

Conductive Capacity of The State: An Assessment of Mexican Political  
Institutions Since the Merida Initiative

By

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**Abstract**

The purpose of this applied research paper is to conduct a preliminary assessment of Mexico's political institutions since the Merida Initiative to evaluate the progress, or lack thereof, in relation to the agreement's explicit goals of institutionalizing reforms and supporting democratic governance. The project's framework is structured using three core pillar questions that address Mexican state capacities: coercive, extractive, and conductive capacity. Conductive capacity refers to the state's ability to effectively channel citizen demands through the state apparatus. First, an assessment of Mexico's political institutions is performed using a variety of methods, including data, survey-item, and case study analyses. Second, the dimension of conductive capacity is tested against coercive and extractive capacities to evaluate whether an interaction between these exists. The results of the assessment demonstrate that the Mexican state's coercive and conductive capacities have significantly decreased since the implementation of the Merida Initiative, while demonstrating that coercive and extractive capacities of the state significantly predict conductive capacity dimension variables.

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### **About the Author**

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*This project is dedicated to all of the innocent people who have lost their lives as a result of the Merida Initiative and to the families of the tens of thousands forcefully disappeared in Mexico since 2007.*

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### **Introduction**

At the turn of the millennium, Mexico took a turn away from the authoritarian 71-year continuous rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to finally experience political party alternation for the first time in its history. The struggle had not been easy. The 1988 electoral fraud, in which a sudden ‘glitch’ in the vote-counting machines not only stole the presidential election away from the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), but also instilled a sense of cultural cynicism towards the political system, making the phrase “the system crashed” a popular Mexican metaphor. The cynicism, however, seemed to have diminished after the 2000 election, as the opinion that democracy was preferable to any other form of government reached its peak in 2002 at 63% (Latinobarometro, 2015).

The newfound optimism was short-lived, nonetheless, as the 2006 presidential election resuscitated many ghosts from the infamous 1988 election. The closest election in Mexican history in 2006, was riddled with accusations that the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, and the incumbent PAN party led by president Vicente Fox Quezada, had committed electoral fraud. His opponent, PRD’s Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, publicly contested the election’s official results, drawing the biggest protest ever documented in Mexican history. While accusations regarding electoral rigging to favor Calderon are contested, Jorge Lopez Gallardo (2012) from the University of Texas in El Paso concludes that the mathematical modeling methods employed throughout his research on the matter indeed support these accusations. Ultimately, in 2006 president Fox passed the presidential sash to Felipe Calderon making him the 56<sup>th</sup> president of Mexico.



From the Mexican presidential seat, Felipe Calderon reshaped Mexico's counternarcotic strategy in the "War on Drugs" by handing the traditional responsibility over combat operations from police agencies to the Mexican military. Nerveless, The Mexican government did not act alone in this strategic policy transformation as the United States joined Calderon in 2007 through the bi-lateral agreement named the Merida Initiative (MI). This bi-lateral agreement, first signed by the George W Bush and Felipe Calderon administrations, and later expanded by Presidents Barack Obama and Enrique Peña Nieto, was initially designed to tackle the growing threat of transnational-criminal organizations (TCO) as a new joint strategy in the decades-long 'War on Drugs'. In 2009, the Merida Initiative was expanded into "Beyond Merida" to include addressing other systemic enablers of TCOs such as institutional corruption, human displacement, and the degradation of the already-weak Mexican institutions.

Since the inception of this initiative, Mexico has experienced some of the bloodiest years in its modern history. From 2007 to 2015, more than 164,000 individuals were killed and more than 27,000 forcefully disappeared (Breslow, 2015, July 27). According to Amnesty International (2016), in 2015 alone, there was a total of 36,126 homicides in the Mexican territory (p 249) and the number of individuals forcefully disappeared remained virtually stagnant at 27,638 (p 250). On the other side of the border, in the US, the high and growing number of deaths due to drug abuse, most recently from heroin, has turned the issue of drugs from a social concern into a national crisis. According to The New York Times "Deaths from heroin rose to 8,260 in 2013, quadrupling since 2000 and aggravating what some were already calling the 'worst drug overdose epidemic in United States history'." (Seelye, K., 2015, October 30).

Judging simply from these numbers, it is apparently clear that the Merida Initiative has not had the anticipated success expected ten years ago. There are no signs, however, that either nation intends to abandon this agreement. Further, given the expansion of the agreement to include goals such as supporting democratic institutions and institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law, any account of the 'War on Drugs', and specifically the Merida Initiative, must consider the economic, social, and political variables that have led us to where we find ourselves today.

### **Research Purpose**

The purpose of this applied research paper is to conduct a preliminary assessment of Mexico's political institutions since the Merida Initiative to evaluate the progress, or lack thereof, regarding the agreement's explicit goals. Specifically, the study will use pillar questions to conceptualize and operationalize Mexico's state capacity. The project will utilize a mixed methods case study approach which targets content analysis, document analysis, survey-item analysis and aggregated statistics.

### **Chapter Summaries**

This project's methodological basis is founded on ideas pertaining to philosophical pragmatism and epistemology. Under pragmatism, Public Administration methodology is the study of the conduct, logic and methods of inquiry directed at finding solutions for public problems (Shields and Whetsell, 2017, p 77). Following that idea, this project contains five chapters that will take the wide-scoped context of MI into a structured and specific institutional evaluation. In this way, Chapter II looks at the history leading up to the project's pillar questions. Chapter III reviews the scholarly literature regarding state capacity and state strength. The

chapter concludes with state capacity being broken down into three analytical dimensions: 1) coercive capacity 2) extractive capacity and 3) conductive capacity. Then, Chapter IV briefly explains the research methods employed to measure each of the three dimensions of state capacity, while chapter V presents and discusses the project's findings.

## **Chapter I: Literature Review**

### **Political and Economic History That Lands Insight into the Pillar Questions**

#### **Introduction**

The War on Drugs could be understood as a phenomenon exclusively related to the visible effects that occur in the United States, such as imprisonment, addiction, and crime. However, that narrowly focused perspective harms the crucial conversation needed to understand the dynamics that play out across national borders. To understand the transnational phenomenon that has developed under the umbrella of the War on Drugs, it is useful to analyze in retrospect the foreign policy decisions of the United States.

South of the United States border, one finds a country with an immensely rich history, tradition, and culture. Once the capital of the Spanish Empire in the Americas, today Mexico finds itself as one of the most violent, economically unequal, and corrupt countries in the world. In the previous century, Mexico went through a revolution, a one-party state system, through liberalization and into a period of democratization that continues to this day. Its relations with the United States, the world's last standing superpower, have at times reflected the distrust born out of the Mexican-American War and other times as 'good neighbors' working together to achieve common goals (Chabat, 2001).

#### **Chapter Purpose**

The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the structure and principles of foreign policy in the United States, briefly recount the historical relationship between Mexico and the U.S, and to conceptualize this project's framework. At the end of this chapter, the concepts relating to the state and democracy will be cohesively organized and aligned with corresponding

pillar questions in order to preliminarily evaluate Mexican political institutions since the MI began implementation in 2007.

### **Foreign Policy**

The guiding organization that directs how the world views and interacts with The United States of America is the Department of State (DOS); other government departments and agencies also involved in foreign affairs includes the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

According to Harrington (2015), over the years, administrations with different ideologies and views of the world have had to accommodate the interaction between morality and realpolitik. Often these two variables intertwine and pose strategic and ethical dilemmas for administrations. Further, there are four identifiable themes that have defined US foreign policy throughout the years: 1) military adventures, as was the case in Vietnam and Iraq, 2) the desire to reduce weapon stockpiles, 3) increase trade, and 4) promote humanitarianism (Harrington, 2015, p. 35).

Another way of analyzing foreign policy is through the lens of national interest. The concept of national interest can be defined as the objectives of a nation-state in the realm of international relations. According to Jentleson (2014) the four core goals of American foreign policy can be captured by using the ‘Four-P model’ which categorizes U.S priorities as: power, peace, prosperity, and principles (p 8). While a rarity, a single policy may be in harmony with all four ‘p’s foreign policy goals. For example, during World War II the United States asserted military might by defeating the Axis powers, achieved a peace deal that ended the war, and reshaped the global map spreading capitalism and democracy throughout western Europe (p 19).

Usually, as in life, we can't always get what we want, which in foreign policy means making decisions that have trade-offs and in which at least one of the 'p's' is compromised. For example, throughout the twentieth century, the United States compromised its goal to export democratic values in the Latin American region, sponsoring dictatorial regimes throughout the hemisphere in exchange for favorable economic arrangements (p 21). The 'Four P-model' can be useful to understand complex policies, such as the Merida Initiative, from the perspective of the American national interest.

### **History: U.S-Mexico Relations**

The relationship between The United States and Mexico throughout history cannot fully be captured through the analysis of a single policy, problem, or theory. To fully understand the purpose of any policy, problem, or theory, however, one must always take a hard look back at history.

Today, these two nation-states not only share a 2,000-mile border but also a collection of problems and policy agreements. This section provides a historical recollection of U.S-Mexico relations leading up to the signing of the Merida Initiative.

### **20th century: From Revolution to Democracy**

The twentieth century interplay between the two nations showed Americans at times at odds or in balance with the 4p model of Power, Prosperity, Peace, and Principles. Prior to the 1910 Mexican revolution the US stood by the side of Mexico's business and political elites who worked to protect US economic interests during most of the reign of the sultanistic autocrat, Porfirio Diaz. This nonetheless changed. In the words of Diaz himself "Poor Mexico, so far from God, and so close to the United States" (Mirowski and Helper, 1989, p 24), the priorities of the Americans changed.

The Mexican Revolution, in which the Americans aided Mexican revolutionary forces, produced a U.S neighbor that would stand by its side through both world wars and into the cold one. During that beginning period, Woodrow Wilson rallied against the country's economic interests famously stating "I . . . am not the servant of those who wish to enhance the value of their Mexican investments," (Jentleson, 2013, p 114).

In Mexico, after the revolution, military dictatorships and congressional appointees who were supported by America's business elites held the executive seat until 1934 when Lazaro Cardenas came to power. Cardenas founded what would become the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) under a message of nationalism, independence from foreign powers, and the social and economic justice sought during the revolution. He expropriated foreign investors, nationalized industries, and enacted one of the few successful agrarian reforms in Latin America. The tension between American business and Mexico's head of state occurred at the time of US unilateralist and interventionist scale-back in the Americas.<sup>1</sup>

As explained by the great Eduardo Galeano:

Nelson Rockefeller, who had graduated as an economist in 1930 with a thesis on his own Standard Oil's virtues, journeyed to Mexico to negotiate an agreement, but Cárdenas would not budge. Standard Oil and Shell, having divided up Mexico by taking the north and the south respectively, defied Mexican Supreme Court rulings on the application of Mexican labor laws. At the same time, they drained the famous Fajo de

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<sup>1</sup> At the time of Franklin Roosevelt's 'Good Neighbor Policy'

Oro deposits with startling speed and were making Mexicans pay more for their own petroleum than they received for what was sold in the United States and in Europe. (p 160)

This passage captures the early makings of themes that follow US-Mexico relations to current times, now seen in the behavior of the licit and illicit transnational actors that operate across borders. Most important to this paper is the behavior demonstrated by American businesses in relation to the Mexican state; the cartelization of Mexican industries, the arbitrary distribution of production zones, negotiations with the Mexican state when at risk of losing business opportunities, and the utilization of economic retributions when faced with adverse outcomes dictated by the state.

### **The State's Prime**

A parallel between the Cardenas and Roosevelt administrations was the increased role of the federal government in both societies. As mentioned earlier, Lazaro Cardenas introduced an agrarian reform with the goal combating colonial-old poverty. This reform, as well as other statist policies such as the nationalization of industries, created a period of urbanization, economic growth, and poverty reduction in Mexico that lasted almost thirty years.<sup>2</sup>

While the war effort was taking place and amidst a labor shortage in the United States, in 1942, the US and Mexico came to an agreement to create the Bracero Program, in which Mexico supplied workers for the industrial and agricultural sectors in the US. The Bracero Program

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<sup>2</sup> While 46% of the population lived below the poverty line in 1940, by 1970 it had essentially been cut in half to an estimated 25% (Trejo, 2001, p 366).



initiated migration patterns in North America, including an increase in both legal and illegal crossings. After the second world war and with a growing population of undocumented workers, both nations collaborated on a mass deportation and repatriation program in 1954 called Operation Wetback (Hanson, 2009).

Both the US and Mexico realized that it was in each other's best interest to collaborate with one another, as demonstrated by the bilateral agreements described above. This post-war period was what Chabat (2001) calls a 'special relationship' between the US and Mexico. The special relationship consisted of American political and economic support in exchange for guarantees that there would be stability directly south of the US border, even if it meant being at odds with US principles.

By turning a blind-eye to Mexico's high-level corruption and anti-democratic practices, the US was not only guaranteed stability directly south of its border, but also a cooperative ally that would combat any potential anti-American leftist movements in the country (Chabat, 2001, p 387).

### **1960s: Democratic Craving**

The 'good neighbor' friendly and cooperative decades decayed as the Mexican one-party state began showing signs that it could crack. In the 1960's civil unrest in the country came in the shape of a new generation yearning the chance to have a voice in the country's decision-making process. Mexicans, especially university students, peacefully demonstrated against the authoritarian PRI and its outdated corporatist syndicalist structure.

