

JOSÉ DE ESCANDÓN: THE CLASSICAL CREATION OF A CONQUISTADOR

by

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Spain's final thorough colonization in North America occurred on the northern fringes of its empire. The man who carried out this great effort was José de Escandón, Spain's last conquistador in New Spain. Escandón not only pacified the Sierra Gorda in north-central Mexico, he explored, conquered, and colonized the area of northeast Mexico and South Texas known as the *Seno Mexicano*. His life reflected the ideal career path of an 18th century peninsular in the New World. Building upon family connections, Escandón embarked on a military life that led to prosperous careers in commerce, the colonial bureaucracy, and colonization. He successfully carried out military and colonization campaigns where others failed, employing the dual principles of generosity and iron-willed discipline. The pacification of the Sierra Gorda and the colonization of the vast *Seno Mexicano* were great feats, yet history books typically mention José de Escandón and his accomplishments only in passing.¹ The impression is that Escandón appeared from nowhere and was almost irrelevant. In reality, his efforts began a process that has resulted in the creation of what has become one of the most dynamic regions in Texas. Here is a man whose previous efforts in royal service and for personal gain positioned him to conquer South Texas and northern Mexico on behalf of his Crown, Church and fellow Spaniards. In the end, Escandón's personal and public success did not make him immune from a fate that befell many of the conquistadors who preceded him; the trinity he served faithfully turned against him.

By the beginning of the eighteenth-century Spain's power was in steady decline. An inability to keep its American wealth in Spain combined with pressure from European rivals to cause the former Iberian powerhouse the loss of some of its New World territorial claims. England, France and Holland gained footholds in the Americas by force, diplomacy, and interloping. Nevertheless, the Spanish monarchs, burdened and overstretched with territorial responsibilities,

continued to use all means available to keep their American possessions.² Despite the struggle to maintain overseas possessions, the Spanish Crown successfully continued the expansion of its American empire. Contemporaneous defense and development was no easy task. To oversee these efforts the Crown relied both on a well-established bureaucracy and opportunistic individuals who hoped to gain wealth and status for their services.³

Spanish expansion in this period followed the same pattern as in earlier centuries. The Crown entrusted exploration, conquest, conversion, and defense to a number of men and organizations. These activities reflected the Spanish mission of territorial, religious, and commercial expansion. In attempting to achieve these goals some were extraordinarily successful while others were abject failures. Two centuries after the initial conquest the same difficulties existed. Insufficient manpower, religious intolerance, and lack of finances hampered Spanish plans. Exacerbating matters were political bickering, poor leadership, and corruption among the individuals and organizations the Crown charged with these duties. Moreover, the drain of colonial riches to finance Spain's meddling in European and African affairs further debilitated efforts.⁴ Escandón too was plagued by some of the same problems that hampered the early conquistadors.

Along the way to becoming Spain's last conquistador, Escandón forged a place in history for himself by having several careers that led the way to glory, riches, and prominence in a strict, but dynamic, hierarchal society.⁵ Escandón was not atypical; his career resembled the experience of many Spaniards of his time. He arrived with a family connection that provided a firm foundation for advancement. He achieved prominence, however, through his intelligent and skilled service to the Crown, which allowed him to meet and marry into the local elite. Escandón benefited from a keen intelligence, but nature also graced him with an odd streak of luck derived from the death of others. That luck consistently ushered in political, social, and economic advancement. Unfortunately, his legacy of success did not follow him in death. History has been less generous to this man who defeated his enemy in combat, reinforced his kings' territorial claims, and assisted the Church's conversion of native peoples. Historians have given a secondary role to Escandón, favoring other better-known

figures and events. Yet, Escandón, an enterprising man with lifelong service, devotion, and loyalty to the Crown, aided in defending, protecting, and expanding his king's territorial reach at his own expense while Spain's world was on the wane. The impact of his efforts still lives, as the borderlands of modern South Texas and northern Mexico explode with population and economic development in communities he directly and indirectly established. Escandón was Spain's last conquistador and colonizer in the New World, but his personal life and previous achievements remain in relative obscurity.⁶

José de Escandón y Helguera was born on May 19, 1700 in the town of Soto la Marina near the city of Santander in the Camargo Valley of Spain's Burgos mountains. His parents, Juan de Escandón y de Rumoroso and Francisca de la Helguera y de la Llata, were well off members of the minor nobility, a social status that allowed Escandón to attain a formal education.⁷ It is uncertain why Escandón left Spain, but in 1715, at the age of fifteen years, he embarked to the New World; a teenager by current standards but an adult in his world. Sailing on the same ship was the newly appointed governor and captain-general of Yucatán, Don Juan José de Vertiz y Hontañón, a man who played a major role in Escandón's later life. Escandón arrived in Campeche on December 1, 1715 and made his way to Mérida, Yucatán where he joined the local militia that his uncle Antonio de la Helguera commanded.⁸ He served the next five years, at personal expense, as a cadet with the *Compania de Cabelleros Montados de Mérida*.⁹ During this time Escandón proved his military skills in defending the region against English aggression.¹⁰

Around the middle of the 1700s the Yucatán became the focus of attention for Spain's enemies. The Yucatán was heavily forested with valuable natural resources, especially Brazilwood. European demand for the wood increased because of the natural dye in several hues drawn from the tree.¹¹ Since the mid-1500s Spain had been the sole supplier of this rare dye source.¹² Because of the peninsula's forbidding dense jungles and disease-ridden environment, the Spanish did not establish permanent settlements to protect the resource.¹³ The discovery by non-Spaniards of Brazilwood in the peninsula offered a source of revenue, and English interlopers quickly took advantage.

British loggers first established logwood sites in the Cape Ca-

toche area, but Spanish pressure forced them to the coastal forests around a small lagoon in Campeche Bay known as the *Laguna de Términos*. The loggers also set up a site on one of the bay's islands which they called Trist. These sites worried Spanish officials because they effectively created a strategic presence between the vital cities of Veracruz and Mérida. As a result, the Spanish organized several military campaigns to oust the English loggers who called themselves "Baymen."¹⁴

Leading the militia were peninsular officers, one of whom was cadet José de Escandón. While serving with the Cabelleros Montados de Mérida, Escandón participated in the final ouster of the British loggers. Not only did he gain military skills that he applied later in his career but he was also influenced by some of the civil aspects of the overall campaign strategy. Governor and Captain-General Don Juan José de Vertiz y Hontañón's lack of military experience forced him to rely on subordinate officers for a plan to remove the English interlopers.¹⁵ A particular plan submitted by Juan Francisco de Medina y Cachón, a local *alcalde*, offered a holistic solution to the problem that had a profound effect on Escandón. The plan called not only for the recapture of the Laguna, but the economic development and defense of the bay as well. Prior to this time attempts to deal with the problem were purely military affairs that left no instructions beyond simple defense. Cachón's plan envisioned a new administrative unit in which Campeche Bay would form a new jurisdiction with Chiapas and Tabasco. This new unit would have its own political and military identity. Cachón's plan forbade the logging of Brazilwood in order to create a more diversified economy and population. Under the plan, monopolies were illegal and commercial goods and military hardware were to be produced locally. To avoid problems with acclimation, manpower had to come from Yucatán, Tabasco, and Chiapas.¹⁶

Although the loggers returned on a cut-and-run basis, they never again had the same presence in the Campeche Bay area. This multiple approach to defeating enemies and developing an area economically influenced Escandón's approach to dominating and settling other weakly controlled areas of New Spain.

Northwest from the Gulf Coast and deeper into the interior existed a long-standing threat that kept Spanish government and military of-

ficials in a constant state of preparedness. Situated closer to the seat of New Spain's colonial government was a indigenous threat. In this rugged terrain lived native tribes that did not easily succumb to Spanish steel and the word of a Catholic God. Raids physically threatened established municipalities and disrupted expansion northward. The nomadic Indians Spain encountered in the interior mountain ranges were far more formidable and difficult to conquer than the developed Indian nations of central Mexico and South America. A nearly constant state of war ensued from the early days of conquest to the mid-eighteenth century.

Northeast of the city of Querétaro is a mountainous region known as the *Sierra Gorda*. It was a region where several resilient Indian nations resisted Spanish penetration and influence. The mountains formed natural defenses that slowed Spanish colonization, Christianization, and development by turning the rugged area into a harbor for autonomous tribes collectively referred to as the *Chichimecas*. Although labeled as one nation, the Chichimecas were composed of a number of different tribes, such as the *Pames*, *Guamares*, *Guachichiles*, and *Zacatecos*, whom the Spanish found difficult to placate and even harder to conquer.¹⁷ Conflict was intense, as both sides waged campaigns to control the region and eradicate each other. For two hundred years strife claimed thousands of lives, with both sides committing atrocities.

As the Spanish conquered and developed territories, defeated Indians became labor pools who were forced to assimilate into Spanish culture. Part of the process involved the use of *congregas*, an abusive system that allowed a Spaniard the right to use the labor of Indians from specified areas.¹⁸ As a result, many Indians fled into the mountains, returning only to exact revenge for abuse and destroy the property both of Spaniards and acculturated Indians. Religious conversions also suffered, as tribes refused Christianization or abandoned both missionaries and missions. The threat of attack created a sense of danger and uncertainty for these isolated missionaries and converted Indians. With each successful attack the Chichimecas became bolder and more aggressive, endangering the existence of Spanish and assimilated Indian populations. In retaliation Spaniards undertook expeditions to exterminate and/or enslave their enemies.

At times they attacked acculturated tribes out of frustration and anger. Efforts to remove these threats proved difficult for those commissioned to carry out the task.¹⁹

Fighting unconventionally and displaying a mastery of the bow and arrow, the Chichimecas fully terrorized both civilian and the military. Especially shocking to the Spanish was the Indian custom of fighting in the nude. The primitive Chichimecas, who were still Stone Age people, proved difficult to conquer. Fighting out of a mountainous region bordering Querétaro, Guadalajara, Durango, and Saltillo, the Indians employed hit-and-run tactics suited to the environment. The nearly impenetrable mountain harbor, the tactics, and the fighting skills of the Indians made long delayed conquest and peace almost impossible. Although at times the Spanish were able to purchase a temporary shaky peace through bribery with some nations, they never obtained consistent security from all tribes. The result was over two hundred years of instability for towns in the region.²⁰ As with the European challenge, it took decades of effort by several individuals to remove the threat. The viceroys of New Spain had to wait until the eighteenth century and José de Escandón before the Sierra Gorda was finally brought under total control. A treaty signed early in the seventeenth century temporarily ended the violence, but by 1718 a new cycle of conflicts arose as the competition for living space led both sides to violate the treaty.²¹ It was at this juncture that José de Escandón again served his king with distinction. His participation in the offensives against the British camps around Campeche Bay had brought progress to his career. His courage and skill in battle earned Escandón promotion to lieutenant, an advancement that launched his career. With the promotion military officials ordered the twenty-one-year-old Escandón to the city of Querétaro in 1721. While in Querétaro Escandón occupied himself with two major projects: the subjugation of Chichimeca tribes in the Sierra Gorda and the reorganization of the region's Christianization efforts. He completed both successfully, earning both military honors and social prominence.

By the end August 1721 Escandón was a lieutenant in Querétaro assigned to an infantry and cavalry regiment commanded by Captain Alejandro de Escorza.²² Renewed war with the Chichimeca tribes known as the *Pames*, *Jonases*, and *Otomies* provided him the

opportunity to earn more promotions.²³ When Escandón arrived in Querétaro Indian insurrections had been in full swing around the Sierra Gorda and its surrounding region for some time. Attached to a company from the city's regimental militia, Escandón again served at his personal expense and worked diligently for the next several years in bringing the warring tribes under control.²⁴ He faced the nations that the Spanish were now labeling as the "Chichimeca League." He also faced other "*indios barbaros*" that rose up in arms for the same reasons as did the Chichimecas.²⁵ But Escandón earned his reputation well before beginning his campaign to remove the "*manchón de ignominia*" in the Sierra Gorda by waging war against rebellious Indians in the Celaya area.²⁶

Escandón rescued a number of towns from the threat of Indian attack. In 1727 Lieutenant Escandón received orders to proceed to Celaya to quell a revolt that began over rumors of Spanish plans to establish nine new towns in the region. His military genius was clearly evident when with a force of eighty men he launched a surprise lightning offensive that overwhelmed the Indians before he even arrived in the town to take up his post. The rapidity of his victory stunned city officials who were unaccustomed to such quick action.²⁷ This accomplishment so satisfied the viceregal government's quest for a quick peace that when the second in command of the Querétaro's militia died in August 1727, Escandón filled the vacancy and was promoted to the rank of sergeant major.²⁸ This was a start of a series of deaths of his superiors officers and his wives that consistently benefited Escandón in more than one way.

In Querétaro he accomplished what no other officer had done; he defeated the local *Otomíes*, thereby ending sixteen years of conflict with this group.²⁹

Newly promoted, Escandón began the pacification of the Sierra Gorda.³⁰ In his next excursion he took on the challenge of another branch of Chichimecas, the Jonases.³¹ By 1732 Sergeant Major Escandón secured the towns of Real de Minas de Guanajuato and Irapuato from this group. A couple of years later the San Miguel el Grande district fell under the threat of a force of ten thousand Indians.³² After receiving the alarming news from the alcalde mayor, Escandón rushed out within twenty-four hours with five cavalry

companies and captured more than four hundred prisoners. With this feat he restored the peace, which allowed the return of residents who had fled the danger.³³ These exploits earned Escandón fame as a successful Indian fighter and a reputation as the man to seek out whenever there were Indian troubles. It was the death of another superior officer, however, that allowed Escandón to advance again. These successful rescues and confrontations, and another professionally beneficial death, aligned Escandón for his next promotion. The death of Joseph de Urtiaga, *Coronel de las Compañías Milicianas de Querétaro*, led to Escandón's promotion to that position on February 22, 1740.³⁴ In that role Escandón finally ended the Chichimeca threat in the Sierra Gorda.

The Spanish continued their struggle against the Chichimecas in various regions for the next eight years.³⁵ By the end of the decade Escandón's forces defeated and pacified the Jonases. With the decisive battle of Media Luna in 1748, Escandón overcame the last great stronghold of the Jonases nation, a hill called San Cristóbal.³⁶ The battle of the Media Luna resulted in the capture of more than one hundred Indians whom Escandón sent to obrajes in Querétaro. Jonases warriors and their families who escaped capture fled to a nearby hill near Moral, a highly defensible locale where they eventually succumbed to Escandón's greater numbers and superior weapons.³⁷ The Jonases was the most troublesome tribe and, with the exception of a few minor uprisings, their defeat effectively ended the Chichimeca threat to Spanish expansion.³⁸

Although Escandón's reduction campaign was less bloody compared with other Spanish victories, it was his lenient treatment of Indian prisoners that earned him the respect of his enemies who called him "*el Capitan Grande*" for his generosity and gifts.³⁹ Some historians, however, dispute this generous view of Escandón, arguing he was just as ruthless as others. Mexican writer Gabriel Saldivar claims Escandón's campaign against the Pames led to the nickname "Exterminator of the Pames of Querétaro."⁴⁰ Others cite his use of slavery expeditions against Indian villages to supply his textile factories with laborers. After Franciscan efforts to achieve peace through conversion and assimilation showed mixed results, Escandón removed the missionaries' charges and sent them to textile factories

in Querétaro to prevent them from becoming a threat to the swelling Spanish population.⁴¹ The Franciscans noted that Escandón and his men displayed worse behavior than the natives.⁴² His ruthlessness against the real and perceived Indian threat was what earned him the notorious appellation “Exterminator of the Pames of Querétaro.” While there is an element of truth in this depiction of Escandón, it is not entirely accurate. Although ruthless in battle against the Indians, he was often generous to them in defeat. Reflective of his dual approach in dealing with the Indian population was his policy of “*como amigos con mano suave y como enemigos con rigor implacable.*” This policy gained him the respect and reputation as a fair man from his former enemies.⁴³ This dual treatment of Indians reveals the complexity of a man who at times displayed extreme characteristics. In this regard he was a man of his times who exhibited the traits of the conquistadors who preceded him.

Regardless of the labels applied to him, Escandón’s actions attracted the favorable attention of government officials and prominent families. His successful military career in Indian campaigns, and the 1741 death of his superior Lieutenant-Captain General Don José de Villapando y Centeno, led Viceroy Pedro de Castro y Figueroa, Duque de la Conquista y Marqués de Gracia Real, to give Escandón the title of Lieutenant-Captain-General of the Sierra Gorda, its Missions, Presidios, and Frontiers.⁴⁴ This position made him the Viceroy’s representative with nearly equal authority in those designated places. Under this authority Escandón achieved his second major goal, the reorganization of Christianization efforts in the Sierra Gorda.

The Catholic Church played a major role in colonial expansion from the beginning of Spanish explorations into the Americas. In spreading the word of God the various missionary orders carved out territories to pursue their responsibilities to the natives and to their brotherhoods. These missionary brothers aggressively defended their jurisdictions from civil and religious rivals.⁴⁵ Any changes could result in the loss of all physical properties and incomes derived from the missions, and from state-paid synods.⁴⁶ Sometimes the missionaries spent more energy defending their jurisdictions than they did converting their native charges. In addition, the dangers inherent in working in the hostile Sierra Gorda and the breakdown in missionary

discipline hampered the spiritual conquest of the region. Christianization efforts in the Sierra Gorda had little success since missionaries first arrived in the region in the late-sixteenth century. Conversions were few and seldom permanent. The dismal record was the result of a variety of reasons. The previously unconquered Chichimecas preyed on the missionaries, disrupting their efforts for many years. Members of the religious order were also to blame for the failure. Some opted to live like hermits, maintaining minimal contact with the people whom they were to convert. Others, much like the congrega owners, became abusive and used their position and authority for their own benefit and enrichment. Originally, there were three religious orders equally responsible for the Sierra Gorda but authorities later narrowed it to just one predominant and two subordinate orders. The Franciscans, Augustinians, and Dominicans all targeted the Sierra, competing against one another and other individuals with different goals. There was also a Jesuit presence in the mountain range, but for the most part it remained a minimal effort.

