An Evaluation of Saul Kripke's Argument for Property Dualism
| dc.contributor.advisor | McKinney, Audrey M | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chambers, Thomas H. | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Fischer, Robert | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Carson, JoAnn | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-08-28T16:14:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-08-28T16:14:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-07 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper concerns Saul Kripke's argument against type physicalism and for property dualism. My objection to the argument is that it relies upon a premise for which Kripke does not provide adequate support. The unsupported premise is Kripke's claim that it is possible for pain to occur in the absence of C-fiber stimulation. This premise relies upon what Crispin Wright identifies as the Counter-Conceivability Principle – the notion that if we can clearly conceive a counterexample to a claim of necessity, that serves as evidence against the claim of necessity. This principle is, however, not useful because it does not provide any guidance for what counts as a clear conception. Additionally, providing precise theories of conceivability and imaginability does not lend the support that Kripke's argument needs. Thus, I conclude that this objection to Kripke's argument stands and type physicalism can be maintained. | |
| dc.description.department | Philosophy | |
| dc.format | Text | |
| dc.format.extent | 56 pages | |
| dc.format.medium | 1 file (.pdf) | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Chambers, T. H. (2013). An evaluation of Saul Kripke's argument for property dualism (Unpublished thesis). Texas State University-San Marcos, San Marcos, Texas. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10877/4691 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Kripke, Saul | |
| dc.subject | property dualism | |
| dc.subject | type physicalism | |
| dc.subject | philosophy of language | |
| dc.subject | philosophy of mind | |
| dc.subject | modal epistemology | |
| dc.title | An Evaluation of Saul Kripke's Argument for Property Dualism | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Applied Philosophy and Ethics | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Texas State University-San Marcos | |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts |