

A Content Analysis of Peacekeeping Issues for the Journal *Armed Forces & Society*

By

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Abstract

Purpose

This study describes peacekeeping issues found in the journal of *Armed Forces & Society*. Peacekeeping is an important aspect of civil-military relations because it attempts to normalize the relationship between society and the armed forces of a nation. As the premier journal on civil-military relations *Armed Forces & Society* should cover topics dealing with peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are undertaken to repair the negative relationship between a society and its armed forces. The journal has proven to be the benchmark in discussing civil-military relations and therefore should incorporate content on peacekeeping.

The peacekeeping issues are organized using a taxonomy found in *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. This study breaks down peacekeeping operations into four categories and describes the level of discussion *Armed Forces & Society* gives to each category. This study illustrates how the journal *Armed Forces & Society*, contributes to the scholarly literature of peacekeeping.

Methodology

Peacekeeping is reduced to four major categories. Categories used in the content analysis include: internal characteristics, operational characteristics, authorization characteristics and the political and military context of a peacekeeping operation. The categories of peacekeeping operations are modeled on a framework derived from the United Nations' *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* produced in 2000. A content analysis of articles found in the journal *Armed Forces & Society* from the first issue in 1974 to the October 2009 issue is used to describe the peacekeeping content.

Results

This study measures and describes the frequency of discussion by *Armed Forces & Society* concerning peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping categories and sub-categories are ranked to show the level of contribution made to the peacekeeping literature. Peacekeeping issues such as personnel, personnel behavior and training are discussed at length and contribute greatly to the peacekeeping discussion. Some areas of peacekeeping, such as the behavior of 3rd party actors, Security Council Mandates and the command and control of an operation are partially represented. After presenting the findings of this study recommendations are made to assist future scholars and journal leadership in contributing to the peacekeeping literature.

About the Author

Christopher W. Brady is a degree seeking graduate student at Texas State University - San Marcos with an interest in international relations. Mr. Brady's enthusiasm for travel has developed into a passion for assisting developing countries to improve their quality of life. Mr. Brady hopes to one day parlay his passion for assisting developing countries into a career at the U.S. State Department.

Chapter I: Introduction

Introduction

Peacekeeping has taken place since world powers have sought to eliminate warfare from the earth. Unfortunately, conflict between men shows no signs of ending. The continued presence of conflict around the globe necessitates a comprehensive understanding of how to best keep the peace.

Historically, many nation-states, coalitions and international organizations have attempted to keep the peace between conflicting parties. A greater understanding of peacekeeping theories and practices will assist the international community in maintaining global peace and security. It is vital to understand how and in which areas scholars should contribute to the literature concerning peacekeeping. Knowing which areas of a subject need development is essential to advancing that subject in theory and practice.

Setting

Armed Forces & Society is a peer-reviewed, internationally recognized journal that publishes empirical, theoretically-informed articles, research notes, book reviews, and review essays. Founded in the 1970's *Armed Forces & Society* has branched out from its humble beginnings as a "largely American journal"¹ to the preeminent internationally recognized source for civil-military relations scholarship. The journal also acts as a tool for the Inter-University Seminar for the dissemination of theory and policy concerning military establishments, civil-

¹ <http://www.in-cites.com/journals/ArmedForcesSociety.html>

military relations, the use and limits of force within military operations, security, and other related topics¹.

The journal contributes greatly to the military related sub-field of international security. As of 2009, *Armed Forces & Society* is currently used by 5,069 institutions worldwide². In a recent interview the editor, Dr. Patricia Shields, stated that *Armed Forces & Society* is the “primary reference to military academies and war colleges”¹. Military institutions across the globe, including the Pentagon, rely on *Armed Forces & Society* for new theory and policy concerning international security. One way in which international peace and security is maintained is through the use of peacekeeping forces. Military institutions that participate in international peacekeeping operations look to *Armed Forces & Society* for the latest contribution to the ongoing discourse about international security and peacekeeping.



Picture found at http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/product/6489_AF&S_n3_72ppiR_GB_150pixw.jpg

Since its inception *Armed Forces & Society* has been a stalwart in leading the discussion concerning military related scholarship, including international security. When asked “How do you see your field(s) evolving in the next few years?”¹ Dr. Shields discussed one change being “the increasing use of international peacekeeping forces in conflicts across the globe”¹. A greater presence of international peacekeeping forces facilitates a need for a greater understanding of peacekeeping theory and policy. *Armed Forces & Society* is already the primary reference for

² Armed Forces & Society Publishers Report 2009

military institutions which participate in peacekeeping operations so what better journal to lead the discussion concerning the future of peacekeeping.

In order to prepare for the future we must understand the past. Dr. Shields briefly discussed an increase in the use of international peacekeeping forces worldwide. In furtherance of a comprehensive contribution to peacekeeping literature, an understanding of the past and current contribution to the topic is necessary. This study serves to describe the contribution of *Armed Forces & Society* to peacekeeping literature, and recommend improvements for the future. Leadership needs to be aware of the contribution its journal is making. An in-depth knowledge of how the journal contributes to the current scholarship will enable journal leadership to prepare for the future. This study will assist the journal's leadership in developing an in-depth contribution to all areas of the peacekeeping scholarship.

Statement of Research Purpose

Journals typically publish four to six articles per issue. Descriptive analyses of the content of a journal can aid journal leadership in calling for discussion of under-discussed subject matter. By realizing a subject is under-discussed the journal can correct its course and adjust its contribution to the literature.

Peacekeeping is a complex subject requiring extensive examination. The very nature of peacekeeping has a profound impact on the society the operation is designed to assist and the armed forces of contributing nation-states. The journal *Armed Forces & Society* should provide fertile ground for discussion of peacekeeping issues.

The purpose of this research is to describe the articles found within the journal *Armed Forces & Society* dealing with peacekeeping issues. Several applied research projects served as inspiration for me when deciding to embark on a descriptive analysis of an international issue. Table 1.1 lists the applied research projects that helped me craft my own.

Table 1.1 Applied Research Projects used to Develop the Research Question

Applied Research Projects

Ari, Leman Basak. 2007. Civil-Military Relations in Turkey. *Applied Research Projects*. Texas State University. Paper 248. <http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/248>

Bowman, Anthony. 2005. A Descriptive Study of Manuscripts and Reviewers for the *Armed Forces & Society* Journal. *Applied Research Projects*. Texas State University. Paper 15. <http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/15>

Fields, Karal G., 2006. Describing the Literature That Assesses the United States Postal Service Redress Program. *Applied Research Projects*. Texas State University. Paper 111. <http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/111>

Hernandez, Agentia C., 2007. An Examination of Human Rights Violations in Latin America: 2002 – 2006. *Applied Research Projects*. Texas State University. Paper 263. <http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/263>

Olldashi, Arjana. 2002. Civil-Military Relations in Emerging Democracies as Found in the Articles of *Armed Forces & Society*. *Applied Research Projects*. Texas State University. Paper 54. <http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/54>

Sexton, Nathan. 2003. A Description of the Articles of the Past Five Years of *Armed Forces & Society*. *Applied Research Projects*. Texas State University. Paper 37. <http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/37>

An accurate description of the content of *Armed Forces & Society* assists the journal leadership in understanding its contribution to peacekeeping literature. Currently, there is no such description of peacekeeping issues found within *Armed Forces & Society*.

Chapter Summaries

The next chapter reviews the historical background of peacekeeping contained within the international system. Chapter two concludes with a brief description of the evolution of peacekeeping. Chapter three develops the conceptual framework of peacekeeping that guides the research. Next, chapter four details the methodology, data collection and statistical techniques used to answer the research question. The fifth chapter reveals the results of the content analysis of peacekeeping articles found within the journal *Armed Forces & Society*. Finally, chapter six provides conclusions and recommendations for future research.

Chapter II: Historical Context

Chapter Purpose

This chapter describes the historical context in which contemporary peacekeeping developed. First, this chapter discusses the international norm of sovereignty, which has influenced the core principals of peacekeeping. Next, a discussion of peacekeeping as it was developed from the Concert of Europe in 1815 to the League of Nations (Bellamy et al 2009, 60-70). Finally, the evolution of peacekeeping is traced from the post-Cold War era to the present day. An illustration of the historical background of peacekeeping is the focus of this chapter.

Sovereignty, the International System and Peacekeeping

This section explores the international system and the norm of state sovereignty as it applies to peacekeeping operations. The different forms of sovereignty are reviewed and applied to peacekeeping operations within the international system. This section: 1) reviews the four forms of state sovereignty: international legal, Westphalian, interdependence and domestic³; 2) shows how state sovereignty has shaped the international system, and 3) illustrates how the international system and the norm of state sovereignty has influenced peacekeeping operations.

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2004, defines sovereignty as the “power to govern without external control”. This definition gives nation-states within the international system the sole and uncompromised power or authority within their territorial borders. By definition nation-states themselves control what happens within their borders. This has an important implication for peacekeeping operations, which is discussed later. The definition of sovereignty has been

³ Krasner 1999 p. 14-20

broken down into four components by Krasner (1999, 9): international legal, Westphalian, interdependence and domestic. Each form of sovereignty is examined as it pertains to peacekeeping operations.

Types of Sovereignty

Krasner (1999, 14) defines international legal sovereignty as “concerned with establishing the legal status of a political entity in the international system”. This means that one state is internationally recognized by others as the sovereign of a state or territory and is granted all the rights and privileges extended to the sovereign. Fowler and Bunck (1995, 12) state that international legal sovereignty is “a ticket of general admission to the international arena”. By this Fowler and Bunck (1995) allude to the privileges states enjoy as a result of international legal sovereign recognition such as: the ability to enter into treaties and agreements with other states, the ability join international organizations, conduct diplomatic relations with other states, maintain diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal actions within a foreign state, and access to foreign resources (Krasner 1999, 14-20). For the purposes of this study two privileges stand out: the ability to enter into treaties and agreements with other states and the ability to join international organizations. These privileges are developed more fully later in this chapter.

Krasner (1999, 20) bases his definition of Westphalian sovereignty on two principals “territoriality and the exclusion of external actors”. Essentially, Westphalian sovereignty is a “norm of nonintervention in internal affairs” (Krasner 1999, 20). Leaders of states are free to choose how they will conduct domestic affairs within their territorial borders. A violation of Westphalian sovereignty occurs when an external actor influences the internal affairs of a state. Krasner (1999, 20) identifies two ways to violate Westphalian sovereignty: intervention and

invitation. Peacekeeping operations are, for the most part, requested by the sovereign, therefore this study will focus on the invitation to violate Westphalian sovereignty. Invitations to violate Westphalian sovereignty are discussed later in the chapter.

Interdependence sovereignty is defined by Krasner (1999, 9) as “referring to the ability of public authorities to control transborder movements”. Basically, interdependence sovereignty is the ability of the state to control the flow of persons and goods in and out of its territory. According to Krasner (1999, 13) “If a state cannot regulate what passes across its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within them”. The clearest example of Krasner’s statement would be the genocide in Rwanda, in which the Rwandan government failed to control the flow of weapons to the Rwandan Patriotic Front from Uganda, and as a result could not control the violence that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 211).

Domestic sovereignty refers “to the organization of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority” (Krasner 1999, 9). Put simply, domestic sovereignty incorporates the ability of the sovereign to maintain domestic control. Domestic sovereignty is the most fundamental exercise of sovereignty, because domestic control of a territory is necessary before a state can enter into agreements or organizations with other states. In this light domestic sovereignty is seen as a building block in which all other forms of sovereignty are based. The next section discusses how the norm of sovereignty has shaped the international system.

The International System and Sovereignty

The norm of sovereignty led to the creation of an international system in which nonintervention and sovereignty are the main principals (Bellamy et al 2009, 21). These principals created an environment in which the state is the ultimate authority. The current international system, in which the state is the ultimate authority and nonintervention into the affairs of states is the norm, is known as the Westphalian model (Krasner 1999, 23). The Westphalian model shaped an environment in which states must consent to external assistance, such as humanitarian assistance or a peacekeeping operation. Failure to achieve consent before conducting a foreign operation within a state is considered to be a violation of a states' sovereignty and is illegal.