However, a century of conversion efforts in the Sierra failed to alter the religious practices of a sufficient number of local indigenous people. As the individual responsible to the vice-roy, Lieutenant Captain-General, Escandón toured the Sierra in 1743 to evaluate the missionaries' efforts and concluded that reorganization and restructuring of clerical efforts and responsibilities were due.

The longstanding failure of the orders to establish a permanent presence in the Sierra Gorda mountains stirred Escandón's interest. The violent hindrance by the Indians prevented the complete conversion/pacification of the Chichimecas. Moreover, earlier reports by his predecessors indicated that some missionaries had lied about the state of missionary efforts. Missions reported as established did not exist in fact, and missionaries were often absent from assigned locales. As supervisor of the missions in the region, Escandón decided to review their status in an attempt to find new solutions to old problems. In January 1743 Lieutenant General Escandón undertook a journey to discover the true state of religious affairs that was to have lasting consequences.⁴⁷ Escandón's preliminary evaluations during the initial stages of his tour of the Sierra Gorda revealed discrepancies that called for a thorough audit of religious activities in the mountains.

To undertake this new, broader task, Escandón added assistants to his inspection. Throughout the month of January the inspection team marched from one end of the Sierra to the other reviewing the conditions and inventories of the missions, measuring the conversion progress, and taking a census of all the missions' population.⁴⁸

Escandón and his troupe began at the Dominican mission at Soriana on January 7, 1743 and ended at the Jesuit mission of San Luis de la Paz on the last day of the month. In almost thirty days he traveled several hundred miles and examined and audited every mission in the Sierra Gorda. During the trip he witnessed first hand the dismal state of mission affairs, which left him with a negative view of the Christianization strategy.⁴⁹ The mission at Jalpan especially made Escandón realize that a reorganization was necessary.

The mission in Jalpan functioned under the leadership of fray Lucas Cabeza de Vaca. Under his guidance was a motley group of tribes composed of different Chichimeca nations, Mexicanos, and a class of Spanish *gente de razón*.⁵⁰ Cabeza de Vaca reported that Indians at nearby rancherías, towns, and haciendas also fell under his jurisdiction. The population served by the Jalpan mission totaled almost four thousand souls. Fray Cabeza de Vaca admitted that the large area and huge number of Indians were greater than he and his mission's ability to provide religious training to all. Indians also complained to Cayetano de la Barreda, one of Escandón's auditors, of extra fees for religious services and forced labor, as well as the lack of basic religious training from the regulars. Escandón concluded that the unsuccessful conversion/pacification efforts in the Sierra Gorda were the result of the failure of the missionary orders to inculcate the Indians with either religious training or knowledge of Spanish laws.⁵¹ Cabeza de Vaca appeared to be overpowered by the immensity of his jurisdiction and tasks, and seemed resigned to accepting the poverty and misery of Jalpan.⁵²

Escandón's evaluation of the state of the missionary efforts criticized the orders for failing to penetrate further into the mountains and for the abuses they heaped upon the Indians. However, he noted that the friars' jurisdictions were too large for them to be effective. His report also proposed major changes that aimed to ensure that the territory came under the full authority of New Spain with the conver-

sion/pacification of the Indians of the Desplobado. Three months later viceregal authorities accepted Escandón's report and proposal with only minor modifications.⁵³

His proposal called for the reassignment of the regular orders; the reestablishment of abandoned missions, and the creation of new ones under the leadership of the Franciscans of San Fernando College; public notification of land distribution in the surrounding communities; and land allocations to those willing to migrate into the Sierra. The proposal also suggested the reduction of troops to lessen tensions while at the same time calling for the "*exortación*," or government support of the military that remained in the region after troop reductions.⁵⁴ This proposal encompassed ideas Escandón had been exposed to years earlier in the Yucatán. His implementation of the proposal, combined with his early experience, helped develop his approach to the Seno Mexicano later. Under the escort of one hundred mounted men and a number of Franciscan friars from San Fernando College, and empowered with viceregal orders, Escandón set out from Querétaro on April 5, 1744 to implement his plan.⁵⁵ Despite carrying royal authority, Escandón faced both military and religious opposition. In his first stop at the presidio of San José Vizarrón in the town of Cadereíta he encountered opposition to his planned troop removal when the presidio commander argued that two hundred men were needed for defense. Nevertheless, Escandón's will prevailed.⁵⁶ Resistance from the Augustinian missionaries proved to be even stronger.

By April nineteenth the Augustinian missions of Toliman, Pachuca, and Pacula had been transferred to the Franciscans. When Escandón returned to the overburdened Jalpan mission and Cabeza de Vaca he faced strong opposition. Other than the initial legal challenge from the order's higher echelons, the Augustinian was the only other serious resistance Escandón encountered. The fray understood Escandón's orders but based his reluctance on the argument that he had no knowledge of the transfer arrangements and requested an extension. He also refused to turn over any property without orders or approval from his superiors.⁵⁷ The fray's stubbornness and argument won him a temporary reprieve, as Escandón left the premises. The victory was short lived; the next day Escandón returned and under

the eyes of a growing mission crowd reminded Cabeza de Vaca of the viceregal approval of his plan.⁵⁸ Knowing he was challenging a greater authority, Cabeza de Vaca changed tactics and attempted to bargain with Escandón. He was willing to allow the Franciscans to establish their mission but they had to provide their own necessities since he would not release any items.⁵⁹ Escandón forcefully reminded Cabeza de Vaca that he was arguing for nothing more than straw covered *jacales*, which brought the friar to his senses and the transfer was completed. The Franciscans ensured there would be no harboring of resentment by offering to return unused synods pertaining to the former order.⁶⁰

Escandón faced no more challenges to his reorganization of the missions and completed his task in May. In completing this assignment Escandón established a firm Franciscan presence and secured the Catholic Church deeper in the Sierra Gorda. The Indian threat, however did not end, but later infractions were not as organized or as severe as past threats. With the reorganization of the missions and his earlier successful military conquests, José de Escandón set in place the conditions that ensured the total domination of the Sierra Gorda and its full entrance into the Spanish domain. Franciscans, such as Junipero Serra, later extended their presence from this stronghold northwest toward California. Meanwhile, in Mexico City another great project that was years behind schedule again received government attention. The pacification of the Sierra Gorda left one great area of the northern Spanish empire to be conquered. Conquest of the land known as the *Seno Mexicano* would be the final achievement and the ultimate destruction of Spain's last conquistador.

A distinguished army career did not necessarily ensure Escandón a steady and rich income. The royal treasury was always short of funds, as revenue was directed back to Spain. Colonial military officers were either unpaid or underpaid and, therefore, searched for ways to sustain a lifestyle reflective of their perceived positions in society. While military titles came to represent an occupation, in reality they were more honorary than financially sustaining. Senior officers in Querétaro did not enjoy huge landed estates, political power, and/or social status.⁶¹ Economic mobility and financial stability were achieved through marriage, mining, and commerce.⁶² For example,

in Querétaro a majority of textile owners were originally military officers.⁶³ Escandón, who had been serving at his own expense, was no different and followed the custom of courting local elite families with marriageable daughters or widows.

The goal of almost every Spaniard who came to the Americas was to obtain wealth and the status it conferred. The customary path for a Spaniard to secure and maintain wealth and status after arriving in the New World was to enter into a strategic marriage, become a valuable member of the in-law's business, and then diversify into his own rural and urban industries.⁶⁴ José de Escandón was a classic example of this pattern; two marriages provided him with the financial means to springboard into occupations other than the military.

Besides a blooming military career, José de Escandón also possessed the best advantage of a Spaniard in New Spain, status as a peninsular. This position made him desirable to fathers with marriageable daughters, and Escandón took full advantage of the situation when he relocated to Querétaro in 1721. On December 9, 1724 Escandón married Doña María Antonia de Ocío y Ocampo, the daughter of a wealthy superior officer. In so doing Escandón made a classical career transition which continued the pattern of previous conquistadors who took advantage of favorable marriages to become wealthy businessmen.⁶⁵

There is some confusion, however, regarding Escandón's first marriage. American and Mexican authors dispute the identity of his first wife. Carlos Castañeda argues that Escandón sailed back to Soto la Marina in 1727 to marry Doña Dominga Pedrajo, a childhood friend. Florence Scott Johnson, however, cites a marriage document to disprove this claim and asserts that it was Escandón's younger brother Juan José who married Pedrajo.⁶⁶ Yet, 1735 and 1736 notarized testaments by the older Escandón that list family members lack any mention of the existence of a brother or brothers in either Spain or New Spain.⁶⁷ If indeed it was the elder Escandón who married Pedrajo, then the last conquistador was living "*la vida mala*," or the life of a bigamist.⁶⁸ Regardless, marriage into the Ocío y Ocampo family secured Escandón's entrance into Querétaro's system of family-owned enterprises. The dowry he received upon marrying María Antonia allowed Escandón to invest in the local textile industry. Ob-

rajes, or textile factories, were one of the more important industries in the city and colony.⁶⁹ As an obraje owner Escandón faced the labor shortage problem common to all in that industry. Escandón, however, was in a better position than most to solve his dilemma. The maelstrom in the northern frontier allowed him the opportunity to obtain Indian slaves, and many of the Indians Escandón captured in the Sierra Gorda ended up in Spanish-owned obrajes.

