

**“A FORM OF REFORM”:
TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER GOVERNOR JOHN CONNALLY,
1963-1969**

THESIS

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By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..... | iv |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Chapter | |
| I. “In a Makeshift Manner”: Texas Higher Education Policy, 1940 - 1962 | 4 |
| II. Foundation for Change: Connally, the Legislature and the Committee of Twenty-Five 1961 - 1964 | 22 |
| III. Top Priority: Higher Education Policy in the Fifty-Ninth Legislature 1964 - 1966 | 37 |
| IV. Problems of Implementation: The Coordinating Board and Higher Education 1966 - 1969 | 51 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 65 |

INTRODUCTION

While every research topic presents its own peculiar problems and obstacles, this particular area of research afforded rather unique challenges. Scholarly historical work on the development of Texas higher education in the period under consideration - the 1960s - is all but nonexistent. Many sources deal with one aspect or another, but synthesis of the general issue is lacking. In part, this condition results from its nebulous nature. The phrase higher education might encompass tax support for schools, pay levels for professors, library services, academic freedom, and many other far-ranging and occasionally disparate topics. For the purpose of this study, higher education is defined as all major policy areas dealing with Texas colleges and universities during the governorship of John Connally.

In meeting these challenges, a variety of primary sources and repositories were exploited. Major Texas dailies, such as the Austin American-Statesman, Dallas Morning News, and Houston Post, were particularly helpful in supplying basic information. The Chronicle of Higher Education, the Texas Observer, and the holdings at the Coordinating Board Library provided similar detail from narrower perspectives than the dailies. Of immeasurable help was the expeditious processing of new open material from the Connally Papers in the LBJ Presidential Library. Essential to reaching a clearer understanding of the subject's nuances were interviews with Kenneth Ashworth, Larry Temple,

Ben Barnes, Jack Keever, and Walter Richter, all of whom were direct participants in the process discussed in subsequent pages.

The central question addressed in this study is whether or not the many higher education initiatives of the Connally administration constituted reform: significant policy change for the better which proved to be effective. They must have received sufficient support after implementation so as to persist. Not only must reforms represent a conscious break from the past, but they must also, under analysis, be proven efficacious. Reform in Texas higher education from 1963 to 1969 will be assessed on that basis and, as one contemporary observed, might well be judged “a form of reform.”

Since the Connally administration, higher education in this state has weathered its share of problems. While some recent difficulties are blamed on the higher education apparatus instituted in Connally’s governorship, they are not of concern to this study, which is concerned with higher education issues from 1963 to 1969.

At the outset, research could easily have produced a political history of John Connally’s influence on higher education. Further deliberation overcame this temptation and resulted in a more balanced focus. This early inclination, however, is indicative of the special relationship between the governor and the campus. Some thirty years after this period, in his obituary in the Dallas Morning News, he appears as a great champion of higher education. And while the temptation persists, Connally’s influence is noted with care so as not to cloud the primary intent of emphasizing higher education.

Following a discussion of policy prior to the 1960s, the text is divided into chapters, each of which roughly accords with a single term of Connally's six-year tenure as governor. The second chapter deals with Connally's troubled first term and the assessment the state's higher education needs. The third details the majority of reforms passed, and the fourth is largely an analysis of them. Their emergence must be viewed in context of what had gone before.

CHAPTER 1

“IN A MAKESHIFT MANNER”: TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY, 1940 - 1962

John Connally's tenure as governor (1963-1969) was a time of reform in Texas higher education. His administration emphasized this course of action with the purpose of improving the quality of the state's colleges and universities. While success for Connally was not quick, it did eventually arrive with greatly increased funding and the creation of a strong coordinating board in 1965. This central administrative agency was granted authority to review degree programs, protect academic freedom, and develop formulas for financing higher education. While the coordinating board was Connally's greatest achievement in the reform of higher education, the times were also favorable for its appearance.

From 1940 to 1962, Texas colleges and universities encountered many problems. Texas, like other states, was beset with a tremendous growth in student population in the years immediately following World War II. It dealt with both a new federal presence in education and Cold War anxiety. Texas also lacked an adequate mechanism by which the schools could be financed. Formation of a regulatory commission in the 1950s temporarily satisfied demand for a solution to this problem, but was ultimately unsuccessful. It was unable to overcome these obstacles and at the same time supply Texas with an overall sound system of higher education.

The most pressing need resulted from the explosive growth of the student population immediately following World War II. In an address to the Texas legislature early in 1947, Governor Beauford H. Jester warned that the state was inadequately prepared for the huge enrollment and predicted that this trend would continue for several years. Jester claimed that “most of our institutions are now finding it almost impossible to care for heavy enrollment, even in a makeshift manner.”¹

This speech was made in support of a constitutional amendment to expand the physical capacity of state-supported colleges and universities to accommodate projected enrollment growth. It would dedicate five cents of every dollar of the state’s ad valorem tax, or between thirty-six and thirty-nine million dollars, over thirty years, to campus-related construction. Jester viewed the expense as essential for the state’s development and was able to impress this notion upon voters, who narrowly approved the measure. To alleviate immediate pressure, the governor requested and received a twenty-million-dollar increase for higher education in the biennial appropriations bill of 1947. These funds were not meant for expansion of curriculum or the upgrading of education, but solely to cover normal operating expenses. This assistance, while substantial, only allowed maintenance of a minimum level of higher education, which was all that the state could provide postwar students.²

¹Speech by Jester, 12 February 1947, Series 4-14, Box 67, Beauford Jester Papers, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas (hereafter this collection cited as JP and this repository as TSA).

²Ibid; Billie Lynne Lowe, “The Reforms of Beauford Halbert Jester’s Administration, 1947-1949” (Ph. D. diss., North Texas State University, 1984), 92-97.

Expanded federal involvement was another immediate postwar issue that greatly affected state policy. Before the war, Texas and most other states maintained complete control over higher education. Shortly thereafter, however, change proceeded rapidly. In particular, Congress was partially responsible for the dramatic rise in the student population. In his appeal for the college building fund amendment, Governor Jester emphasized that fifty-two percent of the nation's college students in 1947 were veterans who were attending school because of the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, or G. I. Bill. He and many others knew that this national initiative to help educate veterans was instrumental in the tremendous increases in Texas college and university enrollments.³

In the 1950s, Washington's role became even more prominent, particularly with regard to funding. In response, states began an ongoing process: the pursuit of federal research grants. Many, including Texas, saw expansion of graduate and doctoral programs as an avenue for attracting federal dollars. The benefit to the state would be the emergence of industrial complexes clustered around research-oriented universities, a combination that would translate into greater public revenues. The sudden advent of federal research funds meant that states felt extreme political pressure to expand their degree programs and research capabilities at any and all costs. This "federal pork" became a passionate political issue fanned by local college booster groups.⁴

³Speech by Jester, 12 February 1947.

⁴Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968), 189.

The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 was another federal influence. Passed in response to the national alarm over the Soviet Union's successful launching of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, this legislation provided federal grants, fellowships, and scholarships to needy and deserving students who pursued careers in public school teaching or embarked upon graduate study. The anxiety over Sputnik created a political furor over what was perceived as a lack of emphasis on education in the United States. The real significance of the NDEA, however, was that it created a permanent basis for federal involvement. Everything before this, including the G. I. Bill, was of a more temporary and limited nature. Once the arms race became a brains race, the large federal role in higher education could not be resisted.⁵

Which is not to say that some, including Texans, did not try. While more indirect methods of federal involvement in higher education, such as the G. I. Bill and the proliferation of federal research projects, were quite welcome in Texas, the NDEA generated controversy. Despite an estimated student loan need of \$193,333, the Board of Regents of the Texas State Teachers Colleges System -- Sam Houston State Teachers College, Southwest Texas State Teachers College, Stephen F. Austin Teachers College, East Texas State Teachers College, and Sul Ross Teachers College -- elected to abstain from participation in the NDEA. Ralph Yarborough, a United States Senator from Texas and a coauthor of the legislation, lamented the fear of federal controls as the reason for this rejection and in 1959 feuded with Governor Price Daniel over the issue. In stating his case, Daniel

⁵John T. Wilson, Academic Science, Higher Education, and the Federal Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 61.

reiterated the notion that local and state control of education would be ultimately sacrificed by too much federal involvement. These schools represented a sizable part of Texas higher education unwilling to accept the new government role.⁶

Higher education in Texas reacted to the shrill anti-communism which seized the nation in the postwar era. Any relinquishment of local control in education, many feared, meant the possibility of subversion. What subsequently came to be known as communist witch hunts had manifested themselves in Texas somewhat earlier. Congressman Martin Dies of Orange, chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, alleged in 1940 that communists had infiltrated the University of Texas. Dies later claimed to have rectified the situation through publicity, and in 1941 he gave the school a clean bill of health. In the meantime, a "Little Dies" committee formed in the Texas Senate to continue the congressman's example at the state level. It drafted a bill to legalize the dismissal of instructors whose teachings were not considered in harmony with the constitution. Before the measure could be voted upon, however, the committee quietly disbanded as a result of outrageous statements to the press from some of its members.⁷

While the Texas legislature scrutinized higher education, the executive branch was also active. In a 1955 interview for the liberal Texas Observer, Homer Rainey, a former University of Texas president and gubernatorial candidate, alleged that in the 1940s conservatives had mounted

⁶Ronnie Dugger, "Is State 'Blind' or 'Wide Awake' to Education?," Texas Observer, 28 February 1959, 6 (hereafter cited as TO).

⁷George Norris Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics. The Primitive Years, 1938-1957 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), 72.

a campaign to capture higher education. He recalled that in 1942 Governor W. Lee O'Daniel met in Galveston with several leading right-wing figures and proposed that a reorganization of college and university boards of regents was in order so as to quell the tide of radicalism. Rainey then observed that this faction managed to secure the majority of new appointments to institutional governing bodies and to other agencies of public instruction, such as the Textbook Commission and the State Board of Education. These appointive practices generally continued through the administrations of Coke Stevenson (1941-47), Beauford Jester (1947-49), and Allen Shivers (1949-57).⁸

As communist subversion became a more potent national issue, the Texas legislature passed legislation that curtailed academic freedom. In 1949, Preston Smith, future governor and then-Lubbock representative, coauthored successful legislation designed to create a mandatory loyalty oath for college students and faculty members at state-supported institutions. An individual who signed this statement claimed that he or she was not a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America. For a decade following passage of this measure, more anti-communist enactments appeared. Many were insignificant, however, in that similar federal laws, such as the Federal Internal Security Act (1950), mandated similar oaths and registrations for party members.⁹

⁸Ronnie Dugger, Our Invaded Universities: Form, Reform and New Starts (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974), 41-42; Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics, 84, 102, 184.

