161)
- Mark Doyle of BBC stayed most of the time as well as RFI
- Very few media were there all the time (p. 161)
- Media are business looking for profit. So they shy away from such reporting because it costs a lot of money (p. 161)
- Other international events in America, South Africa, and Bosnia turned media attention away from Rwanda at that time (p. 162)
- The study conducted by Garth Myers and colleagues in 1996 shows that there were as many twice as many articles on Bosnian conflict than Rwanda (p. 162)
- Most journalists are not genocide savvy nor were they familiar with the geography of Rwanda, thereby mistaking the situation for civil war, and a return to previous situations since 1959 (p. 162)
- During the first few days, special correspondents were more prone to use words like “chaos”, “anarchy” and “furore”, and confuse the massacre as the side effect of the fighting (p. 162)
- On April 12, the main story was the evacuation of foreigners and closing of embassies with strict orders to cover the evacuation and leave (p. 162)
- Newspapers reduced the coverage of Rwandan genocide to focus on Bosnia (p. 163)
- There is only one video image of the massacre taking place shot by British cameraman, Nick Hughes (p. 163)
- People were not interested in genocide pictures from Rwanda (p. 163)
- AFP used the word ‘genocide’ for the first time on April 20 quoting Human Rights Watch in its warning to the UN (p. 163)
- Initially, AFP referred to the conflict as ‘massacre’, ‘killings’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ (p. 163)
- AFP used the word ‘genocide’ on April 28, May 3, May 16, and the word finally came into common use with the UN Committee on Human Rights resolution on May 25 about genocide in Rwanda (p. 63)
- The media and journalists did not independently use the word ‘genocide’ unless they had to quote it from a source (p. 163)
- The media focused overwhelmingly on the aftermath of the genocide – the cholera outbreak in Goma refugee camp because the story there was easy to cover (p. 164).

C. Reporting Rwanda: The media and the aid agencies – Lindsey Hilsum (pp. 167 – 187):

- 500 journalists gathered in Goma, Zaire in late July 1994 to cover the influx of an estimated one million Rwandan refugees. They brought “the technology of instant ‘real time’ news” that was lacking in the genocide coverage (p. 167)
- “The exodus and the subsequent cholera epidemic became a huge story around the world” in televisions and newspapers (p. 167)
- The act of genocide that led to the exodus was given far less space and airtime in the media (p. 168)
- The media presence in Goma changed the genocide story in a very damaging way in that their coverage made the public feel that the real crisis was people dying of cholera (p. 169)
- The interest of journalists to cover humanitarian aids sometimes overwhelms their responsibility to expose underlying issues (p. 170)
- Crisis in developing countries are reported with emphasis on humanitarian over the political or military issues involved (p. 170)
- The tension between January and April, 1994 resulting from President Habyarimana’s refusal to implement the Arusha accord did not receive much media coverage (p. 171)
- “For most of April, there were no more than 10 to 15 reporters in the country at any time” (p. 172)
- The conflict situation was confusing for most of April (p. 172)
- The situation was very dangerous for journalists – “It was a story we wanted to tell but it was appallingly dangerous (p. 172)
- There was no ‘real time’ TV news because it was too dangerous to send an expensive satellite uplink into Rwanda (p. 172)
- The world was aware of Rwanda on May 29 (p. 173)
- By May, newspaper editorials and op-eds advocated UN intervention to stop the killing (p. 173)
- “... few journalists were advocating that Western countries take a political stance...” (p. 174)
- In the disagreement in France over the decision to withdraw completely on April 8, “the media was used in the context of rivalry within the state apparatus, rather than as overall pressure on a coherent, monolithic state” (p. 174).

D. Limited vision: How both the American media and government failed Rwanda – Steven Livingston (pp. 188 – 197):

- “Until the September 2001 attacks on the United States and the war in Afghanistan, international news almost disappeared from American television news.... Similar trends were evident in American newspapers” (p. 190).
- The Rwandan massacre occurred during the second period of relative journalistic inattentiveness to international affairs in America (p. 190).
- The media focused more on other global events at this period to the neglect of the Rwandan crisis (p. 191).