In attempts to recuperate its waning legitimacy, the regime turned to rekindling the image of a country no longer controlled by foreign powers and flexing the over-used oxymoronic party that could be both "revolutionary" and "institutionalized". In concrete policy terms, Mexico

implemented nationalistic measures such as a 49% ownership cap for foreigners looking to invest in Mexican companies (Treault, 2016, p 644). Inwards, the PRI embarked on a campaign of repression, extrajudicial killings, spying, and forceful disappearances.

The US ignored Mexico's repressive regime but it did not ignore the anti-imperialist rhetoric coming from Mexico. As stated previously, the views and actions of presidential administrations directly determine the path of American foreign policy, which from 1969 to 1974 featured Richard Nixon, who came to power with a range of foreign policy problems sitting on his desk. Among the most pressing issues was the ongoing war in Vietnam and the threat of Soviet involvement in the Americas.

The Vietnam War was reaching its limit in the minds of Americans and the discontent was clearly visible in the rise and spread of the drug-experimenting, counter-culture and anti-war movements in the United States. Domestically, Nixon appealed to the socially conservative factions of the country who opposed those growing movements as well as the Civil Rights achievements of the 60's.

Richard Nixon, a prisoner of his own paranoia, viewed the wave of illegal drugs used in America as a major threat to the social fabric of the country (Boullosa, 2015, Kindle 723). At the time, small scale farmers-turned traffickers in the northern part of Mexico expanded their illicit enterprises to the point that they became the primary heroin dealers in the region. The drug volume growth prompted Nixon to demand that the Mexican government execute eradication of opium cultivation in Mexico. Then Mexican President Luis Echeverria, with his anti-imperialist international façade, declined to cooperate with President Nixon.

In retribution for this uncooperative stance, Nixon launched Operation Intercept in 1969 (Boullosa, 2015, Kindle 733). The operation essentially froze mobility along the US/Mexico

border as American border agents were directed to inspect every car coming across the border for hidden narcotics. This new kind of policy showed American power through means other than military, which in the end proved effective as it got Mexico back to the negotiating table and eventually towards the eradication of opium plants fields.

### **1970's: The Beginning of Decay**

As the 1970's unfolded, American interests in Mexico focused on maintaining social stability and cooperation regarding the turmoil that was occurring in Central America. South of Mexico, bloody revolutions were taking place in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The United States, which was worried about the prospects of having other 'Cuba-like' situations in the hemisphere, looked to Mexico for support.

Moreover, the administrations of Echeverria and his successor Lopez Portillo were loud advocates of the various revolutionary forces in the region, including the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and critics of U.S goals. This difference in stances between both countries became a source of tension.

Domestically in Mexico, the decade of the 1970's was characterized by the PRI's effort to regain political legitimacy amidst a social appetite for democratic governance. To that goal, which was cementing public support for the autocratic PRI, the Lopez Portillo administration effectuated a period of heavy public spending, which was materialized by the use of funds raised from the government-run petroleum company, PEMEX.

The immediate results were positive as economic growth drove poverty rates to all-time lows. For example, whereas 56.6% of Mexicans lived in poverty in 1968, in 1980 that statistic dropped to 28% (Trejo, 2001 p. 366). However, the long-term fiscal health of the country, like

that of the majority of petro states, came crashing down when the price of oil dropped in June 1981 (Krauze, 1999, p. 82).

As foreign investment flew out of the country and the peso was devaluated, Mexico's foreign debt during the Lopez Portillo administration rose from \$26 billion dollars to an astounding \$80 billion (Krauze, 1999, p. 83). The chaotic transition into the latter part of the 1980's, and from the Lopez Portillo to the De La Madrid administrations, would test the strength of U.S/Mexico relations given the imminent economic and political crises developing in the Latin American country.

### **1980's: Growth of Criminal Organizations and Economic Liberalization**

The 1980's kicked off with Mexico financially distressed but committed to fulfilling its international obligations of accumulated debt. This fiscally constrained period, which began in 1983, was the beginning of Mexico's transition towards neoliberalism; a policy framework designed to shift discretion over the economy towards private entities and market forces. Neoliberalism policies focus on deregulation, openness to free trade, and government austerity. The fiscal adjustment imposed caused a dramatic redistribution of available income between capital (48% to 64%) and labor (42% to 29%), a 30 percent to 40 percent decrease in wages and salaries, and a significant rise of unemployment and precarious jobs (12%) (Laurell, 2015, p. 250). Further, total public expenditure dropped and about 60% was channeled to pay debt obligations, while simultaneously, social public expenditure was reduced by about 35% between 1982 and 1988 (Laurell, 2015, p 250).

In the United States during the decade of the 1980's, the conservative movement that had been brewing since earlier decades ultimately materialized with the candidacy of Ronald Reagan. Reagan was a salesman in the corporate world, as he was a television and film icon. If he could

charm American consumers as the face of Chesterfield Cigarettes into becoming cigarette smokers, why wouldn't he be able to convince them that marijuana was "the most dangerous drug in America" as president? (Boullosa, 2015, Kindle 871). Ronald Reagan ran for president against the unpopular Jimmy Carter whose drug policy in the US was opposite of Reagan's. Carter's aim was to work towards decriminalization while Reagan's was to once again wage Nixon's War on Drugs. Eventually, Ronald Reagan won the presidency under a neoliberal and antidrug platform.

During this time in Mexico, an expansion exploded terms of activity by Mexican drug groups, who rose from being Colombian smugglers into a powerful and independent organization known as the Guadalajara Cartel (Hernandez, 2012, Kindle 1017).

Parallel to this, in Nicaragua and to the disdain of the United States, the revolutionary Sandinista forces defeated the U.S-backed Somoza regime, becoming one of the few successful revolutions in history. The Sandinista take over in Nicaragua became the central national security focus of the Reagan administration in Latin America. For Reagan, it was unacceptable to have a hostile nation in America's sphere of influence. The solution for the Reagan administration was to fund paramilitaries, or Contras, in Nicaragua that could overthrow the Sandinista government and once again install a pro-US government in the country. However, the Reagan administration's plan was cut short when US congress issued a ban on assistance to the paramilitary forces in Nicaragua (Boullosa, 2015, Kindle 897).

The administration, nonetheless, refused to let the Sandinistas govern in Nicaragua and quickly developed a covert operation to fund the Contras. In 1982, the CIA disguised as a Mexican intelligence organization found a way to fund Reagan's war. The CIA made a secret deal with the Guadalajara Cartel that allowed CIA personnel to train Contra recruits in lands

owned by top Mexican drug lords and to receive drug-related funds in exchange for access to American markets in the distribution of crack cocaine in the United States. (Hernandez, 2012, Kindle 1200). The drug epidemic that followed these events in poor, and mainly black, neighborhoods in America created a cyclical pattern of crime, addiction, and imprisonment that continues to this day. In 1987, the Kerry Commission, led by congressman John Kerry, began a congressional investigation regarding the illegal actions of the Reagan administration and in 1989 the truth of these events was exposed (Hernandez, 2012, Kindle 1178).

During 1988 in Mexico, the political hegemony that the PRI had enjoyed was being tested like never before. During the previous decades and because of a societal push for democracy, the one-party presidentialist structure began opening to include opposition parties, proportional congressional representation, and in 1988, the first legitimately contested presidential election in history.

Since the formation of the post-revolution political system that granted full control to the PRI, every presidential successor was hand-picked by the sitting president<sup>3</sup>. However, in 1988, PRI member and son of ex-president Lazaro Cardenas, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, resigned from the PRI party to launch his own presidential campaign in protest of how the PRI party picked presidential candidates. He ran under an umbrella of center-left and left-wing parties (FDN) and against the technocratic PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

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<sup>3</sup> For example, president Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) hand-picked his finance minister, Jose Lopez Portillo, as his successor and by design ran unopposed in the national presidential election to become president from 1976-1982.

Salinas de Gortari ran a platform that called for economic modernization and closer relations with the United States, looking to continue the neoliberal model that began under his predecessor's administration. On the other hand, Cardenas was the candidate of change who called to end the authoritarian system that had governed Mexico throughout the previous six decades. On election night, the challenger Cardenas appeared to have a substantial lead over Salinas until a mysterious voting system crash prevented the visibility of the results. The next day, the computer system that counted the votes was back on, showing that Salinas had won the presidency with 50% of the popular vote versus Cardenas' 31.2% (Loaeza, 2001, p 96). The electoral process reeked of fraud. Candidate Cardenas contested the legitimacy of the results, but within days Salinas would go on to deliver a speech as president-elect and US president Reagan would go on to congratulate him for his achievement. For the US, Salinas was by far the better choice since he was a Harvard graduate who was ideologically aligned with the neoliberal perspective (Sanchez, 2001) that the US was sponsoring around the developing world called 'The Washington Consensus' (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011).

### **1990's: Democratization**

The presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari marks a breaking point in the political trajectory of Mexico and its relationship with the United States. First, the re-negotiation of Mexico's foreign debt opened the door for talks that would eventually materialize into the first free trade agreement without a human rights certification requirement included in it.

According to Sanchez (2001), the reasons that encouraged the proposal of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were more politically than economically motivated. While most of the debate in both countries focused on jobs and economic growth, the implicit benefits of the agreement were political in nature. For the United States, NAFTA was an

opportunity to have an ally that would support its interests in the region: for example, by helping to find a peaceful resolution in the Central American conflicts, making progress on Latin American debt issues, as well as grantor of greater access to Mexico's natural resources like oil (Sanchez, 2001, p 13). As for Mexico, or more specifically, for Salinas, NAFTA was beneficial because it had the potential to produce the economic boom that would give the autocratic PRI legitimacy once again. Ultimately, the US and Mexico signed NAFTA in 1992 and the agreement took effect in 1994.

From 1994 to 2000, Mexico experienced a period of accelerated democratization. In 1996, Mexico established the Instituto Federal Electoral as an autonomous entity in charge of administering elections on the state, local, and federal levels (Loaeza, 2001, p 97). This was a big step towards democracy because electoral oversight would no longer be left in the hands of the incumbent executive government. In 2000 and after 71 years of PRI rule, Mexico elected Vicente Fox from the center-right party as president, which marked the first time any party other than the PRI took control of the presidency. A sign of progress in the democratic governance was that in the year 2000 more than 50% of the Mexican population lived in entities governed by a political party other than the PRI (Loaeza, 2001, p 100).

Aside from the encouraging signs of achieving a path towards democracy in Mexico, the immediate effects of NAFTA were all but positive. In 1996, there were eight million unemployed in the country and five more in the informal economy because of cut backs in public spending, public employment, and reduction or privatization of social benefits, outlined in the neoliberal model. The crime rate across the country surged including crimes committed by state actors who, amongst many things, were now severely underpaid. For example, about 95%-75% of all kidnappings in the country involved members of the municipal, state, and federal police



agencies (Boullosa, 2015, Kindle 1091). To finish it off, after the imprisonment of the Guadalajara Cartel boss (Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo) as a precondition imposed by the US to sign the trade agreement, the remaining members of the Guadalajara Cartel decided to split the criminal industry throughout the country. They created a federation of cartels across Mexico: specifically, by dividing territories along NAFTA transport routes where the unemployed peasants who were affected by the privatization of communal lands (ejidos) could serve as foot soldiers for the newly created plurality of Transnational Criminal Organizations. In other words, the impact of neoliberal policies in Mexico throughout two decades can best be explained by Carmen Boullosa (2015), “The army of the urban unemployed gave the cartels a deep pool from which to recruit foot soldiers, and the miserably paid (and eminently corruptible) police and military provided the muscle with which to protect their interests.” (Kindle, 1108).

### **Chapter III Conceptual Framework**

#### **Introduction**

The purpose of the conceptual framework is to address the context-setting policy of this project, the Merida Initiative, to draw theoretical grounds through which to evaluate the policy, and to create a conceptual map that will guide operationalization and analysis of the research questions.

#### **The Policy: Merida Initiative**

According to Edgardo Buscaglia (2013), the North American Free Trade Agreement along with the political, economic, and criminal nexus that followed, produced an unsustainable yet self-constrained political power model. As the contestation of power by political parties began to occur during Mexico's democratic opening, the absence of monopolistic control over the drug criminal enterprise, once held by the ruling PRI, incentivized violent competition between rival cartels to get the upper hand in the access to key drug routes and bigger markets. This fragmentation of criminal organizations resulted in increased levels of violence throughout the Mexican territory. To counter this trend, the United States and Mexico came together to sign a bilateral agreement called the Merida Initiative (MI) that ordered the deployment of both the Mexican military and the federal police force throughout the country.

Bailey & Taylor, (2009) theorize that the interactions that occurred in Mexico during the initial phase of the bilateral MI partnership display the ability of criminal groups to function in equilibrium, through cooperation, corruption, and conflict. In other words, they interact with a certain type of dynamism capable of adjusting to withstand a full-fledged military state offensive. Further, the fact that a state military offensive proved to be insufficient in eliminating the various criminal groups across the country demonstrates their relative level of power compared to that of

the state. As it was clear that a solely military approach was a limited strategy, the United States and Mexico expanded the Merida Initiative to include state-building mechanisms.

According to the U.S. Department of State, the Merida Initiative defines its goals or functions as follows:

To disrupt organized criminal groups, institutionalize reforms to sustain the rule of law and support for human rights, create a 21st century border, and build strong and resilient communities. Bilateral efforts expand assistance to state level law enforcement and justice sector personnel; support democratic institutions, especially police, justice systems, and civil society organizations; expand our border focus beyond interdiction of contraband to include facilitating legitimate trade and travel; and build stable communities able to withstand the pressures of crime and violence. (State Department, n.a)

Of importance to this project is the agreement's intent to "build stable communities able to withstand the pressures of crime and violence" and to "support democratic institutions". One can infer from the language used in the policy that political institutions, are central to the Merida Initiative, and therefore, any analysis must take into consideration institutional theories and political thought.