⁹Don E. Carleton, Red Scare! (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1985), 96-97.

Despite the absence of evidence to support a conspiracy, the Texas legislature continued periodic searches for communist and communist-front professors. In March of 1957, Clarence Ayres, an outspoken liberal, was singled out as a subversive. One legislator remarked that he was “The kind who should be run out of the University [of Texas] and out of the state.” The legislature then passed a resolution ordering the university to review the professor for dismissal, since he was alleged to have denounced capitalism and private property. Ayres was also charged of associating with a known communist at a legislative committee hearing over his statements. Even though University of Texas Chancellor James Hart eventually determined that the charges were fallacious, they did go far in creating tension between the faculty and the Board of Regents. Institutional governing bodies in general became conscious of faculty who attracted controversy.¹⁰

Another problem in the immediate postwar period was the way higher education was financed. Texas wanted a quality university system, but provided neither sufficient funding nor a means of raising it. The tradition of sparse budgets and few taxes was longstanding; change would not occur very quickly, even though demands upon higher education had already outstripped state resources. The use of broad-based revenue generators such as sales, ad valorem and income taxes to finance colleges was a national trend. This taxation kept tuition costs low and benefited middle-class families. It was akin to compulsory insurance based on the idea that as long as middle-class students stayed in school, they benefited from everyone’s taxes. In the meantime, their families did not have to depend solely on

¹⁰Austin American-Statesman, 18 March; 7 April 1951 (hereafter cited as AA-S); Carleton, Red Scare, 98 (quotation).

personal savings to pay for a college education. This idea was politically popular and necessitated by the growing national importance of higher education.¹¹

Texas had a long way to go before becoming part of this national trend of generosity toward higher education. As late as 1955, rumors circulated that college enrollment might have to be limited because of insufficient financing. Governor Shivers suggested the doubling of tuition fees from an average of twenty-five to fifty-five dollars per semester. Such curtailing of demand through enrollment limits and cost increases ran counter to the growing national trend of making colleges and universities more accessible and affordable to the burgeoning middle class. Despite this seeming regression, however, Shivers' plan was somewhat progressive in the sense that current tuition fees were based on formulas created in 1933. While the rates were eventually raised, as Shivers suggested, considerable change occurred since 1933. The state's haphazard method of financing higher education was out of step with the national movement that prevailed between 1940 and 1962.¹²

The fact that the state had problems in financing higher education was not lost on the Texas business community. The tradition of low taxation and few state services had grown from the persistence of the Southern Bourbon political ideology in the state's Democratic Party. Texas business leadership changed markedly throughout the postwar period. In the years preceding John Connally's first term as governor (1963-65), some corporate elements

¹¹Frederick Eby, The Development of Education in Texas (New York: Macmillan Company, 1925), 314-15; Jencks and Riesman, Academic Revolution, 277.

¹²"Financial Patchwork Snags State School Progress," TQ, 28 February 1955, 3.

clamored for overhauling the manner in which higher education was financed. They perceived a lack of vision in the state's higher education system which, they contended, translated into a lack of economic vision. In concurrence with the national postwar trend, these interests saw financial gain in using higher education to spur more growth in industry and commerce. One organ of this new perspective, The Texas Businessman, stated in 1959 that "every budget for ten years has been balanced in Texas at (the) expense of colleges..." This weekly newsletter then blamed the state's antiquated tax structure for the failure to deal with rising enrollments.¹³

Some politicians were of like mind and sought to address the problem. Attempts were made to incorporate more long-range planning into the administration of colleges and universities. These initial steps were tenuous, however, and the first substantive reevaluation of higher education policy began in 1949, during Governor Jester's second term. The Fifty-first Legislature had passed the Gilmer-Aikin laws, three comprehensive reform measures for public schools, commonly referred to as Gilmer-Aikin. In the preceding legislative session, State Senator A. M. Aikin of Paris and Representative Claude Gilmer of Rock Springs had created a study committee to address reforms in primary and secondary education. By early 1949 the committee produced recommendations to create a new regulatory apparatus with much stronger central authority. This law enhanced quality

¹³"Texas Colleges," Texas Businessman, 14 September, 1959, 1. This weekly newsletter was published by the Texas Research Corporation for the state's corporate executives.

through mandatory standards of excellence for students, teachers, and school districts.¹⁴

Shortly after he signed the final Gilmer-Aiken bill, Governor Jester and State Senator R. L. Proffer of Justin announced that the impetus provided by Gilmer-Aiken would be transferred to higher education. This stated intention was Jester's first indication of interest in this subject since his support of the college building amendment in 1947. To this end, both Proffer and Jester, through Senator G. C. Morris of Greenville, presented separate bills, which were consolidated in conference committee. The final Jester-Proffer-Morris proposal, which provided for a detailed study of higher education needs, was cosponsored by Representative Dolph Briscoe, Jr., of Uvalde and eventually signed into law.¹⁵

The Jester-Proffer-Morris legislation began a process that would eventually lead to more substantive action in higher education. At the time of its enactment, there was no real coordinating agency or regulatory body for colleges and universities. Institutional governing boards, appointed by the governor, established academic policies and procedures. Any new curriculum or expansion of a public institution required legislative approval. Consequently, schools with powerful political patrons tended to receive the lion's share of funding and new academic programs, regardless of whether or not they were deserving or the programs necessary. This approach spawned rampant abuse. For example, in June of 1949, Jester's administrative aide, Weldon Hart, advised the governor that putting aside

¹⁴Walter P. Webb, H. Bailey Carroll, and Eldon Branda, eds., The Handbook of Texas, 3 vols. (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1952, 1976), 1:692.

¹⁵AA-S, 9 June 1949.

misgivings about signing the bill to elevate Lamar Junior College in Beaumont to a four-year institution, could enlist then-Lieutenant Governor Shivers' support for other legislative initiatives. Jester saw the wisdom of this cause, approved the Lamar College bill, and gave Shivers a victory to take back to his district after the session.¹⁶

In light of the capricious relationship between higher education and the legislature, the Jester-Proffer-Morris legislation was a positive step. It created a study body known as the Texas Education Survey Commission (TESC), whose fifteen members were to be chosen by both legislative houses and the governor. The TESC's charge was to ascertain the varying possibilities of coordinating higher education in Texas in order to avoid costly duplication of degree programs. Financing of universities and the elevation of several junior colleges to four-year schools were also topics of inquiry. With an appropriation of \$50,000, TESC was to compile statistics and form policy recommendations for future action. Jester intended this study as the beginning step in transferring Gilmer-Aiken types of reforms to the field of higher education.¹⁷

While TESC was at work, another body, the Texas Legislative Council, was also studying the subject. The Texas Legislative Council was created by the Fifty-first Legislature to examine all proposed legislation and submit its findings to a group of five senators and ten representatives. Perhaps not coincidentally, architects of the TESC, Senators Morris and Proffer and Representative Briscoe, were members. In November of 1950,

¹⁶Memo to Jester, 9 June 1949, Series 4-14, Box 103, JP, TSA; Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics, 119.

¹⁷AA-S, 9 June 1949.

the Council's staff released a study entitled Public Higher Education in Texas, which offered no recommendations. This document did, however, foreshadow the future focus on college and university coordination by discussing at length different types of systems across the country. It offered several options for coordinating higher education, ranging from individual institutional cooperative governance to a single, powerful state agency. In examining these options, the legislature showed signs of questioning its traditional authority over higher education.¹⁸

The outgrowth of TESC and Public Higher Education in Texas was the formation of a temporary Texas Commission on Higher Education (TCHE) in 1953. With no regulatory or coordinating role in any aspect of public policy, its sole responsibility was further study. Although, various commissions had been at work over the years, TCHE was to take the process further making a recommendation as to the type of system Texas should choose. Subsequently TCHE urged creation of a state agency of the same name with sufficient coordinating power to come to grips with higher education problems.¹⁹

After nearly eight years of study since Governor Jester's warning, the legislature, on May 17, 1955, created the permanent TCHE with statutory authority to manage higher education. It was to develop updated formulas for financing higher education, provide leadership for the state's colleges and universities, and determine whether or not proposed degree offerings could be granted to individual institutions. The fifteen TCHE members were

¹⁸Staff Research Report - Public Higher Education in Texas (Austin: Texas Legislative Council, November, 1950), i and 157, 51-4, TSA.

¹⁹Webb, Carroll and Branda, Handbook of Texas, 3:197.

to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. They were to fill staggered six-year terms, reflect geographic diversity, and serve without pay.²⁰

While some politicians were pleased that the study was finally complete, not everyone was happy with the TCHE. The Texas Observer reported in December of 1955 that TCHE was being derided as a “superboard.” This criticism derived from the notion that any centralized organ presented a threat to local control and that TCHE represented too much state authority over higher education. What others seemed to object to even more was the fact that Governor Shivers’ selections to the commission were weighted towards the business community. Of his fifteen appointments, four were in petroleum, two were bankers, and two were investment security executives. Of the remaining seven, none had a proven interest in higher education and only one, auto dealer M. W. Glosserman of Lockhart, had educational policy experience, gained during his tenure as President of the Texas Association of School Boards.²¹

Over the next decade, TCHE at least partially fulfilled its mandate. During that period, TCHE achieved improvements in the quality and efficiency of Texas schools. In 1964, member John E. Gray evaluated TCHE’s work as largely successful. From 1955 to 1964, the state increased its college and university library holdings by sixty-seven percent, provided the formulas adopted to justify seventy-five percent of requested funds, directed the increase of total funds for all institutions by 226 percent, and

²⁰Dallas Morning News, 18 May 1955 (hereafter cited as DMN).

²¹“New Commission,” TO, 7 December 1955, 7.

eliminated or consolidated 269 departments and degree programs in eighteen state-supported institutions. Also significant, according to Gray, was that average faculty salaries had increased by fifty-five percent.²²

While TCHE produced some positive results during its tenure, its record was not unblemished. Some of its problems were perhaps unavoidable. The commission happened upon higher education just as the United States Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) decision struck down legal segregation. This ruling meant that TCHE would have to deal with the integration of Texas institutions which did not have a history of educating African Americans. Predictably, the situation was a tinderbox. In October of 1964, TCHE created controversy by announcing its plans to phase out a law school at Texas Southern University. The commission considered the predominately African American school, known until 1951 as Texas State University for Negroes, an unnecessary duplication of resources, because of its small numbers and the integration of other state-supported law schools. Somewhat insensitively, TCHE explained that at Texas Southern "legal training was inadequate because it was throttled back to aid the less competent students." Having already alienated conservatives as an agent of integration, TCHE worsened the situation by insulting African Americans.²³

One of TCHE's biggest problems was lack of statutory authority over budgetary matters. The commission could only recommend how much

²²Confidential Memo from John E. Gray to Members of Committee on Education Beyond the High School, 4 April 1964, Box 5, Series 51, John B. Connally Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter this collection cited as JBC and this repository as LBJ).