- “The vast majority of CNN news stories about Rwanda were not about the Hutu massacre of Tutsi and moderate Hutu; instead, they were about the Hutu refugees who fled Rwanda to camps around Rwanda (p. 195)
- Fatigue from Somalia experience and a sense of danger prevented closer coverage (p. 195)

E. Missing the story: The media and the Rwanda genocide – Linda Melvern (pp. 198 – 210):

- The international press described the Rwandan genocide as ‘tribal violence’ (p. 198)
- The message was that “the violence in Rwanda was the result of ancient tribal hatreds... The use of this cliché dominated the early reports on the genocide” (p. 198)
- Jean-Philippe Ceppi published the massacre in the church in Gikondo in a French newspaper Liberation on April 11, 1994 using the word, ‘genocide’ (p. 201)
- Jean Helene also reported the killing in Gikondo, stating that the victims were mostly Tutsi (p. 201)
- After Ceppi’s use of the word ‘genocide’ in his report, it disappeared from news report giving way to misinformation about the conflict (p. 201)
- Roger Winter’s article that explained the genocidal nature of the Rwandan conflict was rejected by most American newspapers but was eventually published in Toronto’s Globe and mail (p. 202)
- New York Times article described Rwanda as small, poor and globally insignificant, and the crisis was an “uncontrollable spasm of lawlessness and terror” (p. 202)
- New York Times editorial of April 23 made reference to “what looks much like genocide” (p. 202)
- The media focus at the time of the genocide was The South African election with 2, 500 accredited press compared to a maximum of 15 in Rwanda (p. 204)
- Shortage of accurate media coverage (p. 207)
- By generally characterizing the genocide as tribal anarchy, the press was “fundamentally irresponsible” (p. 208)
- Rather than the media, nongovernmental organizations led the call for action in Rwanda (p. 208)
- Lack of adequate reporting of the genocide (p. 209)

F. What did they say? African media coverage of the first 100 days of the Rwanda crisis – Emmanuel C. Alozie (pp. 211 – 230)

- Daily Nation highlighted the historical background of the crisis when it reported the death of the presidents (p. 218)

- On April 9, 1994, Daily Sun reported that within hours after the death of the presidents, soldiers were on the street “killing, terrorizing, kidnapping and looting.” (p. 219)
- Both the Guardian and Daily Nation reported on the historical hostilities between the two tribes (p. 219)
- The two papers blamed the various Hutu-dominated governments for the atrocities as well as the rebel group, Rwandan patriotic Front (RPF) (p. 219)
- The newspapers called for truce and gave advice for peaceful coexistence between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel group (p. 220)
- Within the context of the Rwandan crisis, the papers addressed African issues generally since the end of colonialism, pointing out Africa’s problems and failures and indicting various governments in the continent for the sufferings of their people (p. 221)
- The papers explored the failure of international community in the genocide – UN, foreign governments, colonial masters, other African countries and the Organization of African Unity (p. 223)
- The international press paid little or no attention to the historical crisis in Rwanda that led to the genocide (p. 223)
- At the onset of the crisis, the Guardian and the Daily Nation published many articles on daily events. But later, the Daily Nation published more articles over a longer period of time than the Guardian (p. 226).

G. Exhibit 467: Genocide through a camera lens – Nick Hughes (pp. 231 – 234)

- Though there are pictures of those killed, there are only few images of the killings as they take place. It was only on three occasions that killings were filmed as it took place (p. 231)
- Journalists did not know the scale and how systematically organized the genocide was. This reality dawned on recollection, not when they were witnessing it. In other word, it was massive and systematic (p. 231)