Since the 1500s Spaniards had made a lucrative business practice of capturing Indians for forced labor in textile factories and for sale to others. Although royal edicts forbade this practice, Spanish colonists argued its necessity and Escandón was no exception. The reason most cited to support slave raids was the pressure from continuous royal *cédulas* calling for expansion and colonization of land. Spanish colonists argued that they were too few and for successful colonization to occur Indian labor, forced or otherwise, was necessary. Long before Escandón began his conquest of the Seno Mexicano, he participated in slave raids to supply the Querétaro and Mexico City obrajes, including his own, with Indian slave labor.⁷⁰ So lucrative was the business that even the Catholic Church bought, sold, and used the labor of Indian and African slaves.⁷¹ Escandón regularly purchased such slaves who had once been owned by Church officials.⁷² His ventures into the textile and slave industries marked a self-determined transition for the warrior. He now began to identify himself not only as a soldier but also as an obraje owner and a *mercador* (merchant).⁷³ The transition was not in name only but in practice as well. Much like a modern businessmen, Escandón and the other obraje owners faced competition from numerous small shops (*trapiches*) that produced the same products.⁷⁴ In a move to ensure the quality of textiles in his Querétaro obrajes and, therefore, maintain a larger share of the market, Escandón trained an apprentice as an *Oficial de Calidad*.⁷⁵ Applying quality control to increase profits reflected Escandón's sophisticated business acumen, for he increased his wealth with his slave-operated obrajes.

Escandón did not limit his business ventures to the making of cloth. His success in the textile industry permitted him the means to engage in the real estate business in Querétaro and the surrounding areas. In the mid-1700s Querétaro was a growing city with more than

two thousand houses lining the nearly three hundred streets within its limits.⁷⁶ In any expanding city, real estate is a profitable venture and Escandón took advantage of his locale and financial position to enter into realty. Investment in this business also added to his growing fortune. Interestingly, Escandón combined his sale of property with the sale of humans; in one sale for a house he included the services of three nearby congregas of Chichimecas.⁷⁷

Escandón's business ventures brought great wealth but could not stave off personal tragedy. On May 14, 1736 his wife María Antonia died, leaving him two small children and a considerable inheritance.⁷⁸ Escandón's first children, Ana María and José de Escandón y Ossio, both later joined religious orders, leaving their father with no grandchildren. María Antonia's death bequeathed Escandón a large fortune she inherited from her parents.⁷⁹ Now in his mid-thirties, Escandón was again available to bring purity of blood and legitimacy, not to mention wealth, to another distinguished family. One can only imagine the discreet stares and hushed whispers among the ladies at social functions and the visions of fathers with unmarried daughters. A union with the wealthy and well-positioned Escandón would be a great asset to an elite family looking for a suitable son-in-law. It is no surprise that he quickly found another wife. As in his first marriage, his second wife also came from a wealthy family, which proved beneficial to Escandón. On January 3, 1737, less than eight months after the death of María Antonia, he married Doña María Josefa Llera y Baises. The second marriage added to Escandón's already considerable wealth and increased his influence in governmental circles, for his new father-in-law served as *regidor* (councilman) in Querétaro, a position of importance in the Spanish bureaucratic chain.⁸⁰ With this second marriage Escandón also created a new family, fathering seven children, and garnered even greater wealth and social prestige.⁸¹

Escandón's skills and abilities impressed his second father-in-law, who chose the seasoned veteran to handle the important affairs of his new family. When his father-in-law, Santiago de Llera Rivalcuva, decided to formalize his will in 1749, he gave Escandón nearly authority over family matters. De Llera passed over his adult biological sons, Joseph Ignacio and Thomas Geronimo de Llera, and

made Escandón the executor of the will. Interestingly, de Llera again bypassed his sons by naming a second son-in-law as the executor in the case of Escandón's inability to carry out the task.⁸² It is uncertain as to why de Llera ignored his true sons in favor of Escandón, but it is reasonable to assume that there was a belief that his skills and position would serve to preserve the family fortune better.

De Lera's confidence in his son-in-law was not misplaced. When the family patriarch died he left Escandón two hundred fifty-six thousand, ninety-eight pesos and complete authority to manage all business of the estate. With these broad powers Escandón paid for the burial expenses, manumitted a loyal black slave woman, and issued the bequeathed monies and properties to the remaining family members.⁸³

Running the business affairs of his own and the de Llera families while continuing his public life occupied Escandón's attention and may have had a strong impact on his family life. He may have been an absent father to the offspring from his first marriage, because of the demands of negotiating multiple professions.⁸⁴ Both his son José and his daughter Ana María, who later entered into the religious life, were left in the care of the Franciscan fray Vicente Santa María at the convent of Valladolid in Michoacán. While it was not unusual for the sons, and especially the daughters, of well-to-do Spaniards to enter the monastic life, it is significant that Escandón's first children did so at an early age. Nevertheless, their social status remained high even though cloaked in the relatively closed environment of religion. For example, Escandón's wealth allowed Ana María to purchase membership in the elite *Velo Negro* group in a local convent.⁸⁵ While his personal business dealings earned Escandón wealth and social prominence, his public life continued to bring recognition, honor, and more missions to fulfill. Escandón was becoming an important man in colonial society as his record tallied one success after another, each of which captured the attention of the royal government. Crown officials soon called again on Escandón to carry out on the northern frontier what was to become one of the last great colonial accomplishment of Spain in the Americas. Few knew that when King Felipe II marked the boundary of the Seno Mexicano in 1579 and approved the creation of a new province called the *Nuevo Reino*

de León, it would lead to the last Spanish conquest and colonization effort in North America.⁸⁶

The Nuevo Reino de León encompassed an area that extended two hundred leagues north from the Pánuco River and another two hundred leagues west from the Gulf of Mexico coastline. Nuevo León, as it is better known, stretched from modern-day San Antonio, Texas into the present Mexican states of Zacatecas, Durango, San Luis Potosí, Nayarit, Sinoloa, and Chihuahua.⁸⁷ Part of the new province included the Seno Mexicano.

The conquest of the Sierra Gorda provided a starting point to enter the Seno Mexicano, another territory that was also difficult to bring under control. This area was a harsh land that includes much of what today is northeastern Mexico and South Texas. The territory had boundaries that started at the mouth of the Pánuco River near Tampico, stretched northward to the mouth of the San Antonio River and bordered the Sierra Madre range in the west.⁸⁸ The Rio Grande was considered the dividing line between the northern and southern portions of the Seno. The coastal plain was labeled *La Costa* until it was renamed the Wild Horse Desert by American settlers in the nineteenth century.⁸⁹ The Nueces River, with other nearby rivers and *motas*, came to be recognized as the home of the dreaded Apache and Comanche tribes, both of which had a major impact on Spanish colonization attempts.⁹⁰ The weather in this land is characterized by sweltering, humid summers, droughts, flash floods, and *nortes*, or blue northers, appearing suddenly in the fall and winter.⁹¹ There was no shortage of wildlife, as bears, wildcats, and other animals roamed the untamed country and waterways.⁹² It was a physically overpowering environment in which the climate, land, and indigenous inhabitants made Spanish development difficult.

The Seno was also the most convenient gateway to Spain's northeastern outposts but slave raids in the 16th and 17th centuries had created a hostile environment that prevented a direct route through the coast to east Texas.⁹³ The only town of any substance was the relatively poor and under populated San Antonio. However, the region had strategic importance to a Spain leery of French intrusions from the east. In addition, the Seno possessed natural resources, such as salt, that offered profitable opportunities for enterprising persons coura-

geous enough to enter the region. However, the perceived danger to royal territory forced the Crown to better develop Texas and northern Mexico. As a result, in the 1690s the Spanish viceregal government began establishing a series of new missions and presidios to deter any French penetrations.⁹⁴

In 1736 Antonio Ladrón de Guevara, a *vecino* from Nuevo León, requested permission and financial assistance from the viceroy to colonize the Seno. He claimed personal knowledge of the region and familiarity with the Indian tribes there. Guevara's plan was to recruit colonists from his province with the attraction of the award of *fueros* and congregas. The viceroy's denial of the request did not discourage Guevara; he bought a passage to Spain and presented his project to the Council of the Indies in Madrid. To enhance his chance of success, Guevara added two new clauses that asked for a share of profits from salt mines located in the region and that the governors of Coahuila and Nuevo León provide assistance. Guevara received no assurances, for the Council was reviewing alternative colonization proposals.⁹⁵

In Spain at the same time, Narciso Barquin de Montecuesta, the former alcalde of the Villa of Valles, submitted a proposal for the colonization of the southern region of the Seno. His plan included generous subsidies for himself. He requested fourteen million pesos for garrison expenses to protect future missions and villas that were to be populated with people from Villa de Valles and Tampico, approval to use congregas, a commission worthy of his future position with an annual salary of four thousand pesos, and an interest in any salt mines set aside for royal use.⁹⁶

Back in New Spain a third party was proposing yet another plan. José Fernandez de Jáuregui, Governor of Nuevo León, suggested he be allowed to colonize the Seno. Submitting a plan no different from the other two, he used prophetic threats of foreign occupation of the land if there was not a Spanish presence established quickly. And, according to de Jáuregui, he was the man to protect Spanish interests in the region.⁹⁷ De Jáuregui was not far from wrong, for Spain's enemies indeed gazed hungrily at the northern frontier. Years of neglect and minimal presence led the French and the English to believe they had discovered another soft entry into the Spanish colonial mainland.

