

A TEST FAILED: (MIS)USE OF THE ARMY GENERAL CLASSIFICATION TEST
AND THE ARMY GROUND FORCES COMMAND IN WORLD WAR II

by

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Go Bobcats!

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I. INTRODUCTION

“The novice soldier will not go through these various levels of danger without feeling that rational thought works in a different way in this environment, in a way which is contrary to simple thought processes. Indeed it must be an extraordinary person who does not lose the ability to make instant decisions when faced with this environment for the first time.”

General Carl von Clausewitz¹

Purpose of This Study

This study will focus on the classification and assignment of newly accessed recruits, mostly draftees, through the War Department’s use of the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) in 1942-43. This test was administered to all new Army recruits and became one of the Army’s primary tools in the classification and assignment of new soldiers. Correlation of the Army’s manpower distribution by AGCT score shows that this single factor not only dominated recruit allocations within the three principal Army commands, but greatly diminished the initial potential combat strength of the Ground Forces.

The mobilization and build-up of the vast military force which eventually defeated the Axis Powers, and the tools and policies used in the initial allocation and distribution of the nation’s available manpower to activated and strengthened units, remains a misunderstood and under-studied area. The process through which individual citizens became soldiers, who were then assigned into units, which ultimately formed armies -- is a narrative frequently overlooked. Histories by individual soldiers commonly focus on combat heroics and victories with even personal wartime memoirs often

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, Chapter 4; as quoted in David Lee, *Up Close and Personal: The Reality of Close-Quarter Fighting in World War II*. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Frontline Books, 2006, 13-14.

brushing past the military accession process and diving right in to basic training or early overseas action. An examination of how the United States Army, suddenly faced with the prospect of taking on the Axis powers in a worldwide conflict, mobilized a lethal military force from a civilian population is an endlessly fascinating --but also critical -- issue to explore. Many contemporary histories exploring WWII U.S. military performances focus on strategic, operational, and tactical methods; few explore the military's organizational, personnel, manpower allocation, and training policies.

This thesis maintains that in the mobilization period of 1942-43 the Army handicapped itself by misassigning its higher quality manpower resources to Army Service and Air Commands by assigning a high proportion of top-scoring recruits and thus leaving the Ground Forces Command with the lower-scoring soldiers. This was not only unfair to Ground Forces Command, but also resulted in an inefficient force requiring additional attention to training prior to deployment to combat, and then unnecessary casualties in combat itself.

In studying Army policy in the selection, evaluation, and classification of manpower, I argue that the use and overreliance of intelligence testing in designating a recruit's specific Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) created an unnecessarily weakened Army Ground Forces in the early phases of the war. I focus specifically on infantry units deployed to the Western theaters of North Africa, Sicily and Italy, and Western Europe. Infantry Divisions allocated to this theater underwent a process of training, deployment, and engagement in which problems of quality can be quantified. Perhaps most revealing is the fact that although pre-war planning envisioned 15 months

of training prior to a Division's deployment, of the 38 draftee infantry divisions mobilized only one deployed on schedule.²

While the massive World War II buildup of American military forces included the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Army, and consisted of both volunteers and draftees, this study specifically focuses on the Infantry branch of the Army Ground Forces (AGF), especially the 38 infantry divisions activated after the U.S. war declaration. This study will focus on the Army's Western Theater, consisting of campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, and Western Europe. Performance in battle in these campaigns demonstrates that improved personnel policies corrected early missteps and resulted in a more capable infantry. However, the earliest decisions made in manpower allocation remains a topic worthy of scrutiny. Ultimately, the evidence for this thesis conclusion rests in the numerous and dramatic Personnel changes the Army continuously adopted throughout the war.

The policies of the War Department in 1940 limited the pool of American available manpower. Minorities and women were excluded from frontline service, restrictions on educational and physical limitations excluded even more potential soldiers. Within these purviews, each command could reasonably expect to receive an allocation of roughly similar groups of recruits. Within months it became evident that this was not the case. The Air and Service commands demanded and received a disproportionate share of recruits with higher AGCT scores. Examination of the Army's philosophical discourse between 1919-1941 explains much of these policies as new technologies in aviation, armor, communications, and artillery control saw military

² This schedule was modified and expanded several times. Fifteen months was the initial minimum training envisioned. See Appendix 2 for a list of 1942-43 AGF infantry divisions activation and deployment dates.

leaders downgrade the importance of the infantry. It is essential to examine the nature of infantry as a technical skill and how the Army's reliance on new war-fighting methods led to preferential policies that favored the Air and Service Corps. With little information on recruits available initially beyond basic demographics, the AGCT score became a critical method in the assessment of new soldiers. Certain military occupational specialties included AGCT score requirements for assignment to these branches. These policies are explored, as are the frequent changes resulting from complaints from AGF commanders on troop quality.

The Importance of Infantry

By its very nature, the goal of war is the occupation of territory, and this is fundamentally and singularly achieved initially by basic riflemen in the infantry. The front line does not move until the infantry moves it. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the Commander of the Army Ground Forces Command after March 1942, considered the infantry "the backbone of the Army."³ The infantry Platoons to which Basic Riflemen would be assigned may also be understood as those soldiers who, on foot, carried their own weapons and require no crew-served weapons and none requiring continuous resupply of ammunition."⁴ All other branches and commands of an Army exist to support the infantry.

³ Kent Roberts Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley, *United States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2004, 390.

⁴ John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, *Army Lineage Series: Infantry, Part I*. (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1972), 58.

In 1938 Army commanders emphasized the infantry's primacy in a General Staff strategy course stating, "the Infantry Division continues to be the basic combat element by which battles are won, the necessary enemy forces destroyed, and captured territory held."⁵ Major General Fred L. Walker, Commander of the 36th Infantry "Texas" Division, wrote that the infantry was the primary element of the Army:

The life of an infantry soldier in war is the most difficult and trying of all, and the nation should pay its greatest tributes to the infantry soldier. Air Force soldiers rarely miss a meal, never miss a bath, wear clean clothes, sleep in clean, comfortable beds, have normal recreation facilities, and in battle are only under fire for a few minutes at a time. Not so with the infantry. Of all the combat forces, the infantry suffers the greatest losses and deserves the greatest honor.⁶

The Army General Headquarters of 1942 viewed the ordinary rifleman of an infantry division as an unskilled occupation, capable of being adequately manned by almost any new recruit regardless of previous education or occupational skill.⁷ War Department planners did not see the infantry private as a specialist nor a technician despite him needing to: "...understand the use of a dozen weapons...camouflage and concealment; mine removal and the detection of booby traps; patrolling, map reading and combat intelligence; recognition of American, Allied, and enemy aircraft, armored vehicles...the use and disposal of captured equipment; the processing of prisoners of war; first aid..." all while maintaining life and health while living usually outdoors.⁸ Palmer

⁵ Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany 1944-1945*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 31.

⁶ Fred L. Walker, *From Texas to Rome: Fighting World War II and the Italian Campaign with the 36th Infantry Division*. (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2021), 160.

⁷ Of course I note the glaring exception to our modern minds of the African-American soldier, whom the 1942 United States Army did not see as capable of even Ordinary Rifleman duty. Exceptions would be made later in the war as manpower crises arose, however the segregation of the Army in 1942 is outside the purview of this thesis.

⁸ Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley and William R. Keast. *United States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1947, 2

further points out that the infantry soldier's duties rarely included a regular routine, "He had to know how to play his part under conditions of strain and confusion in the teamwork of squad and platoon... The intelligence, skill, and stamina of semi-isolated riflemen and small-unit commanders were to determine not only individual survival on the battlefield but also in many cases the outcome of battle."⁹ In a preliminary study written by Dr. Palmer prior to the publication of the "Green Book" volume on the procurement and training of ground troops he concluded, "It was therefore desirable to select a high grade of manpower for combat units."¹⁰

The life of an infantryman was summarized by *Time Magazine*:

Actually the infantryman of today comes nearer to being a man of all weapons. Except for the airplane, the tank and the artillery, the infantry uses most of the weapons in the arsenal of a modern army: not only the rifle and bayonet but the Tommy gun, machine gun, mortar, hand and rifle grenades, bazooka, flame thrower, good-sized antitank artillery. Sometimes the infantryman has trucks to transport him and vehicles for his heavier weapons. But often he still must slog along, up hill & down, through mud and through dust, toting all this new arsenal of weapons to the point of action, and then fight with them. He has to be lavish in his expenditure of physical effort under the worst of physical conditions. He also has to have guts to fight in situations where there is no possible safety for any man. And to fight effectively he has to be the master of his weapon, and in the infantry today there are probably masters of more diverse techniques in the trade of war than are found in any other branch of service.¹¹

Here, the infantryman is seen to represent qualities wartime America admired: he is determined, tough, resilient, and a "master" of war. While such media saw the

⁹ Palmer et. al. *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*: 2-3.

¹⁰ Dr. Robert R. Palmer *Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the AGF: The Problem of Quality, Study No. 5* (Washington D.C.: Historical Section - Army Ground Forces, 1946), 15. This study provided a draft of chapters in the Green Book series published in 1947 and frequently cited here. This study contains a material omitted from the final, official histories.

¹¹ "Credit for Doughboy." 1944. *Time Magazine* 43 (15): 65-66. <https://search-ebscohost-com.libproxy.txstate.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=54839815&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

infantryman in a praiseworthy light, the War Department minimized the infantry as new weapons systems emerged.

War Department Inter-War Philosophy

The U.S. Army after World War I has often been criticized as a closed, restrictive, and clannish society. Officers waited years for promotions and assignments on friendships and political connections. One critic called the interwar Army “a provincial, somewhat backward society in the process of dozing.”¹² Army officers were simply expected to perform their duties and exercise sound judgement; however, “their intellectual capacities seemed hardly to matter at all.”¹³ Military budgets in the 1920s decreased to a level debilitating the Army, which found itself manned mainly in border garrisons and state Army Guard units. After the United States demobilized the Army after World War I, the Army Chief of Staff at the time, General Peyton C. March, went so far as to declare the Army as “impotent.”¹⁴ An isolationist-interventionist argument dominated political discourse between the wars and in 1935 Congress hampered the interventionists when it passed a Neutrality Act. The Act was extended in 1936 and 1937 and thus reflected the isolationist philosophy which “...conformed to the country’s traditional bias against a large, standing, professional army; they justified opposition to public spending for defense...”¹⁵ The public also trended isolationist as attitudes toward the Army included “a growing pacifist sentiment, fueled by the literature and cinema of

¹² Martin Blumensen, “America’s World War II Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts.” *Parameters* 19, no.4 (December 1989), 9.

¹³ Blumensen, *Parameters*, 12.

¹⁴ Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington DC: Center of Military History), 44. https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo106140/CMH_Pub_93-10.pdf.

¹⁵ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future*, 38.

the interwar period.”¹⁶ Such was the pre-war public attitude toward the Army that when General George C. Marshall was sworn in as Army chief of staff, he wore a civilian suit. War Department officers on duty rarely wore uniforms - until December 7, 1941.¹⁷

Prior to hostilities, the War Plans Division of the War Department published a strategic estimate which evaluated not only potential manpower but also industrial requirements. Named “The Victory Plan,” this study dismissed the then-conventional thinking which called for a two-to-one manpower superiority in offensive operations and envisioned “our advanced weapons systems – technical prowess and stupendous production capabilities – to enable us to win the war.”¹⁸ Thus, the Army envisioned a more dominant role within the Ground Forces for the technical combat arms of artillery and armor. Strategic air advocates believed the enemy could simply be bombed into surrender. Air advocates such as General Billy Mitchell attempted to convince military planners that aerial bombing meant the Army required fewer ground troops and would expose fewer soldiers to direct enemy contact.¹⁹ Improved radio communications and electronic control allowed more accurate artillery fire and coordinated armored and anti-tank attacks. These technologies created a “Combined Arms” approach which saw these elements intertwined within training and deployment planning, and the Army Infantry Branch doctrine waned in urgency to Army planners as a result. Overall, the development of these innovations led to a “tremendous increase in the speed and mobility with which fire power could be brought to bear,” and led Army planners to believe that “modern war

¹⁶ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future*, 37.

¹⁷ Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 373.

¹⁸ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977): 317.

¹⁹ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 223-241.

required a profusion of machines and that personnel employing the machines must receive highly specialized training in their use.”²⁰ These philosophical discourses resulted in a policy where “poaching” of quality manpower by the Air Command and Technical Services later occurred. The AGF saw further manpower sifting between its Armored, Artillery, Anti-Tank, Airborne, and “Regular” infantry divisions.

The outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939 “frightened many Americans and tempered the isolationist-interventionist argument.”²¹ The change in public sentiment allowed President Franklin Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Army commanders to accelerate military preparedness for war. After the German invasion of France in May of 1940 “there was almost unanimous agreement that the United States had to build a powerful Army and Navy -- and Congress hurriedly appropriated the funds to do so.”²² Military appropriations increased from under \$500 million in 1939, to \$3.7 billion in 1941.²³ In May 1940, Congress authorized the Army to expand from its 1939 strength of 187,893 to 375,000 by volunteer enlistees. Predictably, not enough men volunteered, which led to the passing in September 1940 of the Selective Training and Service Act, the nation’s first peacetime draft. Draftees were initially required to serve only twelve months, but later legislation extended many of these soldiers’ enlistments. These men became invaluable “veterans” to new enlistees during the vast mobilization that began in 1942. Total military strength rose from under 500,000 in July 1940 to 1.9 million by July 1941, 4 million in July 1942 and 9.5 million in July 1943. The peak strength of all combined armed service branches reached 12,314,000 on

²⁰ Greenfield. et al., *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 387-8.

²¹ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future*, 38.

²² Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future*, 40.

²³ Coffman, *The Regulars*, 374.

June 1, 1945 with over 15 million Americans serving at some point between 1940 and 1945.²⁴

This expansion of the military prior to December 7, 1941 demonstrated a trend alarming to the Army Ground Forces. In 1940, President Roosevelt “insisted that the Army Air Corps be expanded at the expense of the Army ground forces.”²⁵ Army leaders “expected the next war to take place under open warfare conditions unattainable during World War I but made possible by the significant technological advances of the previous two decades.”²⁶ As the Army began to mobilize for the Second World War, officer training schools “recognized the changing nature of warfare as armies modernized and increasingly relied on mechanized, motorized, and air forces.”²⁷ In many ways as the American military expanded, the President and Army commanders deemphasized the importance of the basic infantry soldier as Armored and Air Corps units grew in prominence. In March 1942 the War Department announced a vast reorganization of the U.S. Army. It dissolved Army General Headquarters and created three commands: the Army Ground Forces (AGF), the Army Service Forces (ASF), and the Army Air Forces (AAF).²⁸ Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced the reorganization as an administrative move intended to lift much of the red tape from Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, but added “The second objective was to give the Air Corps its proper place, to recognize that this war is largely an air war and to put the Air Corps in

²⁴ William A. Taylor, *Military Service and American Democracy: From World War II to the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 26-7.

²⁵ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future*, 49.

²⁶ Mark T. Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the US Army* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 224-5.

²⁷ Timothy K. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940.” *Journal of Military History* 58, no. 2 (April 1994): 229.

²⁸ The Army Service Forces were initially named “Service of Supply.” The name was later changed due to the various technical areas the command directed beyond logistics.

proper relation to the function it will fill. The primary purpose was to create an organization to fight this war and not any past or obsolete wars.”²⁹ The priority the Army intended for the AAF could not have been made clearer to the newly appointed commander of the AGF, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair.

On 2 March 1942 the Army Ground Forces (AGF) Command was activated. The AGF administered the procurement and training of some 60 Army Divisions by the war’s end. Once fully mobilized and deployed to Europe, the AGF proved to be the vital combat force which needed only ten months to defeat the Axis in Western Europe. Undeniably, the US victory in Europe required contingency responses at every organizational level to evolving war conditions throughout the war. The manner in which infantry units were manned in the months before the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 had evolved significantly from the early days of the war.

Historiography

Fascination and intrigue surrounds the history of the Second World War. In popular culture the war provides a platform for endless commemorations, television shows, documentaries, novels, movies, monographs, memoirs, memorials and museums. American perspectives trend toward hagiographic, with national heroes rising to America’s “Greatest Generation” by their actions in “The Good War.” The current American national identity as a world superpower can be traced directly to US victory in World War II. However, in recent years a more nuanced historiography of the Second World War has emerged. This new history explores often overlooked areas of the war

²⁹ “Army Aims to Lift Air Force Status” New York Times, March 6, 1942.
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1942/03/06/85023608.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0.

that present a more detailed and accurate accounting of events. Factors often overlooked – such as the segregation of the United States Army – rise to the forefront of World War II studies today. Wartime American attitudes toward race, class, educational status, and gender, frequently overlooked in past histories are no longer hidden.

In interviews, oral histories, and memoirs of World War II, infantry veterans usually skip over the early days of their service, including their taking of the AGCT and classification and assignment process. Soldiers frequently commented on their civilian jobs having no relation to their assignment to such jobs as machine gunner. This indicated widespread initial frustration at the Army's classification processes. Eventually however, these recollections indicate respect for the service they and their comrades performed in the infantry; to have served on the front lines brought glory and honor. These veterans reserve their respect for only the select few in the infantry, armor, combat engineers and medics. Many see the remainder of the Army as rear-echelon glory chasers, labelling them "typewriter commandos" or "ball-bearing WACs."³⁰ Many front-line combat troops felt hostility to those positioned behind the front lines, seeing them as "shirkers and sharpsters who stole supplies intended for combat troops and got fat on the black market...because base clerks got the same campaign ribbons they did."³¹

³⁰ Lee Kennett, *G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 129. "WAC" refers to the Women's Army Corps.

³¹ Michael C.C. Adams, *The Best War Ever: America and World War II*. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.), 87.

II. THE USE OF TESTING BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY

The Army General Classification Test

The War Department prioritized a personnel system as the likely involvement in war increased. Shortly after the Selective Service Act of 1940 initiated a military draft, the US Army Adjutant General's office accelerated the development of a classification and accession process which would be necessary in national mobilization. Processes needed to be developed to enlist or induct, process, access, and assign new recruits before they could begin Army Basic Training.

Plans included a series of Army Induction and Reception Centers that received newly enlisted recruits. Here, military records were initiated including the soldier's medical and physical profile. Critically, it was in these Reception Centers where the AGCT was administered and a soldier was classified into an MOS and assigned to their permanent Army Division. New soldiers sought to avoid combat and were aware of the extensive list of Army occupational specialties.³²

The Army began planning in 1940 for a written test which would evaluate a recruit's ability to receive training in a military specialty. Under the Adjutant General's office, a group of psychologists were tasked with developing the test, which they prepared and had finished within three months. Psychologists began work on development of the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) in Spring of 1940 within the War Department's Personnel Research Section (PRS) of the Adjutant General's office. An organization of experts convened, tasked with "the development, construction,

³² See Appendix 1 for a complete list of World War II Army Military Occupational Specialties.

validation, and standardization of personnel screening tests and interview techniques for the Army.”³³ A National Research Council (NRC) committee chaired by noted psychologist Dr. Walter V. Bingham assisted the PRS in replacing the Army’s Alpha and Beta tests used in World War I. Dr. M.W. Richardson, a noted expert on test reliability, led the team charged with test development.

The Army had administered exams to soldiers in World War I which “were misconstrued by some as showing that soldiers had a low average mental age.”³⁴ Therefore, the NRC took great care in avoiding any reference to an IQ test being developed. Rather, the test was designed to provide a “rough estimate of the individual’s relative ability to learn.”³⁵

The World War I testing on soldiers developed as the field of psychology, which was still in its development phase, sought to “connect scientific psychology to life.”³⁶ The military’s desire to eliminate mentally unfit recruits led to then-novel idea of a group intelligence test for recruits. A committee of psychologists designed a test intended to measure native ability instead of educational level.³⁷ Throughout the war, the Army administered over 2 million tests, which resulted in the discharge of 8,000 men for mental inferiority, the reassignment of another 19,000 to labor units, and a high degree of predictability in training success.³⁸ The data gathered came out after the war and startled

³³ Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General’s Office, War Department. “The Evaluation of Techniques in Placement in the Army.” *The Compass* 27, No. 2 (January 1946): 39.

³⁴ Thomas W. Harrell, “Some History of the Army General Classification Test” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 77, no. 6 (1992): 876.

³⁵ Staff of the Adjutant General’s Office, “Personnel Research in the Army, II. The Classification System and the Place of Testing.” *Psychological Bulletin* 40, no. 2 (February 1943): 207.

³⁶ Franz Samelson, “World War I Intelligence Testing and the Development of Psychology.” *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 13, no. 3 (July 1977): 276.

³⁷ Samelson, “World War I Intelligence Testing,”: 276.

³⁸ Samelson, “World War I Intelligence Testing”: 277.

the public. While most of the original reports, such as the average mental age of Army recruits measured at only thirteen years, was later disproven, the public relations pressure on the post-war Army led to dropping intelligence testing on recruits. As psychologists began to develop the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) prior to WWII, they decided to avoid the word “intelligence.” As Thomas W. Harrell wrote in a history of the AGCT, this avoided the problem that, “The public considered that either draftees were dumb, or psychologists were crazy, or both.”³⁹

A more detailed description of the AGCT’s goal can be seen in the post-war official Army history, the famed “Green Book” series, which described the AGCT as intended to “measure a compound of native endowments and of the effects of schooling and social experience, amounting to “intelligence” in the popular and practical sense in which it was useful to the Army.”⁴⁰ Richardson gave four stipulations for the content of the test:

“(a) there should be both verbal and nonverbal items but that the verbal aspect should be minimized, (b) spatial thinking and quantitative reasoning should be emphasized because warfare was becoming more technical, (c) questions greatly influenced by schooling and cultural differences should be minimized, and (d) insofar as possible, the time or speed element should be minimized.”⁴¹

Additional instructions for the test stated that it “is not intended to serve the purpose of trade tests,” “does not measure personality traits,” and “must appeal to the average officer and soldier as sensible.”⁴²

³⁹ Harrell, “Some History of the Army General Classification Test”: 876.

⁴⁰ Palmer et. al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 4-6.

⁴¹ Harrell, “Some History of the Army General Classification Test”: 877.

⁴² Staff of the Adjutant General’s Office, “The Army General Classification Test.” *Psychological Bulletin* 42, no. 10 (December 1945): 761.

Background, Origin, and Development of Army Testing

In early 1940 War Department planners anticipated a rapid expansion of America's military and "explored ways of avoiding the waste and errors that had bedeviled World War I mobilization."⁴³ The Army's Personnel Division sought methods that embraced "the practical implications of organizational and personnel management theories," and testing became central to these theories.⁴⁴ Brigadier General William E. Shedd, the Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Department's Personnel Division, wrote a memorandum to Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall outlining the need "to provide a means for an immediate and reasonably dependable classification of enlisted men according to their general intelligence."⁴⁵ The AGCT came to be seen as a convenient means by which to rapidly assess and evaluate recruits aiding military classification officers in the massive mobilization of Army commands.

By June 1940, a trial version of the AGCT was sent to be tested on civilian volunteers. It consisted of 50 vocabulary questions, 50 figure grouping questions designed to test inductive reasoning, and 50 questions using figures to test spatial intelligence.⁴⁶ After giving the volunteers the test, test developers determined that the figure questions provided unsatisfactory results due to a narrow range of difficulty.⁴⁷ A

⁴³ Theodore A. Wilson, *America and World War II: Critical Issues*. (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 2005), 164.

⁴⁴ Theodore A. Wilson, "Who Fought and Why? The Assignment of American Soldiers to Combat," in Paul Addison and Angus Calder eds., *Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939-1945*. (London: Pimlico, 1997), 293.

⁴⁵ Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Assistant Chief of Staff (G-1), 23 January 1940 in Theodore A. Wilson, *America & World War II: Critical Issues*. (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 2005), 164-7.

⁴⁶ Earl E. Cureton, "The Army General Classification Test, With Special Reference to the Construction and Standardization of Forms 1a and 1b" *The Journal of Educational Psychology* 38 no. 7 (November 1947): 386.

⁴⁷ Cureton, "The Army General Classification Test": 386.

“B” version of the test substituted the figure grouping questions with arithmetic reasoning items; block-counting problems were used for spatial intelligence testing. (Figure 1.)

To PERMIT is to (A) demand (B) thank (C) allow (D) charge

Tom sold 18 pints of milk at 9 cents a quart. How much money did he get for the milk?

(A) 50¢ (B) 81¢ (C) \$1 (D) \$1.62

How many blocks?

(A) 5 (B) 4 (C) 3 (D) 6




Figure 1 - Sample Vocabulary, Arithmetic, and Block Counting Questions⁴⁸

After a group of test experts selected and arranged the final questions, an NRC committee meeting reported the test as completed on August 9, 1940.