H. Media failure over Rwanda’s genocide – Tom Giles (pp. 235 - 237)

- Too little of the genocide was reported for the world to understand the scale of the massacre (p. 236)
- There were few pictures of what was going on (p. 236)
- Most senior correspondents were in South African for the election of its first black president (p. 236)
- Previous negative reactions to the picture of Burundi murder on BBC shown at lunch time set the tone for media negligence (p. 236)
- Rushes sent to BBC on the genocide were not aired because of being too graphic for British audience (p. 236)
- Journalists made efforts to report news as it happened but the media e.g. BBC censored it (p. 237)

- The refugee camp made the news rather than the genocide p. 237)
- Broadcast of the killing events in Rwanda in BBC came too late on June 27, 1994 (p. 237)
- Journalists who covered the genocide harbor a sense of helplessness for not applying enough pressure for action (p. 237)

I. Genocide without images: White film noirs – Edgar Roskis (pp. 238 - 241)

- There were many journalists in Rwanda but only at certain times, and so many images sent out but only certain places (p. 238)
- The real genocide was “never captured in still or moving images” (p. 238)
- When the genocide started, the media did not regard Rwanda as a “subject” (p. 238)
- The African stereotype did not allow the media to be committed to Rwanda. Six American correspondents sent were immediately recalled home (p. 238)
- Very few journalists remained during the genocide (p. 238)
- The photographs and the recordings were done after the fact (p. 239)
- Editors rejected the raw, unadorned images of the genocide and testimony of survivors presented by photographers (p. 239)
- Rwandan stories were relegated to the inside pages (p. 239)
- The photos shown were old and small, and the accounts were second hand (p. 239)
- The photograph of the genocide made the front page of a French newspaper late on May 18, and that picture was not taken by a photo journalist (p. 239)
- Journalists depended on humanitarian groups for transport, so their coverage was limited to the refugee camps (p. 239)
- What interested the media was not the genocide but “humanitarian melodrama refugee situation” (p. 239)
- The impressive images of Rwanda were taken in the refugee camp of Goma (p. 240)
- Photographers’ engagement in Goma was self serving – for photo award (p. 240)
- The media portrayal at the refugee camp was that of the awesome white man helping the poor dying Africans (p. 240)

J. Notes on circumstances that facilitate genocide: The attention given to Rwanda by the media and others outside Rwanda before 1990 – Mike Dottridge (pp. 242 – 247)

- Some factors determine the level of media coverage in Africa such as:
 - Whose colony the country was
 - What European language is used in the country
 - How strong the vested interest were to maintain silence
 - Whether the journalist was already tied up with other stories

- What else was going on in Africa and the rest of the world at that time (p. 244)
- “There was little in terms of ‘joined up reporting’ i.e. reporting that shows connection between developments in neighboring countries or within the sub region (p. 244)
- Little or no independent report on the massacres between 1982 and 1986 in Uganda in which Rwandan refugees were persecuted, and which made them want to return home to Rwanda (p. 244)
- The fate of members of Kayibanda government that was ousted by Kabyarimana in 1973 received no coverage in the media (p. 245)
- In the 1980s, journalists were sent to Rwanda from Belgium for a propaganda report on the “rosy” life in that country (p. 246)
- In the 1980s also, some London-based journalists tried to deny daily massacres and tortures in Rwanda (p. 246)
- Between 1960 and 1990, the media have displayed lack of interest, inaccurate information and siding with a repressive regime (p. 246).