Settlement of this frontier region of New Spain would serve as an additional defense against European intrusions. Settlement also offered the advantage of shortening the route from central Mexico to San Antonio. French and English pressures in the first half of the seventeenth century gave urgency to the Spanish desire to conquer and develop the Seno Mexicano.

In July 1739 the King issued a royal *cédula* calling for the exploration and permanent colonization of the region and established boundaries of a new province in which the Seno Mexicano was located. The *cédula* established a junta of high-ranking officials in New Spain to choose one of the three plans. Since Guevara's plan was favored by the Spanish court, the other two contenders dropped their bids. In an effort to impress the junta and ensure success, Guevara gave titles to several Indians to use them as proof of his acceptance among the natives. In addition, Guevara, believing he simply had to go through a formality, boldly pressed his luck, asking to serve as Sergeant Major, Captain of War, Governor and Captain General. His effrontery put off the junta members charged with making the decision and, as a result, they opted to wait until the new viceroy assumed power, thereby buying time with the practice of "*obedezco pero no cumplo*."⁹⁸ Also affecting the junta's decision was their unhappiness over the proposed use of *congregas*, which had caused so much damage in the Sierra Gorda. Nor was the junta impressed with Guevara's ploy of titled Indians; the junta stripped them of their positions and dismissing each with three hundred pesos.⁹⁹

Stunned, Guevara protested directly to the court in Madrid of the inaction and insubordination of the junta and its treatment of his allies, and demanded that he be awarded the right to establish his colony. Guevara's meddling in government decisions and imperious behavior incurred the wrath of both the Council of the Indies and the King. In 1743 the Crown issued a second *cédula* that rejected Guevara's plan and prohibited him from interfering in governmental decisions and pacification programs. However, the Crown honored the titles Guevara bestowed upon the Indians.¹⁰⁰ Although the Crown's rejection ended Guevara's immediate involvement in colonization plans, the persistent Spaniard eventually entered the Seno in the service of José de Escandón.

Though the 1743 cédula ended Guevara's participation it did not negate the original call for the colonization of the Seno. In the time between the two royal decrees, junta member Juan Rodríguez de Albuérne, the Marqués de Altamira, researched the history of the entradas into the Sierra Gorda to determine the best method of colonization. Escandón's record in the Sierra convinced the Marqués that a better man was available for the project. When the new viceroy, Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, Conde of Rivallagigedo, arrived the Marqués persuaded him that José de Escandón was best suited to fulfill royal orders. Perhaps even more important to the Marqués was that Escandón's achievements had come without cost to the *Real Hacienda*. The Marqués' discovery of Escandón may have come at no better time, since under the reign of Felipe V New Spain financed the rejuvenation of the arts and science academies, the rebuilding of the military, and the restructuring of the bureaucracy in Spain. The Crown ordered the colony to send one hundred thousand pesos with every ship going to Spain until a sum of one million pesos had been accumulated.¹⁰¹

On September 3, 1746 Escandón accepted the appointment as Lieutenant of the Viceroy on the Coast of the Seno Mexicano and Conquistador and Governor of the Province and the Seno Mexicano. This broad authority was unparalleled in New Spain, making Escandón second only to the viceroy. Escandón approached the project with the same diligence he put into previous challenges. In preparation he spent the remainder of the year consulting with the Audiencia in Mexico City and with other individuals experienced in the territory. By December he was ready to undertake his greatest challenge. In undertaking the pacification and colonization of the Seno Mexicano Escandón applied all the lessons he had learned during his transition from soldier to businessman. When selected for the conquest of the Seno, Escandón was determined not to fall prey to problems that hampered efforts in the Texas province. He took precautions to facilitate the success of his venture in the unchartered Seno in light of dismal Texas colonization results. The first problem he faced was dealing with an environment far more challenging than that faced by his predecessors in East Texas. The land between the Rio Grande and the Nueces River was an unchartered region of mystery.

Occupying the area were a number of small nomadic Indian tribes whose languages were unidentifiable. Some were hostile while others were more pacific.¹⁰² The more hostile tribes often attacked and killed Spanish shipwreck survivors along the coastline. Part of Escandón's duty was to pacify the Indians of the region and populate it with Spaniards.¹⁰³

Where Spanish colonization efforts in favorable environments struggled to exist, Escandón, guided by his past experiences, organized his more difficult sector efficiently. His strategy incorporated the best aspects of the development of the Yucatán and the reorganization of the Sierra Gorda's missions and pacification of its Indians. Previous experiences led him to conclude that the mission-presidio system was not the appropriate method for pacification and colonization. Escandón was one of the very few who argued that the results did not justify the high cost of presidio and mission maintenance. His time chasing the nomads around the Sierra Gorda taught him that a stationary defensive fort designed to protect missions and borders was ineffective. Like some frontier officers, he believed the use of *compania volantes* offered the best tactical approach on the hostile frontier. He also believed that presidio soldiers' abuse of missionary Indians caused many of the problems. There were also the issues of efficiency and corruption, as some captains overcharged the government for supplies and abused their men.¹⁰⁴ In addition, presidios were often undermanned and staffed with prisoners, who were usually under-supplied and suffered from low morale. Impoverished married soldiers whose families lived on or near their posts suffered greatly under abusive officers, often starving to death.¹⁰⁵

The missions were in no better shape than the presidios. Not designed to create a permanent settlement populated only by Spaniards, missions emphasized religious conversion and training of Indians with the goal of making them sedentary people who would lay the foundations for villas and pueblos. Crown officials gave the regular orders a ten-year deadline to accomplish the task before transferring control to secular priests. The system rested upon the willingness of Indians to accept clerical guidance or conversion. Few in Texas converted, however, because of abuse at the hands of the soldiers and missionaries. The Indians that stayed were forcibly detained. Another

reason Indians refused Spanish tutelage was due to disease. Much like other indigenous tribes throughout the Americas, these nomadic Indians had no immunity to the barrage of viruses with which they came into contact. Smallpox and measles decimated the much smaller family tribes of the northern frontiers and survivors of the dreaded diseases fled the missions. Moreover, those who survived venereal disease contracted from the Spanish and suffered the resultant sterility further reduced population growth.¹⁰⁶

Escandón recognized that the presidio system was inappropriate for colonizing with Spaniards and conceived an approach that combined civil, religious, and military settlements. His formula for success resembled Juan Francisco de Medina y Cachón's plan of making Laguna de Términos more independent and stable. Escandón also reverted to the original Spanish approach to exploration and expansion. Rather than rely on Indians for the population base, he ensured that his entrada was composed of Spaniards who were "equipped with everything needed to transplant European life: people of many trades and estates, seeds, plants, and animals."¹⁰⁷ To avoid the mistake other entradas into Texas made in bringing people unacclimated to the environment, Escandón was highly selective. His colonists came from the provinces surrounding the Seno. He also refused to include parasitic bureaucrats, aristocrats, and high-ranking military officials.

Escandón also used his unlimited powers to obtain the manpower and supplies for the initial entrada. Under the presidio system, the common soldier was expected to provide his own equipment and provisions. Escandón recognized that this method usually meant that soldiers were ill prepared for the colonization task and were prone to abuse Indians. To avoid this situation he ordered the governors of Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Texas to provide the necessary men, provisions, and equipment. For example, the governor of Nuevo León, Vicente Bueno de la Borbolla, was responsible for preparing more than two hundred men with three to four months of supplies procured from the local population and haciendas.¹⁰⁸ By January all the men, equipment, and provisions necessary for the multi-directional entrada were assembled. In all, over seven hundred men from throughout northern Mexico and Texas participated in the 1747 inspection.

Originally planned to last only a month, the whole inspection process took ninety days. Other than the extended time frame, the only major failure Escandón experienced was the inability to sound and explore the bays and rivers that dotted the coastline. Escandón had ordered the alcaldes of Tantoyuca and Guachinango to provide two barks to conduct the operation, but despite repeated requests the alcaldes implemented the customary “*obedezco pero no cumpro*” and failed to send the ships.¹⁰⁹ One command strictly followed was the policy toward Indians during the inspection. Escandón forbade offensive attacks against any natives with whom the parties came in contact. The men were to treat Indians in a friendly manner and could only use violence in defense. This policy resulted in successful contact with numerous tribes, some of which were persuaded of the peaceful mission with trinkets and food. The multiple points of entry also may have given the tribes the illusion of an overwhelming Spanish force and convinced them that peace was the best approach at this time. Escandón’s use of a local cacique as a guide may have facilitated peaceful relations.¹¹⁰

During the three-month inspection trip Escandón’s parties explored and mapped approximately twelve thousand square miles that included the land between the Guadalupe and the Pánuco Rivers and about one-half of the Rio Grande in Texas. Incredibly, although the parties traveled through desert, wetlands and terrible weather, and suffered from the lack of water, there was no loss of life.¹¹¹ This latter fact alone made Escandón’s feat a major accomplishment.