The Army acknowledged that personnel classification required several steps including a personal interview. A War Department pamphlet called for personnel research to measure men, but acknowledged “we cannot find machine gunners in civilian life.”⁴⁹ The War Department pamphlet emphasized the relevance of intelligence testing, noting that “Unaided human judgement is unreliable in evaluating the capabilities of millions of individuals.”⁵⁰ The AGCT furnished a blanket solution for personnel evaluation.

⁴⁸ Cureton, “The Army General Classification Test”: 390.

⁴⁹ War Department Pamphlet No. 12-8, *The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel*, 13.

⁵⁰ War Department Pamphlet No. 12-8, *The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel*, 22.

AGCT Categories and Their Use In the Mobilization Period

Although Army psychologists and Adjutant General staff responsible for the AGCT emphasized that the test was not designed to measure IQ nor mental age the scoring system adapted after a trial period resembled remarkably that of IQ scores. A mean score of 100 was established, with five groups being assigned to scores one and two standard deviations above and below the mean. After scoring of the AGCT, a recruit was assigned a Roman numeral AGCT group ranging from I through V. This was recorded on a classification form and became one of the most critical pieces of information for a recruit and to Classification specialists. Group scores were established as: Group I = 130 and above, II = 110-129, III = 90-109, IV = 70-89, V = 69 and below.⁵¹

The score category assigned to each became one of the first items on which classification officers' and commanders' eyes would settle. A score in the top categories meant that a recruit could, if he wished, avoid the infantry. Prior to a unit's deployment and front line action, commanders began their search for leaders within the ranks by seeking soldiers with the highest AGCT scores. Initially, the classification of a recruit's score intended to assess his "trainability," however, personnel policies opened certain commands and occupations only to individuals within the highest categories. A little more than a week into an Army soldier's career, before any training or duty performance had taken place, a soldier had already been assessed in a critically important way. An AGCT score might have been something many soldiers were only vaguely aware of, but

⁵¹ Harrell, "Some History of the Army General Classification Test": 877.

commanders knew and continuously sought men in the highest categories for such critical positions as company clerk.⁵²

Before reporting for duty, recruits were likely aware of the AGCT's importance due to the wide spread of news stories. An example can be seen in a story concerning the Army's need for officers widely circulated in the summer of 1942:

Upon reporting to the Reception Center, a volunteer candidate is first given the Army's general classification test, in which he must make a score of 110 or more. The rest of his educational background and professional experience is developed by the officer candidate board in an oral interview.⁵³

Potential commissioned officers did require an AGCT score in Categories I or II, scoring in lower categories restricted the man to serving as an enlisted man, although potentially as a non-commissioned officer (NCO.)

While classification officers did evaluate a recruit experience, education, and background, the AGCT category exceeded all other factors in a soldier's fate.

Certain occupations required a minimum AGCT score. For example, the Air Corps required at least a score of 100 for pilots, navigators and bombardiers. This meant that the Air Corps received only recruits in groups I, II and some III's for enlisted flight officers.⁵⁴ Each command, however, contained lower-skill level jobs such as laborer, duty soldier, cook, crewman, laundry foreman, truck driver, salvage technician, general carpenter and toolroom keeper. Thus, all commands received some percentage of group IV and V AGCT category men. Aptitude tests were also in place for specialty areas critical to

⁵² Throughout the entire war, the average highest AGCT scores classified by occupation were Accountants, Personnel Clerks, Chemists, and Students in Medicine, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. The lowest came from Teamsters, Miners, Farm Workers, and Lumberjacks. Source: Naomi Stewart. "AGCT Scores of Army Personnel Grouped by Occupation." *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 7 (1947): 20.

⁵³ "Army Seeks Qualified Men For Officer Training," *Harrisburg Telegraph*, August 31, 1942.

⁵⁴ Harrell, "Some History of the Army General Classification Test": 877.

military missions such as radio-telegraph operator. The Army found that soldiers with a high AGCT score were “2½ times as good a chance at learning Army jobs involving technical skill as men with low scores...”⁵⁵

Results of the AGCT did not match the Army’s predictions. A 1944 memorandum written by Captain Maurice H. Krout, an Army Chief Psychologist entitled “Utilization of Mental Qualification on Test Scores in Assignment Procedure” indicated that in 1942 the Army anticipated a 7% frequency of the total recruit population to score in the lowest AGCT category V.⁵⁶ Instead, the percentage of grade V men appeared to be 17%; this necessitated the development in late 1942 of additional tests to further determine if these lower-scoring recruits could be salvaged. One of these tests, the Mental Qualification Test, utilized from June 1943 onward, consisted of only seventeen items and allowed the Army to sort lower-scoring recruits as either “trainable” or totally illiterate.⁵⁷ This and other follow-up tests to the AGCT, authorized the Army to “permit induction of illiterates who following a minimum of special training could qualify for grade IV or higher...” as well as identify “illiterates who were grade V material only.”⁵⁸ The specialized training of illiterates became a significant source of manpower loss to training centers.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ War Department Pamphlet No. 12-8, *The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel*, 17.

⁵⁶ Captain Maurice H. Krout, “Utilization of Mental Qualification Test Scores in Assignment Procedure.” Memorandum to Lt. Col. C.C. Curtis, Jr., Commanding Officer, Armed Forces Induction Station, Chicago, 27 June 1944.

⁵⁷ Paul F. Ballantyne, “From New Deal Training Programs to World War II Testing: Ideological Maintenance, Test Standards, College Entrance, and Predictive Validity (1933-1946)” Online Publication. <https://web.archive.org/web/20221013225947/http://www.cyberus.ca/~pballan/C5P1.htm>.

⁵⁸ Krout, “Utilization of Mental Qualification Test Scores.

⁵⁹ Palmer et al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 396.

The early mobilization period demonstrated a marked discrepancy in the distribution of recruits. AGCT score groupings as assigned in May 1942 shows a clear preference for the Air Corps:

Table 1 – Distribution of AGCT Category by Branch of Service. ⁶⁰

Branch	I & II	III	IV & V
All Men Assigned	36.8	32.7	30.5
Army Air Forces	48.9	35.6	15.5
Infantry	27.4	29.0	43.6

This classification preference for the Air Corps would remain until 1944.⁶¹ The AGCT category a soldier received mattered greatly in classification, his physical and athletic abilities did not. Unlike both the German and British Armies, no evaluation of an American recruit's physical condition or physique were considered in that soldier's MOS classification. Smaller framed, less athletic recruits saw themselves just as likely as large, athletic recruits in being classified as riflemen.

Thus in 1942 the infantry received recruits who had been classified neither equitably nor logically. Infantry divisions contained two out of every five soldiers in the lowest two AGCT categories, and as I shall explain, this greatly hampered unit training schedules. The physical requirements of an infantryman required carrying not only his rifle but also additional weapons such as hand grenades, ammunition, provisions, additional clothing items such as raincoats, and equipment including the shovel a soldier

⁶⁰ Dr. Robert R. Palmer, *Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the AGF: The Problem of Quality, Study No. 5.* (Washington D.C.: Historical Section - Army Ground Forces, 1946), 43.

⁶¹ Palmer, *Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the AGF: The Problem of Quality*, 26

used to dig his foxhole. As the German and British Army classification system knew well, stronger, larger, and athletic men made better infantrymen.

Classification officers rapidly filled their quotas in MOS's with civilian equivalent occupations in common areas such as mechanic or policeman. In these specialties, previous experience proved essential to a soldier's classification and assignment. A farm worker however, found that his AGCT score would prove critical in determining whether he was sent to training in a non-combat specialty or classified as a rifleman.

The Army Service Command contributed greatly to the Army's AGCT imbalance as well. Many white-collar professions were well suited to the Service Commands role in Army administration, therefore training and prior experience in these fields usually led to assignment to the Service Command. Additionally, as the classification officers were themselves serving in Service Command, they continually looked for AGCT category I and II recruits to assign to their own command.

One program in particular contributed to the higher percentage of low-scoring soldiers assigned to the ground forces. The Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) created in September 1942 was vigorously opposed by Army Ground Forces Commander Lt. General Lesley McNair. The program required an AGCT score of 115 or higher. Men selected would receive assignment, after basic military training, to universities for training in languages, engineering, scientific, and mathematical fields. Over 52,000 high-quality men were kept from assignment to the combat forces by entering the ASTP – the equivalent of roughly four infantry divisions.

III. THE MEN – RECRUITS AND DRAFTEES

Once new recruits, whether draftees or volunteers, successfully completed actions and received their MOS classification and unit Induction Center actions, they went on to Basic Military Training with their permanent units at various Army posts nationwide.

Johnny's Story

A 1942 Army Service Forces training film titled "Introduction to the Army" opens on a scene of an average American man, mowing his front lawn behind a white picket fence. The postman arrives and hands him a letter. It is an Army induction letter for one Harold Leonard Davis with the famed heading, "Greeting:..." Harold, suddenly excitable beyond control, races to a neighbor's house where a fellow average American man, Johnny, is home on leave from the Army. Harold wakes Johnny from his nap and asks, "What'd they do you Johnny? Does it hurt?" Johnny agrees to counsel our young inductee, but only after he puts on some coffee.

At a table over coffee, Johnny begins to patiently explain what Harold can expect in his first days in the Army. The film uses flashbacks as Johnny describes each step of the early processing procedures. Soon, the film emphasizes what Johnny describes as the "mental calisthenics," which he narrates begins with the Army General Classification Test.

Johnny is shown seated in a classroom with dividers between soldiers. Johnny apprehensively looks at the instructor, test instructions are issued, and the soldiers are told to begin. An edited montage using suspenseful music shows Johnny deep in thought, marking answers, zoom-in shots of test questions, and a ticking clock. In voiceover Johnny emphasizes to Harold the importance of this test. After the test, Johnny interviews

with a classification officer, who helpfully explains to Johnny that the test will assist the Army in determining a man's trainability and education level. Johnny answers a few questions about his previous work, and again the officer patiently explains that it is to "...the Army's advantage as well as yours to have you doing what you know best." He further explains "It is the overall picture that counts, you may be assigned to where the Army needs men most."⁶²

The Army needed men most in the most important element of a nation's combined arms -- the infantry. Few men, including Harold, desired the infantry. The film concludes with Harold telling Johnny that what he most regrets is not being able to go to college. He asks Johnny "What if I don't get what I want and wind up in some other branch?" Johnny is reassuring and tells Harold that whether he is assigned as a machine gunner, welder, or tank driver, his training will take up to a year.⁶³ The underlying message of this widely distributed film shown to all new recruits when they first reported to their local Induction Centers was clear, you might not necessarily have to serve in "some other branch"...the infantry.

Once recruits received their order to report for Armed Service induction (see Figure 1) their service began at an local Induction Center before their local board. Here they were either accepted or rejected for military service. The War Department designed these Induction Centers to conduct "only as many steps as needed to determine fitness."⁶⁴ A physical examination, often conducted by the recruit's own doctor, made an initial determination on their fitness for service. The Induction Center provided only initial

⁶² War Department Official Training Film TF 21 2067, *Introduction to the Army*.

⁶³ War Department Official Training Film TF 21 2067 *Introduction to the Army*.

⁶⁴ War Department. *War Department Pamphlet No. 12-8: The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel in the United States Army*. (Washington D.C.: War Department, 28 July 1944), 3.

screening of recruits, and the United States mobilization to full wartime military strength resulted from a local, regional, and national coordination process. Between 1942 through 1945, the Selective Service System drafted 8,895,135 men into the Army.⁶⁵

Prepare in Triplicate

Local Board No. 18
202 Fourth Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
(Place of Local Board)

August 29, 1942
(Date of Induction)

ORDER TO REPORT FOR INDUCTION

The President of the United States,

To: Benjamin Thomas Layton
(Officer name) (Middle name) (Last name)

Order No. 2371

GREETING:

Having submitted yourself to a Local Board composed of your neighbors for the purpose of determining your availability for training and service in the armed forces of the United States, you are hereby notified that you have now been selected for training and service in the Army (Army, Navy, Marine Corps)

You will, therefore, report to the Local Board named above at 5th St. and Pa. Ave. N.E. (Place of Induction)
Wash., D.C. (Baltimore Schedule)

at 7:15 a.m., on the 7th day of Sept. 19 42.

This Local Board will furnish transportation to an induction station of the service for which you have been selected. You will then be examined and if accepted for training and service, you will then be inducted into the stated branch of the service.

