McKinney, Audrey MChambers, Thomas H.2013-08-282013-08-282013-07Chambers, T. H. (2013). <i>An evaluation of Saul Kripke's argument for property dualism</i> (Unpublished thesis). Texas State University-San Marcos, San Marcos, Texas.https://hdl.handle.net/10877/4691This paper concerns Saul Kripke's argument against type physicalism and for property dualism. My objection to the argument is that it relies upon a premise for which Kripke does not provide adequate support. The unsupported premise is Kripke's claim that it is possible for pain to occur in the absence of C-fiber stimulation. This premise relies upon what Crispin Wright identifies as the Counter-Conceivability Principle – the notion that if we can clearly conceive a counterexample to a claim of necessity, that serves as evidence against the claim of necessity. This principle is, however, not useful because it does not provide any guidance for what counts as a clear conception. Additionally, providing precise theories of conceivability and imaginability does not lend the support that Kripke's argument needs. Thus, I conclude that this objection to Kripke's argument stands and type physicalism can be maintained.Text56 pages1 file (.pdf)enKripke, SaulProperty dualismType physicalismPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mindModal epistemologyPhilosophy of mindCausationThesis