²³Houston Post, 10 October 1964 (hereafter cited as HP).

money was needed for higher education each fiscal biennium, but could not compel the legislature to comply. For example, in 1959 TCHE submitted a budgetary request for a ten-million-dollar increase in higher education expenditures. Governor Daniel, however, requested only three million dollars, which was the amount the legislature approved. While the governor and legislature were not required to adhere to TCHE recommendations, the purpose of Texas' system of coordination was supposed to be voluntary. The spirit of the law in creating TCHE was that the legislature and governor would voluntarily comply with the requests. Shortly after Daniel's budget was announced, the Texas Association of College Teachers argued that disregarding the TCHE in this instance would cost the state a large number of young professors and potential industries.²⁴

The commission's lack of authority and enforcement power meant that the Texas legislature could still unilaterally make decisions regarding higher education. In 1959 it agreed to accept, two years hence, Midwestern Junior College in Wichita Falls as a four-year, state-supported school. This approval, however, rested upon the condition that the school would be free of debt. When subsequent legislative hearings began, they revealed that the institution still owed \$900,000 for its junior college district bonds. At this point, the Midwestern attorney proposed to cover this obligation, which had to be satisfied, by floating a new bond issue for \$1.2 million on the district once the school became a four-year university and then reimburse the state through revenue from dormitory fees. When questioned by Senator Charles Herring of Austin that this was in effect paying off their old debt with what

²⁴"Colleges: Some Costs," TO, 16 January 1959, 10.

was rightfully state money, the school officials merely smiled. Lamented Senator William T. (Bill) Moore of Bryan, "I thought the school was supposed to be free of indebtedness. I thought we were getting a big gift." Admitted Senator Abraham Kazen of Laredo, "We made a mistake."²⁵

Another area of concern was that Texas professors were still subject to abrupt, arbitrary dismissal. One of the more severe criticisms of higher education in Texas before TCHE was the lack of academic freedom and protection for tenured professors. In 1959, the American Association of University Professors censured Texas Technological College (now Texas Tech University) for its firing of a tenured professor. In 1962 a similar incident occurred at Sam Houston State Teachers College. The Texas Association of College Teachers voted to censure the Sam Houston Administration for its action without providing due process, a hearing, and an investigation. Confronted with this situation, TCHE could not force institutional boards to comply with national standards of tenure and academic freedom.²⁶

In short, TCHE failed to better higher education, at least to the extent envisioned. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, Texas fell behind in national rank of various educational indices. In March of 1964, The Texas Journal of Science reported that Texas dropped from thirty-second to thirty-seventh in expenditures by state governments for higher education from 1959 to 1962. In appropriation of tax funds for operating higher education from 1959 to 1963, Texas dropped from thirty-second to thirty-fifth. While things had not

²⁵"One Good Deal," *ibid.*, 11 February 1961, 3.

²⁶Ronnie Dugger, "Colleges' Board Censured," *ibid.*, 22 November 1962, 1.

dramatically fallen off, the figures showed that Texas higher education experienced during the TCHE years a steady decline. The TCHE was successful in eliminating some duplication, but had not done enough.²⁷

The notion that TCHE lacked the necessary vision and power to upgrade higher education in Texas was not confined solely to academic circles. Some Texas business leaders severely criticized it for pursuing superficial change, as opposed to substantive reform. They claimed that at the same time TCHE was occupied with changing the names of some universities and reorganizing some degree offerings, Texas was losing the battle for attracting major industry. One example critics offered was Convair, a new technology company. In 1959 Convair created 16,000 jobs in a San Diego facility, while it planned layoffs at its Fort Worth plant. The stated reason given for this move was Texas' niggardly and California's more generous support of higher education. Apparently, TCHE had lost the confidence of a vital part of the business community.²⁸

Yet, TCHE cannot be regarded as a complete failure. The tremendous post-1945 enrollment growth and Cold War hysteria conspired against Texas higher education in the 1940s and 1950s. Thereafter, problems were more mechanical and financial in nature. Legislative caution and years of study had resulted in a weak TCHE. Had the commission been granted more authority to ensure enforcement for its recommendations, its performance might have been better. As created, TCHE could not adequately address the rapid expansion of higher education. While Governor Jester showed some

²⁷L. S. Lockingen, "The Position of Texas in Higher Education," The Texas Journal of Science, 16 (March 1964): 29.

²⁸"Texas Colleges," Texas Businessman, 14 September, 1959, 1.

promise of active leadership, Governors Shivers and Daniel neither directed nor hindered the movement toward greater coordination. By the early 1960s many educators, legislators, and business leaders were sufficiently agitated to stand behind a governor who would promote change.

CHAPTER 2

FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE: CONNALLY, THE LEGISLATURE AND THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY-FIVE, 1961-1964

John Bowden Connally was born on February 27, 1917, in Floresville, a small South Texas farming-ranching town located in the “Brush Country,” approximately thirty miles southeast of San Antonio. As a young boy, Connally worked on his father’s tenant farm during the Great Depression and contributed to family support in a succession of odd jobs. A promising student, his family put aside enough by 1933 to send him to the University of Texas, at Austin, where he majored in pre-law studies and became active in drama and student government. During his university years, Connally cemented friendships with future prominent figures in state and national politics, men such as J. J. “Jake” Pickle, Homer Thornberry, Joe Kilgore, Robert Strauss, Mack DeGuerin, and Lyndon Johnson. It was Johnson, in his capacity as director of the Texas National Youth Administration, who gave Connally a much-needed part-time job.¹

Connally began his close association with Johnson in the congressional and senatorial campaigns of the late 1930s and early 1940s. After serving in the Navy during World War II, he managed Johnson’s

¹John Connally with Mickey Herskowitz, In History’s Shadow: An American Odyssey (New York: Hyperion, 1993), 23, 42-44.

client's diverse business ventures, including broadcasting, railroads, and industrial technology, and after Richardson's death, in 1959, acted as chief executor of his estate. By the 1950s, Connally had quickly eclipsed his modest upbringing and entered the upper echelons of Texas business and political power.²

After Richardson's death, Connally served in the Kennedy administration. While in Washington, he became aware of Texas' lack of progress in higher education, which subsequently became a political issue in Connally's successful 1962 gubernatorial campaign. In his six years as governor of Texas (1963-1969), Connally constantly stressed the need to improve higher education and went so far as to admit publicly his obsession with the subject. Connally viewed his proposed reforms as necessary for the development of Texas into an economic leader and thus won support from among the most influential members of the state's business elite.

Early in 1961, Connally was appointed John F. Kennedy's Secretary of the Navy, and less than a year later resigned to run for the governorship of Texas. His political mentor, Vice-President Johnson, expressed consternation that his protégé would relinquish an influential federal appointment for a lesser office. Indeed, Connally had never held elected office and was pitted against Price Daniel, a popular incumbent intent upon a record fourth term. In a statewide poll in late 1961, Daniel was the choice of fifty percent of the voters, and Connally only four percent. An abiding concern for higher education was one of the primary reasons for Connally's daunting political leap. At the Navy desk, he was struck by the mutual

²Ann Fears Crawford and Jack Keever, John B. Connally: Portrait in Power (Austin: Jenkins Publishing, 1973), 53-54, 58-59.

attraction between universities and new industry. He came to envision a better system of higher education for his state in order to attract new high-technology industry, like that concentrated in Northern California's Silicon Valley, and at the Harvard-MIT complex in Massachusetts.³

Connally centered his 1962 Democratic primary election campaign on a pledge of reform in higher education. Despite other controversial political issues, Connally never failed to emphasize this theme. In a statewide television broadcast, he singled out the state's colleges and universities as the main catalyst for the attraction of new industries. Echoing a national theme, he insisted that "Education will be more closely identified with the economic future of a region" than any other factor.⁴

The Democratic electorate was receptive. In a field of six, Connally overcame tremendous disadvantages and finished first, with 431,498 votes, ahead of liberal Houston attorney Don Yarborough, with 317,986, and incumbent Price Daniel, with 248,524. Other candidates, former Army general Edwin A. Walker, Texas Attorney General Will Wilson, and West Texas oilman Marshall Formby, all failed to garner 200,000 collectively. Connally narrowly won the runoff with Yarborough, and in a surprisingly close general election, went on to defeat Republican Jack Cox, a former Democrat, 54.4 to 46.6 percent.⁵

True to his campaign pledge, Connally committed the Texas Democratic Party to higher education. In an effort to appease both liberals

³Connally with Herskowitz, History's Shadow, 216-19.

⁴HP, 16 February 1962; DMN, 16 February 1962 (quotation).

⁵Mike Kingston, Sam Attlesley, and Mary G. Crawford, The Texas Almanac's Political History of Texas (Austin: Eakin Press, 1992), 255, 303.

and conservatives, Connally, at the September convention in El Paso, proposed a seventy-one-point platform which called for creation of a citizen commission to reevaluate the state's policy regarding colleges and universities. Without debate, a large majority of the delegates approved the plan and changed not a word in the document. This political investment for change in higher education defined Connally's candidacy and provided momentum in his first legislative session.⁶

Upon assuming office, Connally made known his alarm over the frequency with which community and junior colleges became four-year institutions. His concern was that while some of these requests were justified, many others were not. He opposed funding of unnecessary program duplication simply to please local interests. In this regard, he found support at TCHE, which had expressed some dismay over this state of affairs during the general election campaign. Over its director's objections, TCHE approved four-year status for San Angelo College and Pan American (Edinburg) College. Senator Walter Richter of Gonzalez remembered the intense political pressure to vote for these changes. Other pending requests were those from Laredo, Odessa, and San Antonio. Connally's campaign stance on this issue was cautious support for the San Angelo and Pan American proposals, but, recalled subsequent Commissioner of Education Kenneth Ashworth, this rampant four-year movement was a matter which the new governor meant to address.⁷

⁶AA-S, 19 September 1962.

⁷DMN, 12 June 1962; Walter Richter, interview by author, 23 March 1995. Tape recording, Southwest Texas State Alumni Association, San Marcos (hereafter cited as Richter interview); Kenneth Ashworth, interview by author, 2 February 1995. Tape recording, Coordinating Board, Austin (hereafter cited as Ashworth interview).