Escandón took seven months to finalize his report, submitting it on October 26, 1747 to New Spain’s Fiscal de lo Civil, Pedro de Vedoya y Ososio. The report went well beyond a simple description of the Seno Mexicano and offered a full colonization plan to be carried out under his guidance. The proposal requested authority to establish fourteen colonies in the Seno with two on the north side of the Rio Grande. Of the latter two, Escandón proposed establishing one along the banks of the Nueces River near modern-day Corpus Christi and another one further south along the lower San Antonio River. The Church always played a role in Spanish colonization efforts and this plan continued its presence, but in a somewhat different manner. The plan called for the establishment of missions in each colony with the

Franciscan Colleges of San Fernando de Mexico and Guadalupe de Zacatecas providing the missionary staff. While these missions were to conduct the normal conversion process, Escandón, a deeply religious man, did not envision populating his colonies with neophytes. Instead, he wanted to populate the region with Spaniards in the belief that civil settlements with missions would create a more stable and permanent presence in the frontier.¹¹² To attract Spanish colonists, he proposed that settlers be exempt from civil and religious taxation, free land after a period of communal use, and military protection. The colonists were also to receive a one-time subsidy of between one hundred and two hundred pesos to offset relocation expenses.¹¹³

The military was also included but not in the traditional sense. Escandón viewed presidios as ineffective and a cost liability, especially against the nomadic Indians in the region. The nature and size of the small tribes may have led him to believe they would be no major threat. The characteristics of the military presence were also redefined by limiting service to two to three years and providing soldiers with land to assist their transition to civilian membership in the villas. Escandón believed this method would prevent them from preying on the local Indian population. He came to believe the presidio was a major source of trouble for local Indians and its absence would placate tumultuous relations. He proposed that the existing presidio at La Bahía be relocated to present day Goliad and eventually closed. According to Escandón the whole project would cost the Crown only fifty-eight thousand pesos.¹¹⁴

In December Fiscal de Vedoya y Ososio sent his remarks to Viceroy Guñemes y Horcasitas along with a request for a Junta General to meet and vote on the proposal. The Fiscal praised Escandón's plan on a number of points, suggesting that the Kings's cédulas would finally be fulfilled, souls saved, unchartered lands populated, and mining developed. The submission of the report to the Viceroy was just part of the approval process. Again, the power and influence of the Marqués de Altamira resurfaced, as his opinion was requested by the Viceroy. As the person who nominated Escandón for the task, he continued his support, approving the plan and suggesting the acceptance of the peninsular's proposal. On May 12, 1748 the Junta General voted to accept the plan with only one modification; the Junta rejected the

relocation of the Sacramento presidio. The Junta then decided to create a new province named Nuevo Santander, in which the Seno was located, and selected Escandón as Governor, Captain-General, and Personal Representative of the Viceroy of the new administrative unit. Along with the title came the responsibilities of pacifying and colonizing the Seno Mexicano.¹¹⁵

Escandón knew that colonization of the wild region required tough, hardy people if it was to succeed. As a result, he was highly selective in choosing his colonists. He recognized that the offer of free land and financial assistance would attract many of the wrong types of people, so he focused his search for colonists only in the provinces of Querétaro, Nuevo León, and Coahuila. The new governor also called on many of his original entrada leaders to recruit colonists in their provinces. Escandón rejected participation by prominent civil and military officials and citizens. Of the over seven hundred families that wished to go, only five hundred fifty-four were selected. The recruitment and organization of the colonization phase was to be the pinnacle of Escandón's skills and public career.¹¹⁶

Once colonization began Escandón returned to Querétaro to organize the second phase of the project and to receive a knighthood and title of nobility. In October 1749 the King awarded Escandón the title of Count of the Sierra Gorda and installed him as a Caballero in the Order of Santiago, Spain's most prestigious military order.¹¹⁷ As a bonus, the King exempted Escandón from having to pay the normal *Media Anata* and *Lanza* fees typically associated with the honors.¹¹⁸ Any joy Escandón experienced was short-lived, however, as parts of New Spain erupted in economic and social turmoil.

Querétaro suffered a food shortage problem caused by a lack of rain. Crop production dropped as low as one-tenth of the normal yield, and people were crowding into the urban centers. Distribution of crops entering the town was uneven, coming in unpredictable quantities. Starvation increased and crime skyrocketed, and even wild animals wandered the streets in search of food. By November social order collapsed in Querétaro when food riots broke out in response to escalating maize prices. Angry and starving textile workers stormed the city granary. Escandón interrupted his recruitment of colonists and organized a defense to rescue the city from further destruction

by the rioters.¹¹⁹ Dealing with the chaos cost Escandón six months, but once the situation was under control he again concentrated on organizing his villas.

Escandón's colonizing efforts perforce required close relationships with the three pillars of his society that he served loyally. Ironically, the Church, Crown, and Citizen played an important part in the demise of a man whose efforts on their behalf rarely were equaled in colonial history. Entrusted with power and influence given to few individuals, Escandón was betrayed by those he served. As is often the case, in achieving success he opened himself to severe criticism from those he assisted and who eventually disgraced him and brought about his downfall.

Escandón's success in carving out a new province, creating numerous villas, and populating an isolated region created a backlash of resentment and jealousy. The Franciscans from the College of San Fernando criticized the sharing of missionary activities with the College of Zacatecas and submitted an official protest to the Viceroy that attempted to discredit much of Escandón's claims about the new province. Even when Escandón awarded the San Fernando Franciscans the most productive sites and allowed them the privilege of living in the settlements as rather than with their Indians charges, they did not relent. The Franciscans accused Escandón of being a cruel despotic leader not afraid of God or the devil.¹²⁰ The Fiscal at first sided with the San Fernando friars, but Escandón's benefactor the Marqués de Altamira, continued his sponsorship and defended him, his approach, and the complexity of the task he had undertaken.¹²¹

At the same time, the Zacatecan Franciscans complained that they had not received good assignments or land, protesting the disparity in the quality of the lands and their poor location by leaving their missions. The Franciscans also claimed Escandón paid too much attention to the needs of the colonists while maintaining an Indian policy that was extreme.¹²² Always keeping the tribes under vigilance and permitting only limited freedom, Escandón made sure they did not engage in dangerous activities. He offered them the opportunity to accept Christianity or face a war of extermination. Later, he bribed them with trinkets and provided them with food to keep the peace. Indians that went astray were quickly and severely punished, almost

to the point of cruelty. The Indians complained of this treatment and the friars maintained that their pacification had the lofty goal of saving souls while Escandón's simply aimed to insure economic development. In retrospect, the missionaries' argument seems to reflect classic rivalries rather than concern for Indian welfare, for more Indians died in the first five years after Escandón's removal from office than during his nineteen-year tenure.¹²³

The intrepid conquistador continued to take a battering when his own colonists attacked him. Escandón dictated and molded the culture and character of his province. As governor he both macro and micro-managed Nuevo Santander. He established and/or approved settlement sites and selected the exact location for administrative and religious buildings, and assigned a captain as head in each villa. Micro-management of these tasks took longer than the colonists anticipated. Especially irksome was the length of time it took Escandón to parcel out the land promised to the colonists.¹²⁴ Under the original agreement land was to be used communally at first to prevent a monopolization of favorable territory, to ensure the safety and development of industries, and to fully establish the population. When those goals were reached Escandón would divide the land among the colonists. However, the colonists grew tired of land distribution delays. Escandón's own prejudice against *criollos* and the lack of peninsular Spaniards led him to delay taking action. He felt there were insufficient men of good quality to properly administer land distribution and he was unsatisfied with handing out administrative duties to those with minimum qualifications.¹²⁵ Count Escandón's prohibition from the province of all types of alcoholic beverages and gambling also angered the colonists.¹²⁶

Complaints from colonists, Indians, missionaries, and military officers soon began arriving in Mexico City. So numerous were the reports of misconduct that in 1757 the viceroy, the Marqués de Las Amarillas, ordered an inspection of the province.¹²⁷ As a result, José Tienda de Cuervo and Agustín López de la Cámara Alta, a military officer and an engineer, visited every villa in the province and recorded statistical information on geography, industries, civil and military personal, Indians, land history, and transportation, and conducted personal interviews with the settlers.¹²⁸ The recommendations they

made to the viceroy reflected not only a response to the complaints against Escandón but to greater change in Spain's colonial policies that grew out of the Bourbon Reforms as well.