The Westphalian model is the prevailing model of the international system. States are constantly invoking the principals of sovereignty and nonintervention when confronted with change. The Westphalian model of states dictates that any external assistance, including peacekeeping operations, must come at the request of the sovereign. The next section discusses how sovereignty has shaped peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping & Sovereignty

The norm of state sovereignty resulted in a profound impact on creating and maintaining peacekeeping operations. Sovereignty has become and remains a core principle of peacekeeping. According to Bellamy et al (2009, 96) the core principals of peacekeeping, or the "holy trinity" are consent, neutrality and the defensive use of force. Bellamy et al 2009 echo the internationally recognized core principals of peacekeeping of consent, neutrality and the defensive use of force.

All of these principles can be traced back to the principle of state sovereignty. Consent refers to the sovereign allowing a peacekeeping operation to take place. Consent can clearly be traced back to state sovereignty. Under the neutrality principle peacekeeping forces do not choose sides or appear to be biased to the conflict. When a peacekeeping force chooses sides, the sovereign state may exercise its authority and disallow the peacekeeping force to remain in the territory. The third part of the “holy trinity”, the defensive use of force, is similar to neutrality. When peacekeeping forces use force in an offensive manner, they are taking sides and risk becoming combatants in the conflict. Involvement in the conflict could easily prompt the sovereign to exercise their authority and expel the peacekeeping forces. Hence, peacekeeping forces should take care to use force only when necessary to defend themselves. Otherwise the sovereign may feel they are losing control and ask the peacekeeping force to leave.

Of the four types of sovereignty, international legal and Westphalian determine how a peacekeeping operation is authorized while interdependence and domestic dictate when a peacekeeping operation is needed. International legal sovereignty, as stated above, confers two privileges to the sovereign. With respect to peacekeeping operations, sovereign nation-states have the ability to join international organizations and the ability to enter into treaties and agreements with states and organizations (Krasner 1999, 14-20). Without these abilities a peacekeeping operation cannot take place because these abilities create the authorization to conduct peacekeeping operations. The nation-state must join the UN, or any neutral regional organization, and enter into an agreement with the respective international organization concerning the presence of a peacekeeping operation. In terms of peacekeeping, international legal sovereignty gives the sovereign the ability to conduct agreements concerning the authorization of a peacekeeping operation.

Paradoxically, Westphalian sovereignty, as defined above, is voluntarily violated by the sovereign when authorizing a peacekeeping operation. This happens when peacekeeping forces are invited into their territory. Peacekeeping operations influence domestic affairs and hence are violations of Westphalian sovereignty. Although peacekeeping operations violate Westphalian sovereignty by establishing civil and military norms of operation, these operations come only at the request of the sovereign. Usually, peacekeeping operations are undertaken to restore sovereignty to the leader. A brief overview of past and current operations shows that in most cases, sovereignty has already been violated by another party, which prompts the leader to surrender sovereignty to a peacekeeping operation in an attempt to re-establish control over the nation-state. Sovereigns ask for peacekeeping forces because they cannot control the domestic affairs within their own borders. Leaders voluntarily violate their own Westphalian sovereignty in order to re-gain control over domestic affairs. In terms of peacekeeping, Westphalian sovereignty is violated and then restored at the request of the sovereign.

Interdependence sovereignty usually involves the violation of sovereignty by a third party before the imposition of a peacekeeping operation. As seen in the Rwandan case, Rwandan interdependence sovereignty had been violated by Uganda before peacekeeping troops were on the ground (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 211). Leaders commonly authorize peacekeeping operations in an attempt to re-gain interdependence sovereignty. If states maintain their interdependence sovereignty it is unlikely they would request a peacekeeping operation.

Domestic sovereignty for the most part goes hand in hand with interdependence in terms of peacekeeping. When domestic sovereignty is violated it is normally accompanied by the violation of interdependent sovereignty. In most cases the actors that have violated domestic

sovereignty have done so with the assistance of outside sources. Most of the time when peacekeeping operations are needed, violations of domestic sovereignty have taken place because of a breakdown in interdependence sovereignty. Again, an examination of the Rwandan case shows the inability of the Rwandan government to maintain interdependent sovereignty, which led to their inability to preserve domestic sovereignty and prevent genocide (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 211).

An examination of peacekeeping operations shows that nation-states use the norm of Westphalian sovereignty to determine when and how long a peacekeeping operation should be conducted. Peacekeeping operations are conducted at the request of the sovereign. Peacekeeping operations are generally requested when the leader of a nation-state believes control over the affairs of the state has been lost. The request for assistance is an attempt to regain lost control. Once control over the affairs of the nation-state has been re-established, the norm of Westphalian sovereignty can be used to justify the termination of the peacekeeping operation. Westphalian sovereignty is used to invite as well as expel foreign assistance.

The loss of domestic and interdependence sovereignty facilitates the need for peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations are requested when there are disputes over the political power of a state. These parties usually choose armed conflict to resolve their dispute. It is rare that the supplies needed to sustain the dispute originate from one state. The loss of domestic sovereignty facilitates the creation of the dispute to obtain political power while the loss of interdependent sovereignty empowers the dispute to continue. These circumstances usually go hand in hand. Peacekeeping operations attempt to restore domestic and interdependent sovereignty which in turn restores the nation-state's capacity to operate.

In most cases of peacekeeping operations, interdependence and domestic sovereignty were violated by a third party other than the nation-state. The loss of sovereign authority prompts the sovereign to voluntarily violate its Westphalian sovereignty in an attempt to re-gain domestic and interdependent sovereignty. The next section of this study examines how peacekeeping has evolved from its early beginnings to how operations are conducted today.

The Evolution of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations have been a tool for maintaining order and stability in the international system for centuries. According to Bellamy et al (2009, 59) “The idea that great powers have special responsibilities for maintaining peace and security can be traced back to antiquity”.

Early Peacekeeping

Although peacekeeping operations can be traced back to antiquity, this study begins with the Concert of Europe and its attempts to maintain international peace and security. The Concert of Europe was formed in 1815 to “maintain peace in Europe” (Bellamy et al 2009, 60). The Concert of Europe, or the *Concert*, shows an attempt by the European powers to maintain an environment of collective security in Europe. The *Concert* “broke down after 1870, when it could not stem wars between Prussia and Denmark, Prussia and Austria and then Prussia and France.” (Ramcharan 2008, 12). Although the *Concert* failed to maintain collective security, an attempt to work together to maintain peace and security by the leading powers of the day had taken place. The result of continuing conflict around the globe prompted attempts at maintaining collective peace and security elsewhere. In 1878 the Congress of Berlin created a collective security system in the Balkans (Bellamy et al 2009, 61). The Balkans were to be protected by the major powers in Europe as a result of the Congress of Berlin. The Boxer Rebellion in China prompted state representatives from around the globe to work together in an attempt to end war (Bellamy et al 2009, 63). Conferences at The Hague in 1889 and 1908 “intended to avoid war through the use of international law, the promotion of peaceful methods for settling disputes, the

advancement of international arbitration, and the lessening of human suffering in war by...developing rules for protecting non-combatants.” (Ramcharan 2008, 13).

Scholars such as Bellamy et al 2009 and Ramcharan 2008 argue that the collective security envisioned by the *Concert* and the Congress of Berlin were an attempt to “preserve the status quo” rather than ensure collective security, nevertheless both revealed a desire to cooperate in an effort to eliminate war. Although the *Concert*, the Congress of Berlin, and The Hague failed to prevent the scourge of war upon mankind, they did demonstrate a willingness by nations to work together to attempt to eliminate war from the globe.

The end of the First World War stimulated the creation of the League of Nations (Bellamy et al 2009, 64). Ramcharan (2008, 12) emphasizes “The prevention of war was the central idea of the Covenant of the League of Nations.” The *League* had a wider membership than any collective security organization in the past and attempted to incorporate states, other than the European powers, into the collective security arena (Bellamy et al 2009, 65). The *League* intended to preserve “public peace, the tranquility of states, the inviolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties.” (Ramcharan 2008, 12).

Clearly the *League*’s vision of collective global security went beyond the regional focus envisioned by the *Concert* and the Congress of Berlin. Others cite numerous reasons for the failure of the *League*, from major power withdrawal to a movement to preserving the status quo rather than providing true collective security, for example Bellamy et al 2009, Ramcharan 2008 and Diehl 1993. Ramcharan (2008, 16) reveals “Unfortunately, the League too... suffered the fate of the Concert of Europe and the Hague peace conferences and was unable to avoid the recurrence of another global conflagration.” Although the *League* proved ineffective and

ultimately failed to prevent large scale war, it did pave the way for another international collective security organization that still functions today, the United Nations (UN). The next section of this study discusses the UN's impact on peacekeeping operations and peacekeeping during the Cold War.


The UN and Cold War Peacekeeping

The conclusion of the Second World War prompted the Allies to attempt to revive the *League* system of collective security (MacQueen 2006, 43). The failure of the *League* showed its creators where changes needed to be made in order to effectively maintain collective peace and security. The great powers of the world tried again to create an organization dedicated to preserving peace and security around the world. In April of 1945 in San Francisco the United Nations was formally established. (MacQueen 2006, 48). Its purposes included "To maintain international peace and security", "To develop friendly relations among nations", "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems", and "To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends" (Weiss et al 2010, 397). With its objectives in place, the UN attempted to fulfill its aspirations to the international community.

The first UN peacekeeping operation was conducted in Israel. The UN Truce Supervision Organization, (UNTSO), attempted to maintain the truce between Palestine and Israel (Jett 1999, 23). UNTSO was the first of many ad hoc peacekeeping operations that would characterize the nature of peacekeeping (Jett 1999, 23). The early ad hoc nature of peacekeeping operations was fraught with mistakes. Fortunately, peacekeeping on the fly, as it were, allowed UN officials to learn from their mistakes and incorporate those lessons into a wider peacekeeping

doctrine. The case of the Congo in 1960 to 1964 provides a clear example of how the UN learned from its mistakes. In the Congo operation, UN peacekeepers were given the mandate to “take all necessary steps in consultation with the Congolese government to provide it with such military assistance as may be necessary” (Jett 1999, 24).

This vague mandate led peacekeepers to use offensive force in the Congo, thus becoming combatants. This violated the norms of neutrality and the defensive use of force which resulted in “126 of them [peacekeepers] were killed, along with Secretary General Hammarskjold and an unknown number of Congolese” (Jett 1999, 24). These grave mistakes led to a new set of peacekeeping operation rules.



Picture 2.1 found at http://brasskeys.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/large_un-peacekeeper-mar14-08.jpg

Another characteristic of Cold War peacekeeping was the intention to prevent major power confrontation (Jett 1999, 24). Vietnam was not the only battleground for the major powers during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union attempted to turn emerging states into allies through supporting factions within that state. The Congo serves as a prime example. The United States supported the succeeding Katanga Province and the Soviet Union supported the communist Congolese government (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 51). Similar instances of the UN stepping in to prevent the superpowers from confrontation occurred in Angola, Korea, and to a smaller extent Egypt (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999).

Peacekeeping operations during the Cold War were characterized by their ad hoc nature, UN interposition in conflicts that could lead to superpower confrontation and the UN learning from its mistakes. Table 2.1 shows some of the largest UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold-War in terms of expenditure. Mission details include mission duration, personnel, casualties, and expenditures (in millions). Expenditures are in 2000 constant dollars. A complete list of UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold-War can be found in Appendix A.

