

A SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY IN  
URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS OF MEXICO CITY

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## **DEDICATION**

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother, who supports my educational goals and who bestowed on me the humility of knowledge. It is also dedicated to my nephews and nieces whom I intend to assist with my educational experiences throughout this project to guide them in similar feats.

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **A SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS OF MEXICO CITY**

by

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**SUPERVISING PROFESSOR: SCOTT BOWMAN**

In recent decades there has been substantive focus on the integrity of public institutions in Mexico. Factors of organizational corruption and growing attention to the activities of criminal subcultures have illuminated pundit inefficiencies in the administration of social controls. This study evaluates 1,965 surveys of perception and victimization in Mexico City during 2008 to determine demographic attributes that are relative to social disorganization theory as revised by Sampson and Grove's 1989 article. This study examines the association between households who reported an incident of victimization and their demographic composition. The demographic variables consist of employment, education, family head of household, total monthly family income and urban residences. The data was obtained from a non-governmental institute who conducts annual assessment in metropolitan with self-report questionnaires that address perceptions and victimizations. Associations statistically significant between urban residence, education and employment were discovered.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In Quintana Roo, Mexico, the family of Mexican Special Forces Marine Melquisedet Angulo Córdoba came together on the late evening following his funeral ceremony. Cordova came to this unfortunate end from wounds inflicted during gun combat with cartel forces in Cuernavaca, Morelos to which also resulted in the death of renowned cartel Capo, Beltran Leyva (Camarena, 2009). News regarding this successful military operation spread swiftly, and people around the nation joined in recognition of the brave soldiers. Similar to the idea of bidding condolences or sorrow for survived family and friends, the phrase, “te ofrezco mi pesame,” is often offered by close family and friends during the burdensome burial process. Further reverence is commonly afforded for civil service men and women who lose their lives on the line of duty.

Unfortunately, during this critical moment of resignation for Cordova’s family that late evening, a group of gunmen burst into their home mercilessly firing assault rifles killing his mother, sister, brother and aunt. "They broke the door down with a sledgehammer and sprayed them with bullets in the living room and bedrooms," said Saturnino Dominguez, the local deputy police commander (Lopez, 2009). Cordova’s

loved ones became additional victims in an upgrading wave of cartel violence. The aggressive attack on the home of civilians by cartel associates set in precedence a new degree of repercussions against anyone who stands in the way of criminal subcultures.

Not only have Mexican criminal subgroups been infamous for targeted government functionality by corrupting or victimizing officers, they have also begun minimizing individual efforts from law enforcement by solidifying the notion that their families will also be murdered even after their death (Chabat, 2010). This, among other acts of brutality, (*beheadings, castrations, hangings, mass graves etc.*), have galvanized the ruthlessness of criminal subgroups in the modern era of drug trafficking organization and set the stage for dramatic influences on people perceptions of safety (Grayson, 2010).

### **Statement of the Problem**

The tautological issue of corruption and inequality produces an unstable ideology which sustains a stagnant view of formal law (Brasz, 1970). Cultural criticisms of institutions that do not uphold public safety or maintain basic necessities produce informal ecosystems that supplement what formal ones fail to provide (Toro, 1995). Ineffective Mexican institutions have been known to present avenues for criminal subcultures to victimize, intimidate, embed and exploit vulnerable communities. Attributable to recidivating restlessness and intrinsic disbelief in formal social institutions, desperate communities are left to survive the residual dangers of criminal subcultures (Walker, 1981; Toro, 1995; Villarreal, 2002). Those informed in this matter believe that the burdensome price in implementing ineffective formal controls will not

remedy the perceptions of insecurity and will not payout the elimination of local criminal subgroups (Bailey & Chabat, 2002).

The critical issue of isolating criminal subgroups embedded or operating within disenfranchised environments has become the forefront of a formidable societal dilemma in Mexico due to the cultural disbelief in the social organizations. Eradicating mistrust and reassessing policing procedures in communities either financially dependent on criminal enterprises or as laborers out duress is difficult. Without investment from the community, efforts to identify and terminate perceptions of victimization will remain ineffective; thus continuing to diminish the relationships between social organizations and citizens.

### **Purpose and Importance of Study**

The general hypothesis of this research proposes that principles of Social Disorganization theory revised by Sampson and Grove, predisposes Mexican households to be victimized and feel unsafe in their respective communities. Their cross analysis of five neighborhood characteristics consisting of socio-economic status, heterogeneity, residential mobility, urbanization and family disruption are argued to be facilitators of delinquency in communities (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Financial mismanagement of social funds and the lack of ethical accountability in Mexican social institutions have diligently stratified employment opportunities, educational systems and public perceptions of their local communities. Ubiquitous systematic problems in macro-level organizations, particularly in politics and criminal justice departments, have unsettled organizational perspectives through their inability to resolve social injustices by centralized pockets of power (Finnegan, 2012).

The onset of this study will expand a literature review of applicable sociological theories, policy evaluations and relevant historical predispositions for social disorganization theory. There will also be contextual references to the national issues of organized crime and cartel violence when discussing social subgroups, social ideological perspectives, and incentives structures. It is necessary to note that the terms, drug trafficking organizations, narcotic organizations and cartels will be inferred interchangeably from the description of deviant and criminal subcultures. Similarly, policing agencies, court systems, businesses and politicians will be discussed as a unifying conjecture to the identity of social organizations.

The first sections will elaborate the extent of inefficiencies in social institutions, followed by description of social disorganization theory and contributors. Lastly, the research will specifically test four tenants of social disorganization theory (*family disruption, urbanization, residential mobility and low economic status*) and determine if these variables have any bearing on household victimizations.

### **Opening Argument**

Examples such as the opening story have permitted a disillusioned population to fend for themselves amidst a heightened military campaign against organized crime. The vast mistrust for social organizations and experiences of victimization has directly undermined the capabilities of formal and informal social systems to implement communal laws. In the context of Mexico, the raised attention to the growing number of civilian casualties under a national war on drugs against organized crime in addition to the tangles of corruption within the government have rendered community organizations unable to uphold collective efficacy. Ultimately, repercussions endured by communities,

such as that of Mexican Marine Melquisedet Angulo Córdova, leave in its wake a horrifying choice for Mexican citizens to address; “Am I willing to go against corrupt organizations when my own government cannot or will not protect me?”

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE ANALYSIS**

This section will review sources from scholarly journals, local news articles, biographies and national studies for the purposes of generalizing theoretical components of social disorganization with evidence from Mexico's social climate in the last decades. Further discussions will attempt to explain how corrupt perspectives of macro ecosystems provoke citizens to disintegrate from their community and in turn initiate social disorganization. Recent qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the current condition of Mexico regard primary focus on the political mismanagement, perceptions of fear, and criminal subgroups. In addition to the discussion of ecological factors pertinent to Mexican social demographics, an evaluation of social disorganization theory will address empirical findings and its application to Mexican communities.

### **Mexican Socio-Political History**

Democratic advancements in Mexico have exhibited similar shortcomings found in other Latin American during their ideological transitions towards a populist

form of governance (Edelberto, 1996; Teichman, 2001). Obstacles regarding varied forms of resource allocation, position in worldly competitive markets, and stagnant management institutions have proctored the underdevelopment of formal Mexican social networks (Holzner, 2007). Mexico's historical inability to sustain a government model conducive to true capitalism propelled the nation towards a stratified neoliberal economic model (González, 1990).

Throughout Mexico's political dominance by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Mexico tolerated hegemonic forms of control for 71 years; most notably in presidential administrations (Bailey & Chabat, 2001). The authority of the executive branch of government reached beyond the control of social, union, and business organizations and also included disproportionate powers over legislative and judicial powers. Scholars believe modern avenues of corruption became galvanized during this period due to no noticeable remedies or ramifications for civil injustices by officials; particularly as financial hardships in the national ecosystem seemed paramount (Ochoa & Torres, 2012).