K. The media’s failure: A reflection on the Rwanda genocide – Richard Dowden (pp. 248 – 255)

- “Getting to the action was no easy” as there were no flights to Kigali or anywhere else in the country (p. 249)
- Receiving untrue stories from undependable sources by journalists (p. 250)
- Difficulty getting the story out because of telecommunication problem (p. 250)
- Rwanda was not considered by British editors to be important enough. It was seen as “a small country far away in a continent that rarely hits the headline” (p. 251)
- The focus of media reports on April 7 as the genocide started were the plane crash that killed the presidents, the murder of Belgian troops, and the evacuation of foreigners (p. 251)
- The foreign story of the moment for most newspapers was Bosnia (p. 251)
- the attention of the media in Africa at that time was the South African momentous election (p. 251)
- “The language used by the press to describe Rwanda reinforced the impression that what was going on was an inevitable and primitive process that had no rational explanation and could not be stopped by negotiation or force (p. 252)
- Expressions used by the media to describe the crisis included “eruption of tribal violence”, gangs of youths settling tribal scores hacking and clubbing people to death”, “continuing tribal slaughter between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority”, “chaos”, “score settling” (p. 253)
- “Most journalists accepted diplomats’ implicit agenda that the killing of civilians was an offshoot of the renewed civil war” (p. 253)
- Catherine Bond mentioned that Tutsis and moderate Hutus were the targets in the conflict in her April 12 report (p. 253)
- There were several references to genocide in Rwanda and Burundi but these referred to past massacres (p. 253)

- “The Interahamwe – the organized death squad was not mentioned in the press until 30 April” (p. 253)
- “The language of newspapers gradually changed throughout April from a story about a civil war to a story of genocide” (p. 254)
- Media did not seem to understand the organizational nature of the genocide (p. 254).

L. How the media missed the Rwanda genocide – Alan J. Kuperman (pp. 256 – 260)

- The media did not recognize the extent of the carnage to mobilize the world attention to it (p. 256)
- Media mistook genocide for civil war – The Time on April 11; De Standaard on April 12; Radio France Internationale on April 13 (p. 256)
- The media reported that violence was decreasing when it was actually mounting – The New York Times on April 11; Le Monde on April 12, 14 and 15 (p. 257)
- When the genocide was reaching its peak, the reporters were quitting Rwanda (p. 257)
- Media reports of death counts were grossly miscalculated and underestimated – The New York Times on April 10; media estimates remained the same during second week; Guardian on April 16; The New York Times on April 18 (p. 257)
- The media focused almost exclusively on Kigali for nearly two weeks (p. 257)
- Reports in the countryside seemed to indicate a renewal of strife or civil war (p. 257)
- It was not until April 25 that The New York Times insinuated the theme of genocide in its report (p. 257)
- The media did not provide prompt notice of the genocide (p. 258)

M. An analysis of news magazine coverage of the Rwanda crisis in the United States – Melissa Wall (pp. 261 – 273)

- “From the days of the African nationalist movements, Western news organizations have tended to paint a one-dimensional portrait of intracountry conflict occurring in the African continent” (p. 261)
- Sources quoted (215) – aid workers (22 percent), ordinary local people (21 per cent), local opposition members (14 per cent), Western officials (13 per cent), UN representatives (13 per cent), local officials (9 per cent), experts (5 per cent), regional (2 per cent), others (1 per cent) (p. 264)
- Headline analysis suggests that the Rwandans were not favorably portrayed (p. 264)
- Most headlines listed neither cause or solution of/ for the problem (p. 264)
- Headlines that listed the cause cited tribalism as the cause (p. 265)

Keyword results portrayed negative image of the Rwandans and the idea that the conflict was based on brutal tribalism (p. 265)

- Metaphors tended to cluster in particular patterns (p. 265)
- Patterns included:
 - Patterns included: comparing the violence to explosions or eruptions;
 - Comparing the movement of refugees to natural disasters;
 - Comparing the events to biblical scenes or diseases (p. 265)
- Five themes in the coverage:
 - The Rwanda violence was the result of irrational tribalism.
 - Rwandan people are little better than animals, ranging from the barbaric to the helpless and pathetic.
 - The violence is incomprehensible and, thus, is explained through comparison to biblical myths, supernatural causes, natural disasters or diseases.
 - Neighboring African countries are just as violent and, thus, unable to help solve Rwanda's problems.
 - Only the West is capable of solving Rwanda's problems (p. 265)