### **Political Institutions**

Institutions, according to Geoffrey Hodgson (2006), are defined as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure interactions and human behavior. In the realm of political science, the study of institutions has evolved through time. Samuel Huntington gave meaning to

the term ‘institutionalization’ by defining it as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability (1968, p. 12). Huntington conceptualizes institutionalization as a process that changes or matures through time, but which can nevertheless also decay (Huntington, 1968).

### **Mexico’s Political Institutions**

Mexico is a federal representative democratic republic with a multi-party system. To evaluate Mexican institutions since the implementation of the Merida Initiative, it is imperative to understand which government institutions are affected by the policy and which will be analyzed in this project. The intention to combat TCO’s arises from the inherent threat that these groups pose to the state’s ability to retain a monopoly of violence over the territory it claims to control. For this reason, the first part of the project focuses on assessing the change in state strength through two top-down, or center-out, dimensions: coercion and extraction.

Secondly, derived from the MI’s goal to support democratic institutions, this project evaluates the level of institutionalization in Mexico’s national as well as subnational party-systems since MI. This second element is conceptualized here as the conductive capacity dimension of a state’s infrastructural power, which includes a bottom-up process.

### **State Strength, State Capacity, or Infrastructural Power?**

The nation-state, as Max Weber formulated the concepts, includes three distinct layers: 1) political power, 2) the state, and 3) the modern state. According to Michael Mann (1986), it is in the third layer, the modern state, where the state radiates from a central region controlled by elites, outwards throughout its territory to administer state power; a concept that Mann calls the

‘infrastructural power’ of the state. Regions within the territory where the state cannot efficiently access civil society, deliver public goods, or enforce its monopoly of force demonstrates areas of visible state weakness relative to areas where it can willfully exert power.

Infrastructural power differs from what is called despotic power in that despotic power lacks the dynamism, complexity, and professionalization of infrastructural power. Despotic power is the power to rule over society, as opposed to through society (Mann, 2008). A weak state, in this way, rules unsystematically, with an elite resorting to whatever means, rational or otherwise, to enforce its power.

Soifer’s 2008, *State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement*, builds on the concept of infrastructural power by constructing three different models from which the concept can be measured: the state capabilities approach, the weight of the state approach, and the subnational variations approach.

The state capabilities approach assesses infrastructural power by considering national-level inputs such as gross domestic product (GDP), fiscal resources, size of the military, etc. The second approach, which evaluates the weight of the state on society, considers national-level outcomes to measure how a government policy influenced society. For example, a study by Mary Kay Vaughan (1997, p. 5) evaluated 1930’s education policy that was aimed to modernize society in Mexico. The policy failed to mobilize and integrate rural teachers into the larger state apparatus as it was intended and thus exposes state deficiencies. Finally, the subnational variation approach measures spatial distribution and differences in the territorial reach of the state. For example, Soifer (2006) measures the territorial spread of military and police presence, taxation, and public primary education through several Latin American countries.

In response to the high exposure and academic interest the concept of infrastructural power received, Michael Mann (2008) revisited the topic to clarify his originally idea. Mann, among a range of topics, addressed Soifer's argument stating that civil society, and in turn democracy or regime types, should not be incorporated into an analysis of infrastructural power.

According to Mann, "political power relations are not merely those radiating outwards from the state (as the term bureaucracy might imply), but also those emanating in civil society radiating inward to the state in the form of parties and pressure groups seeking to control it. Whatever state autonomy this might enable, infrastructural power is a two-way street: It also enables civil society parties to control the state." (Mann, 2008, p 356).<sup>4</sup>

*Table 1: Infrastructural Power*

Despotic Power	Infrastructural Power	
	Low	High
Low	Feudal	Democracy
High	Imperial	Single-Party

*Source: Mann (2008) p 357*

In any scenario, Soifer's conceptualization of infrastructural power<sup>5</sup> is useful, as exemplified by Luna & Toro's (2014) conceptualization and operationalization. They use state

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<sup>4</sup> Mann (2008) continues: "In states with low despotic power and high infrastructural power, many parties and pressure groups compete for power. If their competition is stably institutionalized, this enables states to mobilize citizen commitment and so legitimate its infrastructures. A better label for this type would be 'multiparty regimes,' or more simply 'democracy'." p 356.

<sup>5</sup> Soifer (2008) and Soifer (2012) use the term 'state strength' and 'state capacity' which, as Giraudy (2012) notes, can also be interpreted as infrastructural power.

capacity (see notes) and its three dimensions: coercive capacity<sup>6</sup>, infrastructural capacity, and extractive capacity<sup>7</sup> to assess state strength in Latin American countries. Coercive capacity refers to a state's ability to impose its will to enforce the rule of law and shape people's behavior. Extractive capacity, in comparison, refers to the state's ability to obtain goods, or otherwise, from society.

*Table 2: Measuring State Capacity*

State Capacity			
Dimensions:	Security	Administration	Extraction
Indicators:	Violent Crime Rate	Census Administration	Direct Taxes/Indirect Taxes
	Lynching Rate	National Identification Card Registration	Direct Taxes per Capita
	Private Security per Capita	Vaccination Rates	Share of Working Population in Formal Sector

*Source: Soifer (2012) p 596.*

*Note: For this project, as in Luna & Toro (2014), security is understood as coercive capacity while extraction as extractive capacity.*

Ultimately, this project includes both top-down and bottom-up processes to analyze if there has been a change in Mexico's institutions since the MI agreement was implemented. To be able to use Mann's intended meaning of infrastructural power while at the same time incorporating some of Soifer's conceptualization and measures, this project uses the term conductive capacity to refer to Mann's upper-right quadrant on Table 1.

## **Conductive Capacity**

The academic debate regarding how the state and democracy should be understood and how, and if, the state and democracy are elements mutually supportive of each other is ongoing.

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<sup>6</sup> Luna & Toro (2014) "The underlying assumption of this measure is that lower levels of crime and corruption should be associated with higher levels of state coercive capacity." (p. 2)

<sup>7</sup> For example, through the direct collection of taxes.

As Fukuyama (2014) explains, there is an implied consensus that regards increasing democracy as a direct translation of better governance. The consensus understands this as if the higher-level of exchanges, information or otherwise, that occur between citizens and state officials, will result in having a better, more ethical, and effective government. There is another branch of academics, such as Fukuyama and seeberg (2014), that view state capacity and democracy as two different, or at least not well understood, intersectional variables.

As mentioned previously, the state is a collection of individuals that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of force within a given territory (Weber 1958, p 78). Democracy, in turn, is a type of regime that channels collective rule-making by ‘the people’ of a state. In this manner, the democratic state is a consensually operative set of rules legitimized by the fact that these are “public rather than secret, knowable by all, and binding upon all.” (Habermas, 1996). To this conceptualization of the relationship between the state and democracy, Mark Warren concludes:

That democratic states are by far and away the most powerful states today can be explained in large part by their *capacities to respond* to the normative discourse of society *while deploying its powers to protect* the very possibility of a politically-directive normative discourse. (Warren, 2006, p 387)

Following the discussion of state capacity, a strong state not only possesses coercive capacities, extractive capacities, and administrative capacities but also *conductive capacities*. Conductive capacity, the concept, is the state’s ability to effectively link democratic governance to the state. It involves channeling collective societal demands through established structures and



procedures. A state with strong conductive capacity balances societal demands with effective public-good delivery through the state apparatus. It also grants equal opportunity for members to access the state and restricts the elite's ability to accumulate power.

Conductive capacity or the democratic state, as Warren calls this, can enhance the power of the state as it enhances the rest of the state's capacities. For example, a state can only use its coercive capacity if it has the resources to fund and administer the task, which in turn requires the ability of the state to extract goods from the people living within the territory. Ignoring or repressing a group that is within the territory only hinders the resource extraction prospects that could materialize by the inclusion of the marginalized group; in other words, collaboration is needed to enable the full power of the state.

By the same token, a group can choose not to cooperate with the state, but it can only sustain this exclusion for so long as it legitimately challenges state power or willingly accepts marginalization; in other words, collaboration is needed to enable the full power of the civilians within the state's territory. Finally, while Fukuyama in most respects makes these same points regarding a needed balance between society and the state in his piece *States and Democracy* (2014), he generally ignores the role that state-on-state and foreign-state-on-domestic-society interactions play in respect to democracy. It is widely accepted that a state does not need democracy for its survival, but both states and democracies are vulnerable to the interference, or even just the appearance of interference, from other states. For the survival of one, or both types of institutions, there is a need for an effective channel between these to exist.

To find that balance between the state and the citizenry, a framework that is grounded, commonly understood, and capable of adapting to disruptions is essential. More infrastructural power means having the dynamism to balance this type of mutual relationship. Therefore, this

project conceptualizes infrastructural power as containing the commonly accepted types of state capacity, coercive and extractive, but also includes a dynamic balancing channel dimension, understood here as conductive capacity.

Conductive capacity is made up of two types of political institutions: democratic and bureaucratic. Democratic institutions are the front-end of the state's conductive capacity, while bureaucratic institutions are the back-end.

### **Democracy**

If a well-functioning democracy is understood as having the dynamism to channel the relationship between citizen and state power effectively, there has to be political instruments that channel the different societal voices. This function is commonly undertaken by political parties through various levels of governments within the state; national, subnational, local, regional, or otherwise.

In Mexico, decentralization of the state and democracy go hand in hand. Democratization, which began in the 1990's, continues to this day. While political parties have alternated power at the federal level, state and local level democratic processes tend to be weaker. For example, the governorships in the subnational entities of Colima, Hidalgo, Campeche, and Estado de Mexico have never alternated, with the PRI still able to hold on to power. In addition, according to Harbers and Ingram (2013), "intra-country variations, predominantly in rural and poor regions where the (central) state has little or no presence" results in situations where the state is present for some citizens and nearly or totally absent for others (p 25). Their calculation reflects, among other effects, signs of possible incongruence between federal and subnational party-system structures and the disparate effects this incongruence produces in terms of the way that citizens relate to the state.

### **Party-System Institutionalization**

It is widely accepted that democracy cannot exist without strong political parties (Satori, 1976) (Morgan, 2011) (Hagopian, 1998). Parties Among the structural characteristics of liberal democracies<sup>8</sup> are party-systems. A party-system is a set of political organizations, or parties, that demonstrate patterned competition through time. To be considered a party-system, three components must be true. There must be: 1) at least two parties, 2) a relatively stable pattern of interactions and competition, and 3) the ability to demonstrate the distribution of electoral support by parties over time (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005).

In the same way that the power of states can be measured and placed on a continuum based on their relative strength or weakness, party-system institutionalization can also be seen in a continuum format<sup>9</sup>. According to Mainwaring and Scully (1999), the critical difference among Latin American party systems is their level of institutionalization<sup>2</sup>, an institutionalized party system implies stability in interparty competition, the existence of parties that have somewhat stable roots in society, acceptance of parties and elections as the legitimate institutions that determine who governs, and party organizations with reasonably stable rules and structures (Mainwaring and Scully, 1999, p 1).

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<sup>8</sup> Boix (2007) “All contemporary democracies are representative democracies. Direct democracy is simply impractical in today’s world. States are too large in territory and population for a sizeable fraction of the citizenry to debate together and directly any political question at hand in a meaningful, sustained manner.”

<sup>9</sup> The party-system institutionalization continuum generally consists of three main categories: Over-institutionalized, institutionalized, and inchoate party-systems. At one end, you have over-institutionalized party-systems that are “frozen”, “static”, and with a de-politicized electorate. At the other end, you have fluid,

An institutionalized party system is one in which a stable group of parties compete regularly within a constant framework. Political actors behave according to the expectation that competition amongst the dominant parties will remain relatively stable through time.

Institutionalized party systems are important because they restrict the ability of political outsiders<sup>10</sup> to enter the competition, they provide guidance for voters to understand and participate in the political process (Moser and Scheiner 2012), generate greater stability in policymaking (Flores-Macías 2012; Lupu and Riedl 2013) and promote economic growth (Bizzarro et al. 2015).

### **Pillar Questions**

The concepts of pillar questions, which bring both structure to the study and ample room for the researcher to operate, best serve the purpose of this study (Shields and Rangarajan, 2013). Most of the research on the Merida Initiative focuses on military aspects, leaving gaps in its influence on community building efforts, human rights, and efforts to strengthen Mexico's democratic institutions. This prevention-inclined part of the Merida Initiative was put in place by the Obama and Peña Nieto administrations the strategy now focuses more on institution-building than on technology transfers and broadens the scope of bilateral efforts to include economic

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or inchoate, systems that are unpredictable, more personality-dominated, and in which voters feel less attached to one specific party. (Sanchez, 2009), (Schedler, 1995)

<sup>10</sup> According to Barr, 2009 "An outsider is someone who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established, competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties. Insiders, by contrast, are those politicians who rise through or within the established, competitive parties of the nation's party system and who preserve that system." (p 33).

development and community-based social programs. There is also increased funding at the sub-national level for Mexican states and municipalities (Seelke, and Finklea, 2015, p. 6).

This project's framework is divided into three parts and aligned with individual pillar questions to address each one. The first pillar question involves analyzing changes in state strength through the dimension of coercion. The second pillar question examines the state's extractive capacity which along with coercive capacity involves a top-down process, while the third pillar question deals with the dimension of conductive capacity, which involves a combination of measures that include democratic institutionalization and administrative capacity measures. Within each pillar question, there are sub-questions or sub-components that allow for a more detailed analysis of each of the main concepts.