Table 2.1: UN Peacekeeping Missions During the Cold-War

Mission	Location	Personnel	Casualties	Expenditures (millions)	Start Date	End Date
UN Truce Supervision Operation	Israel	364*	50	\$52.31**	June 1948	Present
UN Military Observer Group India Pakistan	India/Pakistan	114*	11	\$13.40**	Jan 1949	Present
UN Emergency Force I	Israel	6,073	107	\$1,104.55	Nov 1956	June 1967
Opération des Nations Unies au Congo	Congo	19,828	250	\$2,222.49	July 1960	June 1964
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Cyprus	1,071	180	\$42.98**	Mar 1964	Present
UN Emergency Force II	Israel/Egypt	6,973	51	\$1,059.05	Oct 1973	July 1979
UN Disengagement Observer Force	Israel/Syria	1,263	43	\$35.57**	May 1974	Present
UN Interim Force In Lebanon	Lebanon	15,000	283	\$465.87**	Mar 1978	Present
UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Afghanistan/Pakistan	50	0	\$18.45	May 1988	Mar 1990
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	Iran/Iraq	400	1	\$224.91	Aug 1988	Feb 1991

*2010 Current Personnel; **2010 Authorized Budget; ***Expenditures paid by the Governments of India and the Netherlands in equal amounts.

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>

Post-Cold War Peacekeeping

Post-Cold War peacekeeping refers to operations that have occurred from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1988 to the present day (Jett 1999, 27). Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations are characterized by superpower cooperation, a more structured approach to peacekeeping and more complex mandates. (Bellamy et al 2009, 75).

With the fall of the Soviet Union, peacekeeping operations, and issues confronting the Security Council in general, received a greater degree of cooperation between the United States and Russia (Jett 1999, 27). This greater degree of cooperation meant that the United States and Russia could “cooperate on the world’s problems and use the UN as an effective instrument to deal with them” (Jett 1999, 27). This new level of cooperation not only meant that peacekeeping operations would more likely be authorized, but that funding, logistics and external pressures by the superpowers to end the conflict would be greater.



Picture 2.1 found at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2009/02/11/world/11peacekeeping_600.JPG

Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations are characterized by a greater degree of planning and structure. Cold War peacekeeping operations were more or less ad hoc, where as post-Cold War operations follow a framework to give peacekeepers the best chance of success (the *Report* 2000). The UN has attempted to improve its peacekeeping missions by carefully scrutinized operations such as mandates to personnel and norms of behavior.

Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations also entail a greater degree of complexity. Cold War era peacekeeping operations dealt primarily with establishing a peace between conflicting parties, while post-Cold War peacekeeping operations not only attempt to keep the peace but also assist in the rebuilding of the civil infrastructure, administer humanitarian aid and supervise elections and ensure fair and peaceful transitions of power (Bellamy et al 2009, 75). The UN operation in Angola is an example of the greater degree of complexity in peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, or UNAVEM III, was tasked not only with maintaining the peace between Independencia Total de Angola, or UNITA, and the Movimento Popular de Libertacao, or MPLA, but with conducting elections to determine the legitimate ruler of Angola, providing humanitarian aid to populations effected by the ongoing civil war, and rebuilding the civil infrastructure in Angola (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 5-10). The precursors to UNAVEM III were only concerned with stopping the fighting between the MPLA and UNITA (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 7). The characteristics of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations dictated that UNAVEM III would take greater measures to ensure a lasting peace as opposed to its Cold War era counterpart.

Post-Cold War peacekeeping has taken on a different and more complex persona than its previous structure. Table 2.2 lists Post Cold-War UN peacekeeping operations. Mission details include mission duration, personnel, casualties and expenditures (in millions). Expenditures are in 2000 constant dollars. A complete list of Post Cold-War UN peacekeeping operations can be found in Appendix B.

Table 2.2: Post Cold-War UN Peacekeeping Operations

Mission	Location	Personnel	Casualties	Expenditures (millions)	Start Date	End Date
UN Protection Force	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Macedonia	38,599	167	\$5,216.53	Feb 1992	Mar 1995
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	Cambodia	20,250	82	\$1,906.71	Feb 1992	Sept 1993
UN Operation in Somalia II	Somalia/ Uganda	30,800	154	\$1,807.87	Mar 1993	Mar 1995
UN Angola Verification Mission III	Angola	4,220	32	\$951.86	Feb 1995	June 1997
UN Mission in Sierra Leon	Sierra Leon	18,329	192	\$2,468.82	Oct 1999	Dec 2005
UN Organization Mission in DR Congo	Congo	24,893*	156	\$1,066.33**	Nov 1999	Present
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Ethiopia/ Eritrea	4,627	20	\$1,055.74	July 2000	July 2008
UN Operation in Burundi	Burundi	6,520	24	\$579.38	June 2004	Dec 2006
UN Mission In Sudan	Sudan	14,373*	50	\$756.98**	Mar 2005	Present
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Sudan	21,800*	57	\$1,262.96**	July 2007	Present

*2010 Current Personnel; **2010 Authorized Budget; ***Expenditures paid from UNTAC Budget;

****Expenditures paid from UNPROFOR Budget, *Source:* <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>

In 2000, The United Nations created a Panel on UN Peace Operations to analyze current peacekeeping practices and develop a new set of standards for peacekeepers to follow. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, or the *Report*, called for a wide array of recommendations to improve peace operations. The *Report* (2000, ix) recommends building on the “bedrock principles of peacekeeping” of “consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence”. Additional “bedrock principles” include a confirmation that troops which “meet the requisite UN training and equipment requirements” and mandates should “reflect the clarity that peacekeeping operations require for unity of effort”. (The *Report* 2000, x).

Building on these “bedrock principles” the Panel was tasked with making recommendations for improving peace operations. These recommendations include: “pivotal importance of clear, credible and adequately resourced Security Council mandates; the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort; and that personnel are provided the training and support necessary to do their jobs. (The *Report* 2000, 1-12). The *Report* places emphasis on training and supplies, command and control and the clarity of Security Council mandates helps to shape the conceptual framework of this study.

This chapter discussed sovereignty and its impact on the international system, the development of peacekeeping, early peacekeeping and peacekeeping as it is practiced today. This chapter gives the historical context of peacekeeping and sets the stage for an analysis of the review of the literature describing peacekeeping.

Chapter III: Conceptual Framework

Chapter Purpose

Chapter three serves to develop the peacekeeping conceptual framework. The framework was developed as a result a review of the literature with special attention paid to the *Report*. This chapter outlines the components of a peacekeeping operation. These components are subsequently used to analyze peacekeeping articles in the journal *Armed Forces & Society*.

Purpose

“Peacekeeping is intended to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves, often in conjunction with international mediation” (Bellamy et al 2009, 95). The act of peacekeeping has long been the avenue for international organizations to peacefully bring an end to conflict to those who want peace. International organizations and states’ interests are best served when conflict is absent from the world. People are free to follow their passion, raise their families and pursue their dreams when international security and peace prevail. Peacekeepers attempt to work with the parties to a conflict and develop a resolution that will create a sustainable peace allowing the people effected by the conflict to return to their normal lives. When peacekeeping is done correctly all parties involved benefit, from the citizens of the effected state to citizens around the world.

An examination of peacekeeping operations and practices found within the *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations* show that peacekeeping does not always deter conflict. In some instances peacekeeping operations have served to further escalate hostilities

and create even greater divisions between disputing parties. The operation in Cyprus is a prime example of how a peacekeeping operation prolonged a conflict. Since the days of the Ottoman Empire there has been civil unrest on the small island of Cyprus (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 71). UN intervention in Cyprus began in 1964 and has only served to separate the belligerent parties and allow them to re-arm in preparation for more hostilities “The two communities remain bitterly divided, as evidenced by the sporadic violence across the UN-monitored green line” (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 71). Fortunately this is not always the case. Some peacekeeping operations have brought about a swift end to conflict and a strong foundation for a lasting peace.

A detailed analysis of the components of peacekeeping should be a fruitful source of recommendations for future operations. It is important to discuss peacekeeping issues to ensure that when peacekeeping is put into practice all possible variables are accounted for. The examination of all possible variables that can influence the outcome of an operation can most likely result in a successful mission.

This research aims to accomplish two main goals: first, a definition and examination of past and present peacekeeping operations, second, the journal *Armed Forces & Society* is studied to understand its treatment of peacekeeping issues.

The journal *Armed Forces & Society* was chosen because of the civil military relationship between peacekeepers and those they attempt to assist. Peacekeepers are armed forces and they attempt to influence the local population. A social science journal is an ideal vessel for contributing to the scholarship of peacekeeping. The editor of *Armed Forces & Society* feels that the topic of peacekeeping is important and should be thoroughly discussed by the journal. This

study analyzes peacekeeping in a descriptive nature using the current peacekeeping literature. This analysis can help guide future scholars, editors and students of international relations to better understanding peacekeeping and the literature devoted to peacekeeping issues.

Conceptual Framework

Using the *Report* and available literature as a guide, a conceptual framework of peacekeeping is developed. The components of the peacekeeping conceptual framework are separated into four major categories: internal, operational, authorization and the political and military context of a peacekeeping operation.

Internal Characteristics

The internal characteristics refer to the behavior and composition of the peacekeeping force. The *Report* (2000) finds that internal characteristics are important determinants of success or failure.

The internal characteristics of a peacekeeping force are its rules of engagement, impartiality, personnel and its equipment and supplies. *The Report* (2000). In terms of the behavior of peacekeeping personnel the *Report* (2000, ix) “concur that...impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principals of peacekeeping”. The defensive use of force is a behavioral personnel issue. An analysis of the rules of engagement and impartiality illustrates these bedrock principles in greater detail.

The composition of a peacekeeping operation can also be a major determinant of the outcome of the mission. The *Report* outlines the various personnel that a peacekeeping operation needs to accomplish its mandate. Personnel needed for a peacekeeping operation come in three

categories: military, civilian police, and civilian specialists (*The Report* 2000, 17, 20, 21). In addition to the types of personnel a peacekeeping operation consists of, a discussion of personnel morale and the equipment and supplies an operation has occupies this section.

How a peacekeeping force behaves and whom the force is composed of can easily determine the operation's success or failure. An examination of the internal characteristics of a peacekeeping operation is discussed next.

*Rules of Engagement*⁴

Peacekeeping personnel are bound by certain rules. These rules are internal mechanisms that shape the behavior of the operation personnel. One of these rules pertains to how and when peacekeeping personnel can engage civilians and armed forces. The rules of engagement for a peacekeeping force are different from any other armed forces. Peacekeeping forces follow a defensive set of rules of engagement. Murthy (2001, 209) notes that the use of force for a peacekeeping operation is "to strictly eschew the use of force save in self-defense." Peacekeepers are only to resort to the use of force in a defensive manner and when all other methods of conflict resolution have been exhausted. By limiting engagement to defensive, peacekeepers reduce the risk becoming involved with the conflict. Offensive displays of force can easily turn peacekeepers into combatants. When peacekeepers become combatants, conflict often intensifies and the cycle of violence and chaos continues. Evidence of this can be seen in the case of the UN mission in the Congo in the 1960's. The UN mission in the Congo, or ONUC, decided to support the Congolese central government and took up arms against the rebellious Katangese secession

⁴ Additional sources used to develop this section: Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009

attempt (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 55). ONUC personnel became combatants in the Congolese civil war and as a result suffered 250 fatalities⁵

Neutrality

Neutrality is a must for peacekeepers. The rule of neutrality attempts to accomplish the same end as the rules of engagement in that they both internal mechanisms that shape the behavior of peacekeeping personnel. Neutrality has long been a central component of peacekeeping doctrine. “Among the most fundamental tenets of peacekeeping strategy is that troops be neutral” (Diehl 1993, 64). Peacekeeping forces must remain neutral or risk mission failure and a return to conflict. Considered one part of the “holy trinity” of peacekeeping, neutrality can make or break a peacekeeping mission (The *Report* 2000, ix). Diehl (1993, 63) considers neutrality “an essential ingredient of peacekeeping success” because peacekeepers will not be trusted when seen as a force allied with one of the combatants. The UN operation in the Congo, or ONUC, mentioned above detailed how the peacekeeping force actively took sides in the conflict. UN personnel taking the Congolese government side in the conflict was perceived to be serving the foreign policy goals of the United States which obviously supported one side. Unfortunately, “the mission was widely perceived as a tool of US foreign policy”. (Bellamy et al 2009, 157).