APPENDIX C

THEMATIC CATEGORIZATIONS

I. MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE CONFLICT:

- Journalists got the story wrong in the early days of the genocide (Chaon, 2007, p. 160; Doyle, 2007, p. 145)
- Use of the word ‘chaos’, ‘anarchy’, ‘furore’ (Chaon, 2007, p. 162; Doyle, 2007, p. 145)
- the conflict described as ‘tribal’ and as ‘militias settling scores’ (Doyle, 2007, p. 150; Melvern, 2007, p. 198; Wall, 2007, p. 265)
- Battle for the capital (Doyle, 2007, p. 150)
- Retaliations (Doyle, 2007, p. 150)
- Intense battle for the strategic hilltop (Doyle, 2007, p. 151)
- “Africans killing Africans” (Doyle, 2007, p. 155)
- Civil war (Chaon, 2007, p. 162; Kuperman, 2007, p. 256)
- “the violence in Rwanda was the result of ancient tribal hatreds” (Melvein, 2007, p. 198; Wall, 2007, p. 265)
- When the genocide started, the media did not regard Rwanda as a “subject” (Roskis, 2007, p. 238)
- The media described the crisis as “eruption of tribal violence”, “gangs of youths settling tribal scores hacking and clubbing people to death”, “continuing tribal slaughter between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority”, “chaos”, “score settling” (Dowden, 2007, p. 253)

II. DISCONNECTION FROM THE TRAGEDY:

- An African ambassador spent “more than four hours” explaining the dangerous situation to the journalist but the journalist did not seem to feel what the ambassador was feeling – the genocide (Doyle, 2007, p. 146)
- Newsroom reverted to using “chaos” and “indiscriminate mass killings” in reports published (Doyle, 2007, p. 154)
- Media made a rare presence in the genocide (Chaon, 2007, p. 161)
- People were not interested in genocide pictures from Rwanda (Chaon, 2007, p. 163)
- Until the September 2001 attack, international news almost disappeared from American television news and newspapers (Livingston, 2007, p. 190).

- Roger Winter's article that explained the genocidal nature of the Rwandan conflict was rejected by most American newspapers (Melvern, 2007, p. 202)
- The media did not call for action in Rwanda (Melvern, 2007, p. 208)
- Previous negative reactions to the picture of Burundi murder on BBC shown at lunch time set the tone for media negligence (Giles, 2007, p. 236)
- Rushes sent to BBC on the genocide were not aired because of being too graphic for British audience (Giles, 2007, p. 236)
- Rwandan stories were relegated to the inside pages (Roskis, 2007, p. 239)
- When the genocide was reaching its peak, the reporters were quitting Rwanda (Kuperman, 2007, p. 257)

III. CONCERN FOR SAFETY:

- He could only cover the European evacuation stories because it was the only story that could be covered safely (Doyle, 2007, p. 148)
- The militias (Interahamwe) were looking for Radio France Internationale (RFI) journalists to kill (Chaon, 2007, p. 161)
- "It was a story we wanted to tell but it was appallingly dangerous" (Hilsum, 2007, p. 172)
- A sense of danger prevented closer coverage (Livingston, 2007, p. 195)

IV. USE OF AMBIGUOUS TERMS AND INSINUATIONS:

- Rwandan man attacking another Rwandan (Doyle, 2007, p. 148)
- Clash of government and rebel forces (Doyle, 2007, p. 149)
- Innocent people killed in Kigali (Doyle, 2007, p. 149)
- Opponents of the late president killed by government and militia forces (Doyle, 2007, p. 149)
- Militias were directed by soldiers against rebels and sympathizers who are often taken by militia to include any ethnic Tutsi (Doyle, 2007, p. 152)
- The killing as not being a simple tribal conflict (Doyle, 2007, p. 153)
- Amnesty International's perception of the killing as part of deliberate political plan (Doyle, 2007, p. 153)
- Description of the killings as "the slaughter of civilians," "the mass killings" or ethnic cleansing (Chaon, 2007, p. 163; Doyle, 2007, p. 154)
- Soldiers were on the street "killing, terrorizing, kidnapping and looting" (Alozie, 2007, p. 219)