The "enlightened despotism" of the Bourbon kings (1700-1788) sought to restructure the political and economic life of Spain and its colonies. The so-called Bourbon Reforms aimed to make colonial administration more effective and to generate more revenue by enlarging the economy and making overseas colonies more productive.¹²⁹ Escandón's tax-free colony was an obstacle to achieving the Reforms' objectives. In 1760 a new viceroy arrived with several questions for Escandón from the King. The Crown worried about several things: Was it feasible to maintain towns in the Seno, where there were no mining nor commercial bases, without them becoming a financial burden?; If the settlements survived, would they ruin New Spain's commerce since they were so close to French Louisiana?; Were the settlements too close to French territory?; and Were there any good ports since there was no formal report about them? Viceroy Joaquín de Monserrat, the Marqués de Cruillas, also asked for maps of Nuevo Santander before and after colonization, the actual costs of the entire project, and the results of port explorations and soundings. The King also instructed the viceroy to halt provision of funds to Nuevo Santander, except for the missionaries' expenses. Incredibly, the King ordered the withdrawal of the Counts' title of nobility until everything was verified.¹³⁰

Escandón underwent a lengthy investigation that worsened in 1769 when colonists who did not receive their financial assistance further accused him of falsifying records to hide the theft of relocation subsidies and of the annual military payroll in the amount of forty thousand pesos.¹³¹ Although he claimed to have personally paid for some of the colony's expenses, the large properties and home Escandón kept in Nuevo Santander did not help his argument. In his defense he presented financial records to prove his innocence. Unfortunately, Escandón never lived to hear the royal verdict of the charges. On September 10, 1770 Escandón died in Mexico City. It was left to Manuel de Escandón y Llera, his eldest son from his second marriage, to petition for a final decision. Shortly after his death, new evidence proved Escandón's innocence and he was exonerated of all charges.

His titles and property were restored.¹³² Thus, after fifty-five years of glorious service that benefited his nation, accusations of theft and poor leadership brought down a Spanish patriot who gave more than he received. In a changing world brought on by the need for more money and the natural tendency of jealousy, Escandón's career and personal life were shattered, a sad ending to a life of royal service and personal accomplishment.

1. Archival records in Querétaro show Escandón signing his first name as Joseph but modern scholars have referred to him as José. This article will follow the shortened name to facilitate reading.

2. William David Stetzekorn, *Formerly British Honduras: A Profile of the New Nation of Belize* (Athens: Ohio University Press), 129.

3. For a good description of the Spanish colonial bureaucracy see Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 72.

4. Manuel Rivera Cambas, *Los Gobernantes de Mexico, Tomo I* (México: Joaquín Porrúa S.A. de C.V., 1981), 341.

5. John C. Super, "The Agricultural Near North: Querétaro in the Seventeenth Century," in *Provinces of Early Mexico: Variants of Spanish American Regional Evolution*, ed. Ida Altman and James Lockhart (Los Angeles: University of California-Los Angeles Latin American Center Publications, 1976), 242, 244, 248, and 250.

6. North American historians note Escandón's role in borderland colonization but fail to detail his earlier successful ventures that provided the foundation for his efforts in the northern frontier. Mexican scholars give more attention to his achievements but fail to offer a complete picture of Escandón's life and career.

7. Toribio de la Torre y Coautores, *Historia General de Tamualipas*, 2nd ed. (Ciudad Victoria: Universidad Autónoma de Tamualipas para el Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1986), 55.

8. Juan Fidel Zorrilla and Carlos González Salas, *Diccionario Biográfico de Tamualipas*, (Ciudad Victoria: Universidad Autónoma de Tamualipas para el Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1984), 135.

9. Primo Feliciano Velázquez, *Bajo el Dominio Español, Tomo II, Historia de San Luis Potosí* (Mexico D.F.: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, 1947), 456.

10. Gabriel Saldivar y Silva, "Don José De Escandón," en *Lecturas Históricas Mexicanas, Tomo V*, ed. Ernesto de la Torre (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1994), 69.

11. Stetzekorn, *Formerly British Honduras*, 133. Pirates had long used the logwood for fuel, but it was the accidental discovery by a ship captain who sold his surplus of wood in Europe that revealed its value. See Narda Dobson, *History of Belize* (London: Longman Caribbean Unlimited, 1973), 54.

12. Dobson, *History of Belize*, 53.

13. Setzekorn, *Formerly British Honduras*, 128.

14. Dobson, *History of Belize*, 56 and 60; and Alicia del C. Contreras, "El palo tinte, motivo de un conflicto entre dos naciones, 1670-1102," *Historia Mexicana* 37 (July-September 1987): 51.

15. *Ibid.*, 294-296.

16. *Ibid.*, 298-299.

17. Philip Wayne Powell, *Soldiers, Indians & Silver, The Northward Advance of New Spain 1550-1600* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 33.

18. A congrega may be identical to an encomienda. An encomienda is an encomendero's right to use the labor of Indians in exchange for protection and Christianity. See Burkholder and Johnson. *Colonial Latin America*, 337. This view is supported by Gabriel Saldivar who claims that "*La congrega era un poblado de indios mandado por un español con título de protector, quien se encargaba de instruir a los indios en el cultivo de planras alimenticias y en el cuidado y cría de los ganados.*" See Gabriel Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada de Tamaulipas* (Mexico: Editorial Jus, S.A. de C.V.. 1988), 69.

19. Powell, *Soldiers, Indians & Silver*, 33.

20. *Ibid.*, 15.

21. Lino Gómez Canedo. *Sierra Gorda; Un Típico Enclave Misional En El Centro De México (Siglos XVII y XVIII)* (Querétaro: Dirección Patrimonio Cultural, Secretaría de Cultura, Bienestar Social, 1988), 49-50.

22. Primo Feliciano Velazquez. *Historia de San Luis Potosí*, Tomo II (México: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, 1947), 456.

23. Villar, *Lecturas Históricas Mexicanas*, 69; and Velázquez, *Historia de San Luis Potosí*, 456. Author Manuel Septian y Septian states that Escandón first served as a sergeant and was then promoted to lieutenant. See Manuel Septian y Septian, *Historia de Querétaro: Desde los tiempos prehistóricos hasta el año 1898* (Querétaro: Ediciones Culturales del Gobierno del Estado Querétaro, 1967), 96. However, no evidence exists to substantiate Septian's claim.

24. Velázquez, *Historia de San Luis Potosí*, 456.

25. James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 292; and n.a., "Escandón, José de." *Diccionario Porrúa: De Historia, Biografía, y Geografía de México*, 5th ed. (México: Editoial Porrúa S.A., 1986), 998.

26. Septien y Septien, *Historia de Querétaro*, 96. Manchón de ignominia referred to the Spanish belief that the Indians of the Sierra Gorda had humiliated the supposed European superiority. The term translates into the "stain of humiliation."

27. *Ibid.* Mexican authors disagree over the exact town rescued by this eighty-man force. They cite both Celaya and Querétaro as the rescued town. The fact that Escandón was ordered to Celaya and city officials were the ones mentioning the relief from the threat seems to indicate that it was Celaya rather than Querétaro that benefited in this instance.

28. Velázquez, *História de San Luis Potosí*, 456.
29. Villar, *Lecturas Históricas Mexicanas*, 70.
30. Secretaria de Gobernación, *Estado General de las Fundaciones Hecha por D. José de Escandón en la Colonia del Nuevo Santander: Costa del Seno Mexicano: Documentos Originales que contienen la Inspección de la Provincia Efectuada por el Capitan de Dragones Don José Teinda De Cuervo, del Mismo al Virrey y un Apéndice con La Relación Histórica Del Nuevo Santander, por Fr. Vicente Santa Maria* (México: Talleres Graficos de la Nación for the Publicaciones del Archivo General de la Nación, 1929), 303.
31. Septian, *Historia de Querétaro*, 96.
32. Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada*, 70. Saldivar's figures for the number of Indians may be incorrect. Sources that deal with other Indian threats usually speak of smaller numbers. Since Saldivar does not cite the source of his information it is impossible to determine if Escandón faced ten thousand warriors or a far fewer number.
33. Secretaria, *Estado General de las Fundaciones*, 304.
34. Septian, *Historia de Querétaro*, 96; Octavio Herrera Pérez, *Anales Y Testimonios Del Cantaro* (Ciudad Victoria: Universidad Autónoma de Tamaulipas por el Instituto de Investagaciones Históricas, 1986), 25; and Zorrilla and González Salas, *Diccionario Biográfico de Tamaulipas*, 136.
35. Gabriel Rincón Frías, José Rodolfo Anaya Larios, and Ma. Isabel Gómez Libardini, *Breve Historia de Querétaro* (Querétaro: Dirección de Patrimonia Cultural, Secretaria de Cultura y Bienestar Social, Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro, 1986), 48.
36. Septian, *Historia de Querétaro*, 96.
37. *Ibid.*, 96-97.
38. *Ibid.*; and Frías, Larios, and Labardini, *Breve Historia de Querétaro*, 48.
39. Vicente de Santa Maria O.F.M., *Lecturas Históricas Mexicanas* ed. Ernesto Villar de la Torre , Tomo II (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1994), 9. A contemporary of Escandón, Santa María learned of this title from Indians the last conquistador had defeated.
40. Gabriel Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada de Tamualipas* (Ciudad Victoria: Dirección General de Educación y Cultura, 1988), 80.
41. Canedo, *Sierra Gorda: Un Típico Enclave*, 31 and 68.
42. *Ibid.*, 69.
43. Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada de Tamaulipas*, 78.
44. de la Torre, *Historia General*, 55.
45. Peter Gerhard, *The North Frontier of New Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 20 and 22-23.
46. Canedo, *Sierra Gorda: Un Típico Enclave*, 81-85.
47. *Ibid.*, 61.
48. *Ibid.*, 77.
49. *Ibid.*, 77-78.
50. *Ibid.*

51. Ibid., 77-109.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 81.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., 82.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 82-83.