Neutrality extends past the behavior of personnel and into the nation-state providing the personnel for the peacekeeping operation. When creating a peacekeeping force, contributing states must show neutrality toward the conflict. Personnel of non-neutral states will be perceived

⁵ UN peacekeeping operations fact and figures found at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html>

to be supporting the interests of their home state as opposed to the interests of the common good. “Disputants will be less likely to attribute their [personnel] actions to the interests of the nations that supplied the troops” (Diehl 1993, 64). The conflicting parties must be able to trust that peacekeeping personnel are there to serve the interests of conflict resolution and not goals of competing nations.

Peacekeeping personnel must behave in a neutral manner when performing their duties. The bias actions of peacekeeping personnel can have a disastrous effect on a peacekeeping operation. Perceived bias can result in negative consequences for the peacekeeping operation. When the personnel of a peacekeeping operation act in a bias manner while performing their duties they run the risk of losing consent to be in the host nation. A host nation that observes acts of bias by peacekeeping personnel usually will put an end to the authorization of a peacekeeping operation within its territory.

Finally, biased behavior by peacekeepers enhances the risks of being drawn into the conflict. Peacekeeping personnel perceived as acting in a bias manner may be viewed as adversaries by one side and become targets for combatants in the conflict. This is the most dangerous consequence of a failure to maintain neutrality and can result in the loss of life for all parties involved. Hence, it is in the best interests of the peacekeeping operation that personnel be drawn from neutral states with neutral behavior when performing their duties.

Personnel

Peacekeeping operations cannot take place without a wide variety of personnel. “Staffing from the top down, is perhaps one of the most important building blocks for successful mission

execution” (The *Report* 2000, 25). In the past peacekeeping operations consisted of armed forces under the direction of a commander. Times have changed and peacekeeping operations utilize a wide variety of personnel with specific skills to ensure that the peace is kept and maintained. According to Murthy (2001, 216) the personnel used in peacekeeping missions “have diverse professional backgrounds” such as military personnel, civilian police, and civilian specialists. Special attention is paid to the morale of peacekeeping personnel which can determine how efficiently peacekeeping duties are performed.

Military personnel have always played a role in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations have always used military personnel as the agents of an operation. The military personnel act as a buffer between conflicting parties and to protect the personnel of the operation. In addition, their presence increases the likelihood the conflict does not continue. The role of military personnel has decreased with the addition of civilian personnel but their importance remains.



Picture 3.1 found at <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~unysa/Peacekeepers.jpg>

Civilian police have recently been added to the list of personnel that staff peacekeeping operations. Maintaining law and order was once the duty of the military personnel attached to a peacekeeping operation but the growing complexity of peacekeeping operations has developed a need for a trained police force that is not a part of the military component.

Additional personnel that staff a peacekeeping operation are civilian specialists. These specialists assist the host state with domestic operations. Civilian specialists are tasked with assisting the host state administer civil affairs such as elections, public information services and state run programs. Civilian specialists also distribute humanitarian aid and ensure basic human rights are followed by the conflicting parties. The diversity of a peacekeeping operation's tasks creates a need for civilian specialists.

The morale of the personnel within a peacekeeping operation is an important factor in the operation's success. Personnel who feel that the operation is a waste of time are less likely to successfully complete their duties. Low personnel morale can lead to boredom. Boredom can easily turn a successful mission into a failure. "Boredom is dangerous not only because soldiers need to stay alert in case of an emergency situation but because it carries the risk that the bored soldiers will employ a warrior strategy by provoking situations to create excitement" (Sion 2006, 467). Hence, low personnel morale can compromise a peacekeeping operation.

Equipment and Supplies

As with any task the right equipment is needed to do the job. This holds true with peacekeeping operations as well. Peacekeeping operations equipment and supplies are provided by member states of the UN. Article 43 Section 1 of the UN charter calls for "All Members of the United Nations...to make available to the Security Council...armed forces, assistance, and facilities...for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security" (Weiss et al 2010, 404). The equipment and supplies of a peacekeeping operation must be adequate to perform the operation mandate. A carpenter cannot build a fence without wood, nails and a hammer, just like a peacekeeping operation cannot be successful without supplies for its personnel, aid for the

effected community and tools to resolve the conflict. The *Report* (2000, x) states the clear need for “bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent.”

The genocide in Rwanda is a clear example of a peacekeeping operation failure caused in part by a lack of equipment and supplies. The UN mission in Rwanda, or UNAMIR, was plagued by insufficient personnel, supplies and equipment. Bellamy et al (2009, 139) describes UNAMIR’s meager personnel, supplies and equipment “four months later, [after authorization] only half the authorized number of peacekeepers had been deployed and those that remained were woefully under-equipped”. Adelman and Suhrke (2004, 491) convey “The deteriorating situation on the ground in Rwanda was not contrasted with the slow and inadequate deployment of the mission”. The result of an under-staffed and under-equipped peacekeeping operation was a failure to prevent “up to 800,000 civilians had been intentionally slaughtered in a horrendous genocide” (Adelman and Suhrke 2004, 483) although it is impossible to know the outcome if the UN Troops had been adequately equipped. The dramatic under resourcing of the UN force could only have contributed to the tragedy.

The discussion of equipment and supplies concludes the discussion of internal factors that can influence peacekeeping operations. The next tool used to enable a concise analysis of the peacekeeping literature is the operational characteristics of an operation.

Operational Characteristics

The second major category of the conceptual framework refers to how a peacekeeping operation is put into practice. These practices determine the outcome of a peacekeeping operation. “Emmanuel Erskine, an official with UNIFIL, refers to operational concerns as the

single most important factor in the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation” (Diehl 1993, 67). The operational characteristics of a peacekeeping operation are 1) centralized command and control, 2) the locus of deployment and 3) peacekeeper training.

Command and Control

The command and control of a peacekeeping operation is essential to developing a strategy conducive to success. The *Report* (2000, 16) describes the importance of command and control “The tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it”. The command and control characteristics of a peacekeeping operation can easily determine the success or failure of a mission.

There can be many different types of difficulties associated with the command and control of a peacekeeping operation. According to The Royal Military Academy (2001, 20) “Institutional confusion, lack of unity of direction, in appropriate mandates and insufficient resources have impinged heavily on the adequacy of command and control arrangements in UN peacekeeping operations”. These general difficulties within command and control are explored in depth below.

Institutional confusion can be a major obstacle to a successful peacekeeping operation. Confusion often occurs when there are “difficulties with both horizontal and vertical integration between individuals and departments in the UN system”. (The Royal Military Academy 2001, 25). Different aspects of a peacekeeping operation correspond with different departments within the UN. Potentially, a peacekeeper could have to answer to multiple commanders when performing their duties.

Institutional confusion creates an environment of uncertainty for peacekeeping personnel. An uncertain environment can lead to a lack of unity of direction. Command and control should operate in such a way that ensures all personnel are on the same page. Olonisakin (1997, 364) illustrates the need for peacekeepers to be in sync with each other “The absence centralized logistic distribution meant lack of uniformity in almost all aspects of logistics, and the effects were profound, showing huge gaps between the logistics capability of different contingents”. Unequal logistics distribution translates to personnel being given unequal amounts of supplies, equipment and information regarding their mission.

Mandates authorizing levels of supplies, equipment and personnel need to be adequate for mission personnel. Adelman and Suhrke (2004, 491) reinforce this concept “as a result of the narrowed mandate, the size of the force was lacking”. Inappropriate mandates can doom a peacekeeping operation due to inadequate supplies, equipment and personnel. Mandates for peacekeeping operations need to appropriately address the problems within the conflict zone. Failure to do so can leave additional problems for the people affected by the conflict. Mandates are discussed later in this study.

Locus of Deployment

“The success of a peacekeeping operation has been found to be related to the geography of the deployment area” (Green et al 1998, 489). Where the peacekeeping operation takes place, or the locus of deployment tells the commanders and planners the number of personnel, amount of equipment and set of skills needed to conduct a peacekeeping operation. The locus of deployment is comprised of two components: the geographical terrain and the population density.

The geographical terrain can have a significant influence on the amount of personnel and supplies needed to conduct a peacekeeping operation. Clearly, the larger the area of the operation the larger the number of personnel needed to fulfill the mandate. While some geographic settings call for an increase in personnel and supplies, others allow for a reduction. Natural geographic barriers can often be used to contain violence. Natural barriers such as lakes, oceans and deserts can help contain conflicting parties and create a stronger buffer zone between conflicting parties and third party actors. An example of a natural barrier would be the Mediterranean Sea, which “provided a natural barrier to hostile activity by third party states” (Diehl 1993, 71).

The population density of the locus of deployment of a peacekeeping operation greatly affects the amount of resources a commander needs. The higher the population density served by a peacekeeping operation the more resources that operation needs. An operation with only one hundred personnel cannot be expected to perform their duties among a population of 100,000. The larger the population a peacekeeping operation is protecting the more peacekeepers are needed to ensure agreements are not broken and the needs of the civilians are met.

Training

The training that peacekeeping personnel receive can determine the success or failure of an operation. When peacekeeper training is effective it ensures the norms and universal practices of peacekeeping are followed. Peacekeeping training differs from traditional combat training. During peacekeeping training a soldier should be exposed to what can be described as an “expeditionary mindset” as defined by the US Marines (1998, 403) as “This expeditionary mindset is epitomized by the phrase “bags packed” – that it is ready and willing to deploy at a moment’s notice, any time, to any place to perform any mission”. Shields (2009, 9) identifies

four characteristics that encompass the expeditionary mindset: “first, be ‘mentally prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice,’ second, have ‘the critical thinking skills to be able to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing operational environment,’ third, appreciate and work “cooperatively with other members of a Joint team,” and fourth, possess “sufficient knowledge of the culture in the area of operation to be able to interact with the local populace.”

The characteristics of the expeditionary mindset fit well with the tasks and demands placed on the shoulders of a peacekeeper. Peacekeeping personnel must be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. Conflicts around the globe start at the drop of a hat, and peacekeepers should be able to rapidly deploy to conflict zones to ensure peace is restored and maintained. Peacekeeping personnel must be able to adapt quickly to changing environments. The reality on the ground in a peacekeeping operation can change rapidly forcing a needed change in peacekeeping activities. Peacekeeping personnel need to be able to adjust to the changing environment or risk mission failure. Peacekeepers need to work cooperatively with auxiliary personnel, additional aid organizations, and members of the belligerent parties. Finally, peacekeeping personnel must possess sufficient knowledge of the culture and be able to interact with the local populace. Peacekeepers work with the local populace in distributing aid and rebuilding society. Ignorance about local culture and the inability to interact with the local populace seriously impedes the peacekeepers ability to deliver much needed assistance.

The UN presence in Cambodia is a clear example of peacekeepers not being able to effectively carry out its mandate due to poor training. The UN operation in Cambodia, or UNTAC, ran into problems when UN personnel could not speak to their Cambodian counterparts. Bellamy et al (2009, 125) point out that intelligence gathering and communications

with the local populous was very difficult due to the language barrier. Proper training for the Cambodian mission should have included language training which could have given UNTAC personnel a better chance at success.

Clearly, there is a need for peacekeeper specific training as opposed to traditional combat training. Segal, Reed and Rohall (1998, 544) focus on the need for specialized peacekeeping training. Their study found “Majorities of soldiers in both groups felt that well-trained soldiers need additional training for peacekeeping”. Member states that provide personnel are responsible for conducting the appropriate training. (*The Report 2000*, x). Adequate training is needed to ensure personnel do not make mistakes that lead to operation failure. Impartiality was discussed earlier as an important norm to follow when conducting peacekeeping duties. When impartiality is not apart of the peacekeepers training, bias will have a chance to emerge. Peacekeeping personnel need to know how to conduct themselves during a peacekeeping operation. If the norms and procedures of a peacekeeping operation are not comprehensively understood by peacekeepers the operation will be destined for failure.