Unethical standards have corroded the modems of internal oversight in high and low level social organizations. Limited resources within public serving organizations have also reduced their expected functionality with poorly equipped personnel and lack of prevalent reward systems based on adherence to professional codes of conduct (Toro, 1995). As formal organizations in the government exhibited corruption and complacent behavioral patterns, the, "innovation [trend] has spread, and a threshold is reached beyond which this adaption provides legitimacy" (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). There

were also external forces supplementing community standards as witnessed when elevated levels of violent robbery, property crime and assaults began when as did national economic crises (ICESI, 2009).

Furthermore, non-adversarial transitions of presidential power occurred between 1920 and 2000. During Mexico's political dominance of the PRI, this organization normalized an undemocratic development of a practice termed, "el dedazo." This term encapsulates the informal standard where potential candidate's election depends on strict commitment to the established course of governance of the previous administration (Levy & Bruhn, 2001; Boix & Garicano, 2001; Villarreal, 2002; Grayson, 2010).

In the late part of the 20th century, Mexico underwent political transitions reforming election procedures and increasing the independence of the legislative as well as judicial powers. As a result to a truly competitive election in 2000, Mexico had a presidential election where Vicente Fox, a non-member of the PRI incumbency, was victorious (Ochoa & Torres, 2012). These electoral reforms materialized after dramatic social injustices from power incumbencies were witness by the nation. The unnecessary use of force on labor and student uprisings in the late 1950s, the massacre of students in Mexico City on the eve of the 1968 Olympic Games, the government's repressive response to an earthquake in Mexico City in 1985 and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas' controversial loss in openly fraudulent presidential election insinuated a social awareness of Mexico's cryptocracy (Dominguez & McCann, 1996).

## **Corruption**

Irrespective to electoral reforms, corrupt behavioral patterns in Mexican politics and social institutions have persistently saturated resources and loosened organizational traction with the mass population (Walker, 1981; Chabat, 1994; Bailey & Chabat, 2001; Astorga, 2005). Mexico's coexistence with independent hegemonies early in national development coveted dishonest coalitions among community leaders. During the PRI's years of governance, distribution of benefits by virtue of employment, contracts, educational opportunities and social services operated with no legislative oversight. In circumstances where opposing groups gained legal grounds against the PRI, tensions were often diffused with co-optation (Weyland, 1998). The inflated discretion of managerial positions in social institutions, businesses, and criminal justice agencies did not create avenues for employees to adopt intrinsic accountability for organizational goals, social safeguards of resources and networks (Chabat, 1994; Cejudo, 2009). Regional and local officials also honed occupational leverage by reserving social funds for loyal subordinates and close social networks (e.g. family, friends, and acquaintances).

The function of governance depends on regional leaderships to liaison laws and resources of the collective. Local officials predominantly serve as the intermediary entities between federal resources and municipal economies thus providing primary access to systematic information. This information at times does not reach community members outside the official's close social networks. By providing upward mobility for close social networks, elitist patrons sustained their level of affluence by appointing loyal individuals within their network irrespective of their skill sets (Levy & Bruhn, 2001).

Citizens in Mexico are sequentially bounded between two illegitimate forces; criminal subcultures and corrupt formal organizations (Ochoa & Torres, 2011).

Mexican governmental corruption reached an apex between 1988 and 1994 under the presidency of Carlos Salinas (Pimental, 1999). Salinas' exposure to the national relations began as a secretary of treasury for the former president Luis Echeverria. His undertakings of the financial crisis that took place in 1982 geared the nation towards deregulations of private and international commerce. In 1994, Mexico became a participant in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The ratification of the NAFTA minimized continental monetary policies and foreign investment regulations for private business and production infrastructures (Carlsen, 2008). Globalization under this agreement gave internationally funded manufacturers more discretion and control of their private businesses. Profitable revenue adjustments from international business and the privatization of state-owned enterprises were accomplished in Salina's administration. Mexican legislature supported this model of management because this broadening of interest groups afforded individual diplomats implicit knowledge or momentary associations to subsidiaries and share (Oppenheimer, 1996). International drug trafficking organizations operating in Mexico have attained levels of financial and political clout through this economic remodeling of the North American trade (Toro, 1995; Weyland, 2004; Astorga, 2005; Chabat, 2010; Grayson, 2012; Finnegan, 2012).

Mexico's growing international commerce also bared witness to increasing segments of governmental corruption. Raul Salina, Carlos Salina's brother, was indicted by the Swiss government for unaccounted funds discovered in a drug trafficking

investigation (Private Banking, 1999). Other officials affiliated to President Salinas were discovered for involvement in illegal operations ranging from voter fraud, money laundering, homicide, international drug conspiracies, bribery, and providing impunity to members of organized crimes (Drug Enforcement Administration, 1999; Shelly, 2001; Winer, 2001).

Corruption has since intensified in various professions such as businessmen, farmers, prison officials, military, state and local political officials, and law enforcement departments (Toro, 1995). Local, state and federal law enforcement have been most plagued with corruptive cronyism (Drug Enforcement Administration, 1998). The illegitimate forms of extorting civilians for a small bribe during a traffic violation is one example of unethical practices adopted in the lower levels of formal organizations (Beith, 2010). As pertinent and immediate administrators of justice, law enforcement officers have managed to normalize these implicit transactions of money, jewelry, or any possessions worth bartering in lieu of unlawful detention (Pimental, 1999). Inversely, authoritarian pardons from police officers were granted to close affiliates of public servants.

Normative practices of corruption and extortion became renowned in hierarchies of social networks within all social classes. Subsequent questions regarding the integrity of Mexican social organizations have repeatedly illuminated residual issues resulting from corruption practices and the public's perverse adjustments to discredited social organizations (Chabat, 2010). The longevity of drug trafficking subgroups is merited not only to the large income derived from transnational trafficking of narcotics, but also to the Mexican deregulation of the economy. As Mexican state enterprises were sold to

private parties foreign and domestic under Salinas, money from potentially illegal markets may have been used to purchase valuable assets of the economy; interchanging criminal funds with the legitimate economy of the nation (Oppenheimer, 1996). This period in Mexican history is what set the stage for Mexico's increased vulnerability to organize crime and the war on drugs.

### **War on Drugs in Mexico**

The increase rates of high-profile crimes and inter-cartel violence became a national problem at the turn of the century with unseen levels of brutality and malice gained the world's attention. In 2007, Mexican president, Felipe Calderon, declared war on the drug cartels. This campaign against drug trafficking organizations has had to adjust to paramilitary organizations that diligently pursue monetary incentives and protect their businesses. Within 2001 to mid-May 2010, more than 23,800 deaths were related to cartels (Shirk, 2010). There are currently debates over the most recent death toll. Some say the government is unwilling to produce true figures because it has exceeded more than 40,000 (Chabat, 2010). The bilateral shift toward a free trade agreement not only made available more opportunities to internationally traffic illegal merchandise, but also created highly combative environments driven by adversarial criminal subgroups (Grayson, 2010).

Corruption has been presented in previous sections as a being a downgrade to the social fabric of a community. The appearances of mass graves, bridge hangings, decapitated corpse and open firearm skirmishes continue illuminating alarming inefficiencies from national, state and municipal authorities to protect innocent people

from these combative subgroups. Common reports of unmarked cars patrolling neighborhoods with automatic weapons enforcing their will on civilians coincide with horrifying reports of human rights violations (Pérez, 2009; Shirk, 2010). Public narratives have begun to acknowledge how these methods of exerting dominance and instilling fear have changed behavioral standards and perception among Mexican communities. Pervasiveness of social media has ascribed different dimensions to the perception of the criminal subgroups and their inhumane displays of mutilation and torture.