To evaluate whether the Merida Initiative has been successful, it is important to distinguish areas within Mexico where improvements have seemingly occurred and where they have not. Following the concept of state strength, it would be reasonable to conclude that there are regions where the power, or capacity, of the Mexican state is stronger than others- and as a possible result where the Merida Initiative has had more success.

***Pillar Question 1: How has Mexico's extractive capacity changed since 2007?***

For example, if violence has decreased in a state where violence was high during the initial phases of the MI, when the Mexican security forces were deployed by the Calderon administration, then that would be a sign that MI is working in that specific subnational entity. In that scenario, the lower level of violence suggests that Mexico's coercive capacity is stronger than in an entity where the level of violence remained high or increased.

***Pillar Question 2: How has Mexico's extractive capacity changed since 2007?***

Another way of evaluating state strength is through an examination of the level of extractive capacity through time. While it is beyond this project's goal to establish causality, it is important to note if the state could extract goods in certain areas before MI and later more constrained in its ability to do so. One way to evaluate extractive capacity is through measuring tax revenue per capita at the subnational level. However, tax revenue could be the result of policy and not the result of more extractive capacity. On the other hand, poverty is a social condition that demonstrates state limitations in extractive capacity simply because you cannot collect goods from those that do not have goods in the first place.

Part of being able to extract goods from society involves society having visible resources that the state can extract. The informal economy is a set of economic activities not subject to government regulation and thus a factor that weakens extractive capacity. This sub-pillar will measure if there has been change in Mexico's informal economy since 2007.

***Pillar Question 3: How has Mexico's Conductive Capacity Changed Since 2007***

As the Merida Initiative aims to "institutionalize reforms" and "support democratic governance", it is important to analyze Mexico's party-systems at both the federal and subnational level. While the first two pillar question address top-down processes, this one will evaluate a bottom-up approach. The way this pillar question is structured is by following Mainwaring & Scully's (1995) four dimensions of party-system institutionalization while also adding administrative capacity.

***Pillar Question 3(a): Has there been stability in interparty competition?***

The first dimension in measuring party systems is the level of stability in interparty competition. The way to measure this is by using Pedersen's index of electoral volatility. This is done by calculating the net change in seat share from one election to the next, which is the sum of the absolute changes in vote shares divided by 2 (Pedersen 1983). Constant or relatively stable volatility scores are related to patterned interactions of party competition (Altman & Luna, 2011, pg. 3).

***Pillar Question 3(b): Do political parties have stable roots in society?***

Secondly, strong parties have stable roots in society. Hicken and Martinez-Kuhonta (2015) explains that parties are rooted in society to the extent to which most voters and special interest groups identify with a party. In systems that are not institutionalized, "parties have weak roots in society, voters and politicians have few lasting attachments to parties, there are no enduring links between parties and interest groups and parties have no distinct policy or ideological identities" (Hicken and Martinez-Kuhonta, 2015, p 309). One way to tell if roots in society exist is by looking at the way voters elect presidential and legislative candidates and the difference between those two ways of voting. "Where parties are key actors in shaping political preferences, this difference should be less pronounced." (Mainwaring and Scully, 1999, p 9).

***Pillar Question 3(c): How have citizen attitudes changed regarding democratic institutions?***

The third factor involves whether democratic institutions are the only game in town and the only 'currency of power'. In other words, are political parties considered the legitimate governing institutions from which societal demands are channeled and effectuated? In a country where a military coup, political assassinations, street politics, or any other anti-institutional

processes occur, one can assume that parties, and in turn democracy, are not the only currencies of power in society. In addition, this third dimension is what Randall and Svasand (2002) refer to as the external and attitudinal aspect of party-system institutionalization. It involves society's, as well as other parties' and actors', approach in their role within the the party-system<sup>11</sup>; "notably its degree of trust in parties as institutions and commitment to the electoral process" (Randall and Svasand, 2002, p 8). Ways to measure this dimension include surveys that assess citizen attitudes about democratic institutions, statistics on the volume and frequency of protests, and evidence of political assassinations among other measures.

***Pillar Question 3(d): Are individual parties institutionalized?***

Finally, the last dimension evaluates the internal structure of individual parties and whether these are institutionalized. For a party-system to be institutionalized, individual parties must also demonstrate patterns of stability. In other words, do parties have an internal set of rules, established values, and ideological commitment that party members abide by? is there a dominant individual or set of individuals that have control of the party and its direction, without established set of rules, values, or ideology? Has the party become a significant player in the party-system or is the party marginal? Healthy parties are autonomous, programmatic, have internal mechanisms established, and can function through time without the exclusive control of a few members. Willis-Otero (2016) argues that parties that are less vertically oriented and more

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<sup>11</sup> Party-system legitimacy or external/attitudinal dimension is important because "As it becomes increasingly a taken-for-granted feature of the political horizon, individuals and institutions, including other parties, will more or less consciously adjust their expectations and aspirations accordingly" (Randall & Svasand, 2002, p 14)



internally democratic are more likely to withstand challenging times, such as economic downturn or other external conditions. While there is ongoing debate in the literature about how to measure party institutionalization, one way to do this is by assessing whether the party itself outlived its founding member(s). For example, if a party is as competitive without the party's founders as it was with them, then it can be assumed that it demonstrates a degree of party institutionalization.

***Pillar Question 3(e): Has Mexico's ability to deliver public goods changed since the Merida Initiative?***

Delivering public goods to society is the actionable backbone and outward flow of the conductive capacity dimension of the state. It is where laws transform from abstraction to objective tangibility and where effective political representation becomes quantifiable. In short, public administration serves as the mediating channel between society, the state, and democratic governance. According to Guy Peters (2010), bureaucratic institutions have shifted away from traditional hierarchical structures, towards becoming the main interface between State and society, "so that citizens are more likely to come into contact with a bureaucrat of some sort than they are to come in contact with their democratically elected officials" (p 7).

In addition, the legacy of the past four decades in terms of privatization, liberalization, and globalization, is that it has hindered the functionality of both representative democracy and public administration. First, the ever-increasing role of money in politics has resulted in increased corruption and diminished representation in democratic systems. This, has been further exacerbated by the diminished size and role that the bureaucracy plays in administering justice (Farazmand, 2012, p 255). To this end, the attached and parallel role of democracy and bureaucracy demonstrate a clear link between the two faces of conductive capacity. That is: without justice administration and enforcing the rule of law, democracy suffers.

According to the 1997 Universal Declaration on Democracy:

Judicial institutions and independent, impartial and effective oversight mechanisms are the guarantors for the rule of law on which democracy is founded. In order for these institutions and mechanisms fully to ensure respect for the rules, improve the fairness of the processes and redress injustices, there must be access by all to administrative and judicial remedies on the basis of equality as well as respect for administrative and judicial decisions both by the organs of the State and representatives of public authority and by each member of society. (Bassiouni, et al., 1997)

In this way, a strong state is one naturally responsive to the needs of people and especially crucial in administering justice. The provision of justice balances the political face of conductive capacity and in turn enhances the effectiveness of democratic governance. This third pillar question will assess whether Mexico's ability to deliver the public good of justice has changed since the Merida Initiative was implemented.

Finally, the pillar questions used in this study are summarized in Table 3. The literature used to justify each pillar question is also provided.

Table 3: Conceptualization Table

Purpose: The purpose of this applied research paper is to conduct a preliminary assessment of Mexico's political institutions since the Merida Initiative to evaluate the progress, or lack thereof, in relation to the agreement's explicit goals.	
<i>Pillar Question</i>	Supporting Literature
<b>State Capacity</b>	
<b>I. Coercive Capacity</b>	
<i>PQ1: How has state coercion changed since 2007?</i>	(Baily & Taylor 2009), (State, n.d), (Boullosa & Wallace, 2015), (Buscaglia, 2013), (Soifer, 2006), (Soifer, 2008), (Soifer, 2012), (Mann, 2008), (Mann, 1984)
<b>II. Extractive Capacity</b>	
<i>PQ2: How has state extraction changed since 2007?</i>	(Baily & Taylor 2009), (State, n.d), (Boullosa & Wallace, 2015), (Buscaglia, 2013), (Soifer, 2006), (Soifer, 2008), (Soifer, 2012), (Mann, 2008), (Mann, 1984)
<b>III. Conductive Capacity</b>	
<i>PQ3a: How has interparty competition changed since 2007?</i>	(Pedersen, 1983) (Harbers & Ingram, 2014), (Mainwarin & Torcal, 2005) (Sanchez, 2008) (Mainwaring, 1995), (Seeberg, 2014), (Luna, 2014) (Altman & Luna 2011)
<i>PQ3b: How have the linkages between democratic institutions and society changed since 2007?</i>	(Mainwarin & Torcal, 2005) (Mainwaring and Scully, 1999, p 9). (Hickens, 2015)
<i>PQ3c: How have citizen attitudes regarding democratic institutions changed since 2007?</i>	(Mainwarin & Torcal, 2005) (Randall and Svasand, 2002) (Seligson, 2002) (Dix, Haussman, and Walton 2012)
<i>PQ3d: How has party institutionalization changed since 2007?</i>	(Mainwarin & Torcal, 2005) (Mainwaring and Scully, 1999, p 9) (Levitsky, Loxton, Van Dyck, and Dominguez, 2016) (Willis-Otero, 2016)
<i>PQ3e: How has the provision of public goods changed since 2007?</i>	(Farazmand, 2012) (Peters, 2010)(Ginsburg, 2001) (Kamaruzzaman, 2016) (Wallack, 2016) (Biderman and Reiss, 1967)

## **Chapter IV Research Methodology**

### **Chapter Purpose**

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology used for this project, which will conduct a preliminary assessment of Mexican political institutions since the Merida Initiative was implemented in 2007. The methodology is summarized in the operationalization table (Table 4). This table is “a conceptual map in which these pillar questions form key topographical features” (Shields and Rangarajan 2013, 153). The approach for this project, in terms of measurement analysis, is to use a combination of different methods; specifically, aggregated statistics, survey-items, document analysis, and case studies.

### **Research Methods**

This study employs a variety of methodological tools to evaluate the progress, or lack thereof, regarding MI’s explicit goals to institutionalize reforms and support democratic institutions. Ultimately, the project is divided into three main categories under the conceptual umbrella of state capacity. The first pillar question assesses Mexico’s state coercive capacity, the second pillar question assesses Mexico’s state extractive capacity, and the third and last pillar question assesses Mexico’s conductive capacity.

### **Coercive Capacity**

#### ***How has state coercion changed since 2007?***

To measure the change in state coercive capacity since 2007, this study looks at two variables: 1) intentional homicides and 2) extortions<sup>12</sup>. While the intentional homicide rate

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<sup>12</sup> Extortion is “the practice of obtaining something, especially money, through force or threats.”

provides insight the state's inability to protect human life, the extortion rate allows us to evaluate the relative power of criminal enterprises. In other words, intentional homicides are an effect of state coercive weakness while extortion is an effect resulting from the strength of criminal coercion.

The data for both variables comes from Mexico's Secretaria de Gobernacion (SEGOB) and includes the yearly rate from 1997 to 2016.<sup>13</sup> SEGOB collects the information from each of the Attorney Generals in the Mexican federation<sup>14</sup> who in turn are responsible for the veracity of the information. The rates measure the number of homicides and extortions in the country in relation to the subnational entity's total population. It is computed in the following manner:

$$T_H = \frac{H}{P_t} * 100,000$$

Number of intentional homicides in the total population multiplied by 100,000.

TH= Intentional homicide rate

H=Number of registered intentional homicides.

Pt= Total population.

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<sup>13</sup> SEGOB, or Secretary of Governorship/Interior, is part of the executive branch of the federal government. It is responsible for handling Mexico's internal affairs.

<sup>14</sup> There are 31 federal states (also termed federative entities) and federal district (Mexico City).

## **Extractive Capacity**

### ***How has state extraction changed since 2007?***

The second dimension of state capacity, extractive capacity, entails aligning measures to evaluate the way that the state can collect revenue from society. The variables chosen to do this include the informality rate and the inverse version of the personal savings rate (IPSR) in each subnational entity.

Economic informality aligns with the measure of extractive capacity because it captures the percentage of people who are out of state's reach in terms of extracting taxable income. The informality rate data for this project was collected from the Catalogo Nacional de Indicadores database (CNI) and encompasses the time period of 1997 to 2016 with a geographic coverage of all 32 subnational entities.

While the informal economy captures the amount of money out of state's reach in terms of income taxes, it doesn't encapsulate all of the state's extractive options, such as is the case in sales tax extraction. To account for this shortcoming, survey data was collected to approximate the percentage of people who are not able to save any part of their income. The thinking behind measuring the IPSR is that it provides insight into people's ability to contribute to the formal economy, and thus, be within reach of state extraction. The IPSR was calculated through survey data obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI)<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> In Spanish: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.

## Conductive Capacity

### *How has interparty competition changed?*

To measure the change in interparty competition the study measures electoral volatility and fragmentation. Volatility is computed by calculating the Pedersen Volatility index, while electoral fragmentation is measured by calculating the effective number of parties in a legislative session.

Volatility:

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\sum_{t=1}^n |p_{it} - p_{i(t+1)}|}{2}$$

where (v) is volatility, (n) the number of parties in the given election, (p) the percentage of seats or votes receives by (i) party in time (t), and the subtraction from the percentage received in (t+1).

Fragmentation:

$$N_v = \frac{1}{\sum_i^x vi^2}$$

where (vi) denotes the share of legislative seats going to each party (i) and the symbols below and above the summation referencing that it covers every party, from smallest to largest (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003; (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979).