The next major category in the development of the peacekeeping framework is the authorization characteristics of an operation. The authorization characteristics of a peacekeeping operation are examined in the next section.

Authorization Characteristics

A number of parties must agree to undertake a peacekeeping operation for peace to be achieved. The permission or power to grant permission to conduct a peacekeeping operation is a key factor in the creation of a peacekeeping operation. Parties required for consent to create a

peacekeeping operation include the UN Security Council, UN Member States that contribute to peacekeeping operations, and the parties that are involved in the conflict itself.

The authorization process refers to the decision to undertake a peacekeeping operation. Put simply, the authorization process of a peacekeeping operation are the steps taken in the decision to create a peacekeeping operation. The authorization to deploy a peacekeeping mission is the key first step to creating and maintaining a successful peacekeeping operation. In the case of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, or UNEF I, authorization was not granted by the UN Security Council by virtue of French and United Kingdom vetoes, which led to delays in operation formation (Bellamy et al 2004, 104). The authorization process of a peacekeeping operation must obtain consent from 1) the conflicting parties, 2) by the Security Council in the form of a mandate and 3) by member states who contribute to the peacekeeping force.

The evolution of the nation state system has its roots in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (MacQueen 2006, 8). The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the idea of state sovereignty. According to MacQueen (2006, 8) sovereignty “places the power of the territorial state above all other actors”. This means that actions conducted by a third party must be authorized by the nation-state, or violate state sovereignty. The UN system is predicated on the notion of state sovereignty. Article 2 Section 1 of the UN Charter states “The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members” (Weiss et al 2010, 398). Peacekeeping missions, just as any other ‘foreign action’ within a state’s sovereign territory, must be authorized to operate within the state.

Conflicting Parties

Authorization to conduct a peacekeeping operation within the territorial borders of a nation-state must be granted by the parties to the conflict. In addition, “external intervention in these [internal conflicts] crises must nevertheless be a ‘voluntary’ process that the state or states involved have at least acquiesced to.” (MacQueen 2006, 8-9). Authorization to conduct a peacekeeping operation, once granted, must be constantly maintained by appeasing all parties to the conflict. Either of the conflicting parties can revoke consent to allow the peacekeeping force to operate at any time.

The UN mission in Egypt, or UNEF I, illustrates how consent given by the parties to the conflict must be maintained. UNEF I was the UN’s response to the Suez Crisis of 1956. (Bellamy et al 2009, 103). Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July of 1956 which escalated tensions between Egypt and Israel, and had potential for superpower confrontation. (Bellamy et al 2009, 103). UNEF I was created to be a buffer between Egypt and Israel and prevent incursions into sovereign territory by both parties. Bellamy et al (2009, 106) discusses the importance of consent, “its [the peacekeeping operation] reliance on consent meant that it was never able to patrol the Israel side of the border, nor could it refuse Egypt’s request that it leave Egyptian territory before the outbreak of the 1967 war.”

Authorization, or the granting of consent, also incorporates other parties to the conflict as well as the nation-state in which a peacekeeping operation takes place. If a peacekeeping operation only maintains consent from one of multiple parties to a conflict, then all parties that have not granted consent will view the UN presence as hostile. “The creation of success of a traditional peacekeeping mission depends on the consent and positive contributions of the

disputants” (Bellamy et al 2004, 96). The authorization or consent of the conflicting parties to conduct a peacekeeping operation is the first component of the “holy trinity” of peacekeeping and logically the first step in placing personnel on the ground. Lipson (2007, 19) emphasizes the importance of maintaining consent within a peacekeeping operation “The core principals of peacekeeping – consent, neutrality and the non-use of force except in self defense”. Consent for the peacekeeping operation to take place is the first obstacle the UN faces in starting an operation. As shown by the Egypt example, consent must be maintained by all parties for a peacekeeping operation to remain in place.

The Security Council

The Security Council is responsible for authorizing a peacekeeping operation. The Security Council is authorizes Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to take action to “maintain or restore international peace and security”. (Weiss et al 2010, 403). Once consent within the Security Council is reached a mandate is produced. The mandate is the document of authorization that details the purpose and objectives the peacekeeping operation attempts to accomplish.



Picture 3.2 found at <http://z.about.com/d/usforeignpolicy/1/0/m/1/-/-/unsc500MarioTamaGetty.jpg>

According to The *Report* (2000, 1) the “pivotal importance of clear, credible, and adequately resourced Security Council mandates” can be the determining factor in a mission’s outcome. Clear and achievable tasks must be found within a mandate to ensure the operation has a chance at success. Peacekeeping operations mandates must be clear and achievable. “Clear and detailed

mandates assist in the implementation of a successful peacekeeping operation” (Diehl 1993, 74). Unclear and unachievable mandates can create a confusing environment and a loss of support for the operation.

Vague and improbable mandates do not communicate what the peacekeeping operation intends to accomplish. Unclear mandates are open for interpretation by all parties involved. Differing interpretations of a peacekeeping mandate can become a potential source of more conflict. One side may see the mandate as assisting in keeping the peace while the other may see the mandate as an assault on their position. Vagueness within a mandate can lead to unforeseen negative circumstances.

Mandates need to be clear and achievable for the peacekeepers as well as the conflicting parties. When mandates are vague and improbable, peacekeepers may become confused as to what their duties are. Specific duties and courses of action need to be contained within the mandate; otherwise command and control must interpret what the Security Council meant. Diehl (1993, 74) illustrates an example of how an unclear mandate can complicate an operation “ONUC received no clear instructions on how to perform such functions as securing the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries”.

Clear mandates allow everyone to know what a peacekeeping force is put in place to do and how the mission will be accomplished. The importance of a clear mandate cannot be overstated.

Contributing Member States

Personnel and resources from UN Member states are obtained in the final step of the authorization process. Article 43, Section 1 of the UN Charter states how personnel, supplies and equipment are to be obtained for peacekeeping operations “All Members of the United Nations...undertake to make available to the Security Council...armed forces, assistance, and facilities...necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” (Weiss et al 2010, 404). Member states contribute one hundred percent of the personnel, equipment, supplies and financing to a peacekeeping mission. Member states must authorize the use of their personnel and resources before a peacekeeping operation can begin. Article 44 of the Charter of the UN states that “before calling upon a Member not represented on it [the Security Council] to provide armed forces...invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.” (Weiss et al 2010, 404). The voluntary nature of resource contributions by UN member states creates a delicate balance that must be followed by the UN to ensure the authorization of the use of personnel and resources in a peacekeeping operation.

The next major category in the framework of peacekeeping is the political and military context of an operation, which is examined in the next section.

Political & Military Context

The political and military context of a peacekeeping operation refers to the environment in which an operation takes place. The amount of resources needed to ensure a successful peacekeeping operation can be determined by the political and military context of the dispute.

The details of a peacekeeping operation is another way of describing the political and military context of a peacekeeping operation. The political and military context of a peacekeeping operation incorporates the behavior of 1) the conflicting parties, 2) 3rd party actors and 3) regional and superpowers.

Behavior of Conflicting Parties

The behavior of the conflicting parties is a core determinant in the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation. Jett (1999, 115) conveys “If there is a single key element to the success of peacekeeping, it is the cooperation of the parties.” Peacekeeping operations are voluntarily undertaken by parties to the conflict. “The creation of success of a traditional peacekeeping mission depends on the consent and positive contributions of the disputants” (Bellamy et al 2004, 96). The success of a peacekeeping operation greatly depends on how the conflicting parties live up to their agreements. As discussed earlier, in order to conduct a peacekeeping operation, consent must be granted by the conflicting parties. By granting consent to undertake a peacekeeping operation the conflicting parties actively pursue resolution to the conflict. Behavior of the conflicting parties must continue to reflect a desire to resolve the conflict. Authorization and consent may be given to create and maintain a peacekeeping operation but behavior by a conflicting party that undermines conflict resolution will only serve to initiate more conflict. Conflicting parties who do not live up to their agreements foster distrust thus creating greater chances for a return to conflict.

Two contrasting UN operations in Angola show how much the behavior of the conflicting parties can determine success or failure. The first UN operation in Angola, (UNAVEM I), shows how willingness to abide by the mandate by the disputants can lead to

mission success. UNAVEM I's mandate was to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (Jett 1999, 117). With a staff of only 70 military observers UNAVEM I monitored the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola and was considered to be a success (Jett 1999, 117). The Secretary-General attributed the success of UNAVEM I to "the full cooperation of the parties involved." (Jett 1999, 117).

The second UN operation in Angola, (UNAVEM II), demonstrates how unwillingness to abide by the mandate by the conflicting parties can be a recipe for failure. UNAVEM II's mandate was to supervise free and fair elections. (Jett 1999, 117). The Angolan government and Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola, or UNITA, allowed peaceful elections to be carried out (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 8). No party had gained 50% of the vote so by rule, a second round of elections was required. Before the results of the second election had been tabulated war broke out between the Angolan government and UNITA turning UNAVEM II into a failure (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 8). Fighting continued until a ceasefire was negotiated prompting the creation of UNAVEM III (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 8)

The behavior of the parties to a conflict can have a profound effect on the outcome of a peacekeeping operation. Conflicting parties must live up to their agreements to ensure the peacekeeping operation has a chance at a successful outcome.

Behavior of 3rd Party Actors

Third party actors to a conflict can be independent states, factions and even individuals with an interest in the outcome of a conflict. Their influence on peacekeeping operations can be positive or negative.

Unfortunately third party actors who behave badly, such as the nation of Uganda importing arms to the Rwandan Patriotic Front during operation UNAMIR, can de-rail the peace process. For example third party actors may re-ignite conflict in a fragile peace situation. The intent and actions of third party actors must be taken into account when conducting a peacekeeping operation. Third party actors can tip the balance in a conflict situation. When a third party actor supplies aid to a faction within a conflict, that faction believes it has a better chance at victory. Factions aided by third party actors will abandon the peace process in favor of out right victory over their opponents. When a third party actor is seen as assisting one party to the conflict distrust and paranoia of the opposing side begins to take hold. “Most dangerous would be a situation in which a primary disputant is aligned with a third-party state that becomes involved in a militarized dispute or war with the other primary disputant” (Diehl 1993, 82). Small actions by a third party actor can quickly turn a fragile peace back into a heated conflict. The UN operation in Rwanda, or UNAMIR, illustrates the disastrous effect a third party actor can have on a peacekeeping operation.

UNAMIR was created to monitor the Arusha Agreements between the governments of Uganda and Rwanda (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 212). Rwanda accused the government of Uganda of supplying arms to the Rwandese Patriotic Front, or the RPF (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 210). Uganda acted as a third party to the civil war taking place in Rwanda. The Arusha Accords were designed in part to disarm the local militias and supervise the transitional government (Bellamy et al 2009, 138). Unfortunately, the Arusha Accords were being by the RPF. Bellamy et al (2009, 139) illustrates how a third party actor fueled the fire of genocide. “It became clear to Dallaire [the force commander] and others that arms were being imported and distributed throughout the country”. The result of Uganda importing and

distributing arms within Rwanda enabled the RPF to carry out their campaign of genocide, which killed between 500,000 to 800,000 people in 1994 (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 211).

Clearly the third party actor, in this case the government of Uganda, had a significant impact on the result of the peacekeeping operation.

Third party actors can have a positive influence on peacekeeping operations by acting as mediators to a conflict and creating more voices calling for peace. Negotiations between the conflicting parties and third party actors can help fulfill the mandate of the peacekeepers. Diehl (1993, 82) illustrates how third party actors “bring diplomatic pressure to bear on one of the actors, disposing the actor to support or oppose the peacekeeping presence”. The UN operation in Sierra Leone, (UNOMSIL), illustrates a positive impact a third party actor can have on a peacekeeping operation.