Through public displays of violence, drug trafficking organizations attempt to shame opposition by placing elaborate propaganda banners at the scene of discovery in efforts to illustrate their complete defiance of formal standards, and most importantly, further engrave the fear. Horrifying and gruesome details of drug violence have also been popularized in daily newspapers, internet videos of narco-violence, and even in music (Gordus, 2011) Attacks on public servants have directly become a frequent occurrence in cities throughout Mexico preceding the militarization of drugs enforcement. Under the military campaign after 2006, Mexican citizens in high violence region are also enduring, “spiral of fears,” since forces have been incapable of eliminating threats and have been most readily known for extorting at risk populations for safety (Cayerosy, Magaloniz, Matanock, & Romero, 2011).

Organizational reforms in President Calderon’s administration have emphasized a course of action based on targeting criminal subgroups with an expedited Mexican military model. His executive mandates consistently focus on military reforms and corruption (Chabat, 2010). Although this approach may reduce criminal subcultures

operations, it also contributes conspicuous anonymity and minimal accountability for aggressive military tactics (Ramirez, 1989). These short term solutions have been deemed relatively effective, but concerns over the heavy use of military to deter criminal subgroups have instigated organizational tension between local and federal officials. The sensitive balance between civilian and military authorities is often frayed with mistrust; particularly when transgressions become uncovered on behalf of both authorities (Doyle, 1993).

Narratives in regard to the national reciprocity between Mexico and the United States distinguished Mexico as incompatible of executing complex drug policies (Shirk, 2010). The months before the initiation of the Mexican war on drugs, communities on the northern border had been bombarded with frequent and public displays of violence from drug cartels (Hernández, 2010).

### **Contextual Application of Social Disorganization Theory**

After reviewing the literature of institutional and social inequality in social organizations, it is fundamental to consider ineffective community management of neighborhoods as directly associated to citizen disintegration to social controls. A study by Olivero and Murataya (1998) reported a measurement of citizen satisfaction with police services in Guadalajara. There was an observable lack of support for police organizations and practices due to a sample's "distaste" for police corruption (Olivero & Murataya, 1998). Communities enduring these tense environments have learned to adapt to the illegal activity from both criminal subgroups and formal social organizations. In a 2007 Gallup poll, 58% of Mexicans had confidence in the judicial system (Ray, 2008).

Other polls found one in ten Mexicans has some or much confidence in police agencies (Mitofsky, 2010).

Sustaining this social climate increases polemic doubts that social organizations have the capacity to change. In an evaluation of community exposure to criminal subgroups and police extortions, results suggest that poor and middle classes compose 40% of Mexican regions known to have high violence. The study also noted that among those middle classes, close to 40% have turned to the criminal subcultures for assistance (Cayerosy, Magaloniz, Matanock, & Romero, 2011).

Ochoa and Torres (2012) introduced elements of regional pride in their study of criminal subcultures. Their qualitative study focuses on the, “Knights Templar” of Michoacán which was originally known as “La Familia.” This organization came out as a criminal subgroup who took the initiative to benefit the community, by admonishing young people from making noise or drinking in the streets, deterring spousal abuse, punishing common criminals and violently punishing sadistic crimes (Ochoa & Torres, 2012).

The study evaluates 50 interviews based on three components: cultural factors (civic culture, cultural approval of violence); the decomposition of institutions; and the legitimacy of institutions. In their study of Michoacán, they found certain percentages of people who approve the presence of the “Knight Templar”. Four findings of their qualitative analysis extend the notion that social disorganization of a community can reach high levels of disruption to which local subgroups need to establish order themselves:

“(1) 20% of the participants mentioned knowing a family member or close friend who was involved in some related incident with organized crime. (2) 40% of the people interviewed mentioned that they knew or had some acquaintance with someone who interacts or has interacted directly or indirectly with criminal groups. (3) 60% of those interviewed believe certain conditions of order in the community can be benefitted from organized crime. (4) 80% of the interviews and demonstrates that most people believed that those who coexist without involvement in the activities of these groups risk no problems” (Ochoa & Torres, 2012, pg. 88).

Gastil (1971) makes an addition to the concept of civic culture and states people individually gauge the behavior of subgroups by degrees of violence. The indulging of certain subgroup behaviors can explain how violence at times can be tolerated when the environment recognizes common goals with subgroups (i.e. safety, enemies, and resources). Criminal subgroups have prevalent influences on disenfranchised communities and international markets to which they can indoctrinate residents.

Systematic counter efforts to reduce behavioral pattern of corruption, which were practiced among all social classes, have inversely created an unstable social ecosystem. Displacements of paramount criminal subgroups have driven remaining criminal organization to respond desperately with elevated violence and hostility towards military opposition.

The limited intrinsic supports for formal organizations of Mexican communities in addition to the tensions derived from the burdensome war on drugs help explain aspects public dissonance from societal sanctions (Astorga, 2005). Many informed researchers thus argue that the antidrug ideal in Mexican communities cannot be integrated into moral standards because, “those who happen to live in towns and cities where traffickers have come to establish themselves are the unintended victims” (Toro,

1995, pg.58). In addition to this complexity, involvement in criminal subgroups has become an unconventional and readily attainable form of income during employment hardships (Cayeros, Magaloni, Matanock, & Romero 2011). Acquiring formal and consistent sources of income became difficult in times of depression. During Calderon's war on drugs, the number of Mexicans living on 2,100 pesos (\$150) a month or less jumped from 45.5 million to almost 58 million (CONEVAL, 2008).

### **Social Disorganization Theory Literature Review**

The framers of the social disorganization theory, Chicago sociologists, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, introduced a community level theory of crime and delinquency (Shaw, Zorbaugh, McKay, & Cottrell 1929; Shaw & McKay 1942; 1969). In their search to find predictors of disorganization within a community, Shaw and McKay focused on delinquency rates Chicago and sought to establish an understanding of the variation between communities and officially recorded offenses committed by boys and young men.

Earlier research related to social disorganization by Thomas and Znaniecki (1920) focused on Polish peasant population in Europe. They found aspects of community disintegration as the influx of migrants began relocating in predominantly homogenous neighborhoods. By isolating Polish cultural values, Thomas and Znaniecki used qualitative ethnographic techniques to analyze the effects of migration (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1920). Thomas and Znaniecki structured community disruption as a lack of financial stake in the neighborhood because of the pervasive poverty of incoming migrants and cultural tensions derived from shifts in the ethnic composition of a

community (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Park and Burgess (1925) also made an addition to social disorganization theory through their analysis of growing communities and urbanization in Chicago. Utilizing mapping zones to describe variations in land use and land use changes, Park and Burgess defined five concentric zone categories; central business district (zone 1), transitional (zone 2), working class (zone 3), residential (zone 4), and commuter (zone 5) (Park & Burgess, 1925). Important finding of their study portrayed transitional zones as having more resistance to change and exhibited higher levels of deteriorating conditions. Improvements to neighborhood conditions increased as distance increased away from central zones. Their neighborhood hypothesis states transitional and central zones contain higher concentrations of social problems than other described zones. (Park & Burgess, 1925)

Shaw and McKay argued in their theory presented in *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (1942) that there are three structural factors of low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility which contribute to the disruption of formal and informal sanctions (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Building on scholarship of juvenile delinquency and neighborhood ecosystems, Shaw and McKay theorized that these structural dimensions of communities can limit social interactions and networks. Official data was used to deduce statistics for areas with high concentrations of reported crimes. The use of official statistics is considered the most prevalent criticism to their research. Due to the conflict theory premise, certain areas have more official crime activity based on the implicit biases of police concentration in lower economic communities (Hagan, Gillis, & Chan 1978; Sampson 1986; Smith & Jarjoura, 1988).

Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) developed a similar model to Shaw and McKay arguing that integrations of unassimilated individuals into the social fabric of a local community is a multifaceted process of developing extensive friendship networks, kinship bonds, and local associational investments. This conceptualization of the systemic theory by Kasarda and Janowitz facilitated a foundation for the continued understanding of residential instability within a community (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). The systemic model from Kasarda and Janowitz corroborates the expansion of the social disorganization by considering the intricate ecosystem of symbiotic relationships found in family life and socialization standards (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974 p. 329; Sampson 1988). The established notion of systematic relationships supports the factoring of intervening associations among friendship networks and low organizational participation.

Kornhauser's (1978) evaluation of social disorganization focused primarily on the direct impact of neighborhood structural characteristics on crime when explaining community strains and social controls. Most delinquency theories were based on the effect independent variables such as socioeconomic status had on crime variations (Kornhauser, 1978; Wilson, 1987). Both informal networks of friendship and civil commitment to formal organizational were thought to have unitary effect on crimes (Small & Newman, 2001). These two community parameters vary by demographics and neighborhood structure. Kornhauser's concluded that more definitive structuring of models linking micro and macro social control theories along with empirical tests of the behavioral patterns will be necessary in understanding neighborhood variations (Kornhauser, 1978, pg. 79).

Although findings illustrated criminogenic properties within urban communities, the hypotheses of Shaw and McKay remained underdeveloped due to the lack of relevant data and variable deficiencies (Kasarda & Janowitz 1974; Bursik & Webb 1982; Bursik 1986; Krohn 1986; Heitgerd & Bursik 1987). Replications of their research model found methodical obstacles since the definitions of structural variables were not clearly instrumented. The evaluation of Shaw and McKay's methods could not affirm their predictions of internal and extrinsic influences of social disorganization (Sampson & Grove 1989). Advancements in data collection and statistical analysis have made considerable improvements to concepts and methodology of social disorganization theory. Sampson's and Grove's revised research model was considered, "the most complete examination of the systemic social disorganization model that has ever been attempted" (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993, pg.43).

In 1989, Sampson and Groves article of social disorganization theory, "Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization," the authors consolidated models of neighborhood theories into a clear thesis stating:

"Low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption perpetuate... the inability of communities to effectively achieve organizational goals and maintaining effective social controls as well as increases crime and delinquency rates" (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 779).

With this explanation, their paramount study considerably extends Shaw and McKay's singular measurements of social disorganization by instrumenting intervening variables of, "local friendship networks," "unsupervised peer groups," and "organizational participation" (Sampson, 1986; 1987). With their recognition that a

community's ecosystem is co-dependent on both exogenous and endogenous variables, Sampson and Grove explain neighborhood subjectivity to crime as a bivariate effect on community disorganization (South & Messner, 2000).

The use of self-report to facilitate a macro-level analysis of communities allowed the study to aggregate data from a British Crime Survey (BCS). Empirical results from two large national surveys of England and Wales were used establish community samples of randomly selected people 16 and older. The revised model of social disorganization utilized self-report data regarding rates of crime and delinquency to structure dimensions of community information from residents within 238 localities in Great Britain. Each locality region consisted of a proportionate selection of 60 addresses and together combined for 200 local communities (n= 10,905). A second national survey in 1984 contained a sample of 11,030 residents from 300 British localities (Sampson & Grove, 1989)

### **Exogenous Variables**

Sampson and Grove reported community correlations as they created a regressions model to test the direct and indirect effects sizes on the three intervening measures of social disorganization (friendship networks, organizational participation, and unsupervised peer group) from the five structural sources of social disorganization (urbanization, family disruption, socioeconomic status, residential stability and ethnic heterogeneity). Measurements of all eight predictor variables were also tested for potential correlations with crime rates of each locality (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg.789).

Family disruption is a conjoined measure of marital statuses and single parent family units with children located in a locality. This exogenous variable is instrumented as a direct factor to the communities' ability to supervise delinquent incivilities associated to youth groups. Socioeconomic status were standardized by combining the major dimensions of social class-education (percentage college educated), occupation (percentage in professional and managerial positions), and income (percentage with high incomes). The effect of socioeconomic factors of an area had been established by previous research as having an effect the resources available to uphold community standards and supervise delinquent youth groups (Sampson & Grove, 1989).

Ethnic heterogeneity was measured with an index category previously developed used in previous studies: white, West Indian or African Black, Pakistani or Bangladeshi Indian, other white and mixed (Blau, 1977, p. 78). This variable focused on transient behaviors of influx populations and assumed practices of disintegration which may limit social interaction and community investment. Social control in urban areas with noticeable changes in cultural composition may be distinct from general attitudes and most dependent on close relationships (Thomas & Znaniecki 1920; Shaw & McKay 1942; Kornhauser 1978; Veysey & Messner 1999). Conceptualized diversity within a community was structured by the revised social disorganization theory as potentially increasing secularization through fear and mistrust in areas where resources are scarce and order lacking (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Suttles, 1968)

Residential stability measures are comprised rates of respondents who were raised in the areas within a 15- minute walk from current home. Similar to the dynamics of

racial and ethnic diversity, this component actualizes populations with generally indifferent attitudes regarding the enforcement of informal sanctions. In addition to heterogeneity, localities with ever transitioning populations such as central and inner-city concentric zones are theorized to have a decrease in the enforcement of informal controls (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1920; Parks & Burgess, 1925; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Areas composed of transient citizens such as business sectors tend to have a high level of unsupervised youths (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 799). Urbanization was indicated by assigning predetermined standards to all communities located in central-city zones. Population density and identity of concentration zones with proximity to the inner city were structured using 1983 urban study by Hough and Mayhew (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 785).

### **Intervening Variables**

The samples used by Sampson and Groves observed urban interdependence and differences when identifying the dynamics of local social networks and informal sanctions imposed on youthful peer groups (1989). Their research showed that urbanization tended to limit social participation in local community affairs and catered an environmental predisposition for delinquency (Fischer, 1982; Sampson & Grove, 1989; Veysey & Messner, 1999). In addition, their expansion of intervening variable indicated “unsupervised peer groups and local friendship networks” as important and distinct dimensions of community levels of social disorganization (Sampson & Grove, 1989)

Intervening and exogenous aspects of neighborhood localities were analyzed in the research of Sampson and Grove to provide measures of observable multicollinearity,

variable effect sizes and misspecification errors. Supervision capacities of communities were captured when people were asked to regard the occurrences of, “teenagers who were hanging around on the streets.” Sampson and Grove’s focus on areas aggregate scaling of disorderly teenage peer groups was a “very common neighborhood problem.” By measuring the variations among localities, their research observed areas where the perception of youth hangouts were high and compared indicators of social efficacy with regard to incivility violations (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 796). The indicators of crime related to youth delinquency were incivilities such as vandalism, fighting, and property crimes. Sampson and Grove made it clear they were targeting minor and public nuisances of subgroup that are visible in street corners (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 796).

Local participation in formal and voluntary organizations emulates the structural capabilities a neighborhood possesses in upholding community solidarity (Hunter, 1985). Research findings in both high and low income communities have shown participation in local voluntary organizations is low in both communities, but is most critical in low income neighborhoods (Kornhauser, 1978; Skogan, 1989; 1990).

Informal local friendship networks stability was measured when people were asked, "thinking of the people who live in this area, how many would you regard as friends or acquaintances?" Residential instability ranges from none to most and defines percentage of residents brought up in the area within a 15-minute walk from home (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 783). This measurement was based on the notion that people who stayed within their initial community are more integrated, and therefore exhibit more investment in the sustaining of informal sanctions within the community.

One issue with this scale system is that when respondent reports state they have many personal friends residing in the same area, it does not directly indicate they have strong social ties. A person who indicates “most” of their friends reside within 15 minutes of their residence may still exhibit low social ties. Conversely, a respondent with one proximate friend can have more social participation in community activities and expound a larger commitment to their close social networks (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 796).

### **Literature Results**

The analysis conducted by Sampson and Groves (1989) evolved the characteristics of collective efficacy as it pertains to the administration of informal and formal sanctions. Through the statistical standardization of direct and indirect effects from predictor variables of social disorganization (exogenous and intervening), Sampson and Grove found that crime rates were higher in neighborhoods where friendship ties were weaker, organizational participation was low, and teenage groups were unsupervised (Sampson & Morenoff, 1997). The five extrinsic structure characteristics were significantly related to organization participation, whereas both residential stability and urbanization were correlated to unsupervised peer groups. Socioeconomic statuses of community residence were also significantly related to local friendship networks (Sampson & Grove, 1989, pg. 799).

## CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The present study focuses on determining whether four tenants of social disorganization are associated with victimization and Mexico City. A Chi-Square Test of significance will test nominal and ordinal variable in order to observe potential correlation of family disruption, low economic opportunity, residential mobility and urbanization on participants' reports of victimization in Mexico City. The unit of analysis is measured in houses interviewed in 2009. Participants were asked to account for all members of the home when answering this question. The socio-demographics measured in the ENSI-6 sample will provide a foundation for the secondary analysis which attempt to test the following null hypotheses:

Hypothesis #1: Female headed households will have no association with household victimization.

Hypothesis #2: Educational attainment of the head of the household will have no association with household victimization.

Hypothesis #3: Educational attainments of the informant will have no association with household victimization.

Hypothesis #4: Employment of heads of the households will have no association with household victimization

Hypothesis #5: Employment of informants will have no association with household victimization.

Hypothesis #6: Total monthly family income will have no association with household victimization.

Hypothesis #7: Households in urban housing zones will have no association with household victimization.

## CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

The following chapters will simplify the data source in more detail, explain sample methodology and provide an in-depth discussion of the statistical parameters. The initial section begins with a presentation of the institution providing the data set and state significant findings their victimization research. In the second section continues on a description of the sample demographics as well as the questionnaire format. Lastly, the final section of this chapter will clarify the statistics of the sample and expand the variable applications to the secondary analysis of social disorganization theory.

### **General Characteristics**

The data set utilized in the secondary study was acquired from a Mexican research institute; Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad, a.c (translations; Citizens' Institute for Studies on Insecurity, *ICESI*). In their study titled, “Sexta Encuesta Nacionales sobre Inseguridad” (translation; Sixth National Survey on Insecurity, *ENSI-6*), they conducted their sixth quantitative analysis concerning levels of safety in Mexico. The ICESI, staffed by a confluence of professional researchers from a variety of

disciplines, develop reliable sources on the topic of Mexican criminal victimization and perceptions of insecurity.

The data set is a nationally representative sample, where areas of study are distinguishable by state, cities and urban municipalities of the country. Locations in the studies are selected under a probability sampling scheme based on the demographic foundations obtained through the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (translations; National Institute of Statistic and Geography, INEGI). The sixteen Mexican cities, which aggregately account for more than 60% of the nation's population, are administered an in-depth survey at their domicile. Residents in the housing units are asked preliminary socio demographic characteristics of themselves and household members, if they or anyone in the household had been a victim of crime(s), and finishing with informants' perceptions of insecurity.

Similar to the five previous surveys conducted by the ICESI, ENSI-6 concentrates on the following types of crimes: property offenses, offenses against the integrity and freedom, sexual offenses, abduction and kidnapping express. The resulting calculations have helped Mexican researchers characterize the prevalence and incidences crime, the percentages of unreported and unregistered crimes (dark figure of crime), the size and nature of victimization, the perception of citizens about the insecurity and actions of social authorities.

### **Questionnaire**

The ENSI-6 sample of (n= 71,370) consists of households interviewed in the national territory of Mexico. A resident is considered a viable informant if they are the

head of the household, age 18 or older and capable of providing socio demographic characteristics, perceptions and victimization information. Questions assessing perceptions and certain demographics were recorded in Likert scaling responses pertaining to experiences in 2008. Social demographics are sequentially categorized by age group, employment status, monthly family income and educational attainments. The survey is specific to adult populations permanently residing in private homes within the national territory. However, there are circumstances when the head of household is non-existent or the head of the household is under the age of 18. The data is not included in the analysis because these cases were given a factor expansion equal to zero. This circumstance along with incomplete surveys accounts for the majority of missing cases in the sample.

Field operators of the ENSI-6 gather information by directly speaking to residents about their perceptions and experiences as victims of a crime(s), with particular reference to place(s) and time(s) within the twelve month time: January, 1 and December 31, 2008. Interviews consist of a series of question in each of these seven sections: (1) housing residents, (2) household socio demographic characteristics, (3) victims of crime at home; (4) perception of public insecurity, (5) vehicles household; (6) victims of crime (general) and (7) family income (ENSI-6).

### **Data Sampling Design**

Geographical locations in the ENSI-6 are structured to represent the following macro paradigms: national, national urban, national rural, city and state (ENSI-6). The *unidades primarias de muestreo* (translation; primary sampling units, *UMP*) are the units

used for instrumenting groups of houses according to degrees of population density and housing districts: High Urban, Urban Compliment and Rural. These primary observation units are categories of home variables (households) processed through a three-stage stratified cluster selection system.

ENSI-6 constructed cartographic and demographic mapping established by the Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000 (translation: General Census of Population and Housing, 2000). The national framework of Mexican census data is the basis for the sampling design and provides standard in which to identify the representative clout of the ENSI-6 sample. Each city selected in the ENSI-6 contains large characteristics of urban populations. Urbanization is defined in metropolitan house clusters with reference to population density and qualitative descriptions of the socioeconomic compositions based on census data. In Appendix.1 illustrates the total distribution of all households reported in the ICESI data set. The second stratified selection further defines UMP areas by population zones:

- Urban high
  - Zone 1- self-represented cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants.
  - Zone 2- the other cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants.
- Complement Urban
  - Zone 25- 50, 000 to 99 999 inhabitants.
  - Zone 35- locations of 15,000-49,999 inhabitants.
  - Zone 45- localities of 5,000-14,999 inhabitants.
  - Zone 55- localities of 2,500-4,999 inhabitants.
- Rural
  - Zone 60- Towns under 2,500 inhabitants.

Cluster zones of UMP's are bounded by the amounts of households within a block radius (avg. 1.68 acres). For example, High Urban areas are further described as a

metropolitan block between a minimum of 80 and the maximum of 160 inhabitants. Both Urban Complement metropolitan and Rural UMPs contain between a minimum of 160 and the maximum of 300 inhabitants.

The third stage of selecting participants within each zone and demographic strata is a one-stage sampling of each individual household. The randomness of the last sampling unit (person) selection supports the probabilistic results from the sample. The ENSI-6 analysis on the proportions of crime and victimization have been provided outlooks of both macro paradigms (National, national urban and national rural) as well as micro clusters of urban metropolitan areas (High Urban, Complement, Rural). Table 1a in the appendix illustrates the distribution of households in ENSI-6 study categorized by state, city, and metropolitan areas.