In addition to evaluating electoral volatility, or the net change in seats gained or lost from election to election by all parties in the party system, extra-systemic volatility is also assessed. Extra-systemic volatility (ESV) refers to the share of seats or votes that leave the main (systemic) parties and are gained by extra-systemic (or outsider) parties. It is important to measure ESV since it reflects people's rejection of the established order in preference for

something new. In this case the systemic parties are considered to be the PRI, PAN, and PRD parties.

Finally, volatility is measured at the local level through an analysis of local congresses in terms of seats and through governor elections in terms of votes. Federally, volatility is measured in terms of the lower chamber of congress seats and through votes in both legislative and presidential elections. The time period for this section is 1997 to 2016 and the information was gathered from all of the Mexican local congresses websites and from the national electoral institute (INE) database<sup>16</sup>.

***Do political parties have roots in society?***

The second dimension of conductive capacity which looks at whether political parties have roots, or an anchor grounded in society, is assessed by the number of people who, through surveys, answered that they did not identify with any of the political parties. The surveys were gathered from the Centro de Investigacion y Docencias Economicas (CIDE), from SEGOB, and from the INE databases. The years of the information gathered range from 2000 to 2016. Moreover, abstention rates in federal and local elections are also used to assess party roots in society.

***How have citizen attitudes changed regarding democratic institutions?***

The legitimacy of democratic institutions will be assessed by evaluating citizen perceptions of corruption. Specifically, citizen perceptions about how corrupt they think political

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<sup>16</sup> While the raw data comes from those sources, all of the computations were performed by the author.



parties are. The data comes from the CIDE and INEGI databases with a yearly range span of 2001 to 2015.

***Are individual parties institutionalized?***

To evaluate party institutionalization, two methodological criteria are employed. First, it adopts Levitsky, Loxton, Van Dyck, and Dominguez' (2016) successful party-building operationalization in which the authors hold that for a party to be considered successful it must earn at least 10% of the vote in five or more consecutive national legislative elections and survive after its founding leader has ceased to be a viable presidential contender.<sup>17</sup> The second part involves a brief case study discussion about the growth of the political party named Morena.

***Has Mexico's ability to deliver public goods changed since the Merida Initiative?***

The last item within the conductive capacity dimension assesses Mexico's ability to deliver public goods. To do this it evaluates a measure that perhaps isn't common in political science or public administration research but which is central to this project's main theoretical contention. In sum, the theoretical contention holds that democratic governance and public administration are two sides of the same coin that should be evaluated in conjunction when measuring state capacity. To make that connection and assess Mexico's ability to deliver public goods, the project uses the measure known as the "Dark Figure" of crime. The dark figure of crime measures: 1) the number of crimes that are not reported, 2) the number of crimes that are indeed reported to authorities but are not investigated, and 3) the number of crimes that are indeed reported to authorities but are not counted in the official crime statistics.

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<sup>17</sup> Due to death, retirement, or leaving the party.

The dark figure assesses the administrative side of the conductive capacity dimension in a number of ways. First, it is reflective of the legitimacy of public administration from society's eyes; if citizens feel the better choice between reporting and not reporting an actual crime is to do the latter, it is because they do not hold public authorities in high regard. Most importantly, the dark figure demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the state when it comes to administering the most crucial public good, justice. The data on the dark figure comes from the Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad (CEI) for the years before 2007 and from INEGI for the years after 2007.

To complement the dark figure in measuring administrative capacity, the justice administration effective clearance rate will also be examined. The effective clearance rate refers to the total number of criminal cases that are finalized, irrespective of whether these end in a conviction or absolution, by the total number of crimes registered by the justice department in a given year. It provides insight into how successful the overall justice system is in dealing with crime.

## **Chapter Summary**

The approach for this project, in terms of data collection and analysis, is to use a combination of different methods; specifically, aggregated statistics, survey analysis, document analysis, and case study analysis. The following chapter provides a discussion about the results and findings, while the final chapter provides discussion about the findings, as well as concluding remarks. A summary of the methodology used for each pillar question can be found on Table 4.

Table 4 Operationalization Table

Purpose: The purpose of this applied research paper is to conduct a preliminary assessment of Mexico's political institutions since the Merida Initiative to evaluate the progress, or lack thereof, in relation to the agreement's explicit goals.		
State Capacity		
I. Coercive Capacity		
Pillar Question 1: How has state coercion changed since 2007?		
Component	Measure	Source
A: Violent Crime	Homicide Rate Per 100,000	SEGOB
B: Criminal Org. Capacity	Extortion Rate per 100,000	SEGOB
II. Extractive Capacity		
Pillar Question 2: How has state extraction changed since 2007?		
A: Informality Rate	% of people in subnational entity in informal economy	CNI
B: IPSI	% of people in subnational entity who are unable to save any of their income	INEGI
III. Conductive Capacity		
Pillar Question 3: How has state conductive capacity changed since 2007?		
A: Has there been stability in interparty competition?	1. Electoral Volatility in local congresses 2. Electoral extra systemic volatility in local congresses	Local Congress Websites
B: Do political parties have stable roots in society?	1. Lack of Party I.D 2. Abstention Rate National Elections 3. Abstention Rate Gubernatorial Elections	1. CIDE 2. INE 3. Subnational electoral institutes
C: How have citizen attitudes changed regarding democratic institutions?	% of people in subnational entities who view political parties as being corrupt	CIDE
D: Are individual parties institutionalized?	Receive 10% of vote in five or more national elections	INE
E: How has administering justice changed?	1. Dark Figure 2. Effective Clearance Rate	CEI INEGI

## **Chapter V Results and Discussion**

### **Chapter Purpose**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the results obtained from the various methodological tools explained in the previous chapter. As a reminder, the purpose of this project is to conduct a preliminary assessment of Mexican political institutions since the Merida Initiative was implemented in 2007. The project's conceptual framework follows an adapted structure which is designed to assess Mexico's state capacity. This chapter is organized following that very structure. Coercive capacity will be addressed first, extractive capacity will follow next, and conductive capacity will be the focus of the end of this chapter.

For the variables that make up those three dimensions, a fixed-effect regression was conducted to estimate the effect of the Merida Initiative on these variables. In a fixed-effect regression with a panel/longitudinal model design, as is the case for this study, the effects are estimated by only considering the time-variant characteristics of the units being measured. In this case the units of analysis are the subnational entities being measured yearly from 1997 to 2016<sup>18</sup>. Individual characteristics of the units, such as culture, male/female ratio, geographic components, and other time invariant characteristic are controlled for in the fixed-effect estimate. This is done because by controlling for all time-invariant differences, fixed effects models greatly reduce the threat of omitted variable bias. (Dranove, 2012, p 8). In addition, to account for


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<sup>18</sup> Governor elections, federal elections, and federal legislative results are included in the report but were not analyzed in any of the regression models.

heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were used. Finally, descriptive statistics, tables, and graphs not found in this chapter can be found in the appendix at the end of this report.

### Coercive Capacity Results

Graph 1 and 2: Homicide and Extortion Rates



Without applying any complex statistical analyses, it is clear that there is a major difference

in intentional homicides and extortions before 2007 and after. While the average homicide rate

for the seven years before

the Merida Initiative

(2000-2006) was 11.33

homicides per 100,000

people, the average for

the last seven years

(2009-2016) was 17.75.



On the other hand, the mean difference between before and after MI in terms of Extortion rates

was an increase of 3.06 extortions per 100,000 people.

Table 5: Mean Difference Coercive Capacity

Coercive Mean Difference		
Homicide (MI)		17.1341
Homicide (Pre)		11.3311
	Mean Difference	5.80305
Extortion (MI)		5.4244
Extortion(Pre)		2.36088
	Mean Difference	3.06353
Mean Diff. by Subnational Entity		
Homicide Rate		
	Chihuahua	42.372
	Sinaloa	28.774
	Guerrero	23.013
	Durango	19.05
	Colima	18.215
	Nuevo Leon	15.317
	Morelos	14.393
	Coahuila	11.862
	Tamaulipas	10.994
	Sonora	9.9819
Extortion Rate		
	Quintana Roo	10.546
	Morelos	9.1836
	Tabasco	6.4607
	Coahuila	6.1729
	Baja California	5.2807
	Jalisco	4.4543
	Tamaulipas	4.1336
	Chihuahua	3.9336
	San Luis Potosi	3.605
	Estado de Mexico	3.5186

Further, a fixed-effect linear regression was conducted to estimate the effect of MI on both the homicide and extortion rates. The homicide rate results demonstrate that a significant proportion of the variance can be attributed to MI ( $F(1, 607) = 23.25, p > .000$ ) as  $R^2$  was .48 and adjusted  $R^2$  was .46. MI was a significant predictor of intentional homicides per 100,000 individuals ( $t = 4.82, p > .000$ ) with MI increasing on average by 3.66 homicides.

In addition, the extortion rate fixed effects regression results were significant ( $F(1, 451) = 110.95, p > .000$ ) with an adjusted  $R^2$  of .51. The extortion rate increased on average 3.25 extortions per 100,000 people ( $t = 10.53, p > .000$ ) after the policy was implemented. The results of the regression are presented in Table 6.


*Table 6 Coercive Capacity Regression*

Multivariate Robust Fixed-Effects Regression					
		F	P>F	$R^2$	Adj. $R^2$
Homicide Rate		23.25	0.000***	0.48	0.46
Extortion Rate		110.95	0.000***	0.51	0.47
		$\beta$	Robust SE	t	p> t
Homicide Rate	Merida Initiative	3.66	.75	4.82	0.000***
	const.	12.48	.43	28.76	0.000***
Extortion Rate	Merida Initiative	3.25	0.31	10.53	0.000***
	const.	2.4	0.21	11.66	0.000***

*Note 1:  $p > .05^*$ ,  $p > .01^{**}$ ,  $p > .001^{***}$*

## Extractive Capacity Results

*Graph 3 IPSR and Informality Rate*



The results for the extractive capacity dimension demonstrate that there was not an evident or drastic change after MI. In addition, the analysis is further complicated by the fact that the 2008 global financial crisis occurred simultaneous to the implementation of the Merida Initiative, making it difficult to demonstrate a clear effect. With this in mind, the major conclusion that we can draw in terms of change in overall state extractive capacity is the fact that there wasn't any major change to Mexican extractive capacity. The repercussions of this are consequential because it means that about 70% of the Mexican people are still unable to save any part of their income, while more than half of the country still functions under the shadows of informality.



Table 7: Increase in IPSR

Increase in % of People Unable to Save Income	
Guanajuato	16%
Guerrero	12%
Yucatan	11%
Estado de Mexico	10%
Sinaloa	10%
Jalisco	10%
Queretaro	9%
Nuevo Leon	7.50%
Mexico City	7.30%

In addition to extractive capacity stagnation, it is important to note that among the worst performing subnational entities since the Merida Initiative was implemented, in terms of IPSR, included some of the most populated areas in the country: Estado de Mexico, Mexico City, Jalisco, and Nuevo Leon.


### Conductive Capacity Results

The dimension of conductive capacity, in short, measures the state's ability to respond to society's normative discourse (Warren, 2006, p 387). This project has incorporated concepts of democratic institutionalization and administrative capacity of the state, along with proper measures to evaluate each variable. In addition to the fixed-effect regressions used to evaluate the effect of MI on conductive capacity, this section also includes four supplemental regression models utilized to test the theoretical claim concerning conductive capacity. Throughout the course of this project, a variety of surveys and survey items were analyzed.

One of those survey items is a question stating: *"In your opinion, which is the most important problem in the country?"*. The question provides insight into the most pressing societal demands during specific time periods. Graph 4 is a mosaic chart detailing the responses

to the question. The question is divided into two periods; on the left side, the pre-MI period and on the right, the post-MI implementation period.

*Graph 4: Biggest Problem in the Country Pre-Post MI*



The biggest problem in the eyes of society before MI implementation was the overall condition of public services in the country<sup>19</sup>, while the economy and insecurity were distant second and third places. In comparison, after MI was implemented, the biggest concerns focused around the economy (48%) and corruption (30%).

The contrast between the two periods couldn't be clearer. There was a collective shift in the Mexican mind, going from a simple demand for better public services to an overarching view of corruption in the system. In addition to this, it is not surprising to see concerns about the

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<sup>19</sup> The public services category included education, health, transportation infrastructure and related public services.

economy explode after 2007 as this was not only a Mexican concern but a global one as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. However, what is shocking is the fact that insecurity never came to be, in the eyes of Mexican society, the national *summa priori*; it wasn't the biggest concern before the Merida Initiative and it wasn't the biggest concern after the Merida Initiative.

### ***Multivariate Fixed-Effects Linear Regression***

A fixed-effects, multivariate regression model with an MI independent dummy variable was significant in all of the conductive capacity variables. The results indicate that MI explains a significant proportion of the variance in each variable. A summary of the results can be found on Table 8.