In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front, (RUF), attempted to overthrow the government of Sierra Leone (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 220). The UN attempted to team up with the Organization of African Unity, (OAU), and the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, in an attempt to broker a peaceful settlement (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, 220). Once a peace agreement was reached the UN created the peacekeeping force UNOMSIL to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement (Bellamy et al 2009, 142). In January of 1999 the RUF “overran most of Sierra Leone’s capital Freetown” (Bellamy et al 2009, 142). As a result of UNOMSIL’s expulsion from Sierra Leone. Subsequently, ECOWAS forces stepped in and recaptured Freetown allowing the UNOMSIL peacekeeping force to return (Bellamy et al 2009, 142). Clearly the third party actor, ECOWAS, assisted the peacekeeping operation by maintaining an international presence and allowing UNOMSIL to return to Sierra Leone.

Third party actors can increase the level of conflict or rapidly bring about a peaceful resolution to a conflict. Peacekeeping operations must identify possible third party actors and ensure their influence on the situation serves the purpose of peace and does not instigate a return to conflict.

Behavior of Regional and Superpowers

The behavior of regional powers and superpowers can have the same effect on a conflict as smaller third party actors. An increase and return to conflict or a peaceful resolution to the conflict are the possible outcomes that regional and superpowers can have on a conflict. During the cold war the superpowers were restricted from providing personnel or supplies to peacekeeping operations for fear of escalating east-west tensions. If a peacekeeping operation were to contain men and material from the United States, that operation would be seen by the world as an operation promoting the interests of the United States. This perception would amplify tensions between the east and the west prompting an increase in arms and supplies to factions aligned with the east, and vice versa. The case of Angola illustrates how the superpowers influenced peacekeeping operations during the Cold War.

The UN operations in Angola were designed to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the struggle for power but Russia and the United States ensured that conflict raged on. Jett (1999, 126) discloses “For years, both superpowers funneled arms to their respective sides”. Both superpowers added fuel to the fire and ensured that the struggle for power in Angola continued.

Superpowers can also have a positive effect on a conflict situation. The end of the Cold War brought about new cooperation between the superpowers. The United States and Russia

reversed course in Angola after the end of the Cold War. Jett (1999, 127) portrays how the superpowers adopted a new strategy in Angola “The U.S. and Russia, together with Portugal, the former colonial power, became the troika working to keep the Angolan parties on the road to a lasting settlement”.

Increased pressure upon the conflicting parties to fulfill obligations and reach a peaceful conclusion can be applied by the superpowers. Regional powers are unable to administer such a high level of pressure upon the conflicting parties. The superpowers must act as positive influences on a conflict situation or risk deepening the tensions between the conflicting parties and prolonging the conflict.

Although their influence is not as strong, regional powers can have the same effect on a conflict situation as a superpower. The influence of regional powers can be used negatively by increasing conflict in the pursuit national interests or positively by attempting to end the conflict and establish a lasting peace. Murthy (2001, 225) reveals that sometimes regional powers should allow outsiders to take the lead “countries from outside the region of a conflict may be better suited to undertake peacekeeping responsibilities”. Regional powers, just as the superpowers, must be careful to not create circumstances that prolong conflict.

Peacekeeping Conceptual Framework

The list of descriptive categories and the corresponding literature is shown in *Table 3.1*. This table is developed using the Descriptive Research guidelines stated by Shields (1998, 203). Peacekeeping is broken down into descriptive categories to better understand its characteristics.

Each subsection of this study justifies the elements inclusion in the components of a peacekeeping operation.

Table 3.1: Conceptual Framework Linked to the Literature – Descriptive Categories for Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping Conceptual Framework	
Descriptive Categories	Literature
Internal Characteristics	
Rules of Engagement	Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009, Diehl 1993, A/55/305–S/2000/809, Murthy 2001, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html
Neutrality	Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009, Diehl 1993, A/55/305–S/2000/809
Personnel	A/55/305–S/2000/809, Murthy 2001, Sion 2006
Military	A/55/305–S/2000/809
Civilian Police	A/55/305–S/2000/809
Civilian Specialists	A/55/305–S/2000/809
Morale	Sion 2006
Equipment & Supplies	A/55/305–S/2000/809, Weiss, Forsythe, Coate & Pease 2010, Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009, Adelman and Suhrke 2004
Operational Characteristics	
Command & Control	A/55/305–S/2000/809, Olonisakin 1997, The Royal Military Academy 2001, Adelman and Suhrke 2004
Locus of Deployment	Diehl 1993, Green, Kahl and Diehl 1998
Training	Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009, A/55/305–S/2000/809, Segal, Reed & Rohall 1998, Shields 2009, US Marines 1998
Authorization Characteristics	
Conflicting Parties	Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009, Lipson 2007, MacQueen 2006
Security Council	Diehl 1993, A/55/305–S/2000/809, Weiss, Forsythe, Coate & Pease 2010,
Mandate	Diehl 1993, A/55/305–S/2000/809, Weiss, Forsythe, Coate & Pease 2010,
Contributing Member States	Weiss, Forsythe, Coate & Pease 2010
Political & Military Context	
Behavior of Conflicting Parties	Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009, Jett 1999, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999
Behavior of 3 rd Party Actors	Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2009, Diehl 1993, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999
Behavior of Regional and Superpowers	Murthy 2001, Jett 1999

The following chapter outlines the research method used, its strengths and weaknesses and the methodology used to conduct the empirical portion of this study.

Chapter IV: Methodology

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used to gauge the frequency of peacekeeping issues discussed within the pages of the journal *Armed Forces & Society*. The conceptual framework developed from the *Report* is used to direct the examination of the journal articles. The research method is consistent with the micro-Framework for Descriptive Research developed by Shields & Tajalli (2006, 318), content analysis is used to determine the level of discussion of peacekeeping using simple descriptive statistics. Peacekeeping operation components are assessed using frequency of discussion within the population of articles. The methodology assists us in answering the research question of describing the articles in *Armed Forces & Society* dealing with peacekeeping issues.

Operationalization Table

The operationalization of the conceptual framework to identify the varying levels of discussion was adapted from Karal G. Field's 2006 Applied Research Project Describing the Literature That Assesses The United States Postal Service Redress Program, Argenta Hernandez's 2007 Applied Research Project An Examination of Human Rights Violations in Latin America: 2002 – 2006, and Nathan Sexton's 2003 Applied Research Project A Description of the Articles of the Past Five Years of *Armed Forces & Society*.

Table 4.1: Operationalization of the Conceptual Framework

Section A: Contents Assessment Criteria Coding Sheet				
Variables	Assessment Category	Significantly Discussed	Partially Discussed	No Discussion
Variable 1	Internal Characteristics			
	Rules of Engagement	SD	PD	ND
	Neutrality	SD	PD	ND
	Personnel	SD	PD	ND
	Military	SD	PD	ND
	Civilian Police	SD	PD	ND
	Civilian Specialists	SD	PD	ND
	Morale	SD	PD	ND
	Equipment & Supplies	SD	PD	ND
Variable 2	Operational Characteristics			
	Command & Control	SD	PD	ND
	Locus of Deployment	SD	PD	ND
	Training	SD	PD	ND
Variable 3	Authorization Characteristics			
	Conflicting Parties	SD	PD	ND
	Security Council	SD	PD	ND
	Mandate	SD	PD	ND
	Contributing Member States	SD	PD	ND
Variable 4	Political & Military Context			
	Behavior of Conflicting Parties	SD	PD	ND
	Behavior of 3rd Party Actors	SD	PD	ND

	Behavior of Regional and Superpowers	SD	PD	ND
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Content Analysis

This study utilizes content analysis to describe peacekeeping issues found within *Armed Forces & Society*. The content analyzed are articles published in *Armed Forces & Society*. Each article dealing with peacekeeping components and issues is analyzed using a coding sheet which was designed using the categories in the conceptual framework described in Chapter 3.

The operational relationship between the content analysis and the descriptive categories is depicted above, see Table 4.1. Content analysis provides an illustration of the frequency that peacekeeping components and issues are discussed within the pages of *Armed Forces & Society*. As with all forms of research, content analysis has strengths and weaknesses.

Strengths

Content analysis has many advantages over other forms of research. One advantage of content analysis is that is relatively simple. Babbie (2007, 330) states the simplicity of content analysis “As long as you have access to the material to be coded, you can undertake content analysis”. Simply put, if you can read it you can analyze it.

Content analysis also allows for the correction of errors. When compared to other research techniques, content analysis is the easiest to correct for errors. If my findings were found to be inaccurate a simple re-examination of the articles should result in an accurate illustration of the levels of discussion. Babbie (2007, 330) puts this advantage simply “In content analysis, it’s usually easier to repeat a portion of the study than it is in other research methods”.

If a mistake is made in analyzing the content found within *Armed Forces & Society* a simple re-examination of the content should solve the problem.

A third advantage content analysis has over the competition is that “it permits the study of processes occurring over a long time” (Babbie 2007, 330). This research method allows an analysis of content dating back as far as history had been recorded, and in this case to the beginnings of *Armed Forces & Society*. With other research methods the study of a subject over a long time can become exhaustive.

The final advantage of content analysis over other research methods is “that the content analyst seldom has any effect on the subject being studied” (Babbie 2007, 330). This study will have zero effect on peacekeeping where as evaluative research techniques about peacekeeping could effect how peacekeeping is conducted. Just as content analysis has strengths, there are inherent weaknesses associated with content analysis.

Weaknesses

There are only a few weaknesses associated with content analysis. One weakness associated with content analysis is the limitation to only analyze recorded communications (Babbie 2007, 330). Fortunately this study analyzes the literature of peacekeeping (recorded communication) and thus the weakness is actually a strength.

The main weaknesses associated with content analysis are validity and reliability (Babbie 2007, 330). For Babbie (2007, 146) “validity refers to the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration”. This means that the study must measure what it is intended to measure. In this study, it is the measure of discussion in which peacekeeping concepts and issues occur within the journal *Armed Forces & Society*.

The level of discussion of peacekeeping issues within each article is measured. The levels are significant, partial and no discussion. The analysis of each article is aggregated to reveal the frequency of significant, partial and no discussion of peacekeeping issues. Reliability is slightly different. Babbie (2007, 143) defined reliability “reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, yields the same result each time”. This means that each time a journal article is analyzed the same frequency of peacekeeping concepts and issues are found each time.

Inter-rater Reliability

This study will analyze articles found within the journal *Armed Forces & Society* and describe the level of discussion in which peacekeeping concepts and issues occur. To combat the weakness of reliability a sample of articles will be taken from the population and analyzed by a third party to compare the results of this study. This inter-rater reliability test will determine if the results found by this study are consistent with results found by other researchers. Two individuals agreed to analyze the population in order to determine if the results of this study are reliable.

I have chosen an alumni and an undergraduate student at Texas State University – San Marcos to assist with inter-rater reliability. The first rater is Nancy Tunell, a Texas State University – San Marcos Alumni with a Bachelors Degree in International Studies. Nancy’s studies in international aid, trade, and diplomacy make her well suited to comprehend the facets of peacekeeping. The second rater is Brian Sparks, a degree seeking undergraduate at Texas State University – San Marcos. Brian’s coursework in Psychology provides an intra-personal perspective when looking at peacekeeping operations and their effect on societies.

Analysis of a sample of the population by my secondary researchers revealed similar results. There are minor differences between the raters' and my findings but none show a significant difference in content. Table 4.1 shows the differences in levels of discussion found within the population by the raters and myself.