V. WRONG AND LIMITED FOCUS:

- Intensity of the battle (Doyle, 2007, p. 150)
- Descriptions of types of weapons used (Doyle, 2007, p. 150)
- Focusing on evacuation of foreigners and closing of embassies with strict orders to cover the evacuation and leave (Dowden, 2007, p. 251; Chaon, 2007, p. 162)
- The media focused overwhelmingly on the aftermath of the genocide – the cholera outbreak in Goma refugee camp (Chaon, 2007, p. 164; Giles, 2007, p. 237; Hilsum, 2007, p. 167; Livingston, 2007, p. 195, Roskis, 2007, p. 239)
- The media focused almost exclusively on Kigali for nearly two weeks (Kuperman, 2007, p. 257)

VI. SOURCES:

- The government claims that two million people had been displaced by the fighting (Doyle, 2007, p. 151)
- Credence to the Rwandan army claim that the rebel group had rounded up 250 civilians and killed them (Doyle, 2007, p. 152)
- Claim by Rwandan army officers that camps full of ethnic Tutsis fleeing the violence are created in several parts of the country (Doyle, 2007, p. 152)
- Media dependence on misleading information by a UN spokeswoman about the situation on ground (Doyle, 2007, p. 155)
- “Most journalists accepted diplomats’ implicit agenda that the killing of civilians was an offshoot of the renewed civil war” (Dowden, 2007, p. 253)
- Sources quoted (215) – aid workers (22 per cent), ordinary local people (21 per cent), local opposition members (14 per cent), Western officials (13 per cent), UN representatives (13 per cent), local officials (9 per cent), experts (5 per cent), regional (2 per cent), others (1 per cent) (Wall, 2007, p. 264)

VII. STATISTICS OF DEATH:

- Tens of thousands of people killed (Doyle, 2007)
- Militias loyal to the government of killing political opponents in large numbers (Doyle, 2007, p. 152)
- Number of those massacres in two weeks estimated at 100,000 people (Doyle, 2007, p. 153)
- Media reports of death counts were grossly miscalculated and underestimated (Kuperman, 2007, 257)

VIII. NAMING THE CULPRITS:

- Worst culprits as militias opposed to ethnic Tutsis (Doyle, 2007, p. 153)
- Independent eye witness accounts accused government soldiers and militias loyal to the government of killing (Doyle, 2007, p. 152)
- “A BBC correspondent...says the government militia and the government armed forces are responsible” (Doyle, 2007, p. 155)
- Daily Nation and Nigerian Guardian blamed the various Hutu-dominated governments for the atrocities as well as the rebel group, Rwandan patriotic Front (RPF) (Alozie, 2007, p. 219)

IX. BELATED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ‘GENOCIDE’:

- The word ‘genocide’ was not used until late into the killing (Chaon, 2007, p. 160; Doyle, 2007, p. 154; Kuperman, 2007, p. 258)
- The world was aware of Rwanda on May 29 (Hilsum, 2007, p. 173)
- New York Times editorial of April 23 made reference to “what looks much like genocide” (Melvern, 2007, p. 202)
- Broadcast of the killing events in Rwanda in BBC came too late on June 27, 1994 (Giles, 2007, p. 237)
- The genocide photograph only made the front page of a French newspaper late on May 18, and that picture was not taken by a photo journalist (Roskis, 2007, p. 239)
- “The Interahamwe – the organized death squad was not mentioned in the press until 30 April” (Dowden, 2007, p. 253)
- “The language of newspapers gradually changed throughout April from a story about a civil war to a story of genocide” (Dowden, 2007, p. 254)
- It was not until April 25 that The New York Times insinuated the theme of genocide in its report (Kuperman, 2007, p. 257)

X. RIFTS BETWEEN EDITORS AND REPORTERS:

- Even when the word ‘genocide’ was used, some editors at BBC were not convinced (Doyle, 2007, p. 154)
- BBC use of other sources of information and interviewees that give contradictory account (Doyle, 2007, p. 154)
- Editors persuasions for correspondents to ‘put the other side’ in report (Doyle, 2007, p. 154)
- Editors rejected the raw, unadorned images of the genocide and testimony of survivors presented by photographers (Roskis, 2007, p. 239)