Persons reporting to the induction station in some instances may be rejected for physical or other reasons. It is well to keep this in mind in arranging your affairs, to prevent any undue hardship if you are rejected at the induction station. If you are employed, you should advise your employer of this notice and of the possibility that you may not be accepted at the induction station. Your employer can then be prepared to replace you if you are accepted, or to continue your employment if you are rejected.

If you are not accepted, you will be furnished transportation to the place where you were living when ordered to report for induction by this Local Board.

Willful failure to report promptly to this Local Board at the hour and on the day named in this notice is a violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and subjects the violator to fine and imprisonment. Bring with you sufficient clothing for 3 days.

You must keep this form and bring it with you when you report to the Local Board.

If you are so far removed from your own Local Board that reporting in compliance with this Order will be a serious hardship and you desire to report to a Local Board in the area of which you are now located, go immediately to that Local Board and make written request for transfer of your delivery for induction, taking this Order with you.

D. B. B. Evans, Ltd.
(Seal of Local Board)

19-4021

Member of Local Board.

You may be inducted from overseas if you make the request through your nearest local board and notify us.

Figure 2 - Order to Report for Induction. This document provided an inductee (both volunteers and draftees) with their report date for active military service.⁶⁶

Once selected for active duty, recruits were sworn in at these Local Induction Centers, then sent to one of the 35 regional Army Reception Centers for further screening, processing, and classification. An enlistee's first experience as a fully-fledged member of the Army began with his arrival at one of these Reception Centers around the country. In a 3-7 day period, men onboarded into the Army in an administrative process which included everything from records established, physical exams conducted,

⁶⁵ "Induction Statistics," Selective Service System. Archived November 11, 2021. <https://web.archive.org/web/2022111164703/https://www.sss.gov/history-and-records/induction-statistics/>

⁶⁶ Order to Report for Induction, National Museum of American History, Behring Center. https://web.archive.org/web/20221115080528/https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_1176573.

immunizations delivered, uniforms and initial equipment issued, and the AGCT administered before an initial classification interview and assignment. A personnel record card, which accompanied each soldier in every assignment of his career, noted the Military Occupational Specialty assigned. (see Figure 3)

(1) NAME: JONES JR. 45 JOHN PAUL
(2) BIRTHPLACE OF FATHER: Chicago, Illinois
(3) BIRTHPLACE OF MOTHER: France
(4) BIRTHPLACE OF SOLDIER: Provo, Utah
(5) DATE OF BIRTH OF SOLDIER: November 10, 1915
(6) CITIZEN: ☒ TAKEN OUT FIRST PAPERS ☐ NON-CITIZEN ☐
(7) EDUCATION: 1937 NON-E ☐ ILLITERATE ☐
(8) SCHOOL:

SCHOOL	Graded at Year	Name and Locations of Institutions Attended	Major Subject or Specialization	Degree and Date Received
(57) GRAMMAR SCHOOL	8	Provo, Utah	Academic	
(58) HIGH SCHOOL	4	Ogden, Utah	Academic	
(59) COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	4	Univ. of Utah	Accounting	B.S. 1937
(60) POST GRADUATE				
(61) TRADE, NIGHT OR BUSINESS SCHOOL	1	Los Angeles Calif	Photography	

(9) LANGUAGES, ABILITY TO CONVERSE IN:

SPANISH (0-30)	FRENCH (0-30)	GERMAN (0-30)	OTHER LANGUAGES (0-30)
	✓		

(10) NAME, ADDRESS AND DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP OF NEAREST RELATIVE: Mrs. Josette Jones, Mother, 5702 So. Broadway, Los Angeles, Calif.
(11) DUTY DESIRED NOW: Accountant
ARM OR SERVICE: Finance Dept.
(12) TALENT FOR FURNISHING PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT:

MUSICAL INSTRUMENT	SINGING	THEATRICAL
Piano	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

(13) MAIN OCCUPATION: Accountant (CPA)
JUST WHAT DID YOU DO? Devised and installed accounting systems to meet the needs of varied types of business. Compiled and analyzed financial statements.
LAST DATE OF EMPLOYMENT: June 10, 1941
EMPLOYER: Lybrand, Ross Bros. and Montgomery
ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: 639 So. Spring St. Los Angeles, California
DEPT. SHOP OR BRANCH: Auditing
(14) SECOND BEST OCCUPATION: Typist
JUST WHAT DID YOU DO? Types 50 words per minute and is familiar with methods of filing and indexing. Concurrent with (13).
(15) CORPS AREA OR DEPARTMENT OF ENLISTMENT OR INDUCTION: Ninth
(16) TRADE TEST:

SPEC. SER. NO.	SCORE	TYPE - DATE	SCORE	TEST	SCORE
1		15-12-41	142	1	3
2				2	4

(17) HIGHEST POSITION OF LEADERSHIP (INCLUDING MILITARY): Sergeant, ROTC, 1 year
(18) ADDITIONAL OCCUPATIONS, HOBBIES, ETC.: Hunting (20-06 Savage rifle), Night School Course
(19) FAVORITE SPORTS:

TRACK	BASE BALL	SOFT BALL	FOOT BALL	TENNIS	OTHER
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

(20) PHOTOGRAPHY: ☒
(21) FAVORITE SPORTS: Center on football team, Univ. of Utah

Figure 3 - Soldier's Qualification Card (8 x 10.5 inches)⁶⁷

In the transition for a recruit from citizen to soldier, these Army Reception Centers played a critical role beyond simple administrative waystations. Reception Center operations were designed to efficiently and swiftly process newly sworn-in active-

⁶⁷ Walter V. Bingham. "The Army Personnel Classification System." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 220, Organizing for Total War (March 1942): 22.

duty soldiers, “call them soldiers” and to “find out everything about them.”⁶⁸ Soldiers were then sent to Training Centers and Specialist Schools where they underwent Basic Military Training and specific occupational military skill schools.

Attitudes Toward Assignment in the Infantry

High-quality recruits sought to avoid the infantry. In a October 14, 1943 letter to his wife, Private C. J. English, owner of a magazine distribution business and a recent draftee provided his wife with his mailing address, “Co. B, 195th I.T.B. which unfortunately stands for ‘Infantry Training Battalion’...I might be transferred elsewhere...”⁶⁹ His unhappiness at his assignment to the infantry frequently came up in his letters. On October 17, he wrote, “...if I am lucky there is a possibility of getting out of a rifle squad.”⁷⁰ In another letter he wrote, “...we get continual lectures on how wonderful the infantry is. I heard today that the Lt. who gave us a lecture of this type is leaving for the Air Corps.”⁷¹ He later wrote, “They put me down for either Field Intelligence or Message Center. Hope if I’m poor enough at the shooting I’ll land in the Message Center.”⁷² After Pvt. English’s assignment as an ordinary rifleman he served in Italy with the 30th Infantry Division. In July of 1944 he was wounded by gunshot wound in the upper leg, and while in the hospital recuperating he continued to express his desire

⁶⁸ War Department Pamphlet No. 12-8, *The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel*, 4.

⁶⁹ Private English, C.J. October 14, 1943 letter to Mrs. English, Texas Military Museum, Camp Mabry, Austin, Texas. Item 2106.7.27 A, B, C.

⁷⁰ Pvt. English, October 17, 1943 letter. 2016.7.28

⁷¹ Pvt. English, October 26, 1943 letter. 2016.7.29 A & B.

⁷² Pvt. English, December 3, 1943 letter. 2016.7.41.

to transfer. In an August, 1944 letter to his wife he wrote, “I asked the doctor if we get an interview anywhere along the line in respect to getting anything other than infantry...”⁷³

Of the 676 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) codes in the WWII Army no other required as many men as “745, Rifleman.” An infantry unit contained a variety of ground combat specialties such as “604, Light Machine Gunner,” “607, Light Mortar Crewman,” “511, Armorer,” and “812, Heavy Weapons NCO,” assigned to squads in singles or pairs; but an infantry company required between 100-250 Basic Rifleman.⁷⁴ More soldiers were necessary in this specialty than any other, and fewer volunteers stepped forward to serve as one. Classification officers likely met few comments of gratitude as they wrote “745” on countless recruits’ classification cards.

Mobilization and Manpower Allocation

In 1940 the Army contained only nine full active-duty infantry divisions.⁷⁵ President Roosevelt nationalized 23 National Guard infantry divisions that same year. Due to these measures, and the nation’s first peacetime draft in 1940, Army Ground Forces manpower stood at 780,000. By mid-1943, the AGF numbered 2.2 million men and ended the war in 1945 with 2.7 million.⁷⁶ The training of these men “was the biggest single training organization the United States had ever set up.”⁷⁷ However, as the Army Ground Forces mobilized its infantry divisions to this full strength after the outbreak of

⁷³ Pvt. English, August 3, 1944 letter. 2016.7.163.

⁷⁴ A basic WWII Army Ground Forces infantry company consisted approximately 120-150 men in total and was commanded by a junior officer, usually a captain. Unit sizes varied greatly throughout the commands.

⁷⁵ John Ellis, *World War II: A Statistical Survey: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants*. (New York: Facts on File, 1993), 115-6.

⁷⁶ Army Ground Forces. *A Short History of the Army Ground Forces*. (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2016): 37.

⁷⁷ AGF, *A Short History of the Army Ground Forces*, 37.

war, it found itself with what was essentially the least-motivated, least-willing portion of the nation's manpower of military age. By comparison the "Navy, Marine Corps, and the Army Air Forces therefore had the character of hand-picked organizations."⁷⁸ The attack on Pearl Harbor sent a tidal wave of eager volunteers to military recruiting stations. In 1942, the Navy and Marine Corps were composed exclusively of volunteers.⁷⁹ Those recruits who volunteered for the Army were allowed to select their command; of those volunteers, only 5% selected the Ground Forces. Draftees frequently consisted of up to 90% of an infantry division's overall initial allocation.⁸⁰ Thus, the Army was faced with the colossal task of manning hundreds of thousands of ground combat positions with men uninterested in serving on the front lines.

The Classification Process

A 1944 War Department Pamphlet widely distributed to all commands entitled "The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel in the United States Army" defined classification:

"Classification is the process whereby all pertinent data concerning the officer's or enlisted person's abilities, intelligence, aptitudes, assignment limitations, education, occupational history, military experience, interests, personal traits and other qualifications are ascertained and recorded so that, through their evaluation and use, the individual can be placed in the assignment where he will be of the most value to the service."⁸¹

⁷⁸ Palmer et al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 4.

⁷⁹ Palmer, et. al., *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 4; Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 297.

⁸⁰ For example, the 85th Infantry Division was activated on 1 May 1942 and included a cadre (transfers from already active divisions) of 1,235 enlisted men. 13,062 draftees arrived from Army Reception Centers by the end of the month. Paul L. Schultz and John B. Coulter, *The 85th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949), 8-9.

⁸¹ War Department Pamphlet No. 12-8, *The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel*: 1.

“Personal traits” included officers asking each man, “Do you like girls?” Soldiers failing to answer affirmatively, or appearing too feminine, were deemed unfit for service.⁸²

In the buildup of the US Army in 1942-43, thirty-eight infantry Divisions were created, thus creating a need for approximately 500,000 soldiers. Fully half of a Division’s infantry manpower consisted of basic riflemen. While many civilian occupations provided needed skills to the Army, it has been said that “one of the few civilian occupations that qualifies a rifleman is that of being a gangster.”⁸³ Assuming in 1941 that there were few gangsters available, it is also safe to assume many potential soldiers lived in rural areas and were accomplished hunters. This pastime required several skills vital to an Army infantry rifleman. These skills include not only the obvious need to be familiar with firearms, marksmanship, and a comfort in the outdoors; but also the ability to use a compass and maps to navigate through unfamiliar territory, remain unobserved and silent, select and prepare targeting, and avoid injuring one’s companions when firing. No records can be found determining that the Army asked recruits if they hunted.

The Army classified and assigned recruits to military occupations based primarily on the needs of the service and every recruit was assessed in what later was termed “the largest personnel inventory in the nation’s history.”⁸⁴ The AGCT was administered to every new recruit, volunteer or draftee. One soldier remembered taking the test as “our

⁸² Kennett, *G.I.*, 29; War Department Official Training Film TF 21 2067, *Introduction to the Army*; Gallagher, Robert H. “World War II Story: Scratch One Messerschmitt.” Online Publication, Chapter 2. Gallagher went on to write that he passed on the opportunity to spend the war as a civilian if he had used the famous answer of an urban legend who avoided service when he answered, “No sir, and they don’t like me either!”