Table 4.2: Peacekeeping Discussion Results of Author and Additional Raters (N=24)

Framework Sub-Component	Significantly Discussed	Partially Discussed	No Discussion
<u>Internal Characteristics</u>			
Rules of Engagement	A=11, B=11.5	A=5, B=5.5	A=7, B=7
Neutrality	A=5, B=5.5	A=12, B=12	A=7, B=6
Personnel	A=17, B=17	A=5, B=5.5	A=2, B=2
Equipment & Supplies	A=3, B=3.5	A=5, B=5	A=16, B=16.5
<u>Authorization Characteristics</u>			
Command & Control	A=3, B=2	A=5, B=4	A=17, B=17
Locus of Deployment	A=1, B=1	A=4, B=2.5	A=18, B=18.5
Training	A=7, B=8	A=9, B=8.5	A=9, B=9
<u>Operational Characteristics</u>			
Consent from Conflicting Parties	A=3, B=2	A=8, B=8.5	A=13, B=12.5
Security Council Mandates	A=3, B=3.5	A=7, B=6.5	A=14, B=14
Contributing UN Member States	A=1, B=2	A=9, B=9	A=13, B=12.5
<u>Political & Military Context</u>			
Behavior of Conflicting Parties	A=3, B=4	A=5, B=5.5	A=16, B=15.5

Behavior of 3 rd Party Actors	A=2, B=2	A=4, B=3	A=18, B=18
Behavior of Regional/Supergroups	A=1, B=1	A=6, B=5.5	A=17, B=16

A = The study's author; B = Average of Raters

Population

Babbie (2007, 190) defined population as “The theoretically specified aggregation of the elements in a study.” For the purposes of this study the population will be all articles published by the journal *Armed Forces & Society* that discuss peacekeeping, from its first issue in 1974 to the October 2009 issue. The population of this study is twenty seven articles. A complete list of the articles that make up the population can be found in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: List of Articles Discussing Peacekeeping Issues

Armed Forces & Society Articles Discussing Peacekeeping Issues	
1.	Applewhite, Larry W. and David R. Segal. 1990. Telephone Use by Peacekeeping Troops in the Sinai. <i>Armed Forces & Society</i> , 17; 117-126.
2.	Battistelli, Fabrizio. 1997. Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier. <i>Armed Forces & Society</i> , 23; 467-484.
3.	Blocq, Daniel. 2009. Western Soldiers and the Protection of Local Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations Is a Nationalist Orientation in the Armed Forces Hindering Our Preparedness to Fight? <i>Armed Forces & Society</i> , #; 1-20.
4.	Bridges, Donna and Debbie Horsfall. 2009. Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: Toward a Gender-Balanced Force. <i>Armed Forces & Society</i> , 36; 120-130.
5.	Dandeker, Christopher and James Gow. 1997. The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success. <i>Armed Forces & Society</i> , 23; 327-348.
6.	Diehl, Paul F. 1993. Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Operations. <i>Armed Forces & Society</i> , 19; 209-

230.

7. Donald, Dominick. 2003. Neutral Is Not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace Operations Thinking. *Armed Forces & Society*, 29; 415-448.
8. Goldstein, Lyle J. 2000. General John Shalikashvili and the Civil-Military Relations of Peacekeeping. *Armed Forces & Society*, 26; 387-411.
9. Green, David Michael, Chad Kahl and Paul F. Diehl. 1998. Predicting the Size of UN Peacekeeping Operations. *Armed Forces & Society*, 24; 485-500.
10. Harris, Jesse J. and David R. Segal. 1985. Observations from the Sinai: The Boredom Factor. *Armed Forces & Society*, 11; 235-248.
11. Johansson, Eva. 1997. The Role of Peacekeepers in the 1990s: Swedish Experience in UNPROFOR. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23; 451-466.
12. Lakhani, Hyder and Elissa T. Abod. 1997. The Effectiveness of Economic Incentives for Career Commitment of Peacekeepers in the Sinai. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23; 391-414.
13. Last, David M. 1995. Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques. *Armed Forces & Society*, 22; 187-210.
14. Miller, Laura L. 1997. Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventative Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23; 415-450.
15. Moskos Jr, Charles C. 1975. UN Peacekeepers: The Constabulary Ethic and Military Professionalism. *Armed Forces & Society*, 1; 388-401.
16. Olonisakin, 'Funmi. 1997. African "Homemade" Peacekeeping Initiatives. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23; 349-372.
17. Reed, Brian J. and David R. Segal. 2000. The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention. *Armed Forces & Society*, 27; 57-78.
18. Schumm, Walter R., D. Bruce Bell, Morten G. Ender and Rose E. Rice. 2004. Expectations, Use, and Evaluation of Communication Media among Deployed Peacekeepers. *Armed Forces & Society*, 30; 649-662.
19. Segal, David R., Brian J. Reed, and David E. Rohall. 1998. Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the U.S. Army. *Armed Forces & Society*, 24; 535-548.

20. Segal, David R., Jesse J. Harris, Joseph M. Rothberg and David H. Marlowe. 1984. Paratroopers As Peacekeepers. *Armed Forces & Society*, 10; 487-506.
21. Segal, David R. and Ronald B. Tiggel. 1997. Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post-Cold War World. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23; 373-390.
22. Segal, David R., Theodore P. Furukawa and Jerry C. Lindh. 1990. Light Infantry as Peacekeepers in the Sinai. *Armed Forces & Society*, 16; 385-403.
23. Sion, Liora. 2006. "Too Sweet for War"? Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence. *Armed Forces & Society*, 32; 454-474.
24. Vogelaar, Ad L.W., and Eric-Hans Kramer. 2004. Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions. *Armed Forces & Society*, 30; 409-431.

Statistics

Descriptive statistics are utilized to show the frequency of discussion about peacekeeping concepts and issues as defined by the conceptual framework. The descriptive nature of this study necessitates the need for descriptive statistics only.

Chapter V: Results

Chapter Purpose

The results of the content analysis of peacekeeping articles found within the journal *Armed Forces & Society* are found in this chapter. The results of the content analysis are organized by the conceptual framework's major components and percent of significant, partial and no discussion of each major component's sub-components. Tables 5-8 reveal *Armed Forces & Society*'s level of discussion about peacekeeping issues.

Internal Characteristics

The internal characteristics of a peacekeeping operation are concerned with the composition and behavior of personnel within a peacekeeping operation. *Armed Forces & Society* places great emphasis on the internal characteristics of a peacekeeping operation. Table 5.1 illustrates the significance of personnel peacekeeping issues within the pages of *Armed Forces & Society*. Personnel and the Rules of Engagement are the most significantly discussed peacekeeping issues with personnel receiving 70% and Rules of Engagement receiving 45% significant discussion.

Table 5.1: Internal Characteristics (N=24)

Framework Sub-Components	Significantly Discussed	Partially Discussed	No Discussion
Rules of Engagement	45%	26%	29%
Neutrality	21%	50%	29%
Personnel	70%	22%	8%
Equipment &	12%	22%	66%

Supplies

Table 5.1 also depicts the level of no discussion of the internal characteristics found within the pages of *Armed Forces & Society*. The framework sub-component with the highest level of no discussion is Equipment & Supplies with 66%. Table 5.1 shows that the sub-components Rules of Engagement and Neutrality are not discussed in 12%, and personnel is not discussed in only 8% of the population. More discussion of the internal characteristics Equipment & Supplies is encouraged in the pages of *Armed Forces & Society*.

Personnel is the most discussed internal characteristic of peacekeeping. As shown in Table 5.1 there was 70% significant discussion and only 8% no discussion of personnel issues. According to Table 5.1, Equipment & Supplies and Neutrality are under-discussed peacekeeping topics in *Armed Forces & Society*.

Operational Characteristics

The operational characteristics of a peacekeeping operation ensure that each operation runs smoothly. Operation leadership, where the operation will take place and the training personnel receive are important components of a peacekeeping operation. Table 5.2 reveals the level of discussion *Armed Forces & Society* gives to the operational characteristics of peacekeeping operations.

Overall, the operational characteristics of a peacekeeping operation are under-discussed. Table 5.2 illustrates that Training is the most significantly discussed sub-component with 29%.

Locus of Deployment is significantly discussed in 4% of the population, or one article out of the population.

Table 5.2: Operational Characteristics (N=24)

Framework Sub-Components	Significantly Discussed	Partial Discussion	No Discussion
Command & Control	12%	18%	70%
Locus of Deployment	4%	21%	75%
Training	29%	34%	37%

Table 5.2 also shows the lack of discussion concerning the operational characteristics of peacekeeping operations. Command & Control and Locus of Deployment are not discussed in 70% of the articles in *Armed Forces & Society*. More discussion is recommended in the area of Command & Control and the Locus of Deployment.

Peacekeeping operations’ operational characteristics are, as Emmanuel Erskine puts it “the single most important factor in the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation” (Diehl 1993, 67). Mr. Erskine would recommend more discussion of the operational characteristics of a peacekeeping operation within *Armed Forces & Society*.

Authorization Characteristics

Authorization is the first step to creating a peacekeeping operation. An examination of the peacekeeping literature shows that authorization is the foundation of any peacekeeping

operation. The findings of this study concerning level of discussion about the authorization characteristics of a peacekeeping operation are contained below.

As a whole, the authorization characteristics are under-discussed by *Armed Forces & Society*. Consent from the Conflicting Parties, which was discussed earlier as a key component of any peacekeeping operation, is significantly discussed in 12% of the population. Security Council Mandates shares this under-discussed status with Consent from Conflicting Parties with 12% significant discussion. The final sub-category of authorization, Contributing UN Member States, is the most under-discussed topic. Four percent of the articles found within *Armed Forces & Society*, or one single article, significantly discuss the role of Contributing UN Member States to peacekeeping operations.

Table 5.3: Authorization Characteristics (N=24)

Framework Sub- Component	Significantly Discussed	Partially Discussed	No Discussion
Conflicting Parties	12%	34%	54%
Security Council	12%	30%	58%
Contributing Member States	4%	42%	54%

Table 5.3 conveys the percent of articles that did not discuss authorization sub-components. Both Consent from Conflicting Parties and Contributing UN Member States were not discussed in 54% of the population. Security Council Mandates edged out the rest of the sub-components with 58% no discussion. A conclusion drawn from Table 5.3 is that in half of the content analyzed there is no discussion of the authorization characteristics of a peacekeeping operation.

There is a need for more discussion concerning the authorization characteristics in the annals of *Armed Forces & Society*. With significant discussion at 12% and no discussion occurring in 50% of the analyzed content, greater focus is recommended concerning the authorization characteristics of peacekeeping operations.

Political & Military Context

The details on the ground describe the Political & Military Context of a peacekeeping operation. These details usually involve who is fighting, who is facilitating the conflict and who is trying to stop the conflict.

The discussion of the political and military context of peacekeeping in *Armed Forces & Society* is fairly limited (see Table 5.4). The Behavior of Conflicting Parties is significantly discussed the most with 12%. Eight percent of the articles significantly discuss the Behavior of 3rd Parties while 4%, or one article, discusses the Behavior of Regional/Supergroups. The low percentages of articles that discuss the Political & Military Context of peacekeeping operations show *Armed Forces & Society's* social science focus.

Table 5.4: Political & Military Context (N=24)

Framework Sub-Components	Significantly Discussed	Partially Discussed	No Discussion
Behavior of Conflicting Parties	12%	22%	66%
Behavior of 3 rd Party Actors	8%	17%	75%
Behavior of Regional/Superpowers	4%	26%	70%

The framework sub-components of the Political & Military Context of a peacekeeping operation are not discussed in the majority of the content analyzed. Table 5.4 shows the level of no discussion of the sub-components. The Behavior of 3rd Party Actors leads the way with three-fourths of the population containing no discussion. Seventy percent of the content analyzed contained no discussion concerning the Behavior of Regional/Superpowers and 66% showed no discussion of the Behavior of the Conflicting Parties.

The category least discussed within the pages of *Armed Forces & Society* is Political & Military Context. Table 5.4 illustrates the level of discussion concerning the Political & Military Context with 66% or more containing no discussion, and 12% of the population significantly discuss any sub-component of the Political & Military Context. More discussion of the Political & Military Context of a peacekeeping operation is needed in the future issues of *Armed Forces & Society*.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

Chapter Purpose

The final chapter of this study chronicles the findings of this study and suggests possibilities for future research. Once the study's results and recommendations are clear concluding remarks are made concerning the current contribution *Armed Forces & Society* is making to the peacekeeping literature.