61. Ida Altman and James Lockhart, eds, *Provinces of Early Mexico: Variants of Spanish America Regional Evolution* Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1976), 245.

62. D.A. Brading, "Government and Elite in Late Colonial Mexico," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 53 (August 1973): 393.

63. John C. Super, "Querétaro Obrajes: Industry and Society in Provincial Mexico, 1600-1810," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 56 (May 1976): 198.

64. Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 267; and Brading, "Government and Elites," 396.

65. Florence Johnson Scott, *Historical Heritage of the Lower Rio Grande: A Historical Record of Spanish Exploration, Subjugation, and Colonization of the Lower Rio Grande Valley and the Activities of José de Escandón, Count of Sierra Gorda together with the Development of Towns and Ranchos Under Spanish, Mexican, and Texas Sovereignties 1747-1848* (Waco: Texian Press, 1966), 276; and Zorilla and Salas, *Diccionario Biográfico de Tamaulipas*, 136.

66. Carlos E. Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas 1519-1936, vol. 3, The Mission Era: The Missions at Work: 1736-1761* (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Co., 1938; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1976), 138 (page reference is to reprint edition); Scott, *Historical Heritage of the Lower Rio Grande*, 276-277; and Zorilla and Sala, *Diccionario Biográfico de Tamualipas*, 136 and 355.

67. Testamento de José de Escandón, in Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Históricos, *Documentos Ineditos para la Historia de Querétaro Tomo VIII* (Querétaro: Talleres Praxis, 1990) 172 and 176.

68. La vida mala was the abuse of spousal power and was considered defilement of marriage vows. Bigamy would be an example of such defilement. See Asunción Lavrin, *Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 20-21. Richard Boyer, *Lives of the Bigamists: Marriage, Family, and Community in Colonial Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995) offers an in depth examination of bigamy in colonial Mexico.

69. Altman and Lockhart, eds., *Provinces of Early Mexico*, 236-240; and Bernardo García Martínez, *Historia General de México, Tomo II.* (México: Colegio de México, 1976) 146.

70. Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada*, 65.

71. For a brief examination of African slavery in Mexico see Micheal L. Conniff and Thomas J. Davis, *Africans in the Americas: A History of the Black Diaspora* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 109-112; and Herman Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico: Santa Lucía, 1567-1767* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 246 and 252.

72. Protocolo 7, 12 September 1747, notario: Antonio Fernández del Rincón, Archivo General del Estado de Querétaro (hereafter cited as AHQ); and Protocolo 2, 9 September 1727, notario: José Cardoso, 1727-1728, AHQ.

73. Protocolo 2, notario: José Cardoso, 24 November 1728, AHQ. It should be noted that Escandón also utilized apprentices in his obrajes.

74. John C. Super, "Querétaro Obrajes," 200.

75. AHQ Protocolo 2, Cardoso, 1728: 373, Querétaro 24 November 1728.

76. Altman and Lockhart, *Provinces of Early Mexico*, 232.

77. Protocolo 4, 3 April 1739, Fernández, 1739-1742, AHQ; Protocolo 5, 16 November 1743, Frenández, 1743-1744, AHQ; and Protocolo 7, 8 September 1748, Frenández, 1747-1748, AHQ.

78. Scott, *Historical Heritage of the Lower Rio Grande*, 277.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., no page number given, refer to Genealogical Chart on last page; and Zorilla and Salas. *Diccionario Biográfico de Tamaulipas*, 138-139.

82. Protocolo 4, 7 October 1741, Fernández, 1739-1742, AHQ.

83. Ibid.

84. Fray Vicente Santa María, theology lecturer, at the convent of Valladolid of Michíocan was entrusted with Escandón's children. See María del Carmen, "Los Apaches y sus Leyenda," *Historia Mexicana* 24 (October-December 1974): 172.

85. del Carmen, "Los Apaches y su Leyenda," 172; Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, *Documentos Ineditos*, 177; and Scott, *Historical Heritage of the Lower Rio Grande*, 277. Convents had three social classes of which the Velo Negro was the highest. Women in that class came from wealthy elite families and brought donations and doweries into the order. The Velo Blanco was the second tier and was made up of those women who came from families lower on the socio-economic scale. These women served as the housekeepers of the convent and assumed tasks considered below the position of the Velo Negro. At the bottom were the poor *castas* that served the second class members. See Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 92-93.

86. Donald E. Chipman, *Spanish Texas 1519-1821* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 52-53.

87. The northern province jurisdictions overlapped due to indistinct borders. See Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 52-53; and Gary Starnes, "The Spanish Borderlands of Texas and Coahuila," *Texana* 10 (Winter 1971): 22-23 .

88. Lawerance Frandis Hill, *José de Escandón and the Founding of Nuevo Santander: A Study in Spanish Colonization* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1926) , 40.

89. Ibid.

90. bid.
91. Hill, *José de Escandón*, 45.
92. Ibid., 46, and Armando C. Alonzo, *Tejano Legacy: Rancheros and Settlers in South Texas, 1734-1900* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 23.
93. Robert S. Weddle, "North Toward Texas: Spain, The Middle Corridor and the French Connection," *Journal of South Texas* 8 (Winter 1995): 1.
94. Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 111 and 119.
95. Hill, *José de Escandón*, 56.
96. Ibid., 57.
97. Ibid.
98. Robert A. Calvert and Arnaldo de León, *The History of Texas* (Arlington Heights IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1990), 13.
99. Hill, *José de Escandón*, 57.
100. Ibid., 57-58.
101. Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico, 365.
102. Hill, *José de Escandón*, 24.
103. Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas, "Decreto para la fundación de las Misiones del Seno Mexicano, 1748" TMs [photocopy], p. 90, Old Spanish Missions Historical Research Collection, St. Florence Library, Our Lady of the Lake University, San Antonio.
104. Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 128; Max L. Moorhead, *The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), 25-26.
105. Calvert and de León, *The History of Texas*, 14-15, 24 and 28; Gerhard, *Northern Frontiers*, 31; and Moorhead, *The Presidio*, 22
106. Gerhard, *Northern Frontiers*, 29, 339 and 340; and Hill, *José de Escandón*, 193.
107. Lockhart and Schwartz, *Early Latin America*, 62-63.
108. Israel Cavazos Garza, *Nuevo León y la Colonización del Nuevo Santander* (Monterrey: Editorial de la Sección 21 Del Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, 1994), 29.
109. Scott, *Historical Heritage*, 64-66; and Calvert and de León, *Texas History*, 13.
110. Scott, *Historical Heritage*, 15-16.

111. Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage*, 142 and 150; and Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 162.
112. Juan Fidel Zorilla, review of *El Poder Colonial en Nuevo Santander*, by María del Carmen Velásquez, in *Historia Mexicana* 27 (January-March 1978): 479-496.
113. Chronicler Israel Cavazos Garza, interview by author, 19 August 1997, Monterrey, pen and paper, Municipal Archives of Monterrey, Monterrey; Herbert Eugene Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century: Studies in Spanish Colonial History and Administration* (Berkeley: University of California Publication in History, 1915), 293; Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage*, 293; Cavazos Garza, *Nuevo León*, 33; Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 167; and Hill, *José de Escandón*, 68.
114. Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage*, 151 & 153; and Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, 168. There are suggestions that one hundred fifteen thousand and seven hundred pesos was the original amount. See Septian y Septian, *Historia de Querétaro*, 153.
115. Alonzo, *Tejano Journey*, 29; and Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage*, 153-154.
116. Scott, *Historical Heritage*, 19; and Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage*, 156.
117. Protocolo 6, 28 June 1745, notorio:Antonio Fernandez del Rincón, AHQ; and Castaneda, *Our Catholic Heritage*, 155.
118. Castañeda, *Ibid.*
119. Brian R. Hamnett, *Roots of Insurgency: Mexican Regions, 1750-1824* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 109-110.
120. Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada*, 104 and 114.
121. Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage*, 88.
122. Zorilla, review of *El Poder Colonial*, 104.
123. de la Torre, *Lecturas Históricas*, 71-72; and Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada*, 108.
124. Alonzo, *Tejano Legacy*, 29; and Scott, *Historical Heritage*, 61.
125. Alonzo, *Tejano Journey*, 35.
126. Saldivar, *Historia Compendiada*, 108.
127. de la Torre, *Historia General*, 10, 11.

128. Scott, *Historical Heritage*, 47-51.

129. Allan J. Kuethe and Lowell Blaisdell, "French Influence and the Origins of the Bourbon Colonial Reorganization," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 71 (August 1991): 588; Lockhart and Schwartz, *Early Latin America*, 362; and Herrera Paz, *Anales y Testimonios*, 29.

130. José Antonio Calderon Quijano, *Los Virreyes de Nueva España en el Reinado de Carlos III* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos de Sevilla, 1976), 1:15-16.

131. Cavazos Garza, *Nuevo León*, 39; and Scott, *Historical Heritage*, 110-111.

132. Secretaría de Gobernación, *Estado General*, 309; and Scott, *Historical Heritage*, 112.