⁸³ Harrell, “Some History of the Army General Classification Test.”: 875.

⁸⁴ Kennett, *American Soldier*, 4.

most important chore” at the Reception Center.⁸⁵ After receiving an AGCT score, which was notated on the soldier’s Qualification Card (Figure 2,) classification officers conducted an interview in which specific skills could be quickly ascertained. A recruit claiming experience in the field of radio for example, would cause the officer to reach for a volume containing verbal quiz questions in which the recruit could prove to the officer his qualifications. Each recruit faced such interviews, and the classification process took only a couple of minutes. These officers found themselves limited by constantly changing quotas for specific occupations and filled manpower positions accordingly. While military occupations with close ties to civilian professions were needed, they were easily filled as the supply of personnel far exceeded the demand. One part of the Army’s evaluation of recruits provided classification officers an immediate avenue to instantly reject a recruit for service.

The United States Army of 1940 contained 676 military occupational specialties divided into 10 sub-fields: Administration; Communications; Construction and Engineering; Gunnery and Gunnery Control; Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Security; Maintenance; Medical; Supply; Technical; and Transportation.⁸⁶ With the exception of Gunnery and Gunnery Control these sub-fields held civilian equivalents, which allowed for a more rapid training period and manning to full strength. The Army prioritized certain fields with a high degree of technical knowledge and aggressively sought recruits

⁸⁵ George W. Neill. *Infantry Soldier: Holding the Line at the Battle of the Bulge* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 6.

⁸⁶ “Army MOS Codes – WWII Era.”

<https://web.archive.org/web/20221114131523/https://militaryyearbookproject.org/references/old-mos-codes/wwii-era/army-wwii-codes/army-mos-codes-wwii-era>.

with expertise in areas such as aviation, radio communications, telephone line installation and even office skills such as typing.

IV. THE INFANTRY DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

The Army Ground Forces (AGF) Command activated as an administrative headquarters on 9 March 1942. Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, named Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, confronted the challenge of raising, training, and eventually deploying some 38 infantry divisions, 11 armored divisions, and 5 airborne divisions within the next 18 months. The resources available to him included 28 extant infantry divisions within the continental United States of which 10 were Regular Army, and 18 National Guard divisions federalized into national service since 1940. These divisions became known as “old” divisions, and it was from these old divisions from which the experience, instructors, and initial leaders of the “new” divisions formed in 1942-43 would come.⁸⁷

The full mobilization of the US Army began in earnest with the Selective Service Act of 1940, which instituted peacetime conscription for the first time in American history. The Act required drafted men to serve a period of twelve months on active duty. Many drafted prior to December 7, 1941 found themselves extended “for the duration of the war” and these men became valued veterans despite limited time served. More valued as the US entered the war were the Army Guard and Reserve units, which had been federalized and ordered to active service in the final pre-war period. Personnel serving on active duty provided cadres of veteran personnel to the units composed in 1942-43. These veterans found themselves promoted quickly after December 7, 1941 and served as instructors and in leadership positions within the “draftee” new infantry divisions.

⁸⁷ Palmer et. al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 433, chart 434-5.

The infantry division of the U.S. Army is the smallest military unit capable of sustained independent operation. Assigned specific missions, an infantry division contained its own combat elements as well as headquarters, communications, supply, medical, engineers, reconnaissance, ordinance, and military police. When fully manned and equipped, the U.S. Army infantry division of World War II contained some 13,000 enlisted men, with 800 officers, 14,000 various weapons, and 1,400 vehicles. An infantry division in wartime required 146 gallons of gasoline to move by motor one mile. It took 48 trains of 35 railcars each to move a division by rail. Every day, a division consumed over 44 tons of food. In descending order, a division's chain of command consisted of regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, then finally four-to-twelve man squads. 324 rifle squads, 108 rifle platoons, and 36 rifle companies were assigned within a division.

Each of a division's squads, platoons, and companies required enlisted men as leaders and assistant leaders. Commanders continuously sought the type of men able to perform in leadership positions.

Initial Training Plans and Problems Encountered

AGF Headquarters adopted a training schedule for new divisions which used the familiar WWII calendar verbiage declaring a division's activation date as "D-Day." Actions planned before this date read "D minus sign (number,)" and after as "D plus sign (number.)" A division commander was appointed on D-78, with supporting unit commanders named by D-63. These officers attended specialized schools before reporting for duty on D-33. On D-30, the new division's cadre of 159 officers and 1,190 enlisted men culled from old divisions and instantly promoted to "proper grade" arrived,

along with the training equipment available to the division.⁸⁸ Thus one month prior to the activation of a new infantry division, the trained, experienced soldiers were in place and ready to receive the new recruits who would bring the division up to its full strength.⁸⁹

From D-Day through D+15, the division would absorb and onboard 13,425 soldiers from Army Reception Centers. Immediately commanders began to seek high-quality, standout soldiers for critical positions within the division. Newly appointed company commanders, typically captains, quickly needed to appoint a headquarters platoon. The most critical task was to find a company clerk whose duties included maintaining the unit's paperwork and the vast amount of correspondence requiring immediate attention. Regardless of a company's mission, the Army's monumental administrative demands meant that documents such as accurate duty rosters and equipment inventories became critical. Company commanders found these clerks by sifting through personnel records seeking privates with a high AGCT score. Any private assigned to an infantry company with an AGCT score in Category I frequently found himself appointed company clerk.

Another critical task initially faced by commanders was to identify leaders. Sections, platoons and companies needed both leaders and assistants, as did teams on heavier weapons such as machine guns and mortars. A rifle company of 150 men necessitated the appointment of up to 60 soldiers in some form of leadership position.

⁸⁸ The "old" divisions were sent new recruits as replacements for losses due to cadres. This required complete unit training by these divisions as some old divisions supplied multiple cadres to new divisions and became seriously undermanned.

⁸⁹ Palmer et. al. *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*: 433, chart 434-5

The most immediate and frequent tool used to initially identify these potential leaders by commanders became the AGCT score category.⁹⁰

The overarching U.S. Army doctrine which required such local leaders was that of “mission-type tactics.” These leadership positions necessitated that soldiers possess the ability to think independently and display initiative. Orders and plans frequently became invalid once combat action commenced, and soldiers in leadership positions needed the ability to generate their own plans and orders pertinent to their own local situation.

Adopted by the U.S. Army after observing the actions of the German Army in its Poland campaign of September 1939, the doctrine placed emphasis on the completion of a mission objective rather than on the specific methods needed to achieve mission success.⁹¹ An example might be the taking of an enemy machine gun position. Whether a squad neutralized the position through frontal, flanking or rear attack, or used rifle fire, grenades, or bayonet assault was determined by the squad leader. The order from the platoon leader might simply have been, “Take out that machine gun!” Achieving such an objective required both individual and unit training, albeit a small unit in this example.

In the mobilization period, training pertained not only to individual soldiers, but entire Divisions; when an infantryman arrived at an Army Training Center he trained with the same officers, NCOs and fellow soldiers he would eventually serve with on the front lines. This training method allowed greater unit cohesion and promoted the idea among recruits that they were no longer individuals, but rather a part of a larger team.

⁹⁰ John Sloan Brown, *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 14.

⁹¹ War Department, *Digest and Lessons of Recent Military Operations: The German Campaign in Poland September 1 to October 5, 1939*. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942, 34. The German term for this is “Auftragstatik.”

The first AGF plans developed in January 1942 called for new infantry divisions to undergo a 52-week training schedule in four parts: seventeen weeks of Basic and Individual training (Boot Camp), thirteen weeks of unit training as Regiments (instead of just with one's company), fourteen weeks of Combined Arms training (with Armor and Artillery elements), and eight weeks of review including training with Air Corps elements. Almost immediately, these plans encountered serious problems:

The training of both old and new divisions encountered many obstacles during the period of mobilization in 1942 and 1943, when expansion of the armed forces was proceeding at a breath-taking pace. While obstacles were to be expected in any enterprise as full of imponderables as the training of a great force in short time, the difficulties encountered were sufficiently great and persistent to imperil the combat effectiveness of the infantry divisions produced by the Army Ground Forces.⁹²

The overall training plan for unit training was extended shortly after the problems described here began to manifest.

A shortage of equipment receives the lion's share of the blame. Popular history films and television shows that bother to cover the mobilization and training period often show comical and farcical scenes such as trucks with "tank" written on them or soldiers using broomsticks as rifles as they train. Often, these scenes were true as infantry divisions frequently received only 50% or less of their allotted equipment. An infantry division's full issue would consist of 1,440 trucks and jeeps, 54 towed 105mm Howitzer cannons, 12 towed 155mm Howitzer cannons, 144 mortars, 393 machine guns, 90 sub machine guns, 557 anti-tank rocket launchers, 5,204 carbine rifles, and 6,761 ordinary M-1 rifles.⁹³ No division at this time possessed this inventory. As America's military and

⁹² Palmer et. al. *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 456.

⁹³ "The Organization of Armies" Online resource.

https://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/services/dropoff/schilling/mil_org/milorgan_99.html.

infantry divisions mobilized, its industry did as well, and fully equipped infantry division eventually came to exist – not, however, in 1942. Along with equipment, shortages in instructors and instruction materials also delayed planned deployments. Initially trainees were faced with “the crusty sergeant who knew everything about the SCR-131 radio and nothing about the presentation of information,” his instruction method has been described as the “army-style, pay-attention-you-fuckers lecture.”⁹⁴ Eventually, lesson plans, charts, diagrams, and especially films, replaced these methods as the Army Service Command rapidly developed and provided materials and instructors.

Equipment shortages and a gradually developed training effectiveness tempered, but did not ultimately delay, the deployment of new divisions. Most commanders blamed “personnel turbulence” as the largest hinderance on unit preparedness.⁹⁵ Quality troops were often selected for Officer Candidate School, ASTP, and the Air Corps, not to mention the number of AGF troops in training who later volunteered for airborne divisions, left infantry divisions with what some described as the “dregs.”⁹⁶ The infantry divisions activated beginning in March of 1942 found themselves manned with a population not representative of the nation’s available manpower resources. The ranks of the cadres received by the new divisions also contained quality issues as commanders of old divisions could not resist the temptation to use the personnel requisition as a “dumping ground” for substandard performers, troublemakers, and misfits.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Kennett, *G.I.*, 49.

⁹⁵ For example: Walker, *From Texas to Rome: A General's Journal*, 61.

⁹⁶ Kennett, *G.I.*, 38.

⁹⁷ Major Bell I. Wiley *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, Study No. 12* (Washington D.C.: Historical Section - Army Ground Forces, 1946), 15.

For infantry divisions stripped of quality men disruptions to unit training schedules occurred as replacements arrived. The replacements often came from units earlier in training cycles, this forced the new unit to repeat its own training.⁹⁸ Some old divisions became so undermanned that commanders reported discipline and morale problems within their units as soldiers hoping to deploy faced countless delays.⁹⁹ The old divisions were frequently targeted for stripping by the Army Service Command to address the shortage of instructors.¹⁰⁰ Pre-1942 units, mostly federalized National Guard divisions, theoretically should have been ready for deployment six months after Pearl Harbor; yet not one already selected for deployment to North Africa in Operation TORCH reported to its port of embarkation prior to March 1943.¹⁰¹ Initial plans for draftee infantry divisions activated in 1942-43 envisioned 15 months from unit activation to deployment overseas, a goal met by only one division in the entire war.¹⁰²

As indicated above, the new infantry divisions training in 1942 contained over 13,000 draftees, 42.5% of whom had scored in the lower two categories of the AGCT -- thus, division commanders were challenged with training some 5,500 troops likely to struggle with the demands of the Army. Manpower sifting did not change these numbers; as divisions found themselves stripped to partial strength, most of these lower-quality troops remained in the division. In early 1943, General McNair reported to General George C. Marshall that the assignment policies favoring the Air Corps and technical

⁹⁸ Palmer et. al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 459.

⁹⁹ Palmer et. al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 459.

¹⁰⁰ Palmer et. al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 467.

¹⁰¹ John S. Brown, "Winning Teams: Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success in American World War II Infantry Divisions." Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985: 44. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA164741>.

¹⁰² Brown. *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II*, 11. See Appendix 2 for a list of draftee division and activation and deployment dates.

services, and the culling of quality personnel from AGF units, meant that the character of the manpower in his command “declined visibly toward the end of 1942.”¹⁰³ One specific example saw seven tank destroyer battalions suffer severe personnel losses to Air Corps and Officer Candidate School, after which the unit contained over 50% of the remaining men in AGCT Categories IV and V.