For the first time in Texas history, none of the incoming top state officials in early 1963 were incumbents. Voters wanted change, and Connally wasted no time in presenting his higher education proposals. In his first address to the state legislature, he outlined his plan and asked for the creation of a Governor's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, or Committee of Twenty-Five. Connally had advocated such a citizen group in the Democratic Party platform and asked for a \$50,000 emergency appropriation to sustain its work. He also sought termination of TCHE and a constitutional amendment which would allow nonresidents to serve on Texas college governing boards. The legislature quickly authorized Connally's emergency funding request and praised his bold action.⁸

Connally found, however, that support soon waned. When he proposed his budget, on March 7, the House produced its own, sponsored by Representative W. S. (Bill) Heatly of Paducah. Heatly was a close ally of Speaker of the House Byron Tunnell and Attorney General Waggoner Carr. This faction was determined to dictate the legislature's spending. The House hardly considered Connally's budget, and his recommendations on higher education were largely ignored, except for the creation of the Committee of Twenty-Five. This action was a defeat, but not a disaster, since he had proposed the same levels of higher education increases contained in the previous biennial budget. In a strategic retreat, the governor chose not to

Ashworth is currently Texas Commissioner of Higher Education and was Director of Facilities at the Coordinating Board during Connally's administration.

⁸DMN, 17 January 1963.

confront the legislature, because of assurances that higher education would be rewarded at a later date.⁹

The assurances he received were not honored. Although dissatisfied, Connally signed the appropriations bill, \$12.4 million of which he vetoed, however. He defended this action by stating his intent “to provide a sort of layaway plan—a substantial down payment on excellence in education.” And, Connally promised, “you may rest assured that I plan to guard that nest egg like an old mother hen.” The governor was giving notice that higher education reform would not disappear.¹⁰

The Committee of Twenty-Five (CTF) also met with difficulty. The bill which established it was Connally’s legislative priority and was designated House Bill 1. Its House sponsors were Gene Fondren of Taylor and David Crews of Conroe. Emergency funds totaling \$50,000 were appropriated to study the higher education problem in January, but some sentiment was apparent to include at least ten legislators on CTF. Other revisions of its structure, offered in the form of amendments, were to allow the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of the house to name five members each. These proposed changes to CTF were not part of the measure the House passed, 126 to 10, on March 12. In the Senate, where some complained to HB 1 sponsor Richter that quick passage was not imperative, approval occurred on March 27 by a vote of 26 to 2. This

⁹Ronnie Dugger, “Matter of Three Billion Dollars,” TO, 21 March 1963, 11-13.

¹⁰Quoted in Crawford and Keever, Portrait in Power, 98-99.

cornerstone legislation gave the Connally-appointed committee an extra \$125,000 for study expenses.¹¹

Creation of CTF allowed Connally to influence debate. Charged with evaluating all aspects of higher education in the state, its membership included names from the state's business, political, and academic leadership, including former Texas A&M Board of Regents chairman and San Antonio contractor H. B. Zachry, chair; George R. Brown of Houston's Brown & Root Construction, an early benefactor of Lyndon Johnson; University of Texas Chancellor Dr. Harry H. Ransom; Humble Oil executive board chairman Morgan S. Davis of Houston; J. Erik Jonsson, Texas Instruments board chairman and Mayor of Dallas; and United States District Judge Reynaldo Garza of Brownsville.¹²

Connally was solely responsible for CTF's makeup. Larry Temple, his administrative assistant, remembered that he personally decided upon all,

¹¹58th Texas Legislature, House, Journal (Austin: Baldwin Printing Co., 1963), 540-45 (hereafter cited as 58th House Journal); 58th Texas Legislature, Senate, Journal (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Co., 1963), 550-51 (hereafter cited as 58th Senate Journal); HP, 26 February 1963; DMN, 19 June 1963.

¹²HP, 19 May 1963. The rest of the Committee of Twenty-Five consisted of the United Steelworkers Union regional director Martin Burns, of Houston, who resigned during the study; Elmer Danner of San Angelo, president of Central Telephone Co. of the Southwest; Mrs. Ray L. Dudley of Houston, vice-president of Gulf Publishing Co.; J. Harold Dunn of Amarillo, chairman of the board of Shamrock Oil and Gas Corporation; Jenkins Garrett of Fort Worth, attorney; John E. Gray of Beaumont, president of First Security National Bank and member of TCHE; H. H. Irmay of Longview, vice-president of Texas Eastman Co.; Gifford K. Johnson of Dallas, president of Ling-Temco-Voight, inc.; Dr. Ben W. Jones of Corsicana, president of Navarro Junior College; Dr. Albert B. Martin, president of Amarillo College; Dr. Abner V. McCall of Waco, president of Baylor University; Dr. Vernon McDaniel of Austin, executive secretary-treasurer of the Teachers State Association of Texas; J. M. Odom of Austin, contractor; Sister Mary Vincent O'Donnell of San Antonio, administrator of Santa Rosa Medical Center; General James Earl Rudder of College Station, president of Texas A&M University; Tom Sealy of Midland, attorney; Dr. Willis M. Tate of Dallas, president of Southern Methodist University; M. Harvey Weil of Corpus Christi, attorney; and Dr. D. M. Wiggins of Lubbock, chairman of Citizens National Bank.

or almost all, of its members. Initially, about one-half turned down the governor's request, but he persisted and approached the reluctant individuals sometimes two or three times until all of those contacted eventually agreed to serve. The result was that many of Connally's political enemies were both surprised and worried at the committee's substance.¹³

Despite his inability to deliver immediately on the promise of major change, Connally's performance during his first legislative session received some praise from the media. Correspondent Duncan Dawson of the Dallas Morning News concluded that the consensus of opinion among political prognosticators was that Connally's achievement in creating CTF was commendable. The governor also received accolades for the selection of "eminent and prominent Texans for the task." A setback for the governor was that his wish for immediate termination of TCHE did not materialize.¹⁴

In May, 1963, before the Committee of Twenty-Five began its study, Connally signed a bill that added two four-year colleges. In its 1963 regular session, the legislature approved the elevation of San Angelo College and Pan American College. The Texas Commission on Higher Education concurred with both actions, which Governor Connally had advocated in the 1962 campaign. He couched his support, however, with the stipulation that no funds would be available for the two institutions in his budget until CTF

¹³Larry Temple, interview by author, 15 February 1995. Tape recording, law office, Austin (hereafter cited as Temple Interview). Temple, an Austin attorney, was formerly Governor Connally's legal administrative assistant and executive assistant.

¹⁴DMN, 26 May 1963.

had considered the issue. Connally thus fulfilled a campaign promise while enhancing the importance of CTF.¹⁵

At the same time, however, CTF contended with critics. Expectedly, the Texas Observer, which had found fault with TCHE, admonished Connally for the committee's corporate persuasion and noted that it contained fifteen businessmen, of whom three were attorneys and many were high-level executives. While it was true that some had served on various educational boards, only six members were professional educators; and two of the appointees lacked college degrees. The Texas Observer also criticized chairman Zachry for his impolitic public statement, on the same day the CTF membership was announced, in favor of a tuition raise, larger class sizes, and elimination of the Texas A&M agricultural extension program.¹⁶

The legislature, through its Legislative Budget Board (LBB), also proved problematical. The LBB, a professional research staff which processed statistics used in legislative budget decisions, undertook a study of Texas higher education entirely apart from CTF. The six-member board, chaired by Lieutenant Governor Preston Smith, consisted of legislative opponents of the governor, such as Speaker of the House Tunnell, Representative Heatly, and Senator Dorsey Hardeman of San Angelo. Smith saw the lack of legislative presence on CTF as grounds for ordering a separate study. This independent action, indicative of legislative coolness,

¹⁵DMN, 11 May 1963.

¹⁶"Education Beyond the High School," TO, 30 May 1963, 9-10.

provided a less expensive option in case CTF's recommendations were not accepted.¹⁷

The first organizational meeting took place on June 4, 1963, and included an address from the governor. Connally reminded his audience that while they reflected many different regions, schools, political philosophies, economic interests, and professions, each one of them represented the entire state as a member of CTF. The governor charged them with determining a way for Texas "to catch up with the rest of the nation" and to develop a new management strategy by which higher education expenditures could be made more efficient.¹⁸

Throughout CTF's thirteen months of study, Connally remained aloof from the deliberative process. His hands-off policy did not indicate a lack of interest in the group's proceedings, however. He simply viewed the members as highly qualified and intelligent individuals who would produce appropriate recommendations. When necessary, the governor supplied personnel from his staff and maintained contact with the proceedings through the committee's executive director, Dr. Arliegh B. Templeton, President of Sam Houston State Teachers College.¹⁹

The Committee of Twenty-Five consisted of seven subcommittees, each responsible for specific issues. Subcommittee One was charged with Goals, Policies, Functions; Subcommittee Two, Growth, Needs, Admissions,

¹⁷Memo from CTF secretary Mary Nell Carson to Committee of Twenty-Five, 23 August 1963, Memorandums File, Box 1, Series 51, JBC; DMN, 19 June 1963.

¹⁸Governor's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, H. B. Zachry, Chairman, Education: Texas' Resource for Tomorrow, August 31, 1964 (Austin: 1964), 4-5.

¹⁹Temple interview.

Enrollment; Subcommittee Three, Institutional Role and Scope; Subcommittee Four, Educational Programs and Curriculum; Subcommittee Five, Standards; Subcommittee Six, Technological Improvements; and Subcommittee Seven, Nonteaching: Administration-Management, Cost and Finance. Each subcommittee submitted both an interim and a final report, adhered to strict deadlines, and was allowed a set of outside consultants. Some, such as One and Five, employed no consultants while Six employed seventeen. Consultants represented the upper echelons of business, government, and academia. They included two members of the Federal Reserve Bank in Dallas, petroleum company executives, and presidents and other administrators from institutions of higher learning, from Texas and beyond.²⁰

The consultant to Subcommittee Three, which dealt with coordination in higher education, was Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh of the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB), based in Atlanta, Georgia. The SREB, created in 1949 by several southern states, including Texas, to further higher education in the South, retained Brumbaugh as Director for University Studies, which meant primarily that he supplied member states with statistical information. The SREB agreed to provide Brumbaugh's consultative services to Subcommittee Three for six days and to absorb his expenses.²¹

²⁰Memo from Mary Nell Carson to Committee of Twenty-Five, 23 August 1963, Subcommittee Assignments File, Box 9, Series 51, JBC.