Table 8: Conductive Capacity Regression Results


Multivariate Robust Fixed-Effects Regression		F	P>F	R <sup>2</sup>	Adj. R <sup>2</sup>
Loc. C Volatility		9.86	.002**	0.30	0.17
Loc. C ESV		69.35	.000***	0.37	0.27
Fragmentation		55.43	.000***	0.46	0.36
Lack of Partisan ID		39.4	.000***	0.62	0.59
Percep. Parties Corrupt		326.59	.000***	0.58	0.54
Dark Figure		185.51	.000***	0.38	0.34
Effective Clearance Rate		56.53	.000***	0.51	0.48
		$\beta$	Robust SE	t	p> t
Loc. C Volatility	Merida Initiative	4.07	1.29	3.14	.026**
	const.	16.63	.80	20.66	.000***
Loc. C ESV	Merida Initiative	4.17	0.50	8.33	.000***
	const.	3.48	0.25	14.20	.000***
Fragmentation	Merida Initiative	0.58	0.078	7.45	.000***
	const.	2.59	0.045	57.00	.000***
Lack of Partisan ID	Merida Initiative	13.59	5.69	2.59	.000***
	const.	32.10	2.92	11.62	.000***
Percept. Parties Corrupt	Merida Initiative	8.63	0.48	18.07	.000***
	const.	77.04	0.43	177.72	.000***
Dark Figure	Merida Initiative	11.90	0.87	13.62	.000***
	const.	74.99	0.72	103.92	.000***
Eff. Clearance Rate	Merida Initiative	-3.80	0.506	-7.52	.000***
	const.	11.81	.307	38.52	.000***

Note 2: p&gt;.1 (\*) p&gt;.05\*, p&gt;.01\*\*, p&gt;.001\*\*\*

### ***Inter-Party Competition***

The three variables measured for the inter-party competition component of conductive capacity were significant in the multivariate fixed-effects regression. Local congress volatility on average was 4.07 higher after MI (3.14  $p>.026$ ), local congress ESV was 4.17 higher after MI (8.33,  $p>.000$ ), and fragmentation was .58 higher after MI implementation (7.45,  $p>.000$ ).

*Graph 5 Local Congress ESV*



The meaning of these results is that after 2006 there was a significant change in interparty competition in all Mexican subnational entities, a significant increase in the effective number parties in subnational congresses, and a significant increase in electoral support for non-systemic parties.

### ***Roots in Society***

To measure party roots in society, party-identification, or the lack of partisan identification in this case, was measured through survey-item analysis. The multivariate fixed effects regression with MI as the independent variable was significant ( $F(16, 462) = 39.4$ ,  $p>.000$ ) with an  $R^2$  of .62 and adjusted  $R^2$  .59. The number of people who do not identify with

any political party in Mexico was 13.59% higher after MI (2.59,  $p > .000$ ) than before its implementation.

In addition to measuring the percentage of people who do not identify with any of the parties, the federal and local abstention rate mean differences between pre-and-post MI were also analyzed. The federal abstention rate includes six legislative elections from 2000 to 2015, while the local abstention rate considers gubernatorial elections between 1997 to 2017. A summary of the mean differences between pre-post MI is displayed in Table 9, along with the entities who experienced the largest increases in electoral abstention.

*Table 9 Abstention Mean Differences*

Abstention Mean Difference		
Gubernatorial Abstention (MI)		46.13
Gubernatorial Abstention (Pre)		44.97
		Mean Difference 1.16
Federal Legislative Abstention (MI)		53.54
Federal Legislative Abstention (Pre)		49.23
		Mean Difference 4.3
Mean Diff. by Subnational Entity		
Gubernatorial Abstention		
	Distrito Federal	22.89
	Baja California	12.3
	Guerrero	9.4
	Aguascalientes	6.41
	Michoacán	6.2
Federal Legislative Abstention		
	Distrito Federal	14.29
	Aguascalientes	13.15
	Chihuahua	12.05
	Sinaloa	11.77
	Baja California	8.56

In both gubernatorial and federal legislative elections, the abstention rate increased following MI with mean differences of 1.16% and 4.3%, respectively. The subnational entity with the biggest abstention increase was the capital, Mexico City, with 22.89% and 14.29% abstention rate increases. All in all, the results denote a significant change towards fewer party roots in society after MI implementation.

### ***Legitimacy of Democratic Institutions***

Citizen perceptions about democratic process are crucial for the overall wellbeing and functioning of both the state and democracy. To evaluate whether democratic legitimacy was significantly different after 2007, the project tested citizen perceptions of political parties being corrupt. The results suggest that citizen views about political parties being corrupt increased on average 8.63% after MI implementation (18.07,  $p < .000$ ). The regression model significantly accounted for overall variance with an  $R^2$  of .58 ( $F(14, 434) = 60.52, p > .000$ ). What these results denote is that democratic legitimacy, from the perspective of citizens, is significantly lower after MI than it was from 2001 to 2007.

### ***Party Institutionalization***

The standard used to determine individual party institutionalization, involved measuring whether parties reached a threshold of 10% in the share of votes through five consecutive legislative elections. Table 10 provides the percentage of votes that parties received in lower chamber legislative elections from 1997 to 2015 in Mexico. The table includes parties that either

received above the 10% vote threshold or parties that would have reached 10% if the null vote percentage was added to their total.<sup>20</sup>

*Table 10 Share of Votes in Federal Lower-Chamber Elections*

	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009	2012	2015
PAN	26%	38.24%	30.73%	33.39%	28%	25.89%	21.04%
PRI	38%	36.92%	23.14%	28.21%	36.75%	29.87%	28.82%
PRD	25%	18.68%	17.61%	28.99%	12.20%	16.49%	10.78%
PVEM			13.65%		6.52%		6.50%
Morena							8.35%
MC							6.10%
Null Vote	2.84%	2.32%	3.36%	2.51%	5.40%	4.96%	4.75%

There are two noticeable conclusions that we can draw from the results. The first is the higher percentage in null votes in legislative elections post-MI than before MI, going from an average of 2.73% in the period 2000-2006, to 5.04% in 2009-2015. The second noticeable conclusion is that after 2007 the PRD lost a substantial share of votes in legislative elections; the party went from consistently surpassing the 15% mark to only gathering 15% of the vote once since 2007 and dropping as low as a mere 10.78% in the 2015 election.

One of the main reasons for PRD's recent decline, after achieving record high numbers in the 2006 presidential election, is the result of an internal strife that occurred between two

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<sup>20</sup> Null votes are votes that do not go towards any candidate or party in the ballot. Instead, in some instances, these are casted as a way for citizens to show their discontent, i.e. a citizen may choose to vote for Mickey Mouse or write "All parties are corrupt". Votes may also be nullified if the citizen casting the vote makes a mistake in the ballot. For example, a person may accidentally vote for two parties and therefore their vote is considered null.



factions within the party. The strife ultimately culminated in an official party split following the 2012 presidential election.

On one side of the dispute was the faction of hardliners headed by two-time presidential candidate, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, which argued against cooperating with the right-wing PRI and PAN parties in a variety of policy issues, including the Merida Initiative. The second faction was composed of “New Left” moderate *Perredistas*<sup>21</sup> friendlier to the positions held by the right-wing parties in Mexico.


Moreover, after losing the 2012 election and claiming electoral fraud for a second time, Lopez Obrador left the PRD to create his own party, the Movement of National Regeneration or simply “Morena”. Since Morena’s founding, the party’s support has grown noticeably, as can be seen in graph 6 which shows vote intentions for the 2018 presidential election. As it currently stands, Morena is at the head of the race with 24% of the people saying that they will vote for the party in next year’s electoral contest.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Term referring to members or supporters of the PRD.

<sup>22</sup> Three polls were used: 8/15 poll from Parametria:  
[http://www.parametria.com.mx/carta\\_parametrica.php?cp=4802](http://www.parametria.com.mx/carta_parametrica.php?cp=4802)  
8/16 poll from Reforma: <http://gruporeforma-blogs.com/encuestas/?p=6594>  
8/17 poll from El Universal: <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/politica/morena-mantiene-preferencia-rumbo-2018>

Graph 6: 2018 Election Vote Intentions



In general, the results of party institutionalization, as exemplified by PRD's decline, the growing number of people who view parties as being corrupt, and the fact that an outsider party is the current favorite to win the 2018 presidential election, demonstrate that parties are less institutionalized since 2007 than in the ten years prior to 2007.

### ***Public Administration***

The last category of the conductive capacity dimension measures the delivery of public goods, which was operationalized in this project through the analysis of Mexico's dark figure and effective clearance rate. Fixed-effects regressions were conducted to evaluate if the Merida Initiative was a significant predictor of the administrative capacity variables. The results were significant, indicating that on average the dark figure increased 11.5% after MI implementation (13.62,  $p > .000$ ). MI as a predictor of the dark figure accounted for .38 of the variance ( $F=185.51$ ,  $p > .000$ ). On average the conviction rate decreased 3.8% (-7.52,  $p > .000$ ), with an  $R^2$  of .51 ( $F=56.53$ ,  $p > .000$ ).

***Multiple Fixed-Effects Linear Regression Models***

In addition to testing the effects of MI, multiple fixed-effects linear regression models were conducted to test whether coercive and extractive capacity significantly influence the conductive capacity dimension of the state. Specifically, the models tested whether the homicide, extortion, informality, and IPS rates were significant predictors of local congress ESV, lack of partisan identification, perception that political parties are corrupt, and the dark figure. Hausman tests were conducted to determine whether to use fixed or random effects in the models. These tests came out significant for all of models, which meant that fixed effects were more suitable to use. The results of the models are presented in Table 11.

Table 11: Conductive Capacity Fixed-Effects Regression Models

	Model 1 <i>Interparty Competition</i>	Model 2 <i>Roots</i>	Model 3 <i>Legitimacy</i>	Model 4 <i>Admin. Capacity</i>	
	Local Congress ESV	Lack of Partisan ID	View Parties are Corrupt	Dark Figure Effective Clearance Rate	
Homicide	.14 <sup>(*)</sup> (.029)	.184*** (.051)	.051 <sup>(*)</sup> (.030)	.14** (3.81)	-.001*** (.0002)
Extortion	.21** (.091)	.375** (.127)	.711*** (.087)	.91*** (6.07)	-.002 (.001)
Informality	-.32*** (.128)	-.35** (.164)	-.565*** (.125)	-.62** (.26)	.003** (.001)
IPSR	.04 (.05)	-.013 (.058)	.07 <sup>(*)</sup> (.038)	.27*** (.073)	-.001** (.0003)
	F (4, 131) 5.82***	F (4, 361) 9.20***	F (4, 387) 27.97***	F (4, 387) 20.17***	F (4, 417) 19.97***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.28	0.36	0.31	.48
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.21	0.31	0.24	.44

Note 3:  $p > .10^{(*)}$   $p > .05^*$   $p > .01^{**}$   $p > .001^{***}$

Note 4: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis under their respective  $\beta$  coefficient.

From the results of the four models we can conclude that all of the models, which represent the dimensions of conductive capacity, are significantly influenced by at least one coercive capacity variable and one extractive capacity variable, irrespective of which particular dimension of conductive capacity the dependent variable represents. For example, while interparty competition and party roots are significantly predicted by all but IPSR, legitimacy and administrative capacity are significantly predicted by all four variables. These results indicate the value of integrating a conductive capacity dimension in state capacity and state strength assessments. In addition to the significance of the results, a sizeable amount of the variance in

the four conductive capacity variables is explained by coercive and extractive capacity; adjusted  $R^2$  values range from .13 for local congress ESV ( $F(4, 131) = 5.82, p > .000$ ) to .31 for perception that parties are corrupt ( $F(4, 387) = 27.97, p > .000$ ).

## Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to conduct a preliminary assessment of Mexican political institutions since 2007, when implementation of the security bilateral agreement, the Merida Initiative, between the United States and Mexico began. Three state capacity dimensions were assessed: 1) coercive capacity, 2) extractive capacity, and 3) conductive capacity. The coercive capacity dimension was evaluated by considering the country's intentional homicide rate and the extortion rate. Extractive capacity was evaluated by looking at changes in the informality rate as well as the inverse personal savings rate. Lastly, conductive capacity evaluated a number of variables commonly used to measure party-system institutionalization, also including and operationalizing administrative capacity; administrative capacity was evaluated through an analysis of Mexico's dark figure as well as effective clearance rate.

The project conducted a multivariate fixed-effects regression, as well as multiple mean differences analyses. Table 12 below provides a summary of the findings.

*Table 12: Summary of Findings*

	Since 2007
Coercive Capacity	Decreased
Extractive Capacity	No significant change
Conductive Capacity	Decreased

The findings suggest that over the ten years since the war against organized crime began, Mexican state strength has decreased. Today, Mexico faces more violence, a lower degree of democratic functionality, and the same amount of people living in the shadows of economic

informality and misery of poverty as did ten years ago. If truth rests on the foundation that judgement is passed not on an introspection of intentions but through the evidence found in the results, then the truth is that both Mexican and American authorities have failed to achieve the explicit goals outlined in the Merida Initiative.

Finally, the results of this project demonstrate that conductive capacity is a measure of the state that should not be overlooked. The interaction between state coercion and state extraction significantly affects the quality and overall functioning of both, democratic governance, and the state's ability to deliver public goods.