Throughout 1942, a multitude of reports reached AGF headquarters describing the training problems units suffered due to the troops’ low mental quality. “It was said to be wasteful to develop elaborate and expensive equipment, and then place it in the hands of men incapable of using it properly. It was said to be dangerous to entrust lethal weapons to men in AGCT Class V.”¹⁰⁴ Several elements of the AGF requested that Class IV and V men be reduced from their units and fewer such men assigned. General McNair at first refused these requests, and “it was believed for a time at AGF headquarters that too much was being made of AGCT scores.”¹⁰⁵ Desertion and Absent Without Leave (AWOL) men became a serious problem with up to 5% of a unit’s men absent from training.¹⁰⁶ A War Department letter pointed out to commanders that many of the men desired a long prison sentence in order to avoid combat.¹⁰⁷

Leadership qualities became the most valued of qualities for infantrymen. The Army recognized that given the state of warfare in 1942, it would be paramount for soldiers to have the ability to make proper decisions in the chaos of the battlefield when

¹⁰³ Lt. Col. Bell I. Wiley *Training in the Ground Army 1942-1945, Study No. 11* (Washington D.C.: Historical Section - Army Ground Forces, 1948), 24.

¹⁰⁴ Palmer et. al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 9; Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 299.

¹⁰⁵ Palmer et. al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 9; Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 299.

¹⁰⁶ Walker, *From Texas to Rome*, 132.

¹⁰⁷ Walker, *From Texas to Rome*, 132.

detached from their leaders. The testing and evaluation that Army recruits underwent provided a great deal of information to classification officers, however, “there is no sure way of telling beforehand, that is, in advance of the experience, who is temperamentally fitted to lead men and who is going to fall apart at the sound of the guns.”¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, “no definitive means were available for determining a man’s potentialities as a fighter or combat leader...the qualities which it was most important for the Army Ground Forces to know were those on which psychological research was the most inconclusive.”¹⁰⁹

What was conclusive however was the series of tests required of units in training. These tests were developed after the Army maneuver exercises of 1941 revealed serious deficiencies in ground combat unit readiness. These tests were: “(1) Platoon Combat Firing Proficiency Tests, based on an attack problem involving fire and movement; (2) Field Artillery Battery Test, which required the unit to occupy and organize a position in a rapidly moving situation and prepare to execute observed fires; (3) Infantry Battalion Field Exercise Test, requiring the battalion as part of a regiment and supported by artillery to assemble and launch an attack on a hostile position.”¹¹⁰ With such a definitive rubric in place, maneuvers conducted in 1942 included two new divisions and drew critiques common to subsequent exercises. These included failures in properly organizing offensive and defensive lines, verbose and unclear orders, deficient coordination between infantry and armor, weak and tentative reconnaissance patrols, clustering of trucks and vehicles on roads, and poor cover, concealment, and

¹⁰⁸ Martin Blumensen, “America’s World War II Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts,” *Parameters* 19, no. 4 (December 1989): 4.

¹⁰⁹ Palmer et. al. *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 6.

¹¹⁰ Wiley, *Training in the Ground Army 1942-1945, Study No. 11*, 2-3.

camouflage.¹¹¹ Clear leadership -- at every level from battalion commander to squad leaders -- could have prevented these problems, most obviously the need for troops to receive clear and direct orders. The Army search for leadership continued throughout the war.

Deployments and Early Performance

The United States Army Ground Forces Command ground combat began with the invasion of North Africa in November of 1942.¹¹² Three Army infantry old divisions made up the American contribution to the Allied forces which included one U.S. Army armored Division, nine infantry and three armored divisions from Great Britain and other Allied countries.¹¹³ This combined arms approach complicated operations and “it was soon clear that the modern battlefield and sophisticated weaponry required soldiers who could control their fear, think with some clarity, and use initiative in situations where they were not under direct supervision.”¹¹⁴ As foretold by Army psychologists, predicting which soldiers would perform well in combat was impossible, however, after early actions occurred, “the Army found the ideal battlefield soldier needed youth, *intelligence*, and a proper physique.”¹¹⁵ The arrival in theater of new American units containing draftees caused concern for veteran liaison officers and messengers who frequently

¹¹¹ Wiley, *Training in the Ground Army*, 13.

¹¹² This thesis focuses on the Western Theater of North Africa, Sicily and Italy, and Western Europe. Army Infantry divisions were engaged from December 1941 in combat action in the Philippines and prior to November 1942 in other Pacific engagements. These Army units consisted mainly of manpower already in place and contained only a small population of soldiers who entered service after December 7, 1941.

¹¹³ Ellis, *World War II, A Statistical Survey*, 158.

¹¹⁴ Kennett, *G.I.*, 136.

¹¹⁵ Kennett, *G.I.*, 136. Emphasis mine.

moved between the front lines and rear areas; they were more afraid of nervous American sentries than they were of the Germans.¹¹⁶

New Soldiers' failures to follow orders often proved costly. In an Army Operations publication on lessons learned in the early action in North Africa, an officer of the 9th Infantry Division noted that soldiers failed to adhere to their training when ordered to dig in: "They were ordered to at once upon reaching the position. But they delayed, talked, and gathered in groups. They seemed to have the idea – 'it'll be time enough when the shooting starts.' Then when the shells came over, they all started to dig in at once, and there were not enough shovels to go around."¹¹⁷ Common sense directives emphasized in training, such as that of holding fire until a definite target could be determined, were frequently ignored.¹¹⁸

American infantry riflemen lacked the aggressive action required in combat: "German observers found that the American foot soldier's advance depended upon support from such weapons as tanks and artillery, and that when that support was not forthcoming, the American faltered."¹¹⁹ A further German observation estimated that, "as much as 15 percent of American manpower was useless for war because it was composed of "poor whites."¹²⁰ An AGF observer in mid-1943 reported from Italy, "Squad leaders

¹¹⁶ Robert L. Hewitt, *Work Horse of the Western Front: The Story of the 30th Infantry Division* (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 34-5.

¹¹⁷ Chaplain Kines, 3rd Bn., 39th Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, quoted in *Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia: Experiences, Observations & Opinions Collected from Officers and Men of Front Line Units – March 18-30, 1943*. G-3 Training Section A-F-H-Q, 1943: 2.
<https://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1908>.

¹¹⁸ Lt. Col Cunningham, 1st Bn., 16th Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, quoted in *Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia*, 7.

¹¹⁹ Kennett, *G.I.*, 169; Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, 26-28.

¹²⁰ Kennett, *G.I.*, 169-170.

and patrol leaders with initiative were scarce...The assignment of Grade V intelligence men to infantry is murder.”¹²¹

Allied commanders viewed the American infantry to be inferior. In March 1943 an Allied attack planned in Tunisia scheduled American Major General George Patton’s II Corps and British General Bernard Montgomery’s to move upon Axis troops simultaneously. Montgomery objected to the American involvement, saying that “I do *not* want the Americans getting in the way,” (emphasis in original) adding that they should “get the road ready for me” by clearing mines and performing road repair.¹²² Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, U.S. AGF Commander visited the African theater in April of 1943 and was horrified by what he found. With the 16th Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division he observed, “nowhere did I find anything other than 100 percent lethargy. There was not a bit of fight in the entire outfit.”¹²³ In one scheduled attack a lieutenant prepared men of the 16th Regiment, Company B to charge an enemy position. At the signal he turned to find only three of 43 men joining him in the attack. The remaining 40 waited behind a wall.¹²⁴

An anecdote from the Italian campaign illustrates how some soldiers were simply incapable of independent thinking. In the mountainous Italian terrain, supplies were often ferried on the backs on new recruits as no vehicle nor even pack mules could traverse the path. A lieutenant led a detail of several replacement men to the top of a mountain where a unit supply dump was located. Upon reaching the mountain top, the men became

¹²¹ Palmer et. al. *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 24.

¹²² Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 433.

¹²³ Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 501; Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 292-4.

¹²⁴ Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 126.

exhausted and were therefore ordered to remain until the lieutenant returned. On his way back down the mountain, the lieutenant was wounded and evacuated to a hospital. The three men remained at the supply dump, subsisted on the food in the dump, until they were discovered by a salvage operation company – two months later!¹²⁵ The division commander, General Fred L. Walker, elected not to punish the men, noting, “Unwisely, but obediently, they were carrying out their orders as they knew them.”¹²⁶

Despite the presence on the battlefield of the various components of the American combined arms tactical doctrine, the role the “ordinary rifleman” remained vital to tactical success. Infantry unit commanders urged aggressive soldiers to fire upon the enemy even when outmanned. In a famed incident during the Battle of the Bulge, a dozen American infantrymen poured panicked rifle fire on an advancing German regiment. Simply looking to buy time to fall back to better defensive positions, the Americans caused the Germans to halt and report “fierce resistance.”¹²⁷ The importance of the simple act of firing on the enemy, even at the solitary rifleman level, was known to all infantry commanders.

Changes in the Allocation of Infantrymen and An Improved Force

The United States Army infantry underwent a vast and dramatic improvement prior to the invasion of Western Europe on June 6, 1944. Lessons learned in combat in North Africa, Sicily, and mainland Italy allowed the development of leadership and experience throughout infantry divisions. Replacements, many of whom were now volunteers, found capable veterans to guide them. Classification of infantry soldiers now

¹²⁵ Walker, *From Texas to Rome*, 305-306.

¹²⁶ Walker, *From Texas to Rome*, 305-306

¹²⁷ S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 47-8.

included their physical profile, stronger, larger, and more athletic infantrymen filled the ranks. General McNair felt that the ordinary infantry soldier deserved appreciation, writing in a memo to Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in early 1944: “I am wondering just how we should go about dignifying the infantry rifleman....It might well be charged that we have made the mistake of having too much of air and tank and other special weapons and units and too little of the rifleman for whom all these other combat arms must concentrate to get him forward.”¹²⁸ The respect and admiration from the public, other branches of the Army, and even the Navy and Marines, for the infantry also was heightened by a series of public relations efforts by General McNair and the War Department. The creation of an “Expert Infantryman” badge proved a morale-booster and became much coveted among soldiers.

By early 1944, as War Department planners prepared for the coming invasion of Western Europe, General McNair finally convinced General Marshall of the “disappointingly low quality” of infantry troops.¹²⁹ With a single move, Marshall dramatically improved infantry manpower quality. In early 1944, he cancelled the ASTP program and ordering that all 73,000 high-quality, AGCP Class I personnel be assigned to the AGF. 55,000 went to infantry divisions, whose commanders were thrilled to receive a “valuable transformation” in manpower quality.¹³⁰ In the draftee 99th Infantry Division, the infusion of ASTPers who could read maps and use a compass with ease was

¹²⁸ Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 304.

¹²⁹ Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 304.

¹³⁰ Kennett, *G.I.*, 38.

met initially by hostility from veteran men. However, after training together “much of the antipathy dissipated. Both groups came to recognize value in one another.”¹³¹

Further infantry manpower needs were met by a virtual reversal of 1942-43 policies. 36,000 men who had volunteered for the Army Air Corps were assigned to the AGF and assigned to the infantry. On 29 March 1944, 24,000 aviation cadets – most of whom were in AGCT Classes I and II – were ordered transferred from the Air Corps into the AGF.¹³² By September 1944, 13,000 men voluntarily transferred into the infantry from outside the AGF into infantry divisions.¹³³

Thus, in 1944, essentially a third of the combat forces on the ground in Western Europe consisted of men who, in 1942-43, would not have found themselves assigned to the AGF. Virtually all of these new combat forces men came from AGCT score categories I and II. The infantry which landed on the shores of Western Europe in the summer of 1944 was thus one with higher morale, greater manpower quality, and carrying the respect of the public and its sister services. Although stymied occasionally by supply shortages and brief surprise Axis attacks, the U.S. Army of 1944-45 proceeded virtually at will across Western Europe and defeated the German Army in 11 months. As historian Lee Kennett pointed out: “the United States Army was probably the only army in the war whose manpower in combat was improving at the end of the conflict.”¹³⁴

¹³¹ Robert E. Humphrey, *Once Upon a Time In War: The 99th Division in World War II* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 71.

¹³² Palmer, et.al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 77.

¹³³ Palmer, et.al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 79.

¹³⁴ Kennett, G. I., 39.