### **Demographics of the Secondary Analysis**

The sample of (n=1,965) is comprised of surveys administered in Mexico City, Mexico. Mexico City, which is also a federal state in government, approximately inhabits one fifth of the national population. Men accounted for 46.1% (n=904) of the informants in the sample, while 53.9% (n=1059) were women. Participants' social demographics of gender of the head of the household, education of the informants and head of the household, employment status of informant and head of the household, residence in urban and monthly family income were categorized with tabulations of the sample from Mexico City; The mean age of participants is 45.1. The mean age of the head of household for the sample was 49.66. The intake form divided participants into two forms of input. (a) Survey participant who indicate they are the head of household, and therefore report

information regarding themselves and that of other members in the residence. (b) Selected participant who is not the head of household, but is an informant reporting demographics and incidents of victimization(s) of themselves, head of households and other resident(s). The purpose for this discrepancy is to acquire information from both inputs but utilize the head of the household's socio economic and demographic markers to establish the primary identity of the family unit.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Sample**

Mexico City Demographics		n	%
Gender of Informant	Male	904	46.1%
	Female	1,059	53.9%
Gender of Head of Household	Male	1,366	69.5%
	Female	599	30.5%
Employment Status of Head of Household	Employed	1,524	77.9%
	Unemployed	34	1.7%
	Inactive	393	20.1%
	Doesn't Know	5	0.3%
Employment Status of Informant	Employed	1,364	69.6%
	Unemployed	35	1.8%
	Inactive	560	28.6%
	Doesn't Know	2	0.1%
Education of Head of Household	Elementary	564	28.8%
	Middle-High School	772	39.5%
	More than HS	620	31.7%
Education of Informant	Elementary	446	22.7%
	Middle-High School	822	41.9%
	More than HS	693	35.3%
Monthly Family Income (Pesos)	\$5,000 or less	1,109	56.5%
	\$5,001- 10,000	557	28.4%
	\$10,001- 20,000	216	11.0%
	\$20,001- 40,000	66	3.4%
	More than 40,000	15	.0.8%
Housing Zone	Urban	1883	95.8%
	Rural	82	4.2%
Total		n= 1965	100%

### **Sample Characteristics**

Table 1 provides a description of the sample used in the secondary analysis. The table also contains socio demographic characteristics of people who participated in the victimization and perception survey conducted by the ENSI-6. For the analysis, classification of three social demographics of education, employment, family income and urban housing zones were measured in a Likert scaling system. Cell values were placed on the responses for each demographic per house unit. Additional demographic data from this sample are presented in Table 1 above.

### **Secondary Analysis**

The data analysis for this thesis examines the role certain socio demographics have on occurrences of victimization in Mexico City. The data analysis focuses on four variable dynamics when answering the following: Do social demographics prescribed by social disorganization theory have an association to households who reported an incident of victimization in 2008?

The secondary analysis sample includes 1,965 surveys collected from Mexico City. Statistical evaluations of central tendencies analyses were used to compare social demographic means. After having established demographics, participants are asked the following question: “Has anyone in the house hold been a victim of a crime?” A Chi-square test of association will observe if there is a statistical relationship between participants who were victimized in 2008 and their identified demographic parameters.

Utilizing the same selection process done by the ENSI-6, this current study selects Mexico City due to their relative population demographics and heterogenic properties. The sample also contains a distribution of urban and rural housing zones. The remaining tenants of social disorganization will be derived from household's surveyed characteristics.

Once an association has been statistically observed between a demographic and household victimization, there will be a difference in mean test for households associated to victimization with their according response to following two questions: "Have you heard of gun battle in your neighborhood?" and "Are you in agreement with what the federal government has done to combat organized crime?"

### **Independent Variables**

In order to test the hypotheses between those who reported incidents of victimization of household in the sample, the following independent variable were modeled by the tenants of social disorganization; gender of head of the household, total family monthly income, residence in an urban housing zone, education and employment statuses of both informants and head of household. Using cross-tabulation of each independent demographic, a frequency distribution will assist in determining the relevancy of social disorganization.

Socioeconomic measurements of the sample will be composed of the employment status and total monthly income of household units. Employment statuses are categorized into four Likert scales options: 1=employed, 2=unemployed, 3=inactive and 4=doesn't know. The independent variations of the informant and head of the household

employment information are collected as mutually exclusive variables and are tested separately. Monthly family incomes are similarly classified with Likert values; 1= \$5,000 or less pesos, 2= \$5001- \$10,000, 3= \$10,001- \$20,000, 4= \$20,001- \$40,000, and 5= more than 40,000 pesos.

The gender variable is the only dichotomous variable deduced from the sample; 1=male, 2=female. Family disruption is identified by gender of the head of the household in this research. If the participant does not identify themselves as the head of the household, they provide information of the head of the household as well as themselves.

Residential mobility is instrumented by the educational attainment of the participants and the head of households. The use of education as an indicator of residential stability is not similar to Sampson and Groves' methodology. The rationale of this research is inverted to that of Sampson and Grove by structuring educational attainment as a common marker of people's mobility among social classes as directly associated to their access to resources, information, employment advancement and financial independence. Educational attainment of the informant and head of the household was classified into three groups: "elementary," "middle school through high school," and "more than high school."

Urbanization will be observed with the participant's location of residence; urban and rural. The differences of household victimization by rural and urban areas will be based on the criteria of the ENSI-6 sampling structure.

## **Dependent Variables**

The dependent variable is derived with the household indications of victimization. Similar to Sampson's and Grove's general measurement of total crime rates, survey participants are asked; "During 2008, was anyone in the household a victim of a crime?" This question encompasses all members of the home and is only a nominal measurement of "yes" and "no" (ENSI-6). The dependent variable for the intervening factors of the community will be derived from a respondents' answer to three question regarding community perceptions of safety, organized crime and gun use: "Do you consider you city safe, unsafe, or doesn't know," "Have you heard gun combat in your neighborhood?" and "Are you in accordance with what the federal government has done against organized crime?"

## CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

The study utilizes four demographic variables to test the association of exogenous in Mexico City to household victimization. First, the study compares measures of central tendency. Then cross tabulations were constructed to test for the significance of association within variables. Only after an association has been statistically significant, a difference in mean test will compare average responses to the questions regarding anti-corruption measures and gun use in community.

The large majority of the informants were over the age of 45 and accounted for 39.9% (n=783) of sample. A close majority was the age group between 30 and 44, representing 35.2% (n=681) of the sample. When residents in Mexico City were asked to state whether their city was safe or unsafe, the average score was 1.88 with 84.4% (n=1,657) indicating insecure, 15% (n=297) indicating secure and .45% (n=9) reporting they didn't know. Table 2 illustrates mean scores of discussed demographics of the sample in addition to the average score of two victimization questions. Of the 1,965 households asked if any resident was a victim of a crime, the average score was 1.76. This average can be misleading since the option of; "don't know," carried a Likert value

of 9 thus making the mean score skewed. Chi-square analyses will further test whether there is a significance ( $p \leq .05$ ) association outside the scope of mere chance between demographics characteristics pertaining to social disorganization. The two definitions of informants and heads are mutually exclusive. Large portions of the Total Monthly Family Income report \$10,000 or less with an average of 1.64. Educational averages for both informants and heads of household averaged an education between middle school and high school.

Within the sample, the 1,492 households who reported no incidents of victimization, 75% ( $n=1,025$ ) had a male as the head of the household and 78% ( $n=467$ ) were female. Of the 473 households who did have a member of the home victimized, 25% ( $n=341$ ) had a male as head of the household and 22% ( $n=132$ ) were female. There was no significant correlation between gender of the head of household and households victimized,  $\chi^2$ , ( $df=1$ ,  $n=1,965$ ) = 1.951,  $p=.162$ .

**Table 2. Gender of Head of Household and Victimization**

During 2008, has anyone been a victim of a crime?	Gender of the Head of Household				Total	
	Male		Female			
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	341	25.0%	132	22.0%	473	24.1%
No	1,025	75.0%	467	78.0%	1,492	75.9%
Total	1,366	100%	599	100.0%	1,965	100.0%

Chi Square = 1.951,  $df=1$ ,  $p=.162$ .