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## **Surveys**

Encuesta Nacional Sobre Confianza en el Consumidor

Encuesta Nacional Sobre Cultura Política y Practicas Ciudadanas

Estudio Comparativo de Sistemas Electorales

Encuesta Nacional de Victimacion y Percepcion de la Seguridad Publica

Encuesta Nacional Sobre Inseguridad


Encuesta Nacional de Valores

Indice Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno

Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental

Acevero de Opinion Publica de la Oficina de la Republica

Encuestas Gabinete



Annex I: Map  
of Mexico

## **Annex II: National Parties**



Partido Accion Nacional (PAN)

National Action Party

Founded: 1939



Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)

Institutional Revolutionary Party

Founded: 1929



Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD)

Party of the Democratic Revolution

Founded: 1989



Partido Verde Ecologista (PVEM)

Green Ecologist Party

Founded: 1986



Partido del Trabajo (PT)

Labor Party

Founded: 1990



Movimiento Ciudadano

Citizens Movement Party

Founded: 2011



Nueva Alianza

New Alliance Party

Founded: 2005



Movimiento de Regeneracion Nacional

National Regeneration Movement

Founded: 2014



Encuentro Social

Social Encounter Party

Founded: 2006 Nationally: 2014

*Source: Instituto Nacional Electoral*



**Annex III: Tables***Table 13: Sample of Variables by State in 2006, 2011, 2015*

Entity	Year	Homicide	Extortion	IPSR	Informality	Dark Figure
Aguascalientes	2006	2.33	2.69	67	44	85
Aguascalientes	2011	5.84	9.38	76	46	91
Aguascalientes	2015	3.03	2.87	88	42	92
Baja California	2006	16.22	11.05	63	38	72
Baja California	2011	20.55	10.87	70	42	82
Baja California	2015	23.82	6.34	73	39	90
BC Sur	2006	3.54	12.39	57	35	60
BC Sur	2011	5.65	7.43	73	41	85
BC Sur	2015	19.77	6.41	77	40	88
Campeche	2006	3.58	0	68	52	88
Campeche	2011	6.92	0	73	55	88
Campeche	2015	5.84	3.74	74	54	90
Chiapas	2006	7.76	1.88	54	39	80
Chiapas	2011	12.31	1.79	66	41	93
Chiapas	2015	9.56	4.13	62	35	95
Chihuahua	2006	17.85	1.87	57	47	68
Chihuahua	2011	86.68	6.69	51	51	91
Chihuahua	2015	25.47	0.3	72	51	91
Coahuila	2006	4.15	4.25	68	68	73
Coahuila	2011	23.42	8.41	77	66	92
Coahuila	2015	9.93	7.22	62	68	93
Colima	2006	5.12	0	71	36	68
Colima	2011	24.54	2.09	66	41	87
Colima	2015	23.08	1.22	55	33	90
CDMX	2006	7.23	0	78	49	85
CDMX	2011	8.72	1.79	88	49	87
CDMX	2015	9.64	1.94	75	50	90
Durango	2006	12.93	5.36	55	47	79
Durango	2011	45.2	6.39	76	49	89
Durango	2015	13.49	3.51	81	50	90
Edo Mexico	2006	19.08	0	58	67	83
Edo Mexico	2011	9.54	0	83	72	92
Edo Mexico	2015	12.27	3.82	73	73	94
Guanajuato	2006	4.54	2.25	67	66	84

Guanajuato	2011	10.76	3.94	85	70	96
Guanajuato	2015	15.11	0.14	92	67	97
Guerrero	2006	25.17	1.08	53	53	80
Guerrero	2011	62.13	2.45	78	52	91
Guerrero	2015	56.5	4.04	75	47	90
Hidalgo	2006	3.99	3.24	61	56	87
Hidalgo	2011	4.07	2.45	71	55	92
Hidalgo	2015	4.97	1.46	74	58	94
Jalisco	2006	6.07	6.8	66	55	87
Jalisco	2011	16.2	6.35	75	60	92
Jalisco	2015	12.82	10.48	87	55	95
Michoacán	2006	15.52	2.68	72	65	75
Michoacán	2011	17.34	4.13	69	66	92
Michoacán	2015	25.78	8.96	77	64	93
Morelos	2006	9.33	25.58	74	64	69
Morelos	2011	30.43	12.48	86	62	90
Morelos	2015	5.8		62	57	89
Nayarit	2006	9.25		57	55	79
Nayarit	2011	40.28		61	59	93
Nayarit	2015	16.9	0.94	78	65	93
Nuevo Leon	2006	4.08	1.86	65	39	80
Nuevo Leon	2011	41.75	1.27	78	41	94
Nuevo Leon	2015	8.87	10.01	74	36	93
Oaxaca	2006	28.69	6.26	73	70	82
Oaxaca	2011	16.43	3.1	69	72	92
Oaxaca	2015	18.74	2.27	78	72	94
Puebla	2006	7.42	0	64	68	80
Puebla	2011	10.43	0.05	71	69	92
Puebla	2015	8.06	4.41	65	67	92
Queretaro	2006	3.03	2.5	69	46	79
Queretaro	2011	5.21	1.44	77	46	90
Queretaro	2015	6.93	0.3	83	43	90
Quintana Roo	2006	10.13	1.87	56	48	71
Quintana Roo	2011	19.28	10.53	68	49	90
Quintana Roo	2015	14.48	7.37	66	44	89
San Luis P	2006	5.24	5.6	56	53	73
San Luis P	2011	15.18	8.99	84	51	95
San Luis P	2015	8.75	5.12	63	51	94
Sinaloa	2006	22.12	1.87	57	49	82

Sinaloa	2011	66.21	5.04	74	49	92
Sinaloa	2015	33.27	4.32	69	47	92
Sonora	2006	9.36	1.77	59	41	79
Sonora	2011	17.06	1.01	77	45	92
Sonora	2015	17.46	0.61	71	42	93
Tabasco	2006	7.73	1.58	63	54	81
Tabasco	2011	7.1	6.7	61	59	85
Tabasco	2015	9.77	7.17	84	60	94
Tamaulipas	2006	11.06	0.73	78	42	74
Tamaulipas	2011	25.32	4.65	82	49	93
Tamaulipas	2015	15.04	4.91	64	45	95
Tlaxcala	2006	16.8	0	76	67	89
Tlaxcala	2011	5.89	0	76	69	90
Tlaxcala	2015	4.62	0.7	85	68	94
Veracruz	2006	5.82	2.13	78	58	75
Veracruz	2011	11.42	5.13	84	60	94
Veracruz	2015	7.02	1.57	82	60	95
Yucatan	2006	1.17	0	59	58	71
Yucatan	2011	2.29	1.39	74	61	89
Yucatan	2015	2.5	3.21	79	59	91
Zacatecas	2006	3.45	0.9	81	53	80
Zacatecas	2011	7.81	2.96	82	55	92
Zacatecas	2015	14.91	5.77	75	56	92

*Table 14: Descriptive Statistics*

	N	Mean	Std.
Homicide Rate	640	14.30595	13.0206
Extortion Rate	484	4.268822	4.312159
Informality Rate	640	58.6956	12.48218
IPSR	640	71.44582	9.466717
Avg. Local Volatility	217	18.71132	10.65004
Avg. Local ESV	217	5.619831	4.329538
Fragmentation	217	2.885217	0.7332229
Lack of Partisan ID	510	38.92299	9.041376
View Parties Corr.	480	82.22182	6.871711
Conviction Rate	602	9.9	8.523
Dark Figure	480	82.13283	11.08924

*Table 15: Local Congress Extra Systemic Volatility*

	Average	Total
1997	2.27	4.53
1998	1.53	3.05
1999	3.28	6.56
2000	3.74	7.47
2001	2.69	5.38
2002	4.26	8.51
2003	5.08	10.17
2004	2.89	5.77
2005	5.16	10.32
2006	4.86	9.73
2007	4.65	9.30
2008	8.62	17.24
2009	5.95	11.90
2010	6.02	12.05
2011	6.23	12.47
2012	5.19	10.38
2013	7.85	15.69
2014	11.40	22.79
2015	9.65	19.31
2016	12.54	25.07

*Table 16: Local Congress Fragmentation*

	Fragmentation
1997	2.66
1998	2.36
1999	2.37
2000	2.56
2001	2.56
2002	2.53
2003	2.80
2004	2.72
2005	2.52
2006	2.70
2007	2.92
2008	2.73
2009	2.78
2010	3.10
2011	2.98
2012	3.03
2013	3.34
2014	3.55
2015	3.36
2016	3.83

*Table 18 Party Institutionalization*

Year Founded	Institutionalized	Incomplete/ Marginal
1946	PRI	
1946	PAN	
1989	PRD	
1986		PVEM
1990		PT
1998		MC
2005		Nueva Alianza
2014		ES
2014		MORENA

*Table 19: National Congress Fragmentation Vote & Seat*

National Congress Fragmentation		
	Effective Number of Parties at the electoral level (Votes)	Effective number of parties at the legislative level (Seats)
1997	3.42	2.85
2000	3.00	2.54
2003	3.19	2.76
2006	3.42	3.03
2009	3.77	2.75
2012	3.16	2.8
2015	4.38	3.11

Table 20: Parties Share of Seats in Local Congresses

Election	State	Legislature	Year	PAN	PRI	PRD	PVEM	PT	MC	NA	Other
1	Aguascalientes	LVII	1998	59%	37%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Aguascalientes	LVIII	2001	37%	44%	4%	7%	7%	0%	0%	0%
3	Aguascalientes	LIX	2004	67%	15%	4%	7%	4%	4%	0%	0%
4	Aguascalientes	LX	2007	33%	52%	4%	4%	0%	7%	0%	0%
5	Aguascalientes	LXI	2010	33%	48%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	0%
6	Aguascalientes	LXII	2013	26%	44%	7%	7%	4%	4%	7%	0%
7	Aguascalientes	LXIII	2016	48%	22%	4%	7%	0%	0%	11%	7%
1	Baja California	XVI	1998	39%	46%	14%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Baja California	XVII	2001	50%	39%	7%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	Baja California	XVIII	2004	43%	39%	11%	4%	0%	0%	0%	4%
4	Baja California	XIX	2007	46%	31%	4%	4%	0%	0%	12%	4%
5	Baja California	XX	2010	28%	48%	4%	8%	4%	0%	4%	4%
6	Baja California	XXI	2013	28%	28%	4%	4%	8%	8%	8%	12%
7	Baja California	XXII	2016	52%	20%	4%	0%	4%	4%	0%	16%
1	BC Sur	IX	1999	19%	19%	62%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	BC Sur	X	2002	10%	29%	52%	5%	0%	0%	0%	5%
3	BC Sur	XI	2005	5%	10%	76%	0%	10%	0%	0%	0%
4	BC Sur	XII	2008	10%	10%	67%	0%	0%	0%	10%	5%
5	BC Sur	XIII	2011	33%	29%	19%	0%	0%	5%	5%	10%
6	BC Sur	XIV	2015	62%	14%	5%	0%	5%	0%	0%	14%
1	Campeche	LVII	1997	9%	54%	34%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%
2	Campeche	LVII	2000	37%	53%	8%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
3	Campeche	LVIII	2003	37%	51%	3%	0%	0%	9%	0%	0%
4	Campeche	LIX	2006	37%	46%	9%	0%	0%	6%	3%	0%
5	Campeche	LX	2009	40%	49%	0%	3%	0%	0%	9%	0%
6	Campeche	LXI	2012	26%	57%	6%	0%	3%	3%	6%	0%
7	Campeche	LXII	2015	31%	43%	3%	9%	0%	0%	6%	9%
1	Chiapas	LX	1998	13%	65%	15%	0%	5%	0%	0%	3%
2	Chiapas	LXI	2001	13%	65%	15%	0%	5%	0%	0%	3%
3	Chiapas	LXII	2004	18%	43%	25%	8%	5%	3%	0%	0%
4	Chiapas	LXIII	2007	18%	35%	25%	8%	5%	5%	5%	0%
5	Chiapas	LXIV	2010	23%	30%	20%	15%	5%	3%	5%	0%
6	Chiapas	LXV	2013	10%	39%	5%	32%	2%	5%	0%	7%
7	Chiapas	LXVI	2015	5%	24%	5%	39%	0%	0%	7%	20%
1	Chihuahua	LIX	1998	36%	55%	9%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Chihuahua	LX	2001	33%	55%	6%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%

3	Chihuahua	LXI	2004	30%	55%	9%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%
4	Chihuahua	LXII	2007	36%	45%	3%	3%	3%	0%	9%	0%
5	Chihuahua	LXIII	2010	36%	55%	3%	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%
6	Chihuahua	LXIV	2013	21%	52%	6%	6%	6%	3%	6%	0%
7	Chihuahua	LXV	2016	48%	15%	3%	6%	6%	3%	9%	9%
1	Coahuila	LIV	1997	31%	47%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	16%
2	Coahuila	LV	2000	16%	72%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%
3	Coahuila	LVI	2003	23%	57%	9%	0%	6%	0%	0%	6%
4	Coahuila	LVII	2006	24%	61%	0%	6%	3%	0%	0%	6%
5	Coahuila	LVIII	2009	23%	65%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%
6	Coahuila	LIX	2012	8%	60%	0%	8%	0%	0%	8%	16%
7	Coahuila	LX	2015	16%	64%	0%	4%	0%	0%	4%	12%
1	Colima	LII	1997	35%	45%	15%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%
2	Colima	LIII	2000	32%	52%	12%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%
3	Colima	LIV	2003	35%	50%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%
4	Colima	LV	2006	40%	48%	8%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
5	Colima	LVI	2009	28%	56%	0%	0%	4%	0%	12%	0%
6	Colima	LVII	2012	28%	44%	8%	4%	4%	0%	12%	0%
7	Colima	LVIII	2015	40%	32%	0%	4%	4%	4%	4%	12%
1	CDMX	I	1997	17%	17%	58%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%
2	CDMX	II	2000	26%	24%	29%	12%	2%	3%	0%	5%
3	CDMX	III	2003	24%	11%	56%	8%	0%	0%	0%	2%
4	CDMX	IV	2006	24%	8%	53%	3%	2%	2%	6%	3%
5	CDMX	V	2009	14%	12%	52%	6%	9%	3%	3%	2%
6	CDMX	VI	2012	20%	14%	48%	3%	8%	5%	3%	0%
7	CDMX	VII	2015	15%	12%	26%	5%	2%	5%	2%	35%
1	Durango	LXI	1998	28%	48%	8%	0%	16%	0%	0%	0%
2	Durango	LXII	2001	32%	52%	4%	0%	12%	0%	0%	0%
3	Durango	LXIII	2004	28%	60%	4%	0%	4%	0%	0%	4%
4	Durango	LXIV	2007	27%	57%	7%	0%	3%	0%	3%	3%
5	Durango	LXV	2010	17%	57%	3%	3%	3%	3%	10%	3%
6	Durango	LXVI	2013	7%	73%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
7	Durango	LXVII	2016	32%	36%	8%	8%	4%	0%	8%	4%
1	Estado de Mexico	LIII	1997	39%	33%	21%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%
2	Estado de Mexico	LIV	2000	39%	35%	21%	3%	1%	0%	0%	1%
3	Estado de Mexico	LV	2003	31%	31%	26%	5%	4%	3%	0%	0%
4	Estado de Mexico	LVI	2006	27%	28%	27%	9%	4%	4%	0%	0%
5	Estado de Mexico	LVII	2009	16%	53%	11%	4%	4%	4%	7%	1%
6	Estado de Mexico	LVIII	2012	15%	52%	16%	5%	3%	3%	7%	0%