This study analyzed the articles found within the journal *Armed Forces & Society* and determined the amount and level of discussion of peacekeeping issues. The first chapter introduced the study and stated the intended purpose of research is to describe the articles found within the journal *Armed Forces & Society* dealing with peacekeeping issues. Chapter two detailed the historical background of peacekeeping from the Treaty of Westphalia to the present. Next, chapter three reviews the scholarly literature concerning peacekeeping and develops the conceptual framework for the study. The methodology and operationalization of the conceptual framework are contained within chapter four. Next, chapter five displays the results of the study, highlighting the areas in need of more discussion. The sixth and final chapter concludes the study by summarizing the findings of chapter five, recommending suggestions for future research and offering some concluding statements.

Findings

According to the results of the content analysis, more discussion is recommended in some aspects of peacekeeping. Internal characteristics received the greatest amount of discussion, while Political & Military Context received the least. Specifically, more discussion is

recommended concerning the sub-categories of Locus of Deployment, Contributing UN Member States and Behavior of Regional/Superpowers. All three of these sub-categories are significantly discussed in only one article out of the population. Additional under-discussed peacekeeping issues include Equipment & Supplies, Command & Control, Behavior of Conflicting Parties and Behavior of 3rd Party Actors. More discussion is recommended concerning the remaining sub-categories with the exception of personnel.

Armed Forces & Society has concentrated its focus on the personnel that staff a peacekeeping operation. Seventy percent of the population contained significant discussion and only eight percent contained no discussion whatsoever involving personnel issues. Additional sub-categories that are related to personnel issues are moderately discussed. Issues such as the Rules of Engagement, Neutrality and Training are considered but do not share the limelight given to personnel. Most aspects of peacekeeping operations are under-discussed within the pages of *Armed Forces & Society*. Below, Table 6.1 illustrates the overall levels of peacekeeping discussion and Table 6.2 shows the mode levels of discussion of peacekeeping issues.

Table 6.1: Overall Levels of Peacekeeping Discussion (N=24)

Peacekeeping Characteristic	Significant Discussion	Partial Discussion	No Discussion
<u>Internal Characteristics</u>			
Rules of Engagement	45%	26%	29%
Neutrality	20%	51%	29%
Personnel	70%	22%	8%
Equipment & Supplies	12%	22%	66%
<u>Authorization Characteristics</u>			
Command & Control	12%	18%	70%
Locus of Deployment	4%	21%	75%
Training	29%	34%	37%
<u>Operational Characteristics</u>			
Consent from Conflicting Parties	12%	34%	54%
Security Council Mandates	12%	30%	58%
Contributing UN Member States	4%	42%	54%
<u>Political & Military Context</u>			
Behavior of Conflicting Parties	12%	22%	66%
Behavior of 3 rd Party Actors	8%	17%	75%
Behavior of Regional/Superpowers	4%	26%	70%

Table 6.2: Mode Levels of Discussion of Peacekeeping Issues (N=24)

Peacekeeping Characteristic	Mode Levels of Discussion (SD, PD, or ND)	Overall Highest Level of Discussion of Major Category
<u>Internal Characteristics</u>		
Rules of Engagement	Significantly Discussed	
Neutrality	Partially Discussed	Significantly Discussed
Personnel	Significantly Discussed	
Equipment & Supplies	No Discussion	
<u>Operational Characteristics</u>		
Command & Control	No Discussion	
Locus of Deployment	No Discussion	No Discussion
Training	No Discussion	
<u>Authorization Characteristics</u>		
Consent from Conflicting Parties	No Discussion	
Security Council Mandates	No Discussion	No Discussion
Contributing UN Member States	No Discussion	
<u>Political & Military Context</u>		
Behavior of Conflicting Parties	No Discussion	
Behavior of 3 rd Party Actors	No Discussion	No Discussion
Behavior of Regional/Superpowers	No Discussion	

Weaknesses of Content Analysis

As mentioned in chapter four, content analysis has several weaknesses. The major weakness that must be accounted for in this study is validity and reliability. Validity must be ensured by measuring what is intended to be measured. The frequency of peacekeeping issues found within *Armed Forces & Society* is what was measured. A careful understanding of the issues concerning peacekeeping, via chapters two and three, assure that only peacekeeping issues are measured. Reliability essentially means the same frequency occurs when measured multiple times. To account for this one alumni and one current student at Texas State University – San Marcos agreed to test the population and determine the frequency of peacekeeping issues.

The results found by both additional testers reflected my own results. There were some minor differences, such as a small increase in the frequency of Rules of Engagement, Neutrality and Security Council Mandates, but the increase was not significant. Additional testers to determine the frequency of peacekeeping issues found within the volumes of *Armed Forces & Society* ensure that my findings are accurate and reliable.

Suggestions for Future Research

This study describes articles in *Armed Forces & Society* dealing with peacekeeping issues. The methodology utilized in this study could be replicated to analyze the peacekeeping content of other journals that deal with similar issues. Using this study's framework and methodology to analyze the content of additional journals can assist in the development of peacekeeping literature. Replication of this study for different journals is recommended to assist further development of peacekeeping literature.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping attempts to end conflict and ensure global peace and stability. In order to better understand peacekeeping we must know when an area of peacekeeping is under-discussed. By knowing the level of contribution a journal makes to a subject such as peacekeeping, we know how to better address under-discussed issues. A comprehensive understanding of the theories and best-practices of peacekeeping can help ensure that armed conflict is eliminated from the earth.

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Appendix A

UN Peacekeeping Missions During the Cold-War

Mission	Location	Personnel	Casualties	Expenditures† (millions)	Start Date	End Date
UN Truce Supervision Operation	Israel	364*	50	\$52.31**	June 1948	Present
UN Military Observer Group India Pakistan	India/Pakistan	114*	11	\$13.40**	Jan 1949	Present
UN Emergency Force I	Israel	6,073	107	\$1,104.55	Nov 1956	June 1967
UN Observation Group In Lebanon	Lebanon	591	0	\$21.99	June 1958	Dec 1958
Opération des Nations Unies au Congo	Congo	19,828	250	\$2,22.49	July 1960	June 1964
UN Security Force in West New Guinea	West New Guinea	1,576	0	\$0***	Oct 1962	Apr 1963
UN Yemen Observer Mission	Yemen	189	0	\$10.22	July 1963	Sept 1964
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Cyprus	1,071	180	\$42.98**	Mar 1964	Present
Dominican Republic	Dominican Republic	2	0	\$1.46	May 1965	Oct 1966
UN India Pakistan Observer Mission	India/Pakistan	96	0	\$9.04	Sept 1965	Mar 1966
UN Emergency Force II	Israel/Egypt	6,973	51	\$1,059.05	Oct 1973	July 1979

UN Disengagement Observer Force	Israel/Syria	1,263	43	\$35.57**	May 1974	Present
UN Interim Force In Lebanon	Lebanon	15,000	283	\$465.87**	Mar 1978	Present
UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Afghanistan/Pakistan	50	0	\$18.45	May 1988	Mar 1990
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	Iran/Iraq	400	1	\$224.91	Aug 1988	Feb 1991

*2010 Current Personnel; **2010 Authorized Budget; ***Expenditures paid by the Governments of India and the Netherlands in equal amounts, † Expenditures in 2000 Constant Dollars

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>

Appendix B

Post Cold-War UN Peacekeeping Operations

Mission	Location	Personnel	Casualties	Expenditures† (millions)	Start Date	End Date
UN Angola Verification Mission I	Angola	70	0	\$20.73	Jan 1989	May 1991
UN Transition Assistance Group	Nambia	8,000	19	\$485.61	April 1989	Mar 1990
UN Observer Group in Central America	Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras & Nicaragua	1,098	1	\$113.41	Nov 1989	Jan 1992
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission	Iraq/Kuwait	1,187	18	\$561.52	April 1991	Oct 2003
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	Morocco	520*	15	\$42.28**	April 1991	Present
UN Angola Verification Mission II	Angola	855	5	\$198.64	May 1991	Feb 1995
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	El Salvador	683	5	\$121.69	July 1991	April 1995
UN Advance Mission In Cambodia	Cambodia	1,504	0	\$0***	Nov 1991	Mar 1992
UN Protection Force	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Macedonia	38,599	167	\$5,216.53	Feb 1992	Mar 1995
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	Cambodia	20,250	82	\$1,906.71	Feb 1992	Sept 1993

UN Operation in Somalia I	Somalia	947	6	\$51.12	April 1992	Mar 1993
UN Operation in Mozambique	Mozambique	7,663	26	\$572.37	Dec 1992	Dec 1994
UN Operation in Somalia II	Somalia/ Uganda	30,800	154	\$1,807.87	Mar 1993	Mar 1995
UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	Rwanda	81	0	\$2.67	June 1993	Sept 1994
UN Observer Mission In Georgia	Georgia	458	11	\$28.96**	Aug 1993	June 2009
UN Observer Mission In Liberia	Liberia	652	0	\$106.54	Sept 1993	Sept 1997
UN Mission In Haiti	Haiti	7,342	9	\$351.20	Sept 1993	June 1996
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	Rwanda	2,770	27	\$498.16	Oct 1993	Mar 1996
UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	Chad/Libya	15	0	\$.07	May 1994	June 1994
UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	Tajikistan	81	7	\$63.90	Dec 1994	May 2000
UN Angola Verification Mission III	Angola	4,220	32	\$951.86	Feb 1995	June 1997
UN Confidence Restoration Operation	Croatia	7,071	16	\$0****	Mar 1995	Jan 1996
UN Preventative Deployment Force	Macedonia	1,110	4	\$0****	Mar 1995	Feb 1999
UN Mission In Bosnia Herzegovina	Boznia and Herzegovina	2,052	12	N/A	Dec 1995	Dec 2002
UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Sirminum	Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirminum	2,847	0	\$606.92	Jan 1996	Jan 1998

Western Sirminum							
UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	Croatia/ Yugoslavia	37	0	N/A	Feb 1996	Dec 2002	
UN Support Mission In Haiti	Haiti	2,288	1	\$66.63	July 1996	July 1997	
UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	Guatemala	145	0	\$4.18	Jan 1997	May 1997	
UN Observer Mission in Angola	Angola	3,568	17	\$310.39	June 1997	Feb 1999	
UN Transition Mission In Haiti	Haiti	300	0	\$22.10	Aug 1997	Nov 1997	
UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	Haiti	522	7	\$20.40	Dec 1997	Mar 2000	
UN Mission in the Central African Republic	Central African Rep.	1,612	2	\$101.30	April 1998	Feb 2000	
UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leon	Sierra Leon	307	0	\$12.82	July 1998	Oct 1999	
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	Kosovo	2,479*	N/A	\$528.04**	June 1999	Present	
UN Mission in Sierra Leon	Sierra Leon	18,329	192	\$2,468.82	Oct 1999	Dec 2005	
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	East Timor	10,169	17	\$456.39	Oct 1999	May 2002	
UN Organization Mission in DR Congo	Congo	24,893*	156	\$1,066.33**	Nov 1999	Present	
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Ethiopia/ Eritrea	4,627	20	\$1,055.74	July 2000	July 2008	

UN Mission of Support in East Timor	East Timor	6,773	21	\$498.60	May 2002	May 2005
		13,396*	143	\$443.12**	Sept 2003	Present
UN Mission In Liberia	Liberia					
	Cote d'Ivoire					
UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire		8,544*	65	\$388.44**	April 2004	Present
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	Haiti	11,028*	152	\$483.21**	June 2004	Present
	Burundi	6,520	24	\$579.38	June 2004	Dec 2006
UN Operation in Burundi						
UN Mission In Sudan	Sudan	14,373*	50	\$756.98**	Mar 2005	Present
	Timor-Leste	2,951*	7	\$162.67**	Aug 2006	Present
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste						
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Sudan	21,800*	57	\$1,262.96**	July 2007	Present
UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	Central African Republic/ Chad	3,814	4	\$545.61**	Sept 2007	Present

*2010 Current Personnel; **2010 Authorized Budget; ***Expenditures paid from UNTAC Budget;

****Expenditures paid from UNPROFOR Budget, † Expenditures in 2000 Constant Dollars

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>