²¹Redding S. Sugg, Jr., and George Hilton Jones, The Southern Regional Education Board: Ten Years of Regional Cooperation in Higher Education (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 116; Winfred L. Godwyn to Dr. Albert B. Martin, 1 October 1963, Consultants-Subcommittee File, Box 9, Series 51, JBC. Winfred L. Godwyn was director of SREB and Martin was CTF director, from 18 May 1963 to 17 October 1963, when he resigned for health reasons. He continued to serve the committee

In his book, State Wide Planning and Coordination of Higher Education (1963), Brumbaugh identified three fundamental types of coordination in higher education: a single, centralized coordinating authority, which vested overall coordination and the daily governance of institutions in a state board without the existence of local or regional institutional boards; liaison authority, an intermediate administrative level between the legislature and institutional governing boards; voluntary coordination, which occurred either within a centralized or liaison framework, through legislative directive or through a relationship between decision-makers that evolved over a period of time. In his opinion, the existence of TCHE classified Texas as liaison coordinating authority.²²

Brumbaugh's insights into coordination were shared by Subcommittees Three and Seven, which dealt with the subject. In late September of 1963, Albert B. Martin, CTF's first executive director urged Subcommittee Seven to utilize him. This study group contained no professional educators and was composed of only George Brown and J. M. Odom, both construction executives, and Morgan J. Davis, retired chairman of the board of Humble Oil and Refining. More than any other, this subcommittee represented economic power.²³

Subcommittee Seven, concerned with the more political and controversial aspects of the study, issued its interim report on February 12, 1964, in which it complimented TCHE for its "pioneering work," but

as a member. Martin's position was filled by Arleigh B. Templeton, President of Sam Houston State Teachers College.

²²Brumbaugh, State-Wide Planning, 10-28.

²³Albert B. Martin to J. M. Odom, 20 September 1963, J. M. Odom File, Box 8, Series 51, JBC.

indicated that the coordinating mechanism of higher education in Texas was due for change. Brown, Odom, and Morgan did not, however, advocate a complete break from TCHE and recommended that as much of its general staff as possible be continued. They also urged expansion of the number of commissioners, from fifteen to eighteen, and that funding be significantly increased. They proposed a new name for TCHE, the Texas Commission on Education Beyond the High School, as reflective of its added responsibilities. While the report did not list the specific changes in responsibility, it implied the replacement of TCHE.²⁴

Subcommittee Seven shaped CTF's recommendations on the issue of coordination of higher education. A very important CTF meeting, on February 19, involved three proposals from Seven voted on by the committee as a whole. They were, creation of a powerful coordinating board, its functions, and its scope: to oversee all state-supported education beyond the high school. All three were unanimously approved, and only two motions failed to carry a majority. One proposed a nine-member instead of an eighteen-member board; the other, sponsored by George Brown, sought to establish sixteen-year terms.²⁵

In releasing its findings, CTF took pains to cultivate support. On July 13, it held a luncheon meeting, compliments of George Brown, to which were invited political leaders, including Governor Connally, Lieutenant Governor Smith, Speaker of the House Tunnell, Senators A. M. Aikin of

²⁴Interim Report of Subcommittee Seven, 12 February 1964, Interim Report of Subcommittee Seven File, Box 15, Series 51, JBC.

²⁵Minutes of the Committee of Twenty-Five, 19 February 1964, 2/19/64 Meeting File, Box 3, Series 51, JBC.

Paris and Grady Hazelwood of Amarillo, and Representatives Heatly and Ben Barnes, of DeLeon. After this briefing session, the committee met with a group of college and university presidents who were familiarized with the report's contents. The next morning, at a lengthy press conference, CTF publicly presented its findings to the media. After seventeen committee members each addressed an aspect of the study, Connally reaffirmed his support of these recommendations and told reporters that he would use the full weight and prestige of his office to accomplish substantial change in higher education. Especially did he endorse a powerful coordinating board consisting of eighteen members for six-year terms and administered by a commissioner of higher education. He also advocated doubling the state's spending on higher education over four years, raising faculty salaries, increasing tuition by one hundred percent, and strictly enforcing rigid national academic freedom and tenure policies.²⁶

By the time CTF's final report appeared, on August 31, it had become the object of a selling campaign. On April 24, Gifford K. Johnson, Ling-Temco-Voight president and Subcommittee Two chairman, used his own resources to create a small informative reader to help "soften up" legislators. Some members undertook speaking tours in their geographic areas so as to convince newspaper editorial boards, business organizations, and other public interest groups of the wisdom of adopting the CTF recommendations. This thrust was especially evident in politically sensitive areas, such as Corpus Christi, where M. Harvey Weil, a local attorney, addressed a luncheon for civic leaders. In response to concern over the expense attached

²⁶Minutes of the Committee of Twenty-Five, 13-14 July 1964, 7/13-14/64 Meeting File, Box 7, Series 51, JBC; AA-S, 15 July 1964.

to the committee's proposals, Weil argued that Texas needed more highly skilled graduates and that the state's dependence upon the shrinking pools of talent from the outside was costly. Weil kept the administration abreast of his efforts in a letter to Connally public relations aide Julian Read. The other members were instructed to do the same.²⁷

Despite the political success of higher education as a campaign issue and the initial burst of support from the legislature, no significant change occurred during Connally's first administration. Funding remained level and TCHE still managed Texas colleges and universities. Creation of the Committee of Twenty-Five, however, produced an effective means of developing public policy. While CTF received criticism, it shaped the higher education debate and spawned public support for change. In initially biding his time, Connally constructed the foundation for change in higher education, a crucial issue in the following years.

²⁷Gifford K. Johnson to Arleigh B. Templeton, 24 April 1964, and Templeton to Johnson, 5 May 1964,, Gifford K. Johnson File, Box 7, Series 51; M. Harvey Weil to Julian Read, 16 July 1964, M. Harvey Weil File, Box 8, Series 51, JBC; Corpus Christi Caller, 16 July 1964.

CHAPTER 3

TOP PRIORITY: HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY IN THE FIFTY-NINTH LEGISLATURE, 1964-1966

On a Friday evening in April of 1965, John Connally threw out the ceremonial first pitch in the Houston sports complex subsequently called the Astrodome, the pioneer of indoor facilities that would greatly alter the nature of professional sports. Connally's presence in front of President Johnson and dignitaries from Mexico underscored the notion that his governorship was at its crest. At the same time, in another arena, his efforts on behalf of higher education in Texas were producing a new orientation which rivaled the impact of Astroturf and climate-controlled spectator comfort.²

A year earlier, as the nation grieved over the Kennedy assassination, he had won reelection decisively. With a campaign promise of change in higher education, he rolled over his 1962 Democratic opponent, liberal Houston attorney Don Yarborough, in the primary and in the general election defeated Republican Jack Crichton by nearly three to one. That issue dominated his second administration, which achieved reorganization of higher education through a powerful coordinating board, increased state

²HP, 10 April 1965.

funding for colleges and universities, additional student programs, and a new level of federal involvement.²

The governor's survival of the Kennedy assassination was a tremendous advantage in his 1964 reelection. He was a mythic hero in the minds of many. No public relations firm could have created as popular an image, which translated into a ninety-three percent approval rating among Texas voters. This phenomenon, observed The New Republic, was responsible for rendering his political opposition "fragmented and ineffectual." Connally's base of support, previously the more conservative branch of the Democratic Party, now cut across class and ethnic lines.³

One of Connally's central campaign themes was support for the Committee of Twenty-Five. On April 10, he promised the Association of Texas Colleges and Universities that he would expand the state's ability to provide higher education and stressed that if the CTF recommendations were implemented, two and one-half times the current number of students could be enrolled by 1975. He emphasized cooperation between all institutions and made clear that academic "empire-building" was not to be confused with the state's needs. Later that month, before a group of corporate leaders, Connally spoke at length of the business community's obligation to education. He added that one educated mind was worth more than warehouses full of advanced technological products. A statewide poll taken weeks before the 1965 legislative session began gave Connally an 84

²Kingston, Attlessey, and Crawford, Political History of Texas, 259, 303.

³James Reston, Jr., The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 294-97; Andrew Kopkind, "Connally's Texas: A Report from the Grey Place," The New Republic, 20 November 1965, 9-10 (quotation).

percent approval rating, based largely on the issue of educational improvement.⁴

Connally's position was further enhanced with the removal of a key legislative impediment. On January 8, 1965, a few days before the Fifty-ninth Legislature convened, he announced that he would appoint Speaker of the House Byron Tunnell to a newly vacated seat on the Texas Railroad Commission. Tunnell led the legislative faction which had fought Connally's higher education proposals and defeated his budget in the previous legislature.⁵

Among the candidates for the speakership was Ben Barnes, a twenty-six-year-old representative from DeLeon and a prominent legislative lieutenant to both Connally and Tunnell. Barnes had previously accumulated 102 secondary pledges for a possible run for the speakership in 1966 and simply called them due two years in advance. Therefore, less than a week after Tunnell's resignation, Barnes was elected Speaker of the House, the second youngest individual ever to hold that position. One of the first to congratulate him was Governor Connally, who scored a double political coup with the removal of Tunnell and the elevation of his astute young political ally.⁶

His popularity peaked, his legislative fortune rising, Connally immediately turned to higher education. Unlike 1963, he did not allow the legislature time to propose a budget, but put forth his own fiscal

⁴HP, 11 April 1964; New York Times, 21 April 1964; DMN, 13 June 1965.

⁵DMN, 9 January 1965.

⁶Ibid.; AA-S, 11, 13, January 1965.

recommendations to the public on December 18, 1964, nearly a month before the session convened. Even without new taxes, the governor asserted, significantly more funding would be available for higher education. The previous legislature's tax rates and the state's booming economy had created a general revenue surplus totaling \$398 million. Of that sum, he specifically earmarked \$33.8 million for faculty salary raises, which, if realized, would rank Texas faculty at state institutions ten percent above the national average. The Committee of Twenty-Five's proposed coordinating board, however, was his principal objective. Creation of the board was embodied in House Bill 1, the centerpiece of Connally's legislative program, which proposed enactment of all CTF recommendations.⁷

In his public budget announcement, the governor established the success of HB 1 as his top priority and deemed it critical to other higher education initiatives. Connally indicated that upon passage of coordinating board legislation, he would recommend a \$226 million appropriation, up from \$167 million in the previous biennial budget. He also issued a veto warning to the legislature when he claimed that failure to adopt House Bill 1 would result in his advocacy of only those spending increases necessary to meet current needs. He justified his stand by emphasizing that the coordinating board was necessary to safeguard the taxpayers' increased support of higher education.⁸

⁷DMN, 18 December 1964.

⁸Ibid.