This research reveals a significant association between the employment status of the head of the household and victimized member of the home,  $\chi^2$ , ( $df=3$ ,  $n=1,956$ )

=10.056,  $p < .05$ . Table 3 illustrates that 77.5% ( $n=1,524$ ) of participants in the entire sample indicated their head of the household as employed, while only 25.7% reported having a member of their home as a victim of a crime. Households who did not report victimization ( $n=1,484$ ) were mainly within the homes of inactive heads of the home representing 81.9% ( $n=322$ ) of the sample.

**Table 3. Employment of Head of Household and Victimization**

During 2008, was anyone in the Household a victim of a crime?	Employment Status								Total	
	Employed		Unemployed		Inactive		Doesn't Know			
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	392	25.7%	8	23.5%	71	18.1%	1	20.0%	472	24.1%
No	1,132	74.3%	26	76.5%	322	81.9%	4	80.0%	1,484	75.9%
Total	1,524	100%	34	100%	393	100%	5	100%	1,956	100%

Chi-square = 10.056,  $df = 3$ ,  $p < .05$

Another association is determined between employment of informant and household victimization,  $\chi^2$ , ( $df = 3$ ,  $n=1,961$ ) = 7.916,  $p < .05$ . The largest frequency of informants who indicated their household was victimized ( $n=349$ ) were those who were employed. Of those who were victimized, they only accounted for 25.6% of all employed informants in the sample ( $n=1,364$ ). There are two cells which do not contain the necessary expected counts to properly test the null hypothesis.

**Table 4. Employment of Informant and Victimization**

During 2008, was anyone in the Household a victim of a crime?	Employment Status								Total	
	Employed		Unemployed		Inactive		Doesn't Know			
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	349	25.6%	10	28.6%	112	20.0%	1	50.0%	472	24.1%
No	1,015	74.4%	25	71.4%	448	80.0%	1	50.0%	1,484	75.9%
Total	1,364	100%	35	100%	560	100%	2	100%	1,956	100%

Chi-square = 7.916,  $df = 3$ ,  $p < .05$

Table 6 was constructed to show a relationship between education of the head of the household and victimization of members of their home. This Chi-square analysis revealed a statistical significance between these two variables,  $\chi^2$ , (df=3, n=1,956) =13.477,  $p < .01$ . The largest percentage of household victimized of the sample 26.9% (n=208) consisted of heads of the household with education between middle school and high school.

The variations between sample sizes of educational categories are minimal. The associations demonstrated in the tabulation indicate heads of the household who reported household victimization have the highest frequencies within those also report having education between middle school and high school.

**Table 5. Education of Head of Household and Victimization**

During 2008, was anyone in the Household a victim of a crime?	Education of Head of Household						Total	
	Elementary		Middle School- High School		More than High School		Count	%
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%		
Yes	105	18.6%	208	26.9%	159	26.6%	472	24.1%
No	459	81.4%	564	73.1%	461	74.4%	1484	75.9%
Total	564	100%	772	100%	620	100%	1956	100%

Chi-square = 13.477, df=2,  $p < .01$

The analysis between the informants' education and household who reported victimization also revealed a statistical significance,  $\chi^2$ (df=2, n=1,961) =26.736,  $p < .001$ . Of the informants whose last educational attainment was between middle school and high school (n=193), 26.6% stated their households were victimized.

Similar to the findings of heads of households, variation percentages of informants' educational attainments are slight but the highest percentages of people

whose household had a victim of a crime were between middle school and high school by representing 44.9% of all those who reported an incident of victimization in the household.

**Table 6. Education of Informant and Victimization**

During 2008, was anyone in the Household a victim of a crime?	Education of Informant						Total	
	Elementary		Middle School- High School		More than High School			
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	67	15.0%	212	25.8%	193	26.6%	472	24.1%
No	379	85.0%	610	74.2%	500	74.4%	1489	75.9%
Total	446	100%	822	100%	693	100%	1961	100%

Chi-square = 26.726, df = 2, p < .001

The testing identifies a significant correlation between total monthly family income and household victimization,  $\chi^2$ , (df = 4, n = 1,963) = 22.809, p < .001. Of the 472 households that were victimized, 225 households reported bringing in less than \$5,000 pesos a month. Due to one cell of the tabulation having an expected count less than 5 in the demographics representing households whose total monthly family income is more than \$40,000 is too small to make these results reliable.

**Table 7. Total Family Income and Victimization**

During 2008, was anyone in the household been victim of a crime?	Total Monthly Family Income (Pesos)										Total	
	\$ 5,000 or less		\$ 5,001 - 10,000		\$ 10,001 - 20,000		\$ 20,001 - 40,000		More than \$ 40,000			
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	225	20.3%	156	28.0%	71	32.9%	17	25.8%	3	20.0%	472	24.0%
No	884	79.7%	401	72.0%	145	67.1%	49	74.2%	12	80.0%	1491	76.0%
Total	1109	100%	557	100%	216	100%	66	100%	15	100%	1963	100%

Chi Square = 22.809, df = 4, p = < .001

Chi-square tests of association were performed to further examine significant differences between rural and urban metropolitan zones when comparing frequencies of household victimization. The Chi square analysis of Table 7,  $\chi^2$ , (df=1, n=1,965) =5.317,  $p < .05$ , demonstrated an association between urban households and incidents of victimization. It is important to note however the discrepancy in sample size for rural and urban household zones.

Among the 1,965 households of the sample, urban zones households composed 97.8% (n= 462) of households reporting an incident of victimization. Of those urban households reporting victimization (n= 462), they only account for 23.5% of the entire urban sample (n=1,965) of Mexico City. According to the resulting tabulations, households in urban housing zones indicate a larger percentage ratio but remain a relatively small compared to the entire sample of those reporting no household victimization which suggests a counter-intuitive finding to that of the urbanization premise in social disorganization theory. Table 7 illustrates 75% (n=1,421) of the urban houses surveyed indicated no occurrence of victimization in the household.

**Table 8. Housing Units and Victimization**

During 2008, was anyone in the household a victim of a crime?	Housing Zone				Total	
	Rural		Urban		Count	%
	Count	%	Count	%		
Yes	11	13.4%	462	24.5%	473	24.1%
No	71	86.6%	1421	75.5%	1492	75.9%
Total	82	100%	1883	100%	1965	100.0%

Chi Square = 5.317, df= 1,  $p < .05$

A t-test analysis demonstrated no significant difference when comparing victimized and non-victimized households as they stated if they heard gun shots in their neighborhood (1.7,  $df = 1,880$ ,  $p = n.s$ ). Assuming the null hypothesis is true and the confidence interval significance is 95%, there exists no more than a 5% chance of incorrectly rejecting the null.  $H_0$ : The mean of the difference between urban victimized and non-victimized when stating if they heard gun shots in their neighborhood is going to be zero. Similarly, a t-test analysis demonstrated no significant difference when comparing victimized and non-victimized households as they answered their perception of federal enforcement against organized crime (1.25,  $df = 1,880$ ,  $p = n.s$ ).

## **CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

The main objective of this study was to analyze the characteristics of household who reported victimization in Mexico City. This study consisted of 1,965 household entries in the ENSI-6. The study explore whether four exogenous variables of social disorganization can help explain why certain groups were victimized at higher frequencies. Comparisons of variables rendered the following findings. Educational attainment, employment status of the head of household, and residences in urban areas are the only exogenous variables which are significantly associated with victimization. In addition, average scores for associated variables are not significantly difference than the total sample mean.

The association between female headed household and victimization was presumed to be nonexistent under the null hypothesis number 1. These analyses revealed no statistical significance between gender of the head of the household and victimizations of members of the home. Household with males as head of the household were observed as having a higher percentage of victimization than female. The null hypothesis number 1 is accepted.

The null hypothesis number 2 and 3 stated that educational attainment will have no correlation to household victimization. The Chi-square analysis for both head of the households and informants revealed an association between the educational attainment and household victimization. Households reporting educational measurements between middle school and high school displayed higher percentages of victimization. The null hypothesis of number 2 and 3 is rejected, and an association is statistically evident.