XI. STEREOTYPICAL VIEWS AND REMARKS:

- View of Africa as the dark continent and chaotic (Doyle, 2007, p. 154; Wall, 2007, p. 265)
- Crisis in developing countries are reported with emphasis on humanitarian over the political or military issues involved (Hilsum, 2007, p. 170)
- The language used by the press to describe Rwanda reinforced the impression that what was going on was an inevitable and primitive process that had no rational explanation and could not be stopped by negotiation or force (Dowden, 2007, p. 252; Wall, 2007, p. 265)
- New York Times article described Rwanda as small, poor and globally insignificant, and the crisis as an “uncontrollable spasm of lawlessness and terror” (Melvern, 2007, p. 202)
- The African stereotype did not allow the media to be committed to Rwanda (Roskis, 2007, p. 238)
- Rwanda was not considered by British editors to be important enough. It was seen as “a small country far away in a continent that rarely hits the headline” (Dowden, p. 251)
- Keyword results portrayed negative image of the Rwandans and the idea that the conflict was based on brutal tribalism (Wall, 2007, p. 265)

XII. MISLEADING REPORTS:

- British and American army media relations staff with misleading report of Western troops taking control of the situation (Doyle, 2007, p. 155)
- Inaccurate highlight of rebel killings by Western media (Doyle, 2007, p. 155)
- Media presence in Goma changed the genocide story in a very damaging way in that their coverage made the public feel that the real crisis was people dying of cholera (Hilsum, 2007, p. 169)
- After Ceppi’s use of the word ‘genocide’ in his report, it disappeared from news report giving way to misinformation about the conflict (Melvern, 2007, p. 201)
- There was shortage of accurate media coverage (Melvern, 2007, p. 207)
- Journalists received untrue stories from undependable sources by journalists (Dowden, 2007, p. 250)
- The media reported that violence was decreasing when it was actually mounting (Kuperman, 2007, 257)

XIII. MEDIA COMMERCIAL CONCERN:

- Media turned away from reporting because it costs a lot of money (Chaon, 2007, p. 161)

- There was no 'real time' TV news because it was too dangerous to send an expensive satellite uplink into Rwanda (Hilsum, 2007, p. 172)

XIV. PERSONAL EFFORTS OF JOURNALISTS:

- Journalist sent news report refuting UNHRC spokeswoman misleading information about the conflict (Doyle, 2007, p. 156)
- Journalist reported the massacre she saw the very same day (Chaon, 2007, p. 161)
- "Few journalists were advocating that Western countries take a political stance" (Hilsum, 2007, p. 174)
- Jean-Philippe Ceppi published the massacre in the church in Gikondo in a French newspaper Liberation on April 11, 1994 using the word, 'genocide' (Melvern, 2007, p. 201)
- Jean Helene also reported the killing in Gikondo, stating that the victims were mostly Tutsi (Melvern, 2007, p. 201)
- Catherine Bond mentioned that Tutsis and moderate Hutus were the targets in the conflict in her April 12 report (Dowden, 2007, p. 253)
- Journalists made efforts to report news as it happened but the media e.g. BBC censored it (Giles, 2007, p. 237)
- Difficult transportation condition for journalist (Dowden, 2007, p. 249; Roskis, 2007, p. 239)
- Difficulty getting the story out because of telecommunication problem (Dowden, 2007, p. 250)

XV. OTHER INTERNATIONAL FOCUS:

- Other international events in America, South Africa, and Bosnia turned media attention away from Rwanda at that time (Dowden, 2007, p. 251; Chaon, 2007, p.162; Livingston, 2007, p. 191)
- The media focus at the time of the genocide was The South African election with 2, 500 accredited press compared to a maximum of 15 in Rwanda (Dowden, 2007, p. 251; Giles, 2007, p. 236; Melvern, 2007, p. 204)

XVI. AFRICAN MEDIA PERSPECTIVE:

- The Guardian (Nigeria) and Daily Nation (Kenya) reported on the historical hostilities between the two tribes (Alozie, 2007, p. 219)
- The two newspapers called for truce and gave advice for peaceful coexistence between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel group (Alozie, 2007, p. 220)

- They indicted the various governments in the continent for the sufferings of their people (Alozie, 2007, p. 221)
- At the onset of the crisis, the Guardian and the Daily Nation published many articles on daily events. But later, the Daily Nation published more articles over a longer period of time than the Guardian (Alozie, p. 226).