Hinging on creation of the board was Connally's ambitious higher education package. Specifically, he advocated new student loan programs, reorganization of all four-year schools into three separate university systems, and increased overall funding. Many legislators viewed this agenda as positive and politically popular. Even legislative enemies were complimentary and predicted enactment.⁹

The governor also worked behind the scenes to ensure success. Before his opening address to both houses, Connally met with specific legislators to clarify certain higher education issues. He warned against excess optimism over the state's general revenue surplus and reminded them that the addition of Pan American College and Angelo State College during the previous session had increased normal operating expenses. He estimated that almost one-fourth of his increase for higher education was siphoned by normal rates of growth and the two additional four-year schools. Any reduction in his budget recommendations, he emphasized, would produce hardship.¹⁰

Some opposition remained, however. A large number of legislators considered their top priority a raise in public school teachers' salaries of forty-five dollars per month. Initially, the governor did not recommend this increase. He claimed that it would necessitate a tax hike, since he had earmarked most of the revenue increase for higher education. Some, such as Senators A. M. Aikin and Dorsey Hardeman, considered the raise a

⁹59th Texas Legislature, House, Journal (Austin: Nelson Typesetting Co., 1965), 73-75 (hereafter cited as 59th House Journal); San Antonio Express, 28 January 1965 (hereafter cited as SAE).

¹⁰AA-S, 18 January 1965.

more important legislative goal than the fulfillment of the governor's proposed higher education agenda. Representative George Hinson of Mineola went so far as to claim that Connally singled out public school teachers as the losers in the budget.¹¹

Dissent notwithstanding, the campaign on behalf of HB1 proved effective. Connally and Speaker Barnes formulated a strategy whereby the governor's staff drafted the bill while Barnes handled day-to-day legislative maneuvering. Of concern to both was the receptiveness of Lieutenant Governor Preston Smith. While Smith was not regarded as a perennial legislative opponent of Connally's proposals, he had demonstrated indifference to the administration's goals in the past and was not completely convinced of the coordinating board's need or value. Therefore, the two decided to "work around" Smith by first passing the legislation in the House by the largest possible majority.¹²

At the request of Barnes, Connally's floor leader, this approach was effected early. Representatives Dick Cory of Victoria and Charles Wilson of Trinity sponsored HB 1, which offered no surprises on first reading. It specified the requirements of board membership, its supersedure of TCHE, and its assumption of control over junior colleges from TEA. Another important factor was that Cory was an established conservative and liberals respected Wilson. On second reading, both representatives provided a slate of amendments which added substance to the bill in terms of specific policy. All of Cory's changes were accepted without objection and dealt

¹¹SAE, 19 January 1965.

¹²Temple interview; Ben Barnes, interview by author, 2 March 1995. Tape recording, business office, Austin (hereafter cited as Barnes interview).

with definitions of language, the role of the commissioner of higher education, the coordinating board's power of review, its hiring standards, and the weight of its formulas.¹³

Several amendments were not acceptable to the Connally faction, however. Others that ultimately failed required that a percentage of the board's makeup consist of professional educators, that at least one-third of its membership reflect geographical representation, and that junior college teaching or administrative experience be a prerequisite for appointees. After these challenges were repulsed, Cory, on the third reading, submitted two additional amendments, without objection, and the bill passed, 140 to 4. The tremendous margin of victory in the House had fulfilled part of the Connally-Barnes strategy.¹⁴

William (Bill) Moore, a conservative from Bryan, sponsored HB 1 in the Senate, where Aikin and Hardeman opposed Connally's focus on higher education over public schools. It arrived on February 25 and immediately reached a second reading. The bill's overwhelming approval in the House had the desired effect. After five opposition amendments were offered and defeated by large margins, passage occurred, 27 to 3, with Aikin and Hardeman in the minority. The resounding victory in the Senate was impressive, as Barnes recalled, since that body maintained much closer ties to TCHE than the House. Indeed, Senator Walter Richter

¹³59th House Journal, 52, 54, 112; 258-66; Barnes interview.

¹⁴59th House Journal, 52, 54, 112; 258-66; 282-84, 422, 464.

offered an unsuccessful rival bill, which would have empowered TCHE with the new board's statutory authority.¹⁵

On March 3, 1965, the governor signed the law that created the "Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System," to supersede TCHE on September 1 of that year. Connally displayed uncharacteristic sentiment during the ceremony and contended that no act had ever given him greater pleasure. The governor believed that with a powerful Coordinating Board, he had finally fulfilled promises of broad change in higher education.¹⁶

A strong link between TCHE and the Coordinating Board was retained. Despite the possibility of replacement, members of TCHE defended the necessity of a strong regulatory authority. Connally followed CTF recommendations by retaining as many of TCHE's staff as possible. Lester Harrell, its executive director, was made acting Commissioner of Higher Education for nearly a year before becoming its Assistant Commissioner for Federal Programs. Other TCHE staff members retained prominent positions on the Board such as Ray Fowler, Assistant Commissioner for Fiscal Affairs, and David Hunt, Assistant Commissioner for Public Junior Colleges and Statistical Services.¹⁷

¹⁵59th Texas Legislature, Senate, Journal (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Co., 1965), 253, 325-28 (hereafter cited as 59th Senate Journal); Barnes interview; Richter interview; "The Superboard Nears Reality," TO, 22 February 1965, 1-4.

¹⁶HP, 5 March 1965; DMN, 5 March 1965.

¹⁷AA-S, 22 April 1965; "Meet the Staff," Coordinating Board Report, October 1966, 3, Coordinating Board Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter this source cited as CBR and this repository as CBL); Ashworth interview.

When the Board legally replaced TCHE, on September 1, 1965, the governor received praise for its membership, which included prominent CTF members such as John Gray, H. B. Zachry, Dr. D. M. Wiggins, and M. Harvey Weil. He further extended the olive branch to TCHE and its supporters when he named six of its fifteen members to the new eighteen-person Board. In his official charge, Connally reminded his appointees that although they came from different parts of the state, they represented all of Texas on the Board. Because of the inevitable political pressures that eventually dogged the Board's early years, some observers claim that its superior personnel allowed it to survive.¹⁸

Some legislators, however, lamented creation of the Coordinating Board. Representative Bob Eckhardt from Houston, a previous supporter of House Bill 1, claimed that the legislature had abdicated its duty and rubber-stamped the governor's agenda without sufficient deliberation. He attributed this failure directly to Connally's influence. "Because of some strange fascination with the Governor's power," he said, "we acted as

¹⁸HP, 2 September 1965; "Charge to the Coordinating Board Texas College and University System at Austin, 20 September 1965," CBL; Jack Keever, interview by author, 28 February 1995. Tape recording, residence, Austin (hereafter cited as Keever interview). Keever was an Associated Press correspondent who covered the Texas Senate in the 1960s and coauthored a book on John Connally. In addition to the four CTF appointees, the remaining Board members were Newton Gresham of Houston, attorney and former chairman of the Board of Regents of the State Teachers' Colleges; Mrs. John T. Jones of Houston, chairman of the Texas Women's University Board of Regents; Sam Rayburn Bell of Paris, realtor and TCHE member; Dr. J. J. Seabrook of Austin, former president of Huston-Tillotson College; Dr. G. V. Brindley of Temple, surgeon; Charles Prothro of Wichita Falls, oilman-rancher and TCHE member; C. G. Scruggs of Dallas, rancher and editor of Progressive Farmer magazine; Dr. Joaquin Cigarroa of Laredo, physician and TCHE member; Harry Provence of Waco, newspaper editor; Victor Brooks of Austin, engineer and businessman; Eugene McDermott of Dallas, executive committee chairman of Texas Instruments; Tom Sealy of Midland, attorney and former chairman of the University of Texas Board of Regents; Dan C. Williams, president of Southland Life Insurance Company and TCHE member; and J. C. Looney of Edinburg, attorney, former county judge of Hidalgo County, and TCHE member.

though we could not change it.” Eckhardt was among those who feared the Board’s potential for the suppression of academic freedom, in contrast to others who were alarmed at the thought of too much academic freedom and protection of tenure.¹⁹

Within weeks after the Board’s creation, Connally was forced to defend it against adverse legislation. On April 13, he vetoed a bill to create a medical school for Texas Technological College, maneuvered through the both houses by Lieutenant Governor Smith and other West Texas legislators. Connally reiterated that the newly created Board should approve the proposal before the legislature considered its enactment. The governor’s action thus saved the new board from being undermined before its first meeting, but brought scorn from Smith, who believed that the rationale for the veto constituted “unwarranted interference.” Likewise, Lubbock Senator H. J. (Doc) Blanchard vowed to offer future legislation that would do away with the Board.²⁰

Advances in the financing of higher education in 1965 were impressive: a raise in faculty salaries of \$50.5 million, to a level ten percent above the national average; a significant boost in library appropriations, from \$4.7 to \$8.6 million; and an increase of over one hundred percent in research funds, from \$3.4 to \$7.4 million. All told, Texas colleges and universities received \$80.5 million more over the previous session, from \$155.7 to \$236.2 million, and junior college

¹⁹59th House Journal, 2701 (quotation); “The Mystery of Section 11,” TO, 5 March 1965, 4; “The Superboard Nears Reality,” ibid., 22 February 1965, 4.

²⁰Houston Chronicle, 14 April 1965 (hereafter cited as HC).

spending rose from \$16.5 to \$26.9 million. Total higher education outlays were \$263.1, as opposed to \$172.2 million for the previous biennium.²¹

Not all of the changes in higher education were attributable to the Connally administration, however. Representative Hinson, who criticized the governor's emphasis on higher education early in the session, championed a significant new \$100 million statewide student loan program. In the Senate, Grady Hazlewood of Amarillo won passage of a new loan package totaling \$75 million, while the governor recommended a similar program at \$50 million. Subsequently, a conference committee set the figure at \$85 million, and, on November 2, 1965, voters approved a constitutional amendment to issue bonds for the Texas Opportunity Plan, later to become the Hinson-Hazlewood Loan Program. Administered by the Coordinating Board, the Hinson-Hazlewood program had an immediate impact and assisted more than 21,000 qualified Texas students over the next three years.²²

Governor Connally took the unusual step of publicly congratulating the legislature at the end of its 1965 session. He cited many achievements in a session he termed "the most productive [of] this century." In particular, he pointed to creation of the Coordinating Board, which he linked to excellence in higher education and the state's future development. The Board, he affirmed, would become the mechanism by which the tax

²¹AA-S, 6 June 1965; SAE, 6 June 1965; Edward G. Holley, "Academic Libraries Face a Bright Future," Texas Library Journal, Fall 1963, 80-81 (hereafter cited as TLJ).