7	Estado de Mexico	LIX	2015	15%	45%	16%	3%	3%	4%	3%	12%
1	Guanajuato	LVII	1997	44%	33%	14%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%
2	Guanajuato	LVIII	2000	66%	26%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%
3	Guanajuato	LIX	2003	53%	25%	11%	8%	3%	0%	0%	0%
4	Guanajuato	LX	2006	64%	19%	8%	6%	3%	0%	0%	0%
5	Guanajuato	LXI	2009	61%	22%	3%	8%	0%	3%	3%	0%
6	Guanajuato	LXII	2012	53%	33%	6%	6%	0%	0%	3%	0%
7	Guanajuato	LXIII	2015	53%	22%	8%	8%	0%	3%	3%	3%
1	Guerrero	LVI	1999	2%	65%	30%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
2	Guerrero	LVII	2002	9%	43%	37%	2%	2%	4%	0%	2%
3	Guerrero	LVIII	2005	9%	28%	48%	4%	4%	7%	0%	0%
4	Guerrero	LIX	2008	7%	39%	39%	5%	2%	7%	2%	0%
5	Guerrero	LX	2012	4%	24%	54%	4%	4%	7%	2%	0%
6	Guerrero	LXI	2015	2%	41%	30%	13%	4%	7%	0%	2%
1	Hidalgo	LVII	1999	24%	62%	10%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
2	Hidalgo	LVIII	2002	14%	62%	24%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	Hidalgo	LIX	2005	7%	72%	10%	7%	3%	0%	0%	0%
4	Hidalgo	LX	2008	10%	63%	13%	3%	0%	0%	10%	0%
5	Hidalgo	LXI	2011	17%	60%	7%	3%	3%	3%	7%	0%
6	Hidalgo	LXII	2014	7%	67%	10%	3%	0%	0%	13%	0%
7	Hidalgo	LXIII	2016	23%	43%	10%	3%	0%	3%	10%	7%
1	Jalisco	LV	1997	50%	43%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%
2	Jalisco	LVI	2001	53%	40%	5%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	Jalisco	LVII	2004	43%	48%	5%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4	Jalisco	LVIII	2007	50%	33%	8%	3%	3%	0%	5%	0%
5	Jalisco	LIX	2010	44%	46%	5%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%
6	Jalisco	LX	2013	38%	44%	5%	0%	0%	13%	0%	0%
7	Jalisco	LXI	2016	13%	33%	5%	8%	0%	36%	3%	3%
1	Michoacán	LVIII	1998	13%	60%	23%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
2	Michoacán	LIX	2002	13%	43%	43%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
3	Michoacán	LXX	2005	15%	38%	43%	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%
4	Michoacán	LXXI	2008	30%	25%	35%	3%	3%	3%	3%	0%
5	Michoacán	LXXII	2012	23%	43%	28%	3%	3%	0%	3%	0%
6	Michoacán	LXXIII	2015	18%	38%	30%	5%	5%	3%	0%	3%
1	Morelos	XLVII	1997	17%	40%	40%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%
2	Morelos	XLVIII	2000	50%	40%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	Morelos	XLIX	2003	30%	27%	27%	10%	0%	7%	0%	0%
4	Morelos	L	2006	40%	13%	37%	3%	0%	0%	7%	0%
5	Morelos	LI	2009	20%	50%	10%	7%	3%	7%	3%	0%

6	Morelos	LIII	2012	13%	27%	43%	10%	0%	0%	0%	7%
7	Morelos	LIII	2015	13%	20%	40%	3%	0%	7%	7%	10%
1	Nayarit	XXVI	1999	20%	37%	30%	0%	10%	0%	0%	3%
2	Nayarit	XXVII	2002	23%	60%	3%	0%	3%	0%	0%	10%
3	Nayarit	XXVIII	2005	7%	60%	20%	0%	7%	3%	0%	3%
4	Nayarit	XXIX	2008	20%	53%	10%	7%	0%	3%	7%	0%
5	Nayarit	XXX	2011	23%	53%	7%	3%	3%	3%	7%	0%
6	Nayarit	XXXI	2014	20%	50%	10%	7%	7%	0%	0%	7%
1	Nuevo Leon	LXVII	1997	57%	33%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%
2	Nuevo Leon	LXIX	2000	55%	38%	2%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%
3	Nuevo Leon	LXX	2003	26%	62%	2%	0%	7%	2%	0%	0%
4	Nuevo Leon	LXXI	2006	52%	36%	7%	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%
5	Nuevo Leon	LXXII	2009	40%	48%	2%	2%	2%	0%	5%	0%
6	Nuevo Leon	LXXIII	2012	48%	36%	5%	0%	5%	0%	7%	0%
7	Nuevo Leon	LXXIV	2015	40%	38%	0%	5%	2%	5%	2%	7%
1	Oaxaca	LVII	1998	10%	61%	29%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Oaxaca	LVIII	2001	17%	60%	19%	0%	2%	0%	0%	2%
3	Oaxaca	LXIX	2004	14%	55%	19%	2%	2%	0%	0%	7%
4	Oaxaca	LX	2007	9%	56%	13%	0%	4%	4%	2%	11%
5	Oaxaca	LXI	2010	26%	38%	21%	0%	5%	7%	0%	2%
6	Oaxaca	LXII	2013	21%	40%	24%	2%	2%	2%	2%	5%
7	Oaxaca	LXIII	2016	10%	38%	19%	2%	7%	0%	0%	24%
1	Puebla	LIV	1999	18%	67%	10%	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%
2	Puebla	LV	2002	24%	61%	5%	2%	2%	5%	0%	0%
3	Puebla	LVI	2005	27%	63%	2%	2%	2%	2%	0%	0%
4	Puebla	LVII	2008	20%	63%	5%	0%	5%	2%	5%	0%
5	Puebla	LVIII	2011	49%	39%	0%	7%	2%	2%	0%	0%
6	Puebla	LIX	2014	32%	20%	10%	5%	5%	5%	10%	15%
1	Queretaro	LII	1997	44%	40%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%
2	Queretaro	LIII	2000	48%	32%	8%	4%	0%	0%	0%	8%
3	Queretaro	LIV	2003	48%	28%	8%	0%	0%	4%	0%	12%
4	Queretaro	LV	2006	64%	16%	8%	4%	0%	4%	4%	0%
5	Queretaro	LVI	2009	40%	36%	4%	4%	0%	4%	12%	0%
6	Queretaro	LVII	2012	40%	40%	4%	4%	0%	4%	8%	0%
7	Queretaro	LVIII	2015	52%	32%	4%	4%	0%	0%	4%	4%
1	Quintana Roo	IX	1999	8%	60%	28%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%
2	Quintana Roo	X	2002	12%	56%	12%	8%	0%	12%	0%	0%
3	Quintana Roo	XI	2005	17%	33%	29%	0%	0%	21%	0%	0%
4	Quintana Roo	XII	2008	17%	58%	4%	13%	4%	0%	4%	0%

5	Quintana Roo	XIII	2011	14%	54%	14%	7%	4%	4%	4%	0%
6	Quintana Roo	XIV	2013	12%	60%	4%	12%	4%	4%	4%	0%
7	Quintana Roo	XV	2016	24%	24%	12%	20%	0%	0%	4%	16%
1	San Luis Potosi	LV	1997	37%	52%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%
2	San Luis Potosi	LVI	2000	41%	56%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	San Luis Potosi	LVII	2003	41%	44%	7%	4%	0%	0%	0%	4%
4	San Luis Potosi	LVIII	2006	56%	19%	15%	4%	4%	0%	0%	4%
5	San Luis Potosi	LIX	2009	44%	33%	4%	4%	4%	0%	7%	4%
6	San Luis Potosi	LX	2012	22%	33%	7%	19%	4%	4%	7%	4%
7	San Luis Potosí	LXI	2015	26%	30%	15%	7%	4%	4%	7%	7%
1	Sinaloa	LVI	1998	28%	60%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Sinaloa	LVII	2001	30%	53%	8%	0%	8%	0%	0%	3%
3	Sinaloa	LVIII	2004	38%	53%	8%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
4	Sinaloa	LIX	2007	35%	55%	5%	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%
5	Sinaloa	LX	2010	30%	50%	5%	3%	3%	3%	8%	0%
6	Sinaloa	LXI	2013	25%	55%	5%	0%	3%	3%	3%	8%
7	Sinaloa	LXII	2016	18%	53%	3%	3%	0%	0%	5%	20%
1	Sonora	LV	1997	30%	42%	27%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Sonora	LVI	2000	42%	45%	12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	Sonora	LVII	2003	39%	55%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4	Sonora	LVIII	2006	39%	42%	12%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%
5	Sonora	LIX	2009	42%	36%	6%	6%	0%	0%	9%	0%
6	Sonora	LX	2012	42%	42%	6%	0%	3%	0%	6%	0%
7	Sonora	LXI	2015	39%	45%	3%	0%	0%	3%	6%	3%
1	Tabasco	LVI	1998	3%	61%	35%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Tabasco	LVII	2001	6%	52%	39%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
3	Tabasco	LVIII	2004	9%	40%	49%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4	Tabasco	LIX	2006	6%	51%	43%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
5	Tabasco	LX	2009	9%	51%	31%	3%	3%	0%	3%	0%
6	Tabasco	LXI	2012	6%	20%	49%	3%	14%	6%	3%	0%
7	Tabasco	LXII	2016	6%	17%	37%	14%	3%	3%	0%	20%
1	Tamaulipas	LVII	1998	22%	59%	9%	0%	9%	0%	0%	0%
2	Tamaulipas	LVIII	2002	31%	56%	6%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%
3	Tamaulipas	LIX	2005	28%	56%	6%	0%	3%	0%	0%	6%
4	Tamaulipas	LX	2008	25%	59%	6%	3%	3%	0%	3%	0%
5	Tamaulipas	LXI	2011	17%	53%	3%	14%	3%	0%	11%	0%
6	Tamaulipas	LXII	2013	28%	53%	3%	3%	3%	3%	8%	0%
7	Tamaulipas	LXIII	2016	56%	31%	0%	3%	0%	3%	6%	3%
1	Tlaxcala	LVI	1998	9%	53%	25%	3%	9%	0%	0%	0%

2	Tlaxcala	LVII	2001	18%	29%	41%	3%	6%	0%	0%	3%
3	Tlaxcala	LVIII	2004	19%	31%	31%	3%	9%	3%	0%	3%
4	Tlaxcala	LIX	2007	45%	10%	26%	3%	6%	3%	3%	3%
5	Tlaxcala	LX	2010	38%	38%	9%	0%	6%	3%	0%	6%
6	Tlaxcala	LXI	2013	22%	34%	16%	3%	3%	6%	6%	9%
7	Tlaxcala	LXII	2016	22%	28%	16%	9%	3%	3%	6%	13%
1	Veracruz	LVIII	1997	20%	60%	16%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%
2	Veracruz	LIX	2000	24%	60%	9%	2%	2%	2%	0%	0%
3	Veracruz	LX	2004	42%	42%	12%	2%	0%	2%	0%	0%
4	Veracruz	LXI	2007	22%	62%	8%	0%	2%	4%	0%	2%
5	Veracruz	LXII	2010	28%	58%	6%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%
6	Veracruz	LXIII	2013	20%	52%	6%	10%	2%	0%	8%	2%
7	Veracruz	LXIV	2016	32%	20%	10%	4%	0%	0%	2%	32%
1	Yucatan	LV	1998	32%	64%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Yucatan	LVI	2001	48%	48%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	Yucatan	LVII	2004	52%	40%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4	Yucatan	LVIII	2007	36%	56%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%
5	Yucatan	LIX	2010	24%	60%	8%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%
6	Yucatan	LX	2012	32%	56%	8%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%
7	Yucatan	LXI	2015	32%	52%	4%	4%	0%	0%	4%	4%
1	Zacatecas	LVI	1998	21%	41%	34%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%
2	Zacatecas	LVII	2001	13%	33%	43%	0%	7%	3%	0%	0%
3	Zacatecas	LVIII	2004	13%	20%	50%	0%	13%	3%	0%	0%
4	Zacatecas	LIX	2007	17%	40%	23%	3%	10%	7%	0%	0%
5	Zacatecas	LX	2010	20%	37%	17%	0%	13%	7%	7%	0%
6	Zacatecas	LXI	2013	10%	43%	17%	7%	10%	7%	7%	0%
7	Zacatecas	LXII	2016	10%	37%	7%	10%	7%	0%	7%	23%

*Note: Author's calculations with data from national and subnational congresses' websites*