Null hypotheses number 4 and 5 also stated there are no associations between employment status and household victimization. The research did find an association between both parties' employment status and victimization. The analysis on Table 4 and Table 5 show that households with employed heads of household and/or informants have some association to victimization. The tabulation resulted with two cells counts that were less than 5 thus reducing the credibility of the derived association. The null hypotheses number 4 and 5 are accepted in light this shortcoming.

Total monthly family income of a household was stated by the null hypothesis number 6 as having no association with victimization. However, the research did reveal a statistical association between these two variables. The reason is for denouncing this statistical finding is due to one expected count having a figure less than five, thus leading this research to accept the null hypothesis number 6. Lastly, hypothesis number 7 stated households in urban housing zones have no association with victimization. Chi-square tests of association did demonstrate a correlation between urban households and incidents of victimization. These results described in Table 7 indicate households in urban neighborhoods are victimized less than rural households. The evidence suggests a

significant association between these two nominal variables; the null hypothesis number 7 is rejected.

According to social disorganization theory, five extrinsic aspects of community inhibit the levels of integrations of subgroups with societal sanctions. In Mexico City's sample, each variable was tested individually with rates of household victimization. This was done because the assumptions of the null hypothesis require expected counts to be large enough uphold the null hypothesis as true. The intervening variables utilized in this research were a participant's response to the following question: "Have you heard gunshots in your neighborhood?" and "Do you agree with the federal campaign against organized crime?" This measurement, although limited, was afforded by the data. Through fear and the lack of credibility of social organization, subgroups are likely to assimilate to at risk neighborhoods indoctrinating informal ecosystem rather than formal sanctions (Gastil, 1971).

The demographics that were found to significantly correlate with household victimization are education (residential mobility), employment status (economic opportunity) and urban residences (Urbanization/Heterogeneity). The context analysis of this research developed surmountable evidence regarding these four tenants of social disorganization. The statistical test of association was relative to all but one variable of gender of the head of the household. This test was done with disproportionate samples and has a predominant representation of male heads of the households. It is essential to note that some aspects of social demographics were case sensitive to the participant who

was providing information. Household with sub-family units living in the same residence could have resulted in missing demographic information.

The combination of both heterogeneity and urbanization was done to account for limited data variable. The data set did not purposely account for any variable that would indicate heterogeneity. It is apparent in the sampling design that the selection of housing units was a stratified process. In the case of Mexico City, this district is acknowledged as a state and a city. The fact that this sample is a national capital, contains diverse housing zone (urban/rural) and is composed of immense population density, this research finds it adequate to combine these two variables in one association test. This exception was not applicable to any other city in the ENSI-6 data set.

In the T-test analysis regarding households who reported gun shots in their neighborhood, the null hypothesis is accepted. The statistical findings indicate that there is no association between household who reported victimization and those who heard gun shots in their neighborhood. This result is grounded on the notion that there is no difference between household victimizations. Whether a household resident hears gun shots, this factor has no bearing on the household victimization. The sound dispersion of gun shots reaches both victimized and non-victimized households.

### **Limitations**

The most pressing limitation regards the lack of a replicable heterogenic variable. This missing component is difficult to measure and can encompass a wide range of diverse components. Formulating structural equations of variations within subgroup networks are not a collected unit of analysis in ENSI-6. Furthermore, due to the organic

behavior of social networks, social sciences struggle in developing consistent quantitative measurements when observing intrinsic values such as loyalty, belief, assimilation levels and attitudes about neighborhood controls (Suttles, 1968; Grasmick, & Bursik, 1993).

The underlying assumption that structural barriers of a community can impede the intrinsic development of formal and informal cultures cannot be accurately instrumented into a tangible unit of analysis (Bursik, 1984, p. 31).

One criticism of the applied theory is that social organization and disorganization are structured on different ends of the same continuum. These singular models of transposing intervening factors into a dichotomous outcome will polarize the two potential outcomes and mislead outlooks on variations. The human dynamics of motivations and environmental stressors require flexible methodology that can capture the confluence of social forces. Crime is not a natural result from a lack of social organization. The notion of, “ordered segmentation,” developed by Suttles acknowledges these informal ecosystems even in areas with a high crime rate (Suttles, 1968).

Another limitation is that the measure of residential instability was not the same as the revised test of social disorganization. The primary research notates residential instability as a measure referring to the respondent’s current distance from their first home of residence. In this research education was instrumented as an indicator of residential stability. This is primarily due to data set limitations. This research attempted to adjust this limitation to best replicate the research model of Sampson and Grove.

The research design of this study was limited by nominal measurement of the socio demographics. There are benefits to these units of analysis. The use of nominal

variables allowed this study to consider some household characteristics as pertaining to household groups. Total monthly family income, urban residences, and the gender of the head of the household encapsulated an all-inclusive subgroup identity. This is a relatively novel development and structures the dependent variable of household victimization to account for all members of the familial subgroups.

The most pressing shortcoming of this study consists of the unit measurement used in the statistical analysis. Social disorganization theory consists of factors associated with subgroups. Sampson and Grove thus measured localities within 200 municipal cities. In this research, the unit measurements were households in Mexico City and were not combined into any local subgroup category. This micro level outlook does not coincide with the concepts established in social disorganization theory by Sampson and Grove. This limitation was dictated by the data set and was the only disposable information used in the analysis.

### **Policy Implications**

The results of the research can assist policy officials of Mexico in understanding the polemic doubts of social organizations and the susceptibility of vulnerable demographics. By identifying social variable that are associated to victimization, police agencies can develop taxonomies for victim characteristics and define household safeguards. This implementation can help validate the community's participation with police, test accuracy between source agencies, and guide social programs in prioritizing courses of action.

The data set acquired from the ENSI-6 does not replace official information, but instead complements existing statistics. It is vital for social organizations to exchange data regarding the population for which they are accountable. Further research of social disorganization should be conducted with a larger sample in order to further test exogenous relationships and increase statistical strength of hypothesis. Another policy recommendation regards the prolonged use of military action and developing assessment tools to gauge public sentiment towards military presence. Social commitment may become anguished through the repetitive use of military as they implement methods of social control in domestic environments.

### **Future Research**

The research conducted concludes there is an association between residential mobility, socioeconomic status and urbanization with household victimization. The general implication of social disorganization theory was not observable when comparing frequencies of tabulated variables in relation to household victimization. The critical reason for this is that there was not sufficient evidence to imply households in urban areas, who are victimized, and do not on average, disagree with federal enforcement against organized crime and are not consistently exposed to gun shots in their respective neighborhoods. The methodology of Sampson and Grove sought to explain crime and delinquency rates in urban community areas. Similarly, this research attempted to observe relevancy of to social disorganization in the sample of Mexico City by identifying household victimization as a direct result of social disorganization.

More research in the field of social interactions can help inform policy reforms particularly in areas where high rates violence have been rendered communities socially disorganized. Further research can test other city distributions as well as observe variation between intra city demographics by city, state and nation. Developing a broader sample of measurement statistics can assist in the study of social disorganization and better facilitate intervening components.

Additionally, the use of micro level measurement units has lead this research to conclude that the data set is most conducive to Routine Activity since their specification on daily activities is abundant and affords potential research in the area of capable guardians in urban Mexican neighborhoods (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Through the tenants of routine activity theory, a potential study focused on the transactions of police extorting on the public. Routine activity theories is best suited in observing variations in the differential standards of corruption by police officers and further explore varied police treatments based on the class standards, gender, and localities. The complexity of community organizations in Mexican cities requires the eclectic application of sociological theories, organizational sciences and political reforms in order to best assist policy implications of community safety and social institutional integrity.

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