²²DMN, 7 May 1965; 59th Senate Journal, 706; 59th House Journal, 1372; AA-S, 28 April 1965; John B. Connally, Report to the Legislature: Texas Reaches for Greatness, 15 January 1969 (Austin: [Office of Governor], 1969), 6.

revenue would be expended in an efficient manner to the benefit of all Texans.²³

The media applauded Connally's success. In an analysis of the achievements of the Fifty-ninth Legislature's first session, the Austin American-Statesman believed the Coordinating Board to be "a sort of magical passport to the wonderland of tomorrow." The San Antonio Express praised the session as precedent-shattering, startling, and extremely productive. Richard Morehead, a political correspondent for the Dallas Morning News, considered the focus on higher education as instrumental to the state's future and a testament to the governor's political strength.²⁴

These changes in Texas higher education coincided with growing federal involvement. During the Kennedy administration, the government cautiously expanded its presence through regulations attached to college and university construction funds. In addition, Congress, in 1962, passed a five-year, thirty-two-million-dollar program for the creation of an educational television network and the next year approved the Higher Education Facilities Act, which authorized grants and loans for new on-campus building. With the exceptions of the G. I. Bill and NDEA, federal initiatives previously had not extended beyond support for additional land grant colleges.²⁵

²³SAE, 6 June 1965 (quotation); AA-S, 22 April 1965; 59th House Journal, 3196-97.

²⁴AA-S, 6 June 1965; SAE, 6 June 1965; DMN, 1 June 1965. See also Richard Morehead, 50 Years in Texas Politics (Burnet, TX: Eakin Press, 1982), 181.

²⁵"Higher Education Laws: A Chronology," Chronicle of Higher Education, 22 February 1967, 7 (hereafter cited as CHE).

Federal presence expanded drastically during the Johnson presidency. New G. I. Bills were passed in 1964 and 1966. The Higher Education Act of 1965, which increased the tendency toward direct support from Washington, provided aid for libraries, assistance for developing schools, a national teacher corps, supplemental opportunity grants, and guaranteed student loans. In 1966 the University of Texas, the twentieth leading institutional recipient of federal monies in 1963, received thirty-eight million dollars from Washington and increased its national ranking by seven places. Other Texas institutions in the top one hundred schools receiving federal funds were Texas A&M University (sixtieth), Baylor University (seventy-third), and Rice University (ninety-first). In 1965 most two-year and four-year colleges received thousands of dollars for summer employment of economically disadvantaged students from the Economic Opportunity Act. Unlike his predecessor, Price Daniel, who had opposed NDEA, Connally typically gave quick approval of funds for his state.²⁶

This willingness to accept outside funding was one indication that higher education changed greatly during Connally's second term. He used public sentiment and sound strategy to exercise commanding influence within the Fifty-ninth Legislature. Calculated expenditure of political capital resulted in the creation of the Coordinating Board, after years of evolutionary development in that direction. He also bore considerable responsibility for greatly increased state support for colleges and

²⁶Wilson, Higher Education, 60-62; "Federal Aid to Colleges Doubles in 4 Years; Distribution is Wider, New Statistics Show," CHE, 27 September 1967, 3; DMN, 9 June 1965.

universities and presided over the funneling of larger federal assistance to Texas institutions. This was not the end of higher education as an issue, however. The next term would determine how these important changes would be administered.

CHAPTER 4

PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION: THE COORDINATING BOARD AND HIGHER EDUCATION, 1966-1969

While the Coordinating Board represented the culmination of years of policy evolution in Texas higher education, its initial existence during John Connally's governorship was controversial, and its power remained undetermined. From 1966 to 1969, the Board compiled a mixed record of success on issues concerning budget, planning, program and degree oversight, academic freedom, private colleges and universities, and management of federal funds. In responding to sharp criticism, it occasionally showed signs of weakness. Despite these difficulties, however, the Board survived and became a significant element of reform in Texas higher education.

One controversial aspect of the Board's role pertained to budgeting. While its authority did not extend to dictating appropriations to the governor and the legislature, it did set criteria for any spending in higher education. Approximately seventy percent of the total budget for colleges and universities was allocated on the basis of formulas which the Board developed. In addition, the Board had statutory power to make recommendations on spending beyond its formulas upon formal request by the governor or the legislature. Whereas higher education had previously

been beholden to executive, legislative, and TCHE wishes, the Coordinating Board's budgetary counsel merged with the executive budget to rival the Legislative Budget Board (LBB) and the legislature.¹

The Board also used extrastatutory power to influence the budgetary process. Although its enabling act, HB 1 of 1965, bestowed no lobbying authority per se, the Board exercised influence on behalf of higher education during legislative sessions. This kind of advocacy found favor with many policy makers in such matters as institutional construction standards and community college policy. While the Board could dictate in these and other areas of higher education, it frequently chose the less controversial promotional approach.²

In its infancy, the Board showed independence from Connally in exceeding his recommendations for library spending. In December of 1966, the governor announced his budget for the upcoming Sixtieth Legislature in which he requested \$22 million for senior college and university libraries. In January, the Board requested an additional \$2.5 million to accommodate rapidly rising enrollments at four-year institutions. The LBB answered the request when it recommended that \$2.1 million go directly to the Board to distribute to those institutions which were most severely affected.³

¹Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1971), 112-13. Berdahl is currently president of the University of Texas at Austin.

²Michael Lee Abbott, "The Role and Functions of a State Coordinating Agency: A Study of Differential Perceptions" (Ph. D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1976), 17, 160.

³C. James Schmidt, "Budget Recommendations for State-Supported Senior College and University Libraries, 1968-1969," TLJ, Spring 1967, 29-35.

Whatever self-direction the Board exhibited, however, was quashed by lack of support from Connally and the legislature in the 1967 budget. The victory over library funds notwithstanding, other important recommendations were ignored. One of the Board's most important objectives was an increase in tuition and fees, from a per semester average of fifty to two hundred and ten dollars. The increase appeared dramatic because tuition rates had not been raised since 1957. In the governor's tax message to the legislature, in February of 1967, he took the politically popular stand and recommended no increase whatsoever. This tactic eliminated the possibility of an increase, which did enjoy some support in the legislature. Connally also offered budgetary recommendations for higher education which were smaller than the Board's, the result of his refusal to use their enrollment projections. This friction prompted a Houston Chronicle correspondent to complain that Texas was "still a far cry" from realizing the excellence its citizens desired.⁴

Despite this setback, higher education received increased support. Even though the governor economized the Board's requests for four-year institutions, the level of financing was impressive. One factor in the appropriations process was the governor's request for a one-year budget in response to pressure from Lieutenant Governor Smith to pledge a moratorium on tax increases. As a result, the two one-year budgets produced a substantial appropriations increase to higher education. The first, for fiscal year 1967-1968, almost matched the previous biennium at

⁴Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System, Annual Report, 1 December 1967 (Austin: [Coordinating Board], 1967), 3; DMN, June 6, 16 1968; HC, 5 February 1967 (quotation).

\$235.1 million. In the 1968 special budgetary session, higher education received \$259.4 million. The combined appropriations totaled \$494.5 million, a substantial increase from the \$172.2 million in the 1963-65 biennium and the \$263.1 million from the 1965-67 biennium. Because new liquor and sales taxes in both sessions funded the increase, the cost of education to students remained low.⁵

Connally's support of the Board was especially apparent with regard to long-range planning. The governor justified lowering its requests in the 1967 budget as a means of raising the importance of a master plan. He would, he affirmed, sustain the Board's desired funding levels only when the document was completed. He was of the opinion that only through a statewide blueprint of objectives could additional higher education funds be justified and not smack of localism. He also opposed already frustrated West Texas legislators by supporting the Board's decision to not certify the creation of any additional four-year institutions until the plan was finished.⁶

This concept faced a hostile legislature, however. It included a detailed analysis of every state four-year institution and defined a role and scope for each. Legislators concerned with obtaining new degree programs and departments for schools in their districts considered the master plan a threat. The Board's budget for 1968-69, as recommended by

⁵AA-S, 15 December 1966, 5 June 1968; CHE, 8 February 1967, 4; *ibid*, 12 July 1967, 12; DMN, 1 April 1967; John K. Folger, "Can the States Support Higher Education in the Future?" in A Symposium on Financing Higher Education: Proceedings of the SREB Held in Miami Beach, Florida, 12 June 1969, ed. Winfred L. Godwyn (Atlanta: Southern Regional Education Board, 1969), 23.

⁶AA-S, 15 December 1966; DMN, 1 April, 15 December 1967.

the LBB and Senate Finance Committee, was reduced to \$529,116, or \$264,529 less than its previous allocation. Most of the decrease came from the Board's master plan fund. Regarding this budget dispute, Harley Pershing editorialized in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram that the Board's work was "handicapped by a lack of support from the legislature."⁷

Nevertheless, the Coordinating Board forcefully promoted the plan. In its meeting of May 15, 1967, discussion centered on the cut in funds to guarantee its completion. Commissioner of Higher Education Jack Williams argued that legislative tightfistedness jeopardized the plan's seventy-six separate study projects. Members authorized the staff to prepare a resolution to the legislature, and in a separate statement chairman John Gray described the inaction as costly to the entire state. The Board was aware of the political necessity of the master plan in achieving desired levels of funding.⁸

The plan was released in June of 1968 and advocated both managed growth and stabilization for all aspects of higher education. For junior colleges, it urged expansion and adoption of a statewide core curriculum, so as to facilitate free credit transfers to public four-year institutions. For the colleges and universities, it recommended realistic growth and authorized new institutions, at San Antonio, Houston, Midland-Odessa, and Corpus Christi, to begin by 1974. The master plan was a ten-year policy

⁷Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 23 June 1968 (hereafter cited as FWST).

⁸Coordinating Board Minutes, 15 May 1967, 1967 volume, 9, bound and unpublished volumes, CBL. Dr. Jack Williams became the Commissioner of Higher Education after serving as Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of the Graduate School at Clemson University in South Carolina. While at Clemson he had been a consultant to the Committee of Twenty-Five.

blueprint which attempted to provide a basis for higher education decision-making beyond the usual biennium to biennium wrangling.⁹

The authority which evoked most fear was the Board's oversight of institutional growth and degree offerings. Before the Coordinating Board's first meeting, the State Board of Education, which determined the creation of junior colleges under TCHE, was flooded with requests for new schools from areas in the state where alarm over the new agency's mandate was pronounced. Some legislators and educators recalled the dictatorial bent of regents at various Texas institutions during the 1940s and 1950s and likened that to the Board's statutory authority. Detractors considered dangerous what they termed as "absolute programming authority."¹⁰

On this subject, however, the governor was in complete sympathy. Connally protected the Board's power of academic review by not allowing the legislature to circumvent its decisions. The Board ruled in 1967 that doctoral programs at East Texas State University should be terminated by September of 1968. The school fought the decision and lobbied the legislature for a bill to counter this action. Despite a failed attempt in the 1967 session, a bill to reverse the Board's decision passed the legislature in the special session of 1968. In an effort to preserve the Board's authority, the governor vetoed the act and publicly reaffirmed his support.¹¹

⁹Texas Reaches for Greatness, 7-8.

