Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market




Yu, Ying
Jin, Tongdan
Zhong, Chunjie

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Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute


This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO) and multiple power generating companies (GenCos). Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.



stackelberg game, q-learning, multi-agent simulation, electricity market, incentive mechanism, Ingram School of Engineering


Yu, Y., Jin, T., & Zhong, C. (2015). Designing an incentive contract menu for sustaining the electricity market. Energies, 8(12), pp. 14197-14218.


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