XVII. POOR MEDIA PRESENCE AND COVERAGE:

- There were twice as many articles on Bosnian conflict than Rwanda (Chaon, 2007, p. 162)
- The genocide given far less space and airtime in the media (Hilsum, 2007, p. 168)
- “For most of April, there were no more than 10 – 15 reporters in the country at any time” (Hilsum, 2007, p. 172)
- There was lack of adequate reporting of the genocide (Melvern, 2007, p. 209)
- Too little of the genocide was reported for the world to understand the scale of the massacre (Giles, 2007, p. 236)
- There were many journalists in Rwanda but only at certain times, and so many images sent out but only certain places (Roskis, 2007, p. 238)

XVIII. LACK OF EXPERIENCE:

- Most journalists are not genocide savvy nor were they familiar with the geography of Rwanda (Chaon, 2007, p. 162)
- The conflict situation was confusing for most of April (Hilsum, 2007, p. 172)
- Journalists did not know the scale and how systematically organized the genocide was (Hughes, 2007, p. 231)
- Media did not seem to understand the organizational nature of the genocide (Dowden, 2007, p. 254).
- The media did not recognize the extent of the carnage to mobilize the world attention to it (Kuperman, 2007, p. 256; Wall, p. 265)

XIX. DEARTH OF PHOTO OR VIDEO EVIDENCE:

- There is only one video image of the massacre as it was taking place (Chaon, 2007, p. 163)
- Though there are pictures of those killed, there are only few images of the killings as they take place. It was only on three occasions that killings were filmed as it took place (Hughes, p. 231)
- There were few pictures of what was going on (Giles, 2007, p. 236)

- The real genocide was “never captured in still or moving images” (Roskis, 2007, p. 238)
- The photographs and the recordings were done after the fact (Roskis, 2007, p. 239)
- The photos shown were old and small (Roskis, 2007, p. 239)

XX. JUDGMENTAL COMMENTS:

- By generally characterizing the genocide as tribal anarchy, the press was “fundamentally irresponsible” (Melvern, 2007, p. 208)
- Journalists who covered the genocide harbor a sense of helplessness for not applying enough pressure for action (Giles, 2007, p. 237)
- Photographers’ engagement in Goma was self serving – for photo award (Roskis 2007, p. 240)
- The media portrayal at the refugee camp was that of the awesome white man helping the poor dying Africans (Roskis, 2007, p. 240)

APPENDIX D

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF GLOBAL MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS WITH RELATED CODE ETHICS

American business media
American Society of Media Photographers (Houston)
American Society of Newspaper Editors
Association of Hungarian Journalists
Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland
Australian Journalists Association
Austrian Press Council, Belgian Press Council
British National Union of Journalists
British Press Complaints Commission
Catalan Journalists Association
Committee on Publication Ethics
Croatian Journalists' Association
Czech Journalists
Denmark Press Council
Federation of the Spanish Press
German Press Council
Global Alliance For Public Relations and Communication Management
Greek Journalist Unions
Icelandic Press Council
International Federation of Journalists
Ireland's National Union of Journalists
Journalists of the Republic Slovenia
Journalists' Union of Russia
Latvian Union of Journalists
Lithuanian Journalists' Union
Malta Press Club
Polish Journalists Association
Portugal Syndicate of Journalists
Slovak Syndicate of Journalists
Society of Professional Journalists
Swiss Federation of Journalists
Turkish Press Council, Union of Bulgarian Journalists
Union of Journalists in Finland (<http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/media.html>).

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