¹⁰SAE, 6 June 1965; Ronnie Dugger, "The Continuing Mystery of Section 11," TO, 16 April 1965, 10-11 (quotation).

¹¹"Legislative Action of the 60th State Legislature," CBR, July 1967, 7; Berdahl, Statewide Coordination, 156; Ashworth interview.

The scope of the Board's oversight was clear in its first months of activity. Its review of degree and department requests began in July of 1966, and by November of that year, it had authorized thirty-nine new degree programs. While some existing programs were discontinued, the Board was more circumspect with this power. Instead of commanding, it often requested institutional review and otherwise promoted the changes it favored. Its absolute power in these matters and its advocacy role in higher education were reconciled in the Board's obvious restraint.¹²

Academic freedom was another important policy concern. Again, as in the Board's budgetary, master plan, and oversight authority, legislative support was lacking. In fact, before it could formulate guidelines on academic freedom, Representative Ralph Wayne of Plainview offered a bill to strip its authority to develop tenure standards. This attempt was the first of many to negate one or more aspects of the Board's power. It adopted a statewide policy on October 16, 1967, which specified procedures for tenuring and dismissal. Disregard of these general principles, however, continued to be a problem in Texas higher education.¹³

Establishing greater academic freedom through more rigid regulations proved to be a mixed success. Before new academic freedom policies could be implemented, the improved atmosphere in higher education produced some change. Because of corrective action taken by its regents, Texas Technological College was removed from the American

¹²"Program Development in Texas Public Colleges and Universities," CBR, November 1966, 6-7; Abbott, "Roles and Functions," 18.

¹³60th Texas Legislature, House, Journal (Austin: Nelson Typesetting Co., 1967), 3519; Kever interview; "Policy Adopted on Academic Freedom, Responsibility and Tenure," CBR, October 1967, 2-4.

Association of University Professors' censure list. Conversely, several months after the implementation of the Board's rules, two other state schools, Texas A & M University and Amarillo College, were added to the list. Both cases involved the dismissal of tenured professors through procedures which lacked "almost every fundamental...of due process." This setback meant that Texas replaced Pennsylvania and Arkansas as the most censured state.¹⁴

The Board also dealt with problems of private colleges and universities. Its master plan specifically supplied research funds, obtained from the United States Office of Education, to the Liaison Committee on Texas Private Colleges and Universities, a panel of seven presidents and chancellors of private colleges. The resulting Board-sanctioned study produced a report in which the Liaison Committee warned that without more state assistance, private education in Texas would become a thing of the past. The accessibility of new, relatively low-cost state-supported schools was causing substantial enrollment declines in private institutions, whose per-semester tuition had increased from an average of \$592 in 1963 to \$791 in 1967.¹⁵

Some private schools emulated the Board in their coordinating authorities. Six small, church-related, predominantly African-American institutions formed the Texas Association of Developing Colleges, which

¹⁴"Texas Tech Censure Lifted," CHE, 3 May 1967, 5; Robert L. Jacobson, "Censure Place on 9 Colleges, Lifted from 6," ibid., 6 May 1968, 1, 5 (quotation).

¹⁵"Independent College Study Report," CBR, June 1968, 1; Anita Brewer, "Private Colleges in Texas Urge State Aid Now," CHE, 1 July 1968, 5. The seven institutions represented on the Liaison Committee were: Austin College, Southern Methodist University, St. Mary's University, University of St. Thomas, Baylor University, Trinity University, and Rice University.

served as a kind of central administrative agency. This pioneer organization provided a means by which African-American schools throughout the South could weather the hard times in private higher education. Like the Coordinating Board, the Association was entrusted with review of institutional scope and programs, federal grant distribution, and overall guidance.¹⁶

Although the Board received accolades for its performance in a variety of capacities, it also suffered adverse publicity and a damaging loss in personnel. In June of 1968, Commissioner of Higher Education Jack Williams announced his resignation from the Coordinating Board and acceptance of an appointment as Academic Vice President of the University of Tennessee System. Williams, regarded as a hard-nosed advocate for Board recommendations, had made enemies in the legislature. He was hired with the promise of a \$40,000 salary, but in 1965 the legislature appropriated \$22,500. Several Board members and nonprofit organizations then raised enough private funds to make up the difference. Two years later, the legislature again refused to comply when it appropriated \$26,000 for salary and allowed outside sources to provide the remainder.¹⁷

Speculation surrounding the controversial Williams resignation varied. Two Connally biographers suspected a rift between the governor

¹⁶“6 Negro Colleges in Texas Try Team Approach to Problems,” CHE, 13 September 1967, 9. The six member institutions of the Texas Association of Developing Colleges were: Bishop College, Jarvis Christian College, Huston-Tillotson College, Paul Quinn College, Texas College, and Wiley College.

¹⁷“J. K. Williams Selected Academic Vice-President of the University of Tennessee System,” CBR, June 1968, 1; DMN, 21 June 1968; FWST, 23 June 1968.

and the commissioner over the rejection of Coordinating Board budget recommendations in 1967 and 1968. An associate claimed that Williams was wounded by harsh criticism of his decisions and salary supplementation from several regents and legislators. A prominent political figure in the Connally camp recalled that Williams did not appreciate the necessity of some politics in the higher education debate and that he probably resigned out of frustration over having to deal with pressure from Connally and members of the legislature. Whatever the reason, some thought Williams' resignation to be the death-knell of the Coordinating Board. His replacement, as of September 1, 1968, was Dr. Bevington Reed, the Board's Assistant Commissioner for Senior Colleges and Universities since August of 1967.¹⁸

Beyond its many state-directed responsibilities, the Board also coordinated federal involvement, which grew substantially in the 1960s. Washington contributed nearly four billion dollars to combined higher education programs for the fiscal year 1967-68, when four Texas universities, the University of Texas, Texas A&M, Baylor, and Rice, ranked in the top one hundred institutional recipients of government funds. The Board, through its federal liaison department, facilitated distribution of federal monies through fellowships, grants, loans, and training and research contracts that flowed to state institutions.¹⁹

¹⁸Crawford and Kever, Portrait in Power, 162-63; Ashworth interview; DMN, 5, 14 June 1968; Barnes interview. Before coming to the Coordinating Board, Reed, a native of West Texas, was the Academic Vice-President of Mankato State College in Minnesota.

¹⁹Ian E. McNett, "\$4-Billion in Federal Funds Voted for Higher Education," CHE, 8 November 1967, 2.

Largely through the Coordinating Board, Washington's role in the growth of higher education in Texas grew markedly. From 1965 to 1967, the Board approved federal matching grants of over \$23 million for on-campus construction from the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. For the period 1963 through 1967, construction funds from this one source amounted to \$59 million, spread among 123 projects and 74 Texas institutions. Some aid, however, such as the Economic Opportunity Administration's work-study programs, which provided for eighty-five percent of the total state funds for library assistants in 1967, did not go through the Board.²⁰

In addition to establishing the Coordinating Board as a viable entity, Connally was able to secure passage of another component of his overall program, the Connally-Carrillo Bill. Sponsored in the Sixtieth Legislature by Senator Wayne Connally of Floresville, the governor's brother, and Representative Oscar Carrillo of Benavides, this measure passed both houses in May of 1967. It exempted from payment of all fees and tuition, at state-supported colleges and universities, scholastically qualified, Texas-born students from low-income families, or those earning less than \$4,800 annually. Governor Connally could claim another victory, for he considered this legislation to be a major component of his higher education initiative.²¹

²⁰Edward G. Holley, "A Further Look at Academic Library Support in Texas," TLJ, Winter 1967, 154-55; "Construction Grant Awards," CBR, October 1967, 2.

²¹60th Texas Legislature, Senate Journal (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones, Co., 1967), 1694, 2284; Connally, Texas Reaches for Greatness, 6.

During John Connally's governorship, higher education in Texas experienced significant growth. An important aspect of this was the tremendous increase in funding. Total state outlays rose from \$172.2 to \$494.5 million in the half dozen years from 1963 to 1969. In accordance with national trends, Texas' expenditures greatly expanded during this period. Greater fiscal support, some claim, may have been the prime component of reform in higher education during the Connally years.²²

While funding was critical, an integral element of reform was creation of the Coordinating Board. Even though it did not enjoy overwhelming support in its early years, it represented substantial administrative progress. In real terms, the Board's exercise of its oversight powers justified increased funding for higher education to the governor. Perhaps more important, however, was the shifting of some decision-making power away from local legislators to a more specialized body who developed a larger picture of the state's higher education objectives. Over what previously existed, this reorganization brought a more rational distribution of resources to state schools; produced for the

²²Godwyn, A Symposium on Financing Higher Education, 23; "Funds for Colleges Rise 45 Percent in 28 States," CHE, 12 July 1967, 12; John M. Crawl, "States Allocate Over \$5-Billion to Universities," *ibid.*, 14 October 1968, 1, 8; Barnes interview.

first time a long-range plan for higher education; and allowed the Board to manage growth of state institutions in the name of greater efficiency.²³

As the focal point of higher education in Texas, the Board increasingly became critical to the growing federal partnership. Washington slowly developed a direct relationship to higher education after World War II with a succession of G. I. Bills and Cold War measures such as NDEA. As federal programs and funds grew substantially during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a central state apparatus became essential. In this respect the creation of a federal liaison department within the Board played a pivotal role in the distribution of the proliferating resources.²⁴

So that Texas might attract its share of federal funds, Connally was determined that excellence should replace the overall mediocrity of state colleges and universities that was generally acknowledged to be the consequence of a lack of competent, authoritative planning. Creation of the Coordinating Board in 1965 promised change for the better. At first, the Board experienced difficulty and from time to time found the legislature, and even the governor, in opposition. Its recommendations were taken seriously enough, however, so that most achieved eventual enactment. Given the nature of politics and the importance of the issue, the Board's successes were much more significant than its occasional failures. Perhaps current Commissioner Kenneth Ashworth defined it best as "a form of reform." This assessment bolsters the notion that while Connally's

²³Crawford and Keever, Portrait in Power, 163-64; Sam P. Wiggins, Higher Education in the South (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1966), 55.

²⁴CHE, 8 April 1968.

achievements on behalf of higher education were not, at least in national context, radically new or sweeping, they appeared to work better than anything to date.²⁵

The many changes associated with Connally are significant enough to be considered reforms. The governor's support of higher education through a powerful Coordinating Board and increased funding represented a substantial overhaul in the way the state's colleges and universities had operated. Certainly, many of today's educators and leaders would suggest that these changes did not result in long-term reforms. They did, however, contribute significantly to the growth and status of the state's colleges and universities. Texas higher education, beset with problems in the post-World War II era, rose to new heights during the governorship of John Connally.

²⁵HC, 5 February 1967; Barnes interview; Ashworth interview.

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