V. CONCLUSION

Due largely to the efforts of General Lesley J. McNair, whose Ground Forces training program is largely still practiced to this day, and the changes made in personnel allocation throughout the war as commanders recognized the need for high-quality leaders in the infantry, the United States Army and its Infantry Branch performed at an increasingly high level sufficient to win the Second World War. Despite this low-quality of AGCT-scoring troops, McNair continuously developed innovative training programs and forced changes in the classification policies to increase allocation of higher quality troops into the AGF until his reassignment as a field commander in Normandy in July 1944.¹³⁵ His biographer concluded that General Lesley J. McNair's "ability to overcome the innumerable challenges caused by factors outside of his control, creating a well-trained combat force guided by sound doctrine and effective leaders, stands out as one of the most remarkable achievements of the war."¹³⁶

The Army General Classification Test would go on to be administered to over 9 million men during the war, each and every one of whom was classified and assigned a duty largely based on his performance on the test.¹³⁷ When classifying recruits into military occupations civilian occupation and previously acquired knowledge factored into a soldier's classification and assignment, however, the AGCT score could prove the defining ingredient in a recruits' military experience. His AGCT category excluded him from specific occupations or found him assigned to specific commands.

¹³⁵ General McNair was killed in action in Normandy on July 25, 1944 by mis-dropped American bombs. He was preparing for his first battle command. He became the highest ranking American killed in action.

¹³⁶ Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 308.

¹³⁷ Staff of the Adjutant General's Office, "The Army General Classification Test.": 760.

Regardless of what the test actually measured, be it intelligence, trainability, or experience; The AGCT's primary purpose was to serve the needs of the Army. After mobilization, the AGCT became the largest psychometric procedure administered to the nation's "largest and most representative sample of the general population."¹³⁸ After the war, intelligence testing in general would use the AGCT as a foundation and the military modified it only slightly into the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test taken by millions of recruits and veterans to this day.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Read D. Tuddenham, "Soldier Intelligence in World Wars I and II," *American Psychologist* 3, no. 2 (February 1948): 55. <https://eds-a-ebshost-com.libproxy.txstate.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=7fe32444-a2db-4eee-b13e-8162c770bfeb%40sessionmgr4008>.

¹³⁹ Including the author. I took the ASVAB in 1981 prior to my service in the United States Air Force as a Personnel Specialist.

APPENDIX SECTION

APPENDIX 1

World War II Army Enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOS)

Arranged by Functional Field and Subgroups

Numbers below 500 indicate military jobs with corresponding civilian occupations.

Numbers above 500 designate jobs with no parallel civilian occupation. (Exception: 590 Laborer, and 521 Basic, who may be trained in any job as designated by commanders.)

Gunnery and Gunnery Control

Light and Heavy Weapons (including organizational maintenance)

511 Armorer
604 Light Machine Gunner
605 Heavy Machine Gunner
607 Light Mortar Crewman
745 Rifleman
746 Automatic Rifleman
812 Heavy Weapons NCO
1607 Heavy Mortar Crewman
1812 Light Weapons NCO

Field and Coast Artillery (including organizational maintenance)

571 Electrician, Harbor Defense
572 Seacoast Gun Data Computer
576 Flash Ranging Observer
578 Observation Station Operator Coast Artillery
586 Sound Ranging Observer
608 Gun Crewman, Coast Artillery
645 Fire Control Instrument Operator, Field Artillery
724 Range Section Operator Coast Artillery
802 Artillery Mechanic, Minor Maintenance
836 Sound Recorder, Field Artillery
844 Gun Crewman, Light Artillery
845 Gun Crewman, Heavy Artillery
864 Gun Crewman, Medium Artillery
1531 Gun Crewman, Pack Artillery

Antiaircraft Artillery (including organizational maintenance)

527 Antiaircraft Range Section NCO
597 Antiaircraft Artillery Machine Gun Crewman, SP
598 Antiaircraft Artillery NCO, SP Weapons

601 Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Crewman
633 Fire Control Electrician, Antiaircraft (Automatic Weapons)
634 Fire Control Electrician, Antiaircraft (Gun)
635 Searchlight Electrician
692 Height Finder Observer
763 Searchlight Crewman
833 Artillery Mechanic, Antiaircraft (Automatic Weapons) Minor Maintenance
834 Artillery Mechanic, Antiaircraft (Gun) Minor Maintenance
841 Artillery Mechanic, Antiaircraft (Self-propelled) Minor Maintenance
946 Searchlight NCO
1645 Range Section Operator, Antiaircraft
2601 Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Crewman
3601 Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Crewman, SP

Tank and Antitank (including organizational maintenance)

610 Antitank Gun Crewman
660 Tank Mechanic, Minor Maintenance
1736 Light Tank Crewman
2736 Medium Tank Crewman
3736 Amphibian Tank Crewman

Air Crew

509 Bombardier
580 Remote Control Turret Mechanic-Gunner
611 Aerial Gunner
612 Airplane Armorer-Gunner
737 Flight Engineer
748 Airplane Mechanic-Gunner
757 Radio Operator-Mechanic-Gunner, AAF
770 Airplane Pilot
772 Liaison Pilot
773 Service Pilot
939 Aerial Photographer-Gunner
940 Aerial Photographer
1684 Airplane Power Plant Mechanic-Gunner
1685 Airplane Electrical Mechanic-Gunner
2750 Aerial Engineer
2756 Radio Operator and Mechanic, AAF
2867 Radar Observer-Mechanic, Bombardment

Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Security

Reconnaissance

733 Reconnaissance Car Crewman
761 Scout

Intelligence and Operations

552 Control Tower Operator
631 Intelligence NCO
670 Master Gunner, Coast Artillery
671 Master Gunner, Antiaircraft (Gun)
768 Control Center Technician
791 Air Operations Specialist
814 Operations NCO
832 Master Gunner, Antiaircraft

Radio Intelligence

538 Voice Interceptor (Designated Language)
543 Radio Intelligence Control Chief
709 Traffic Analyst (Radio)
738 Intercept Operator, German
739 Intercept Operator, Japanese
6709 Traffic Analyst, German
8709 Traffic Analyst, Japanese

Security

301 Investigator
510 Information Center Operator
518 Ground Aircraft Observer
526 Balloon Crewman
669 Military Policeman, Occupied Territory
677 Military Policeman
968 Mine Detector Operator

Gas and Chemical

731 Smoke Generator Operator
786 Toxic Gas Handler
809 Decontaminating Equipment Operator
870 Chemical NCO
979 Chemical Warfare Man General

Communications

Message Center

542 Communications Chief
560 Pidgeoneer
667 Message Center Clerk
674 Message Center Chief
765 Visual Signalman
805 Cryptographic Technician
807 Cryptographic Code Compiler
808 Cryptanalysis Technician

Telephone and Telegraph

039 Cable Splicer, Telephone and Telegraph
095 Central Office Repairman
097 Installer-Repairman, Telephone and Telegraph
115 Automatic Telephone System Maintenance Man
187 Repeaterman, Telephone
197 Submarine Cable Station Technician
209 Submarine Cable Station Operator
232 Switchboard Installer-Repairman Manual
236 Telegraph Operator
237 Teletype Operator
238 Lineman, Telephone and Telegraph
239 Teletype Mechanic
261 Wire Chief Telephone and Telegraph
309 Telephone Operator
384 Installer, Toll Telephone and Telegraph
641 Field Lineman
650 Telephone Switchboard Operator
801 Cryptographic Repairman (Designated Equipment)
893 Facsimile Operator
894 Facsimile Technician
950 Wire Repairman, VHF

Radio and Radar Operation

514 Radar Crewman (Designated Set)
740 Radio Operator, Intermediate Speed
756 Radio Operator AAF
759 Radio Operator, CKS
760 Radio Operator, AACS
766 Radio Operator High Speed, Manual
776 Radio Operator, Low Speed
777 Radio Operator High Speed Automatic
798 Transmitter Attendant, Fixed Station
799 Intercept Operator Fixed Station
842 Radar Operator, AN/TPQ (Designated Model)
843 Radar Operator, AN/TPT (Designated Model)
866 Radar Observer Sea Search
869 DF Evaluator
1766 Radio Operator, AN/MRQ (Designated Model)

Transportation

Motor Transportation (including organizational maintenance)

014 Automotive Mechanic (Second Echelon)
316 Automobile Serviceman
345 Truck Driver, Light

378 Motorcyclist
735 Full-Track Driver
931 Truck Driver, Heavy
932 Special Vehicle Operator

Animal Transportation (including organizational care)

093 Horsebreaker
094 Horseshoer
235 Teamster
563 Horse Artillery Driver
565 Pack Driver
710 Stable Sergeant
712 Packer, Animal
713 Packmaster

Railway Transportation

033 Brakeman, Railway
047 Traffic Man, Railway
058 Conductor, Railway
069 Dispatcher, Railway
110 Locomotive Engineer
111 Locomotive Fireman
185 Railway Signal Operator
265 Yardmaster

Water Transportation (including organizational maintenance)

065 Seaman
080 Marine Engineer
117 Marine Fireman
118 Small Boat Operator
141 Marine Oiler
546 Coxswain, Mine Yawl
547 Master, L Boat
732 Amphibian Tractor Driver
797 Amphibian Truck Mechanic (DUKW)
837 Amphibian Track Vehicle Mechanic
838 Seaman, Landing Craft
839 Marine Engineman
927 Amphibian Transportation NCO
934 Amphibian Truck Driver

Air Transportation

967 Air Transportation Technician
2967 Flight Traffic Clerk

Supply

General

252 Foreman, Warehouse
348 Parts Clerk, Automotive
505 Ammunition NCO
581 Signal Supply Technician
582 Aerial Mine Technician
583 Engineer Supply Technician
656 Submarine Mine Loader
714 Mine Supply Maintenance Technician
769 Chief Storekeeper, Railway
815 Ordnance Supply NCO
821 Quartermaster Supply Technician
825 Medical Supply NCO
826 AAF Supply Technician
835 Supply Clerk
847 Prosthetic Dental Supply Clerk
848 Parts Clerk, Armament
901 Munitions Worker
949 Ammunition Renovator

Food-Service, Purchasing and Supply

017 Baker
037 Meat Cutter
060 Cook
371 Purchasing Agent
819 Commissary Steward
820 Subsistence NCO
824 Mess Sergeant

Cargo Handling (including organizational maintenance)

246 Cargo Gear Mechanic
271 Longshoreman
470 Cargo Checker
473 Winch Operator

Maintenance

Armament Repair

903 Small Arms Weapons Mechanic
907 Mechanic, Turret
913 Artillery Mechanic, Light
914 Artillery Mechanic, Heavy
915 Artillery Mechanic, Heavy Antiaircraft
923 Welder, Armor Plate
973 Chief Artillery Mechanic

978 Artillery Mechanic, Light Antiaircraft
1907 Gyrostabilizer Mechanic

Aircraft Armament Maintenance

575 Remote Control Turret Repairman
662 Aerial Torpedo Mechanic
678 Power Turret and Gunsight Mechanic
681 Power Turret and Gunsight Repairman
960 Remote Control Turret Mechanic,

Airplane Maintenance and Repair

528 Airplane Hydraulic Mechanic
548 Fabric and Dope Mechanic
550 Airplane Woodworker
555 Airplane Sheet Metal Worker
559 Glider Mechanic
573 Welder, Aircraft
665 Fuel Cell Repairman
684 Airplane Power Plant Mechanic
685 Airplane Electrical Mechanic
687 Airplane Propeller Mechanic
689 Airplane Cable Mechanic
747 Airplane and Engine Mechanic
750 Airplane Maintenance Technician
762 Airplane Engine Repairman
911 Airplane Armorer
925 Aircraft Engineering Technician
956 Airplane Carburetor Repairman
958 Airplane and Engine Electrical Accessories Repairman
964 Airplane Supercharger Repairman

Instrument Repair

098 Instrument Repairman, Nonelectrical
338 Instrument Repairman, Electrical
381 Watch Repairman
574 Bombsight and Automatic Pilot Repairman
579 Casemate Electrician
683 Bombsight Mechanic
686 Airplane Instrument Mechanic
899 Director Repairman, Electrical, Heavy Antiaircraft Artillery
917 Director Repairman, Mechanical, Heavy Antiaircraft Artillery
918 Fire Control Repairman, Light Antiaircraft Artillery
919 Control System Repairman, Heavy Antiaircraft Artillery
921 Height Finder Repairman
922 Instrument Repairman, Fire Control
957 Airplane Electrical Instrument Mechanic

959 Airplane Mechanical Instrument Repairman
961 Airplane Gyro Instrument Repairman
962 Optical Instrument Repairman
994 Servo Mechanic, PQ Target Airplane

Radio and Radar Repair

150 Crystal Grinder
647 Radio Repairman, Aircraft Equipment
648 Radio Repairman
649 Radio Repairman, Fixed Station
754 Radio Mechanic, AAF
775 Radar Mechanic, Ground Equipment (Designated Set)
778 Radio Mechanic, AACS
792 Radio Repairman, Single Channel Teletype :
849 Radar Mechanic, Troop Carrier
850 Radar Mechanic, Night Fighter
851 Radar Mechanic, Beacon
852 Radar Mechanic, RCM
853 Radar Mechanic, Navigation
854 Radar Mechanic, Sea Search
856 Radar Mechanic, Sea Search (LAB)
860 Radar Mechanic (GEE)
862 Radar Mechanic (IFF)
863 Radar Mechanic (GCA)
867 Radar Mechanic, Bombardment
868 Radio-Teletype Mechanic
933 Instrument Landing Equipment Mechanic
948 Radar Mechanic, Ground Loran
951 Radio Repairman, VHF
952 Radar Repairman, Gun-Laying Equipment (Designated Set)
953 Radar Repairman, Reporting Equipment (Designated Set)
955 Radar Repairman, Airborne Equipment (Designated Set)
974 Radar Repairman, AN/TPT (Designated Model)
993 Radio Mechanic, PQ Target Airplane
1648 Radio Repairman, AN/MRQ (Designated Model)

Photography Equipment Repair

042 Camera Repairman
158 Microfilm Equipment Repairman
206 Sound Projector Repairman
207 Sound Recording Equipment Maintenance Man
943 Camera Technician

Special Equipment Repair

229 Medical Equipment Maintenance Technician
282 Office Machine Serviceman

366 Orthopedic Mechanic
593 Link Trainer Mechanic
969 Link Celestial Navigation Trainer Mechanic

Automotive Equipment Repair

138 Motorcycle Mechanic
240 Tire Rebuilder
313 Construction Equipment Mechanic
337 Foreman, Automotive Repair Shop
413 Motor Inspector
529 Wrecker Crewman
905 Mechanic, Engine, Wheel Vehicle (Gasoline)
906 Mechanic, Chassis, Wheel Vehicle
90S Mechanic, Chassis, Track Vehicle
909 Mechanic, Engine, Track Vehicle
912 Electrician, Automotive
926 Mechanic, Fuel Induction
965 Mechanic, Automotive, Wheel Vehicle (Third Echelon)
966 Mechanic, Automotive, Track Vehicle (Third Echelon)

Railway Maintenance

181 Signal Mechanic, Railway
182 High Voltage Lineman
184 Substation Operator
199 Section Hand, Railway
258 Substation Electrician
281 Third Rail Repairman
401 High Voltage Cable Splicer

Railway Equipment Maintenance

046 Car Carpenter, Railway
048 Car Mechanic, Railway
112 Locomotive Mechanic
135 Electric Locomotive Repairman
205 Shop Engineer, Railway

Boat Maintenance

202 Carpenter, Ship
456 Calker
477 Mechanic, Marine Engine
478 Ship Fitter

Balloon Maintenance

535 Balloon Gas Handler
615 Chief Balloon Rigger

619 Balloon Rigger
639 Balloon Armorer

Shop Maintenance

024 Blacksmith
114 Machinist
129 Foundryman
148 Pattern Maker, Wood
242 Toolroom Keeper
256 Welder, Combination
302 Machine Operator (Designated Machine)
341 Shop Maintenance Mechanic
342 Master Mechanic
431 Machinist's Helper
457 Shop Clerk

Maintenance, General

013 Diesel Mechanic
030 Boilermaker
050 Carpenter, General
061 Coppersmith
077 Powerhouse Engineer
078 Electrician
081 Engineman, Operating
082 Stationary Engineer
084 Stationary Fireman
092 Generator Switchboard Operator
113 Woodworking Machine Operator
121 Utility Repairman
144 Painter, General
145 Painter, Sign
164 Plumber
165 Lineman, Power
166 Powerman
189 Rigger
201 Sheet Metal Worker
270 Cooper
304 Electric Motor Repairman
322 Refrigeration Mechanic
506 Portable Power Generator Repairman
822 Utilities NCO
846 Portable Power Generator Operator

Salvage and Repair

044 Canvas Cover Repairman
192 Saddle and Harness Maker

194 Salvage Technician
200 Sewing Machine Operator
204 Shoe Repairman
234 Tailor
530 Salvage Repair NCO
609 Leather and Canvas Worker
620 Parachute Rigger and Repairman
924 Bomb Salvage Technician

Laundry Operation and Maintenance

102 Foreman, Laundry
103 Laundry Machine Operator
104 Laundry Maintenance Mechanic

Fumigation and Bath

591 Foreman, Fumigation and Bath
706 Fumigation and Bath Man

Medical

Medical Care

067 Dental Laboratory Technician
072 Physical Therapy Technician
264 X-ray Technician
365 Optician
409 Medical Technician
422 Podiatrist
452 Optometrist
657 Medical Aidman
673 Medical NCO
855 Dental Technician
861 Surgical Technician

Pharmacy and Laboratory

149 Pharmacist
484 Entomology Technician
858 Medical Laboratory Technician
859 Pharmacy Technician

Veterinary

120 Meat or Dairy Inspector
250 Veterinary Technician
700 Veterinary Ambulance Orderly

Sanitation

196 Sanitary Technician

Construction and Engineering

Construction, General

034 Bricklayer
035 Carpenter, Heavy Construction
059 Foreman, Construction
063 Crane Operator
064 Power Shovel Operator
100 Structural Steel Worker
116 Dredgeman
214 Stonemason
259 Well Driller
359 Construction Machine Operator
533 Demolition Specialist
729 Pioneer
804 Camouflage Technician
817 Pontooneer

Diving Operations

454 Diver
455 Diver's Helper

Logging and Sawmill

329 Lumberjack
459 Sawmill Machine Operator
462 Forest Products Tallyman
464 Millwright, Sawmill
466 Foreman Logins

Fire Fighting

383 Fire Fighter

Oil and Water Supply (including organizational maintenance)

220 Pump Operator
485 Petroleum Storage Technician
487 Petroleum Pumping Equipment Repairman
727 Water Supply Technician

Technical

Surveying and Drafting

004 Aerial Phototopographer
070 Draftsman
071 Draftsman, Mechanical
074 Draftsman, Structural
075 Draftsman, Electrical

076 Draftsman, Topographic
136 Model Maker
191 Rodman and Chainman, Surveying
227 Surveyor
228 Survey and Instrument Man
230 Surveyor, Topographic
243 Geodetic Computer
387 Cartographer
577 Survey and Instrument NCO, Field Artillery
1076 Observation Draftsman,

Photography

043 Cameraman, Motion Picture
130 Animation Artist
131 Film Editor, Motion Picture
132 Electrician, Motion Picture
137 Projectionist, Motion Picture
152 Photographer
208 Sound Recorder, Motion Picture
285 Cameraman, Animated Motion Picture
286 Motion Picture Production Technician
287 Sound Editor, Motion Picture
407 Sound Mixer, Motion Picture
415 Electrician, Sound Transmission
449 Process Background Supervisor

Printing and Publishing

128 Multilith or Multigraph Operator
167 Lithographic Pressman
168 Printer
169 Job Pressman

Photographic Laboratory

016 Laboratory Technician, V-mail or Microfilm
028 Blueprinter or Photostat Operator
107 Photolithographer
134 Laboratory Technician, Motion Picture
945 Photographic Laboratory Technician

Chemical and Physics Laboratory

160 Physics Laboratory Assistant
292 Chemist
293 Chemical Engineer
358 Glassblower
411 Chemical Laboratory Assistant

Weather Observation (including maintenance)
782 Weather Equipment Technician
784 Weather Observer
787 Weather Forecaster
790 Weather Observer-Teletype Technician
942 Radiosonde Operator

Training (including maintenance)

283 Athletic Instructor
458 Dog Trainer
617 Altitude Chamber Technician
658 Link Trainer Instructor
659 Instructor (Designated Subject)
688 Tow Target Reel Operator
691 Flexible Gunnery Trainer Operator-Mechanic
703 Coxswain, Radio Target Boat
938 AAF Gunnery Instructor
970 Link Celestial Navigation Trainer Operator

Miscellaneous

486 Safety Inspector
170 Engineering Aide (Designated Field)
479 Still Operator
719 Oxygen and Acetylene Plant Operator
722 Submarine Mine Planter

Administration

Clerical—Administrative

055 Clerk, General
056 Postal Clerk
213 Stenographer
267 Translator
279 Legal Clerk
320 Interpreter
373 Sales Clerk
405 Clerk-Typist
502 Administrative NCO
622 Finance Technical Clerk
623 Finance Typist Clerk
624 Finance Clerk

Classification and Guidance

262 Occupational Counselor
263 Psychiatric Social Worker
275 Classification Specialist

289 Personnel Consultant Assistant
290 Personnel Technician

Machine Records

272 Key Punch Operator
400 Tabulating Machine Operator
425 Tabulating Machine Repairman

Military Band

020 Band Leader
175 Bandsman, Oboe
176 Bandsman, Bassoon
432 Bandsman, Clarinet
433 Bandsman, Cornet or Trumpet
434 Bandsman, Bass Drum
435 Bandsman, Snare Drum
436 Bandsman, Euphonium or Baritone
437 Bandsman, Flute or Piccolo
438 Bandsman, French Horn
439 Bandsman, Saxophone
440 Bandsman, Trombone
441 Bandsman, Tuba

Special Services

274 Writer, Military Subjects
288 Playwright
296 Artist
442 Entertainment Specialist

Miscellaneous

022 Barber
188 Duty Soldier II
356 Foreman Labor
521 Basic
522 Duty Soldier I
564 Special Assignment
566 Duty NCO
590 Duty Soldier III
625 Officer Candidate
629 Student
803 Bugler

APPENDIX 2

1942-1943 Activated (“Draftee”) Infantry Divisions

Listed by Activation Date

Division	Activation	Overseas	Campaign	Approx. Deployment Delay in Months
<u>1942</u>				
77 th ¹⁴⁰	March	Mar 44	Pacific	9
90 th ¹⁴¹	March	Mar 44	Western Europe	9
85 th	May	Dec 43	Italy	4
93 rd	May	Feb 44	Pacific	6
76 th	June	Dec 44	Western Europe	15
79 th	June	Apr 44	Western Europe	7
81 st	June	July 44	Pacific	10
80 th	July	July 44	Western Europe	9
88 th ¹⁴²	July	Dec 43	Italy	0
89 th	July	Jan 45	Western Europe	14
95 th	July	Aug 44	Western Europe	8
78 th	August	Aug 44	Western Europe	10
83 rd	August	Apr 44	Western Europe	4
91 st	August	Apr 44	Italy	4
96 th ¹⁴³	August	Jul 44	Pacific	7
94 th	September	Aug 44	Western Europe	6
98 th	September	Apr 44	Pacific	4
102 nd	September	Sep 44	Western Europe	8
104 th	September	Aug 44	Western Europe	7
84 th	October	Sep 44	Western Europe	7
92 nd	October	Sep 44	Italy	7
99 th	November	Sep 44	Western Europe	6
100 th	November	Oct 44	Western Europe	8
103 rd	November	Nov 44	Western Europe	9
86 th	December	Feb 45	Western Europe	12
87 th	December	Oct 44	Western Europe	8
<u>1943</u>				
97 th	February	Feb 45	Western Europe	10
106 th	March	Nov 44	Western Europe	5
66 th	April	Nov 44	Western Europe	4
75 th	April	Nov 44	Western Europe	4

¹⁴⁰ 1st Battalion, 307th Regiment, 77th Division awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

¹⁴¹ 3rd Battalion, 358th Regiment, 90th Division awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

¹⁴² 3rd Battalion, 51st Regiment, 88th Division awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

¹⁴³ Only draftee unit awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for the entire division. Four pre-1942 divisions did.

69 th	May	Dec 44	Western Europe	4
63 rd ¹⁴⁴	June	Nov 44	Western Europe	3
70 th ¹⁴⁵	June	Dec 44	Western Europe	4
42 nd	July	Nov 44	Western Europe	2
71 st	July	Jan 45	Western Europe	4
65 th	August	Jan 45	Western Europe	3

1942 Divisions, Average Delay: 7.6 months

1943 Divisions, Average Delay: 4.3 months

¹⁴⁴ 254th Regiment, 63rd Division awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

¹⁴⁵ 2nd Battalion, 274th Regiment, 70th Division awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

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